THE STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN HOPE AND SKEPTICISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030032-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 32
• Content Type: OPEN

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SALT (1)
THE STRATEGIC
CE
BE' EEN HOPE
AND SKEPTICISM
b v Paul H. Nitze
There are two vital policy issues related to
strategic arms. The first concerns the best
way to negotiate-and the prospects for ac-
cord on-meaningful strategic arms limita-
tion agreements. The second concerns what
to do about the U.S. strategic defense pos-
ture in view of the imminent deployment
of the new family of Soviet offensive sys-
tems. Inasmuch as these two issues are them-
selves interrelated, there is only one overrid-
ing question of operational significance:
What should the United States now do
about strategic arms?
This question cannot be viewed in a vac-
uum. Arms. development, deployment, and
control policy derive from our foreign and
national security policy and-that, in turn, is
intimately related to the state of our.domes-
tic affairs and to domestic policy. The scope
of considerations bearing on the problem is
almost limitless. It is therefore necessary to
find some way to simplify our approach.
Someone else would undoubtedly summa-
rize the Washington strategic arms debate
differently, but my version can at least serve
as a starting point.
One point of view runs as follows:
> Detente is a good thing. Further arms
control agreements can help to make dtitente
irreversible.
> Superiority is meaningless. It is asked.
in Secretary Kissinger's words, "What in the
name of God is strategic. superiority? What
is the significance of it politically, militari-
ly, operationally at these levels of numbers'
What do you do with it?"
Mize
> Not stated, but implicit, is the judg-
ment that there is little prospect at present
that the Soviet side can be persuaded to sig-
nificantly curtail their planned programs.
To try to match the new Soviet deploy-
ments in an effort to maintain equality
would be meaningless (we already have
overkill capabilities), costly, and endanger
detente. The public, the military, and the
Congress must, therefore, be convinced that
it is wise to accept Soviet nuclear superiority:
In sum, the essence of this point of view
is that in order to make detente irreversible,
the United States should both accept Soviet
nuclear superiority and codify it in arms
control agreements which provide for un-
equal limitations on the two sides.
Those who are skeptical about this pol
icy argue as follows:
> Those responsibly concerned for continu-
ing U.S. national security, in particular
those in the Department of Defense, have
not been and are not against arms control.
They would like to see effective limitations
which would provide equality, or essential
equivalence, in the strategic nuclear capabil-
ities of the United States and the Soviet
Union, which would contribute to crisis
stability, and which would provide a basis
for reducing the arms competition.
> It is not impossible to reach an agree-
ment on such arms control measures. How-
ever, there is a question as to whether, under
former President Nixon, . the decision-mak-
ing and negotiating processes were so de-
signed and used as to optimize the prospect
of achieving such agreement.
> Why shouldn't the United States be
entitled to equality? Is not inferiority the
opposite of superiority? What degree of in-
feriority is it proposed that the United States
accept? Is a deterrent posture such as that of
the French adequate? What is the probable
political. effect of various degrees of recog-
nized inferiority? What would be the effect
of such inferiority upon the quality of de-
terrence and thus the prospect of war? What.
could the effect be should deterrence fail? Is
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inferiority more tolerable in the absence of
agreement than if ratified by agreement?
> The overkill argument misses the fol-
lowing points. It deals with weapons in in-
ventory, not with alert, reliable, survivable,
penetrating weapons subject to proper com-
mand and control. It deals with today's sit-
uation rather than that of the critical period
five, ten, or fifteen years from now.
> The Soviet side does not view detente in
the same broad sense in which some Amer-
icans do. There is little confidence that even
the current limited benefits of detente would
continue indefinitely if the Soviet side were
to achieve clear strategic superiority.
> A positive program for long-term bet-
ter relations with the Soviet Union should
include not only SALT agreements but also
economic agreements which contribute equal-
ly to U.S. and Soviet interests and a certain
degree of progress toward respect for human
freedom.
Implicit in the skeptics' argument is that
to the extent it is not possible to have con-
fidence in achieving essential equivalence,
crisis stability, and strategic arms reductions
through agreement, the United States should
respond to the imminent deployment of.the
new , family of Soviet strategic systems
through appropriate increases in U.S. stra-
tegic programs.
