FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000500050039-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: May 15, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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UNCLASSIFIED
15 May 1974
SUBJECT: Freedom of Religion in North and South Vietnam
Summary
There are two separate issues involved in the ques-
tion of religious freedom in Vietnam:
--The freedom of individuals to practice religion.
--The freedom of religious groups to engage in
the political process.
In South Vietnam there are no restrictions on the
practice of religion. In North Vietnam religious activ-
ity is largely proscribed for the young, but religious
practices among the older generation are tolerated,
although not encouraged. Both South and North Vietnam
have taken action against the political activities of
religious groups and have sought to bring such activi-
ties under regime control. In North Vietnam by
1960, all religious groups were under effective state
control, although the Catholic Church retains its
cohesion and has some resistance potential. Successive
governments in South Vietnam have been only partially
successful in restraining political activities of
religious groups.. In 1955, the GVN disarmed two large
indigenous sects (the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao) and gained
their political support. The government has consistently
failed, however, to win over the Buddhists, and they
remain a strongly organized, significant political
force often opposed to the regime. In 1963, the Bud-
dhists played a crucial role in deposing President Ngo
Dinh Diem. Currently the Buddhists are badly rent by
factionalism and pose little threat to the government.
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IWAW
Religion in North Vietnam
Article 26 of the North Vietnamese constitution
of 1960 states that "citizens of the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam enjoy freedom of religious belief; they
may practice or not practice a religion." In reality,
this constitutional right is only a pose useful to Hanoi
for world propaganda purposes. The North Vietnamese
have used socical legislation, propaganda, and indoc-
trination to ensure that religious groups are subser-
vient to the state and to discourage people, especially
younger groups, from practicing religion. The North
Vietnamese have not resorted to draconian measures,
such as those adopted by the Chinese Communists, to
stamp out religion, but have generally followed the
more moderate course pursued by most European communist
states. DRV religious policy seems to be dictated more
by political and economic considerations than by ide-
ology. Hanoi believes it must control all potential
sources of opposition and resents the diffusion of economic
resources involved in religious practice. The practical
consequence of this attitude has been the toleration
of religion practiced by older people and by people
in remote rural areas, and wary acquiescence in the
continued existence of a substantial Roman Catholic
minority in the North.
The Catholic minority has always represented a
fairly sizable resistance potential. Although about
half the Catholic population fled south after the 1954
partition of the country, 700,000 remained--about 5
percent of the total population. They were concen-
trated in the rural areas of a few provinces, and have
shown a cohesion which the Communists have found hard
to weaken. In dealing with the Catholics, the DRV has
vacillated between policies of conciliation and harsh
repression. In a Christmas 1954 message to the Catho-
lics, President Ho Chi Minh promised "to respect reli-
gious freedom." Excesses of a land reform program in
1955-1956, however, led to violent riots in the heavily
Catholic province of Nghe An in November 1956. After
crushing the revolt, the DRV adopted placating policies
and even allowed Catholics to rebuild churches.
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Church-state relations deteriorated in 1960. The
church was cut off from physical contact with Rome, and
all foreign priests were expelled. The church had long
had a high proportion of native-born clergy, however,
and these men continued to perform masses, weddings and
other church ceremonies--harassed but not totally sup-
pressed by the regime. The DRV has closed down most,
if not all, seminaries and thus prevented the church
from training enough new priests to replace the aging
clergy. This suggests that the regime intends to weaken
the church through attrition rather than open suppres-
sion.
Other religions in North Vietnam, less cohesive
and resilient than the Catholic Church, have fared less
well under relentless Communist pressures. The Com-
munists quickly assumed control of Buddhist temples--
the North's principal religion in 1954--and forced most
of them to close. A Buddhist front organization has
been formed for the purposes of propagandizing Buddhist
groups and priests in other parts of Southeast Asia with
the North Vietnamese line. The number of practicing
Buddhists has been declining as older members die and
are now estimated to number around 100,000. The DRV
strongly discourages training of new Buddhist priests,
and youth in general has not been drawn to Buddhism
partially because of Communist propaganda which claims
that idle temple lands and unemployed priests waste
valuable economic resources. A few show pagodas remain
open in Hanoi and other urban areas, and from time to
time Buddhist festivities are celebrated to sustain the
regime's claim to religious tolerance.
