WORTHWHILE NIE'S ON CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000500100003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 9, 1975
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Relea& 2005/07/22 ti 0B01 495R000500 0) $. 2015-75
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
9 September 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIO
SUBJECT: Worthwhile NIEs on China
REFERENCE: Acting, D/DCI/NIO's Memorandum,
dated 5 September 1975, Subject:
The Predictive Record
Herewith are some suggestions regarding worthwhile NIEs
on China in the past ten years. Most of the NIEs are a mixed
bag with some realistic portions followed by some wrong specu-
lative shots. What I've done is to select out certain comments
which viewed in retrospect reflect the truth of the times. Also
I've selected certain predictions which turned out to be pretty
close to the mark.
1. A 1966 NIE stated China will take 30 to 50 years to
become a truly strong power. The remark itself was attributed
to CHEN Yi. In 1975 we have a pretty solid report in which
CHOU En Lai said it will take 25 more years for China to reach
this status. Hence, in the light of subsequent developments,
the 1966 statement looks pretty good.
2. An NIE in 1966 estimates that the PRC will need fifty
million tons of chemical fertilizer to regain per capita grain
production of 1957. In 1974 the PRC reached the 1957 level
with about 30 million tons of chemical fertilizer. The fact
that a lot of chemical fertilizer was the key as stated in
the 1966 NIE was basically correct. Its totals, however,
were a bit off.
25X1
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 Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80B01495R0Q00100003-6
3. A 1965 NIE states cadre financial corruption and
cadres becoming scapegoats for the regime's mistakes were
major phenomena of the time. "Down to the countryside"
workers and disillusioned youth represented major areas of
discontent. This remains true today.
4. In May 1967 an NIE said that joint action with the
USSR was debated in the top leadership after U.S. escalation
in Vietnam. There were high level critics of MAO's basic line
which had resulted in the loss of Soviet military, technical
and economic assistance. In 1974 and 1975 there have been
numerous allegorical references to this phenomenon which may
still be a contentious force in the Chinese leadership.
25X1
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National Intelligence Officer
for China
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9 September 1975
Approved For Release 2005/07/ ;C DP80B01495R000500100003-6
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