.U.S. Objectives in SALT
As the U.S. delegation saw it, U.S. ob-
jectives in the SALT negotiations were three-
fold. First, to seek both the reality and ap-
pearance of equality, or essential equivalence.
of the permitted levels of strategic arms ca-
pabilities of both sides. Second, to seek lim-
itations which would help maintain crisis
stability and thus reduce the risk of nuclear
war. Third, to provide a basis for reducing
the arms competition. Certain constraints
had to be kept in mind: the agreements
must be adequately verifiable by national
technical means; they must take our allies'
interests into account and be generally ac-
ceptable to them; and they must be mutual-
Nitze
ly acceptable to both sides----and thus meet
the test of negotiability.
There is a certain internal conflict between
these various objectives and constraints. It is
important, therefore,- to consider the prior-
ities which we should attach to each. I once
discussed this at length with Elliot Richard-
son when he was Secretary of Defense. I ad-
vanced the vie~y that the second objective
was the most important and the third- the
least important. Richardson agreed the
third was the least important, but disagreed
with my argument that the maintenance of
crisis stability, which bore most directly on
the quality of deterrence, was more impor-
tant than maintaining essential equivalence.
He had been impressed by the point lucidly
advanced by Professor Samuel Huntington
that the American people would not long
tolerate a position of strategic inferiority and
that the greatest risk of war would arise if the
Soviets achieved clear superiority and the
United States then began to initiate a pro-
gram to regain equality or essential equiva-
lenc:e. In any case, maintaining crisis stabil-
ity, if not the most important objective, is
an important one.
I think the clearest case of crisis instabil-
ity was that existing in Europe in 191.4,
when the ability to mobilize rapidly was
considered essential to assure an advantage.
Thus, when Austria mobilized against Ser-
bia, Russia believed it had to respond. This
forced Germany to respond. The forces lead-
ing to war thus became uncontrollable. Sim-
ilarly, in the late 1950's, when most of the
strategic power of the two sides was concen-
trated on a small number of highly vulner-
able airfields and early warning systems were
ineffective, a potentially overwhelming ad-
vantage could have been obtained by the side
striking first. Those who argue that new
technology and further strategic weapons de-
ployments do not add to the security of either
side, ignore the great increase in crisis stabil-
ity that has taken place since the late 1950's.
The process can go either way. The task to-
day is to make sure that the progress we have
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made is maintained and not reversed.
As one looks toward the future, all iden-
tifiable fixed positions, including silos, air-
fields, large and thus fixed radars, submar-
ine pens, etc., are potentially vulnerable. So
are moving systems that can be localized and
barraged or tracked. Even fast-moving sat-
ellites can be shot out of the sky. Each year
ABM technology improves; the new site de-
fense radar now under development should
be a twenty-fifth of the volume, correspond-
ingly decreased in cost, and more capable
than the smaller of the two radars now being
readied at our ABM site at Grand Forks,
North Dakota. Submarines are difficult to
localize or to track, but in time this system,
like any other, will be vulnerable to coun-
termeasures unless equally effective counter
countermeasures are developed.
Under such circumstances, how does one
maintain crisis stability? The best approach
would be through agreed arms control meas-
ures. It is not difficult to conceive of limita-
tions which would go far toward solving
the problem. Let us say that both sides agree
to scrap all their present ICBM's and substi-
tute thousands of new ICBM's, each with a
throw-weight (a measure of the potential
power of a missile to propel a useful payload
to intercontinental distances) of no more
than 200 pounds. Within such a. throw-
weight limitation an effective combination
of yield. and accuracy for a single missile to
destroy more than one silo becomes inher
ently infeasible. Therefore, since reliability
will always be less than perfect, a stable re-
lationship should result. But such hypothet-
ical solutions have two constraints-verifi-
ability and negotiability. Certain of the most
important qualitative characteristics of stra-
tegic weapons, such as accuracy, are inher-
ently unverifiable. Furthermore, the Soviets
are not, under present circumstances, pre-
pared to scrap the systems they now have
deployed or to forgo the new systems they
are now testing and are about to deploy.
