DOD/ISA'S RESPONSE TO DDI REPORT

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030016-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 24, 2006
Sequence Number: 
16
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 20, 1975
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030016-9.pdf184.64 KB
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CONFIDENTIAL App~'d'For Release 200 / THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SP - 70/75 20 May 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence SUBJECT: DoD/ISA's Response to DDI Report ~L ~~' 1. Attached is a memorandum addressed to me from James Wade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, containing his appraisal of the DDI report on perceptions of the US-Soviet strategic balance that you forwarded to him on 4 April 1975. For what should be obvious reasons, I believe the memorandum should have been addressed to you. 2. Wade, as you may know, is a personal SALT colleague of long standing and as such I feel obliged to respond orally to his letter. Subject to your approval, I would like to be able to tell him that the DDI will be in touch with him and/or Mr. Charles Sorrels to get their views on how best to guide the work of the Analytical Support Center for the ultimate benefit of all. 3. I am making this suggestion because I believe that the DDI report appears to have fallen somewhat short of what Sorrels might have been led to expect. I'm thinking, for example, of what you wrote in your memorandum to me of 3 January 1975: OPR and/or OCI would be asked to amplify and expand the FBIS compilation of foreign reactions through the survey of other sources. I am mindful of your 4 April 1975 covering memorandum which states that such undertaking "yielded few additional details". But basically I am in agreement with the point in your January memo, that the problem of developing a methodolony for dealing with the complex subject of perceptions needs to be addressed by an organization such as the Analytical Support Center, and in talking with Wade I would seek to reinforce that point. 4. Wade would probably also be interested in the status of the OPR study of Western Europe attitudes toward detente. Your 3 January 1975 memo also noted that this study might answer. some of Sorrels' questions. Approved For Release 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP80B014 25X1 C01"JFIDENTIAL' CONFIDENTIAL Appror Release 2006/f}2/0-~: C1~=RBRS06@1495ROQ~600030016-9 "~?'' L SP - 70/ 75 SUBJECT: DoD/ISA's Response to DDI Report 5. Please let me know whether it is acceptable to you for me to talk to Wade along the lines indicated. 25X1 Howard Stoertz, Jr. National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs Attachment: Memorandum as stated Approved For Release 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030016-9 CONFIDENTIAL Appror Rele 2006/6~1~A7'! ~}~!1. ~,~3W~495R000600030016-9 -3- SP - 70/75 SUBJECT: DoD/ISA's Response to DDI Report Distribution: Orig - Addressee 1 - NIO/SP 1 - NIO/RI 25X1 NIO/SP (20May75) Approved For Release 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030016-9 ~ONFIDENTIAL~ pprov~ed_"F"o'r Rel~~e 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP80B01495ROOQ~00030016-9 ASSISTANT SECRETARY t7F DEFENSE W AS H I NCaT/JFi, D.C. 2A301 INTERNATIOtiAL SECURITY AFFAIRS ~ ~IAY 175 MEMORANDUM FOR MR, HOWARD 5TOERTZ, JR. Natianat Intelligence Officer far Strategic Programs Central Intelligence Agency SUBJECT: FBIS Analysis of Perceptions of the U,S,~Soviet Strategic Balance: I appreciate your interest in improved urbdes?standing of the perceptions of the state and trends in the strategic balance held in key countries such as West Germany, the UK, France, and Japan. The report completed by FBiS under the management guidance of the Office of Political Research, provides interesting reading but lacks analytical depth and deals with a disappointing .fraction of desired product outlined in the proposed outline which we as consumers prepared last December, Attached} As an experiment in consumer articulation of needs and responsiveness of one part of CIA, the experience was not encouraginga Again, your personal support in this effort was much appreciated. ~;lt/ta P. Wade,- Jr. Deputy Assistant Secretary Copy to: LTG Wilson Approved For Release 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030b16-9 Appro~ci?For Rel~:ase 2006/02/07: ~~80B01495ROQ~?00030016-9 , Study of Perceptions of the Strateq_ic Ealaneo Expressed in Other taations, 1'972 ~ 1974 Time Frame - 7'he study will initially cgncentrate on the. Limo periods of 2,~~ months before and after the S/,L'1' I Mosco~.r Summit in May, 1972 and t1'te Vladivostok Summit in Piovember, i974. 1n its second phase, the study ? should cover the 1g72-ig7~- period, to provide a firmer basis for establishing trends in ,the perceptions, and the factors which stimulate -and shape statements of perceptions of the current and expected' state of the strategic balance. - _-. Countries covered The nations included in the study would be West Germany, Franco, UK, {perhaps ane .country among Norway, Denmark, and Sweden), Japan, t'RC, and perhaps Israel and Egypt. ~ - Saurceso .The stated perceptions by .political elites and general publio- noted and analyzed would be drawn from opinion surveys, major medial government, and other .institutional sources such as the tfSS in Eondon. - Media in West Germany, for example would include Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Der Spiegel (e.g., an interview with the Foreign Minister). Government statements would ?snclude formal documents (such as West Germa~i Annual Defense Report or British V:l~ite Paper) and statements- by major leaders, publicly and privately, to US officials reported through State lZepartment and other cables. - Purpose - The principal purpose of the study is-ta provide some detailed factual basis for discussion and anaiysls of the nature and trends in the perceptions of foreign political elites and general publics of the current state (1972-- 1974) and expected trends in strategic balance. - The study should determine ti~hat aspects of tl-ie strategic balance are irtportant as bases for perceptions of the strategic balance. Specifically,. it should identify, factors {such as static measures) or-events which prompt: and shape statements of perceptions of the strategic balance; such as the 5unu~iits in Piny, .1972 and Paov, }g74, demonstrations of technology and force capability such as Soviet t?t1 RV tests, C5A drop of MIPtUTEt?1a?d and resupply to Israel, declaratory policy such as Posture ?StatenTent and budgetary actiorrs such as Congressional approval of FY 1g75 strategic RED initiatives. The study should include tl~e implications explicitly and implicitly drat~rn by the foreign observers of the state anal trends in the strategic . balance for the credibility of US deterrent pasture, for' desired relations s~rith-the US, for their oti?rn nation`s defenses and behavior, and for Soviet propensity to take risks and press for advant4-rge.. Approved For Release 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030d16-9