POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA'S HEART ATTACK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000500180007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 12, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

NATIONAL INTELLIGENC OFFICERS
OFFICE OF Tf p 111R"6 @rF" .~99P(B1rNr.'ECIA-RDP
DATE: July 12, 1974
TO: The Director
FROM: Acting NIO/SEA
SUBJECT: Political Implications of Souvanna
Phouna's Heart Attack
REMARKS:
The attached, prepared at the request of
the NSC Staff, was drafted by OCI and
coordinated within the Agency.
B. E. Layton
Distribution:
Original - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DDI L---
1 - D/NIO
1 - AD/OCI
1 - C/EA
1 - AC/EA/TBL
1 - DC/EAPD
1 - C/EAPD/Indochina Branch
1 - IC/PRD
3 - NIO/SEA
1 - NIO/RI
R0005 0180007-4
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July 12, 1974
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Political Implications of Souvanna Phouma's Heart Attack
1. Prime Minister Souvanna's reported heart attack poses a serious
threat to the stability and perhaps even the viability of the coalition
government in Laos. We have no details concerning his condition other
than that it has been described as "serious." Souvanna does have a
history of heart difficulty and is also a diabetic, which could complicate
his chances for recovery.
2. The immediate danger in the situation lies in the possibility of
nervous over-reaction by either the Vientiane or Pathet Lao side. Infor-
mation and misinformation regarding Souvanna's condition and the intentions
of the Communists and the right-wing is bound to spread quickly through
Vientiane's rumor mills. A prognosis of full or partial recovery will, of
course, ease the paranoia within both camps, but until Souvanna's condition
stabilizes the situation in Vientiane will likely remain tense.
3. An incapacitated Souvanna -- but one who can still make some
decisions -- would be the best solution. Both sides in the coalition
structure almost certainly would be willing to live with such a situation,
at least until it could be determined whether or not Souvanna would eventually
be able to resume some semblance of active political life. Without Souvanna
actively at the helm and serving as an arbiter between the Pathet Lao and
the non-Coiiumznists, however, bureaucratic paralysis is likely to grip the
government.
4. If Souvanna should die, the succession situation will be messy.
Under the current constitution, the King would be called on to designate
a new prime minister from within the cabinet. The prime minister-designate
would then have to be approved by the National Assembly. Just this week,
however, Souvanna ruled that the dormant rightist-controlled assembly should
be dissolved. The Communists, who backed this decision strongly, would
reject any effort to reverse that decision now.
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5. In the present situation, however, personalities are-more important
than procedures. There now appear to be four contenders for Souvanna's
mantle. The least likely is Deputy Premier Leuam Insisiengmay, who recently
has become the unofficial head of the new non-Communist political front being
organized in Vientiane. A moderate conservative, Leuam has not always been
on the best of terms with Souvanna but has maintained a reasonably cooperative
relationship with him for the past several years. Like other Lao rightists,
he is unenthusiastic about Communist participation in the government. Leuam
is not an effective leader and previously has displayed little interest in
political power.
6. The other deputy premier is Lao Communist Phoumi Vongvichit, who
also serves as foreign minister. Phoumi is the ranking Communist in the
cabinet and the senior ideologist of the Lao Communist movement. Able and
articulate, he has served as an effective spokesman for Pather Lao interests
in the coalition cabinet.
7. A third candidate is a well-known neutralist, Interior Minister
Pheng Phongsavan. Pheng is a longtime associate of Souvanna and served as
the prime minister's chief negotiator during the protracted Lao negotiations.
Pheng is politically ambitious, and he apparently views himself as Souvanna's
political heir. Pheng has tried to stay on good terms with both the Com-
munists and the Western powers. Pheng is a controversial figure, however,
and would find it hard to overcome opposition among civilian and military
rightists, who suspect him of harboring pro-Communist views. The King
reportedly also believes that Pheng is an untrustworthy and corrupt man
whose actions are detrimental to the country's best interests.
8. Last, but certainly not least, is Souvanna's half-brother, Prince
Souphanouvong. The nominal head of the Pathet Lao and the chairman of the
Advisory Political Council, Souphanouvong is perhaps the best known political
figure in Laos after Souvanna. He is a sophisticated politician and probably
believes himself to be the logical replacement for Souvanna. Souphanouvong,
however, would be unacceptable to the non-Communists.
9. Of these four, Pheing would appear to be the front runner -- if
only because he is a neutral and like Souvanna has had long experience in
dealing with both sides. In any event, the final choice may be dictated by
Souvanna -- provided he is willing and able to name a successor. If not,
then the King.may have to step into the breach and appoint a new prime
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minister -- without any reference to the cabinet or to the defunct
assembly. It is always possible that the King himself might serve as the
interim head of government until the two sides could find a mutually
agreeable successor. The King, however, has a distaste for politics and
probably would play such a role only as a last resort.
25X1
B. E. Layton
Acting National Intelligence Officer
for Southeast Asia
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