Therefore, realistic solutions to the problem
of maintaining crisis stability through arms
Nitze
control agreements must be weighed against
the test of their negotiability.
How to Negotiate Strategic Arms
Agreements
The original U.S. and Soviet delegations
to the Strategic Arms Talks were selected
and appointed almost exactly five years ago.
We first convened at Helsinki in the fall of
1969. From the-very beginning there was a
question as to how the Soviet side would ap- .
proach the talks. Our overwhelming opinion
was that the Soviets shared our view that in.
such bilateral negotiations between the two
major nuclear powers, neither side could ex-
pect the other to settle for less than parity,
that the imperfect information as to each
other's deployment plans and strategic con-
cepts was unsatisfactory and potentially clan-
gerous. and that. it was in everyone's interest
to arrive at agreements which would reduce
the instabilities of the past and thus enhance
security, on both sides.
A minority on the U.S. side, particular-
ly those who had, over the years, studied
Soviet theory and practice, had a different
view. They believed that. the Soviet side
would look at the talks primarily from their
own political viewpoint,. would seek to op-
timize Soviet gains through the talks, and
would use tactics similar to those they had,
used on important issues in the past. I shared
the hopes of the majority but also the skep-
ticism of the minority.
Soviet Organization and Tactics
in the Negotiations
At the very first session at Helsinki, it be
came clear that the skeptics had a strong case.
It soon became evident that the Soviet side
had worked out a highly one-sided theory
and were prepared to use a wide range of
tactics to achieve its goal.
Let me first describe the composition of
their delegation, including advisers and staff.
Vladimir S. Semenov, the head of the del-
egation, is a Deputy Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, and thus outranks the chief of the U.S.
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delegation- His original, number two was
General N'ikolay V. Ogarkov, Deputy Chief
of Staff, who outranked the senior U.S. mil-
itary member of the delegation. The Exec-
utive Secretary of their delegation, Nikolay
S. Kishilov, was a senior KGB officer who
had some years earlier been thrown out of
Finland when it was revealed that he and
a woman who had purported to be his
wife were running two separate spy rings
in Finland. Petr S. Pleshakov is Minister
of the Radio Industry which builds all
the radars and electronic gear for the So-
viet military. Academician Alexandr N.
Shchukin is one of their senior and most
distinguished. scientists who has played a
leading role in the research and development
leading to their major weapons systems. At
least a third of their staff had had KGB ex-
perience. Many of their military advisers
had affiliation with military intelligence. Ye-
reskovsky, who is now part of their staff,
was well known when he served in the So-
viet Embassy in Washington as a Soviet ex-
pert on U.S. congressional relations.
Their tactics covered a wide range. When
we moved into our offices in Helsinki, it was
found` that a Tass correspondent had rented
a room overlooking them. It was equipped
with telescopes. antennas, and various other
gadgets. It soon became apparent that all but
the most secure telephone communications
were being monitored. To protect their own
intelligence security the Soviets had. gone to
the most extreme measures.. All their chauf-
feurs were officers in military intelligence.
The "need to know" principle was fully en-
forced. Foreign Office people, and even their
scientists and military production people.,
were not permitted to know anything not
appearing in the U.S. press about Soviet mil-
itary deployments.
They made an attempt to break down in-
dividual members of the U.S. team. Initial-
ly they tried to get people to drink too
much. When it didn't work, they aban-
doned it. They invited us to Leningrad and
inundated us with stories about the siege of
Nitle
Leningrad. They tried to flatter individual
members of the team, hoping to play on pos-
sible disagreements within it.
In the actual substantive negotiations they
employed an amazing tactical versatility.
They used words in other than their nor-
mally accepted sense, or quotations out of
context or subtly modified, and exploited the
differences in nuance between Russian words
and their English equivalents.
Another technique was to attempt to get
an agreement in principle, without exposing
how it would be implemented. Still another,
to package elements of the problem together
in a manner advantageous to their side. An-
other was to create expectations that if we
conceded a given point, then other impor-
tant points would become easy to resolve.
