DOD/ISA'S RESPONSE TO DDI REPORT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030016-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 24, 2006
Sequence Number:
16
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 20, 1975
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030016-9.pdf | 184.64 KB |
Body:
CONFIDENTIAL
App~'d'For Release 200 /
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SP - 70/75
20 May 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: DoD/ISA's Response to DDI Report
~L
~~'
1. Attached is a memorandum addressed to me from James Wade, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, containing
his appraisal of the DDI report on perceptions of the US-Soviet strategic
balance that you forwarded to him on 4 April 1975. For what should be
obvious reasons, I believe the memorandum should have been addressed to
you.
2. Wade, as you may know, is a personal SALT colleague of long
standing and as such I feel obliged to respond orally to his letter.
Subject to your approval, I would like to be able to tell him that the
DDI will be in touch with him and/or Mr.
Charles Sorrels to get their views on how best to guide the work of the
Analytical Support Center for the ultimate benefit of all.
3. I am making this suggestion because I believe that the DDI report
appears to have fallen somewhat short of what Sorrels might have been led
to expect. I'm thinking, for example, of what you wrote in your memorandum
to me of 3 January 1975: OPR and/or OCI would be asked to amplify and
expand the FBIS compilation of foreign reactions through the survey of
other sources. I am mindful of your 4 April 1975 covering memorandum which
states that such undertaking "yielded few additional details". But basically
I am in agreement with the point in your January memo, that the problem of
developing a methodolony for dealing with the complex subject of perceptions
needs to be addressed by an organization such as the Analytical Support
Center, and in talking with Wade I would seek to reinforce that point.
4. Wade would probably also be interested in the status of the OPR
study of Western Europe attitudes toward detente. Your 3 January 1975
memo also noted that this study might answer. some of Sorrels' questions.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP80B014
25X1
C01"JFIDENTIAL'
CONFIDENTIAL
Appror Release 2006/f}2/0-~: C1~=RBRS06@1495ROQ~600030016-9
"~?'' L
SP - 70/ 75
SUBJECT: DoD/ISA's Response to DDI Report
5. Please let me know whether it is acceptable to you for me to
talk to Wade along the lines indicated.
25X1
Howard Stoertz, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs
Attachment:
Memorandum as stated
Approved For Release 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030016-9
CONFIDENTIAL
Appror Rele 2006/6~1~A7'! ~}~!1. ~,~3W~495R000600030016-9
-3-
SP - 70/75
SUBJECT: DoD/ISA's Response to DDI Report
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - NIO/SP
1 - NIO/RI
25X1 NIO/SP (20May75)
Approved For Release 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030016-9
~ONFIDENTIAL~
pprov~ed_"F"o'r Rel~~e 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP80B01495ROOQ~00030016-9
ASSISTANT SECRETARY t7F DEFENSE
W AS H I NCaT/JFi, D.C. 2A301
INTERNATIOtiAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
~ ~IAY 175
MEMORANDUM FOR MR, HOWARD 5TOERTZ, JR.
Natianat Intelligence Officer far
Strategic Programs
Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: FBIS Analysis of Perceptions of the U,S,~Soviet
Strategic Balance:
I appreciate your interest in improved urbdes?standing of the
perceptions of the state and trends in the strategic balance
held in key countries such as West Germany, the UK, France,
and Japan.
The report completed by FBiS under the management guidance of
the Office of Political Research, provides interesting reading
but lacks analytical depth and deals with a disappointing
.fraction of desired product outlined in the proposed outline
which we as consumers prepared last December, Attached}
As an experiment in consumer articulation of needs and
responsiveness of one part of CIA, the experience was not
encouraginga
Again, your personal support in this effort was much
appreciated.
~;lt/ta
P. Wade,- Jr.
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Copy to: LTG Wilson
Approved For Release 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030b16-9
Appro~ci?For Rel~:ase 2006/02/07: ~~80B01495ROQ~?00030016-9 ,
Study of Perceptions of the Strateq_ic
Ealaneo Expressed in Other taations, 1'972 ~ 1974
Time Frame -
7'he study will initially cgncentrate on the. Limo periods of 2,~~
months before and after the S/,L'1' I Mosco~.r Summit in May, 1972 and t1'te
Vladivostok Summit in Piovember, i974. 1n its second phase, the study ?
should cover the 1g72-ig7~- period, to provide a firmer basis for
establishing trends in ,the perceptions, and the factors which stimulate
-and shape statements of perceptions of the current and expected' state
of the strategic balance. - _-.
Countries covered
The nations included in the study would be West Germany, Franco, UK,
{perhaps ane .country among Norway, Denmark, and Sweden), Japan, t'RC, and
perhaps Israel and Egypt. ~ -
Saurceso .The stated perceptions by .political elites and general publio-
noted and analyzed would be drawn from opinion surveys, major medial
government, and other .institutional sources such as the tfSS in Eondon. -
Media in West Germany, for example would include Die Welt, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, and Der Spiegel (e.g., an interview with the Foreign
Minister). Government statements would ?snclude formal documents (such as
West Germa~i Annual Defense Report or British V:l~ite Paper) and statements-
by major leaders, publicly and privately, to US officials reported through
State lZepartment and other cables. -
Purpose -
The principal purpose of the study is-ta provide some detailed factual
basis for discussion and anaiysls of the nature and trends in the perceptions
of foreign political elites and general publics of the current state (1972--
1974) and expected trends in strategic balance. -
The study should determine ti~hat aspects of tl-ie strategic balance are
irtportant as bases for perceptions of the strategic balance. Specifically,.
it should identify, factors {such as static measures) or-events which prompt:
and shape statements of perceptions of the strategic balance; such as the
5unu~iits in Piny, .1972 and Paov, }g74, demonstrations of technology and force
capability such as Soviet t?t1 RV tests, C5A drop of MIPtUTEt?1a?d and resupply to
Israel, declaratory policy such as Posture ?StatenTent and budgetary actiorrs
such as Congressional approval of FY 1g75 strategic RED initiatives.
The study should include tl~e implications explicitly and implicitly
drat~rn by the foreign observers of the state anal trends in the strategic .
balance for the credibility of US deterrent pasture, for' desired relations
s~rith-the US, for their oti?rn nation`s defenses and behavior, and for Soviet
propensity to take risks and press for advant4-rge..
Approved For Release 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030d16-9