SOVIET AND CHINESE AID TO NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000500050038-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 38
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release~2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495R000500050038-4
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Soviet and Chinese Aid to North Vietnam
1. Since 1963 the annual value of Soviet and Chinese
military and economic aid to worth Vietnam has ranged from
about $600 million to about $950 million (see attached table).
Although the 1972 figure was the second highest of the period,
nearly two-thirds of this figure represents military goods.
With reconstruction underway and the ports again open, economic
aid should recover from its 1972 low.
2. Economic aid from the USSR exceeded $300 million
annually during the 1969-71 reconstruction period and could
have been higher if North Vietnam's absorptive capacity were
not so limited. Soviet aid fell sharply in 1972, however, as
a result of the mining of North Vietnam's ports and the halt
in reconstruction activity during the 1972 bombing. Deliveries
from China fell only moderately as Hanoi shifted to a massive
overland transportation effort in the latter part of 1972 to
maintain the flow of essential supplies such as foodstuffs
and petroleum.
3. China's relative importance as a source of economic
aid exceeded that of the USSR in 1973 for the first time since
before the war. Soviet shipments recovered only partially as
mine clearing and dredging operations did not fully restore
Haiphong's port capacity. Hanoi continued to rely heavily
on overland transportation from China for essential imports.
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4. Economic assistance to North Vietnam should rise
again in 1974 and the USSR should regain its position as
Hanoi's major supplier. North Vietnam's requirements for
food, fertilizer, and petroleum remain high and the pace of
reconstruction should pick up now that preliminary damage
surveys have been completed and Hanoi has had time to prepare
a comprehensive reconstruction program.
5. The military aid figures reflect the level and
intensity of combat operations in Indochina. The high level
in 1968 resulted both from replacement requirements for ground
forces equipment following the 1968 Tet offensive and the
delivery of substantial amounts of Soviet air defense equipment
before the bombing halt that year. Combat levels were lower
during the next two years and military aid declined. This
trend was reversed in 1971 when Hanoi began preparations for
the 1972 spring offensive. Military assistance jumped sharply
again in 1972, reflecting an upsurge in deliveries of ground
forces equipment and air defense equipment. Our preliminary
estimates for 1973 indicate that shipments apparently turned
down following the ceasefire agreement.
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 .- - Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495R000500050038-4
'~
Soviet and Chinese Aid to North Vietnam
Million US Dollars
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973* C
umulative
Economic Aid
425
475
405
425
300
425
2
4
,
55
USSR
305
385
345
320
210
200
1
765
China
120
90
60
105
90
225
,
690
Military Aid
530
315
190
280
605
290
2
2
,
1
0
USSR
415
175
90
165
375
175
_
1
395
China
115
140
100
115
230
115
,
815
*Preliminary estimates
Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495R000500050038-4