They would use. imprecise language in
presenting provisions which would limit
their side and precise language where the ob-
ject was to limit U.S. actions..
They liked the tactic of presenting a full
draft of an agreement at the earliest oppor-
tunity so that subsequent negotiations
would be on the basis of their text, not a
U.S. text.
They thoroughly understand the value of
endless repetition, of taking the high ground
to gain trading room, of making concessions
grudgingly and only. for equal or greater
concessions, of moving to stronger positions
rather than compromising, of unexpectedly
shifting the subject of negotiations from one
field to another.
They understand the importance of dead-
lines and uses of delay, the ways in which
multiple levels of negotiations can be ex-
ploited, and the importance of negotiating
on one's home territory.
They always negotiate ad referendum to
higher authority. Even Chairman Brezhnev
has withdrawn positions he had previously
agreed to, on grounds that the Politburo had
not concurred.
All of these techniques can be countered
by an experienced and cohesive team of ne-
gotiators on the other side. But when one
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is negotiating in this kind of ambiance, the
most extreme care and almost perfect coor-
dination are required to avoid errors. In my
judgment this has not always been achieved,
even to the somewhat limited extent pos-
sible in a democratic society.
U.S. Organization and Tactics
in the Negotiations
The U.S. delegation, both at SALT I and
SALT II, was, in my opinion, highly compe-
tent, cohesive, and well led. Ambassador
Gerard Smith was the original head of the
SALT delegation; subsequently Ambassador
Alexis Johnson was appointed as his re-
placement. The other members of the del-
egation were drawn from the State Depart-
ment, the Defense Department, the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The delegation was
ably supported from the intelligence stand-
point by the CIA. There were differences of
approach between the members -of the del-
egation, but the often intense arguing out
of those differences generally resulted in a
consensus within the delegation, or a deci-
sion by the head of the delegation, wiser
than the initial positions of any of the par-
ticipants.
Our most difficult problems sprang from
the necessity of reconciling what appeared
to be the optimum approach in dealing with
the tactics of the Soviet side and instructions
from higher authority in Washington, or
in obtaining clarifications of or amendments
to those instructions. There was a constant
flow of detailed reporting to Washington
through State Department channels. In ad-
dition, there were direct channels of report-
ing from the various members of the del-
egation to the departments and agencies
which had nominated them. The sound
practice arose of making copies of all such
"back-channel" communications available to
the head of the delegation.
The main reasons why the results of the
delegation's efforts were less than optimum
were errors in judgment by higher author-
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Nitze
ities in Washington, both on strategy and
tactics and on the development of two lev-
els of negotiation-the first between the two
delegations, and the second, higher lev-
el of negotiation between Kissinger, Nixon,
and Ambassador Dabrynin, and, on occa-
sion, with Brezhnev and his associates.
"... there is no precise U.S. record
of what was said."
These two levels were inadequately coordi-
nated on the U.S. side while they were much
better coordinated on the Soviet side..
Nixon had such a passion for secrecy and
such a lack of confidence in the. reliability
and judgment of what he considered to be
the bureaucracy, that not even the head of
the U.S. delegation was kept precisely in-
formed of what was happening at the high-
er level. This went to such lengths that at
discussions at the highest level, Nixon would
rely on the Soviet interpreters rather than.
the more competent American interpreters
whose notes might be made available to oth-
ers on the U.S. side. As a result, there is no
precise U.S. record of what was said. Even
the less precise memoranda of discussion,
subsequently dictated by a member of Kis-
singer's staff, were not made available out-
side of the White House. It was not even
the practice to give a full oral debriefing. to
those who had a need to know. I believe this
situation still exists even after Nixon's resig-
nation-and that it is a serious mistake.
A further consequence of this two-level
negotiation was that it deprived the Presi-
dent and his immediate advisers of available
expertise and of the ability to fine comb the
relevant detail. This resulted in wholly un-
necessary difficulties, some of significant con-
sequence, in parrying Soviet strategy and
tactics,
The Correlation of Forces
The way in which world events are per-
ceived by the two sides during the negotia-
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tions is an even more fundamental factor
than their organizational arrangements and
negotiating tactics.