Religion in South Vietnam
Since South Vietnam achieved its independence in
1954, religion has been heavily politicized. Although
this has not affected the individual's practice of
religion, contending political factions have arisen with-
in various religious groups which no South Vietnamese
regime can afford to ignore. A major reason for the
politicization of religious groups is that opposition
political parties have often not been free to operate
openly. Public assembly has frequently been allowed
only in religious gatherings. As a consequence, reli-
gious groups have evolved into de facto political
parties.
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Under French colonial control, Catholicism was
promoted in Vietnam, and Vietnamese Catholics dominated
the political scene. President Diem's Catholicism,
following the ouster of the French, caused opponents
to rally under the aegis of Buddhism--the religion of
a majority of South Vietnamese. Of the 18 million
people in South Vietnam, perhaps 5-6 million are active
Buddhists, nearly 2 million are Catholics, 1.5 million
are Cao Dai, and about one million are Hoa Hao. The
Buddhists have at times seemed nearly as strong a
political force as the military, with the Catholics and
perhaps the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai a distant second and
third.
As a political force, the Buddhists suffer from
factionalism and an inability to adopt a positive
political program. The most militant and troublesome
faction in recent years has been. the An Quang Buddhists,
named for the An Quang Pagoda, its headquarters in Sai-
gon. Its best known leader is Thich Tri Quang. The
An Quang faction has strong anti-Catholic tendencies
and at times has been rather anti-American. "Divide
and rule" tactics applied by the government against
the An Quang faction have had limited success in
splitting the group. Buddhist leaders often complain
that the government, by closing down temples and
arresting bonzes, violates their constitutional right
of religious freedom. Such complaints are politically
motivated. There is in fact no evidence that the re-
ligious practice of Buddhism as such has ever been
suppressed. Inasmuch as most government and military
officials are Buddhists themselves, a policy of sup-
pression is unlikely to be adopted.
Roman Catholicism is the second most important
religion in South Vietnam. Under the French, Catholics
had educational opportunities and positions in the
colonial government far out of proportion to their
numbers. In view of these historical.advantages,Catho-
lics are still heavily represented in the middle and
upper levels of the government. The Catholics are
essentially pro-government, and more anti-Communist
than the Buddhists.
For many Vietnamese, the tradition of religious
tolerance in South Vietnam has promoted a tendency
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toward religious electicism--that is, a belief in several
religions simultaneously. Cao Dai theology, for example,
contains elements selected from Buddhism, Taoism, Con-
fucianism, Christianity, Vietnamese animism and occultism
borrowed from French spiritualists. The Cao Dai movement
was formed in 1919. After 1945 it had its own army,
enabling it to govern a large area northwest of Saigon
in an autonomous manner. The Cao Dai were forcefully
subdued by the Diem government in-1955, but continued
to practice their colorful religion without interference.
The Hoa Hao is a splinter Buddhist group organized
in 1939. Like the Cao Dai it ac uired
military strength after World War II, andlalsoalikedthe
Cao Dai, was brought under control by the Diem govern-
ment in 1955. The Hoa Hao, who form most of the popu-
lation of An Giang and Chau Doc provinces in the Mekong
Delta, have become strongly anti-Communist supporters
of the government, while continuing to practice their
own unique form of Buddhism.
It is unlikely that the shape of religious tolera-
tion and practice in North and South Vietnam will change
significantly in the foreseeable future. The North will
continue to block the growth and encourage the decline
of religion, while in the South the traditions of reli-
gious tolerance and religious political action will remain.
UNCLASSIFIED
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