NIO/SP REQUEST FOR INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030021-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: December 6, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director/OPR
Could we discuss the attached in
my office Monday morning (16 December)
at 9:00?
Paul V. Walsh
ADDI
cc: DD/OSR
12 Dec 1974
(DATE)
FORM GH 54 IoI WHICH REPLACES
MAY FORM
I AU
BE USED.
MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/(---R
Could we discuss the attached
in my office Monday morning (16 December)
at 9:00?
Paul V. Walsh
ADDI
cc: Director/OPR
FORM
NO -
US10-101
54 'Oi WHICH RELACES FORM
ED.
12 Dec 1974
(DATE)
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Directs , FBIS
Per our telephone conversation.
Paul V. Walsh
ADDI
Attachment
3 Jan 1975
(DATE)
10-101
0AUG NO -
54 10 1 WHICH C MAY FORM
1 USED.
BE
25X1
I
FORM AUG NO.
54 IOI WHICH REPLACES
MAY FORM USED.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs. Proctor, Walsh
Attached is an ISA request, through Stoertz,
for a reaction piece on the Nixon-Brezhnev summit
of May 72 and the Vladivostok meeting. It's a
tall order.
What action?
Parenthetically, it seems to me that this
request, together with what seems to be an in-
creasing number of requests that we line up reps
for NIO meetings, points to the need for some
sort of DDI clearing house. With a few adjust-
ments in duties, the Executive Staff could act as
schedulers and record keepers, but we could not
deal with substance and we might find ourselves
swamped if all NIOs began 10 December 1974
using us as a channel for (DATE)
all intra-DDI business.
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10.101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
25X1
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Edward W. Proctor
Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: NIO/SP Request for Intelligence Reports
SP - 166/74
6 December 1974
1. This memorandum contains a request from one of our customers
which gives rise to a recommendation of my own. Mr. Charles Sorrels
of ISA/Policy Planning, acting on behalf of Dr. James Wade, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), has asked for an intelligence
study containing, inter alia, an in-depth analysis of the reaction
in certain countries to the Nixon-Brezhnev summit of May, 1972, and
to the recent Ford-Brezhnev meeting at Vladivostok as they have
affected perceptions of the US-Soviet strategic balance (see the
attached outline provided by>,A). It is my understanding that CIA
has not produced or scheduled any study of this question beyond what
is normally done with reactions gathered by FBIS. It seems to me that
such a project would have potential utility for ISA and other customers.
It would require the inclusion of information received through channels
other than FBIS, e.g.; diplomatic channels. Thus it would involve the
participation of OCI, and perhaps OPR, in addition to FBIS. Mr. Sorrels
is available to discuss in detail the approach, scope, and timing of the
inquiry ISA is requesting.
2. Mr. Sorrels' request serves to remind me of a broader problem
which confronts the Intelligence Community, having to do with perceptions
of strategic power and the strategic balance by the Soviets and others
in the coming months and years. The importance of this problem is made
clear in NIE 11-3/8, which maintains that the political impact of future
Soviet forces will depend largely on how they are perceived by the
Soviets, the US, and other nations. Further, the Estimate says that in
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SP - 166/74
SUBJECT: NIO/SP Request for Intelligence Reports
a crisis, views about the capabilities and resolve of both sides will
be affected by perceptions of strategic forces.
3. The Community's attention also has been drawn to this problem,
in part, through a Key Intelligence Question (KIQ 6) which asks about
Soviet perceptions relating to strategic weapons and the strategic
balance. The draft strategy report for this KIQ outlines certain
measures to be taken in addressing it. My concern is that CIA ought
to figure importantly in this and related efforts. Specifically, I
recommend that some DDI analytical resources (e.g., those in FBIS,
CRS, OCI, and OPR) be focused on the problem of the perception of the
US-Soviet strategic balance by the NATO countries and other key countries
of Europe and Asia. I assume that OSR/SEC could also contribute, but
believe that their resources are already heavily committed to Soviet
perceptions and other related matters.
4. The publication by CIA of intelligence analyses on this
subject, as data and conclusions are developed over time, could be of
considerable value to US policy officials. The results of such an
effort should put the US in an improved position to make decisions in
the future dealing with the important question of the political
sufficiency of its strategic forces.
25X1
National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs
Attachment
Outline
cc: D/DCI/NIO
SECRET
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OUTL I NE
Study of Perceptions of the Strategic
Balance Expressed in Other Nations, 1972'& 1974
Time Frame
The study will initially concentrate on the time periods of 2-3
months before and after the SALT I Moscow Summit in May, 1972 and the
Vladivostok Summit in November, 1974. In its second phase, the study
should cover the 1972-1974 period, to provide a firmer basis for
establishing trends in the perceptions, and the factors which stimulate
and shape statements of perceptions of the current and expected state
of the strategic balance.
Countries covered
The nations included in the study would be West Germany, France, UK,
(perhaps one country among Norway, Denmark, and Sweden), Japan, PRC, and
perhaps Israel and Egypt.
Sources: The stated perceptions by political elites and general public
noted and analyzed would be drawn from opinion surveys, major media,
government, and other institutional sources such as the IISS in London.
Media in West Germany, for example would include Die Welt, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, and Der Spiegel (e.g., an interview with the Foreign
Minister). Government statements would include formal documents (such as
West German Annual Defense Report or British White Paper) and statements
by major leaders, publicly and privately, to US officials reported through
State Department and other cables.
Purpose
The principal purpose of the study is to provide some detailed factual
basis for discussion and analysis of the nature and trends in the perceptions
of foreign political elites and general publics of the current state (1972-
1974) and expected trends in strategic balance.
The study should determine what aspects of the strategic balance are
important as bases for perceptions of the strategic balance. Specifically,
it should identify factors (such as static measures) or events which prompt
and shape statements of perceptions of the strategic balance, such as the
Summits in May, 1972 and Nov, 1974, demonstrations of technology and force
capability such as Soviet MIRV tests, C5A drop of MINUTEMAN and resupply to
Israel, declaratory policy such as Posture Statement and budgetary actions
such as Congressional approval of FY 1975 strategic R&D initiatives.
The study should include the implications explicitly and implicitly
drawn by the foreign observers of the state and trends in the strategic
balance for the credibility of US deterrent posture, for desired relations
with the US, for their own nation's defenses and behavior, and for Soviet
propensity to take risks and press for advantage.
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