At the initial sessions of SALT 1 at Hel-
sinki, the U.S. delegation dwelt at length on
the distinction between a zero-sum game, in
which one side's gains are equal to the oth-
er side's losses, and a non-zero-sum game,
in which both sides can either win or lose.
It was our contention that the nuclear rela-
tionship between the United States and the
Soviet Union is analogous to a non-zero-
sum game, not to a zero-sum game. We
argued that an agreement which provided
essential equivalence, and which maintained
or enhanced crisis stability, would. add to
the security of both sides, reduce the risk of
nuclear war, do so at a reduced cost in re-
sources, and thus be of mutual benefit. We
further contended that only if both sides approached the negotiations with the objec-
tive of optimizing mutual gains could the
conflicting views be resolved on whether one
side's gains would be, or appear to be, the
other side's losses. I still believe. that this ap-
proach is essential to negotiating sound
agreements.
The Soviet side did not accept this view-
point. Soviet doctrine has always placed
heavy emphasis upon what they call the
"correlation of forces." In this term, they
include the aggregate of all the forces bear-
ing upon the situation--including psycho-
logical, political, and economic factors. So-
viet officials took the view that the correla-
tion of forces had been and would continue
to move in their favor. They deduced from
this the proposition that even though we
might, at a given time, believe their propo-
sals to be one-sided and inequitable, realism
would eventually bring us to accept at least
the substance of them.
Among the factors which affected the So-
viet view of the trend in the correlation of
forces was their estimate of the political uni-
ty, strength, and will of the United States.
This estimate was undoubtedly affected by
the U.S. impeachment process. Another fac-
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Nirze
tor was, and continues to be, their view of
the economic upheaval caused by inflation
and the increase in oil, food, and other basic
raw materials prices. Still another factor is
their evaluation of political, psychological,
and social conditions in Europe, Japan, and
the developing world. And. finally, their
evaluation of the future build-up of relative
military capabilities, including strategic nu-
clear capabilities. Undoubtedly, there are
other and possibly offsetting considerations,
including Soviet relations with China and
the always present internal strains in a cen-
trally controlled society.. On balance, how-
ever, they have reason for their stated belief
that the net correlation of forces has been,
and is, changing in their favor. Until this
trend changes, the prospects for obtaining
arms control agreements which would sig-
nificantly relieve the strain upon the U.S.
defense posture are less than good. For the
Soviet side to become persuaded to approach
the negotiations from a non-zero-sure ap-
proach rather than from a zero-sum approach
requires that there be an evident change in
their view as to the probable evolution of the
correlation of forces in the future.
The U.S. Strategic Defense Posture.
I will now discuss the second vital stra-
tegic arms issue-----what to do about the U.S.
strategic defense posture in view of the inn-
minent deployment of the new family of
Soviet offensive systems. This new family
includes a broad range of improved capa-
bilities. At least three of the systems tested
include modern MIRV technology. There are
substantial increases in throw-weight (the
SS-19 may have up to three times the
throw--weight of the SS-l1, which it would
replace). Some use a cold launch technique
which could make fairly rapid reloading
possible. The new silos are substantially
harder and thus less vulnerable than those
they would replace. All include improved
guidance techniques through the availability
of sophisticated on-board computers. The re-
entry vehicles being tested are of a form ap-
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propriate for higher accuracy. The warheads
probably have improved weight-to-yield ra-
tios. One of the systems is appropriate for
deployment. in mobile launchers. The com-
mand and control elements of the various
systems have been improved. And there are
indications that additional systems beyond
those now being tested are in the process of
being developed.
In the SLBM (sea-launched ballistic mis-
sile) field, other new offensive systems are
in the process of development or deploy-
ment, including the 4,200-mile SSN-8 be-
ing deployed on the Delta class submarines.
Coupled with these developments are im-
proved satellite surveillance techniques (both
photographic and electronic), . powerful
over-the-horizon radars, and satellite inter-
ceptors.
The aggregate throw-weight of deployed
Soviet offensive missile systems promises to
exceed 10 million pounds and could go to
15 million pounds or higher.
What then is the nature of our problem
in maintaining the quality of deterrence?
Let us assume that 2,000 pounds of throw-
weight are needed to give high confidence of
achieving a 95 per cent probability of de-
stroying a hardened fixed point, that 3,500
pounds of throw-weight are required to
blanket an area of 400 square miles with
blast and radiation effects sufficient to de-
stroy an aircraft in flight, that 15,000
pounds of throw-weight are necessary to dis-
able a submarine, localized to a 300 square
mile area of the sea, by a barrage attack. Let
us further assume the Soviets wish to de-
stroy 1,200 fixed points, blanket 400,000
square miles of aircraft escape area, and bar-
rage 100 aim points at sea. How much
throw-weight would be required? The first
task would require 2.4 million pounds, the
second task 3 million pounds, the third task
1.5 million pounds-approximately half
the Soviet throw-weight could be kept in re-
serve. This being an unclassified paper, none
of the above assumptions are necessarily
close to the mark. They are offered only to
Nitze
illustrate the type of problem we face in try-
ing to make sure that we have the forces to
provide high quality deterrence into the
1980's.
One approach, strongly advocated by
some ABM opponents in the 1969 debate, is
to adopt a policy of launch on assured warn-
ing of a massive attack- The problem with
such an approach is that the cutoff line be-
tween what constitutes a massive attack and
what constitutes less than a massive attack
could be ambiguous, that the time for deci-
sion would be extremely short, and that,
with an unprotected capital, the President
might not be in a position to make the de
cision; it might have to be delegated, and to
whom? It may nevertheless be wise to de-
velop the capability for the launching of
ICBM's on assured warning with an open cir-
cuit, requiring an inflight cornmand for ac-
tivation, with appropriate preplanning for
its possible use, as proposed by Simon Ra-
mo. Related to this option is the question
of further hardening of our missiles during
boost phase to further assure against a pin-
down strategy by the other side..
Another approach is to make a portion of
our ICBM force mobile, either land mobile or
air mobile. The usual objection to land mo-
bile systems-that the number of such sys-
tems deployed can only be verified within -
fairly wide margins--.seerns to me incommen-
surate with the strategic problem involved.
Considering the levels of missile throw-
weight, the numbers of re-entry vehicles, and
the weight of the individual warheads the
Soviets are expected to.deploy, further clan-
destine increments would have no apprecia-
ble effect on U.S. fixed silo vulnerability.
The question of strategic significance is that
of assuring, through mobility, the prelaunch
survivability of a U.S. land-based ICBM
component in the face of expected and pos-
sible Soviet deployments.
Another possible. approach is to increase
the proportion of our retaliatory force ca-
n-ability at sea. In the short term, the h:st
course :vould be to acceierate the deploy-
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ment of Trident I missiles in Poseidon sub-
marines. The most cost-effective way to in-
crease survivable throw-weight beyond that
which existing Poseidon boats can provide is
to proceed with the existing Trident subma-
rine program or even to expand it from two
submarines a year to. three and eventually
equip them with Trident II missiles. In the
long run, substantially more effective sys-
tems are conceivable but much study and
development work will be required before
we can proceed to deploy such a new sys-
tem. Among the SLB~i problems to be coped
with are reliable and timely command and
control.
With respect to the bomber and bomber
defense components of the deterrent, there are
important problems to be met in the con-
text of maintaining an offsetting contribu-
tion to parity. This requires. assuring the
prelaunch survivability and escape surviva-
bility of the bombers and the penetration to
target capability of bomber armaments, and
denying the Soviets a substantially free ride
for their future bomber force.
The cheapest and fastest way of main-
taining the reality and appearance of parity
-but not necessarily of crisis stability--is to
develop and deploy a new missile launched
from existing Minuteman silos. Such a
missile could have, say, four times the
throw-weight of Minuteman III, be ex-
trernely cheap per pound of throw-weight,
and could be ready for testing in about a
year. The most difficult general problem is
that of assuring reliable and survivable corn-
mand and control systems as a whole.
The above is intended merely to sug-
gest the range of approaches which must be
explored and on which decisions must be
made if (a) the judgment is correct that we
cannot have high confidence. in achieving
SALT agreements, beyond the ABM treaty,
which will significantly reduce the stress on
our strategic defense problem, and (b) we
propose to maintain rough parity, high con-
fidence deterrence, and thus crisis stability.
The question of cost is, of course, vital.
150.
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Nitze
In the last few years the direct annual cost
of our strategic programs has been running
at about $8 billion. The allocable indirect
costs are probably of a lesser but roughly
comparable magnitude, but would not nec-
essarily vary in any direct relationship to
additional direct costs. It is impossible to es-
timate with any precision the costs of a pro-
gram of the nature suggested above. To make
a. rough guess as to the general range of the
magnitudes involved, the increment to cur-
rent strategic expenditures in constant 1974
dollars might be as low as $2 billion a year
or as high as $10 billion. The economic sig-
nificance of such an increase can be assessed
against many criteria: percentage of GRIP
(far less than I per cent) ; percentage of the
current total defense budget (3 to 15 per
cent) by the degree it complicates the prob-
lem of achieving a. balanced budget in. the
interest of halting inflation; the continuing
balance-of-payments problems of the United
States; and its potential impact on other de-
sirable programs, such as energy, environ-
ment, and the elimination of poverty,
Why Make the Effort?
I turn now to what may be the most iFn-
portant set of subissues: the desirability of
maintaining parity, high quality deterrence,
and crisis stability, and the probable conse-
quences of not doing so. Each of these issues
is undoubtedly controversial.
I would advance the thesis that detente,
in the sense of warm formal relations with
the Soviet Union, should continue, and that
continuing negotiations with the Soviet
Union is desirable. But detente does not im-
ply any change in long-term Soviet aims or
expectations, or any reliable continuing re-
straint on Soviet actions. Their interest in
maintaining the atmosphere of detente can
exercise a certain tactical restraint upon what
they say and do from time to time. I see lit-
tle in the arguments that we must make sac-
rifices to the Soviet Union to help maintain
Brezhnev in office. The Soviet system doesn't
work that way. Nor do I believe that
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Nixon's so-called personal relationship with
Brezhnev was as significant as he would have
had us believe.
What evidence is there on which to base
a judgment on the future evolution of So-
viet intentions regarding the strategic situ-
ation and the political arena? We have some
decades of experience both with Soviet ac-
tions and words; we have their more cur-
rent statements, some directed to us and oth-
ers directed to Soviet audiences; we have evi-
dence from the development of capabilities
and programs for future capabilities.
I believe that the historical evidence, the
evidence of what members of the Soviet hier-
archy say to themselves, and the evidence from
the capabilities the Soviets are developing
tend to support, the following propositions:
The Soviet leadership places emphasis on
ambitious goals, including general hegemo-
ny, is cautious in protecting itself and what
it already controls, and continues to empha-
size its estimate of the correlation of forces
in making its decisions. It is unlikely, were
the correlation of forces to move further in
a direction which they judge to be favor-
able, that the Soviets would not exploit that
change. Certainly we cannot have high con-
fidence that they would not.
One might ask whether the U.S.-Soviet
nuclear relationship is an important element
in the Soviet view of the evolution of the
correlation of forces. It would seem that the
enormous effort and the concomitant sac-
rifices of other Soviet interests that their
strategic program did and continues to rep-
resent, is adequate evidence that it is an im-
portant element.
Could a significant shift in the U.S.-So-
viet strategic relationship lead to an increas-
ed danger of war? It was Clausewitz's view
that war exists for the benefit of the de-
fender; the aggressor would always prefer
to achieve his aims without war. I believe
that the Soviet Union does not want nu-
clear war and would not want it even ix it
had overwhelming nuclear superiority. The
evidence, however, supports the propiisition
CIA-RDP80B0l495RO 600030032-1
Ni tze
that they consider a nuclear war-winning
capability to be the best deterrent, that they
would make a pre-emptive strike if they saw
a danger of otherwise sustaining the first
blow, and that they would have serious dif-
ficulty in exercising political restraint if lo-
cal conditions permitted actualizing gains
toward their long-term goals. They under-
stand the importance of not changing the
situation so radically at any one time that
it might provoke unmanageable counterre-
actions.
What would be the effect on third coun-
tries of a significant change in the U.S.-So-
viet nuclear relationship? It would seem:
probable that such a change would tend to
increase accommodation to Soviet views. In
the case of certain countries, I should think
it would increase the incentives to have nu-
clear capabilities of their own and thus in.
crease proliferation.
In short, if one does not want to see ei-
ther an increase in the prospects for general
Soviet hegemony or an increase in the risk,
of nuclear war, it is necessary to maintain.
the quality of deterrence, crisis stability, and
rough strategic parity. There may he general
agreement with that proposition, but there
is disagreement as to what is necessary to
satisfy the criteria, particularly that of
rough parity.
I don't think that anyone quarrels with
the proposition that there was rough par-
ity in 1969 or in 1972, or that there is in
1974. There have been changes in the stra-
tegic force deployments of both sides, bu.t
any net shift in the quality of deterrence,
crisis stability, or parity can be judged to
have been marginal. On the other hand, it
seems clear that during the period from
1961 to 1963, the United States enjoyed a
clear-margin of superiority. My point is that
despite the complexity of the inputs, it is
not that difficult to distinguish between
rough parity, meaningful superiority, and
unsatisfactory inferiority, and that any at-
tempt to deceive the public or allies on this
score would be counterproductive.
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 Approved ("Release 2006/02/07
We should continue to seek an effective
and balanced agreement with the Soviet
Union on the limitation of strategic offen-
sive arms. To simplify the negotiation of
such an agreement, I believe we should con-
centrate on four concurrent approaches to
the problem. The first, and perhaps the least
likely of success, is to continue the effort to
negotiate roughly equal ceilings on the
throw-weight of MIRVed missiles at a low
enough level to be meaningful: i.e.. low
enough to postpone significantly the day
when a high percentage of the hardened si-
los of the other side would become vul-
nerable to a counterforce attack. The second
is to negotiate roughly equal ceilings on the
overall missile. throw-weight, MIRVed and
unmlR`: ed, of both sides, with realistic al-
lowance for the bomber equivalent of mis-
sile throw-weight. The third is to nego-
tiate a schedule of phased reductions in these
ceilings to lower levels, even lower, if pos-
sible, than planned U.S. deployment levels.
The fourth is to encourage, rather than
avoid, an objective exchange of views on
the relative strategic capability of those U.S.
and Soviet nuclear-capable forces whose role
is not primarily an intercontinental strategic
one, both in a theater and an intercontinen-
tal context. I believe such a joint objective
analysis is a prerequisite to Soviet acceptance
of rough parity in the ceilings on those
weapons systems which have primarily a
strategic role. Even if the first approach
were impossible to attain, success in achiev-
ing the last three would still constitute a sig-
nificant and useful accomplishment.
In my view, we should return to the ob-
jective of negotiating an agreement of in-
definite duration. I see little prospect that an
agreement limited in duration to 10 years
,cou?d effectively mitigate the long-term de-
fense problem facing the United States.
My second conclusion is that it is un-
certain, and in fact doubtful, that we can.
under present circumstances, negotiate an ef-
Nitze
fective and balanced strategic offensive arms
limitation agreement which would reduce
the long-term stress on our defense posture.
For this to be possible a change in the So-
viet perception of the prospective correlation
of forces would be necessary. This would re-
quire greater internal cohesion within the
United States and within the alliance struc-
ture, an improvement in the economic and
monetary prospects of the non-Communist
world, and an indication that the United
States is determined under all circumstances
to maintain high quality strategic deterrence.
My third conclusion is that, both in order
to optimize the prospects of eventual success
in attaining a balanced and effective offensive
strategic arms agreement and to meet the
situation should that not be possible, the
united States must make the difficult anal-
yses and take the difficult decisions as how
best to meet, through our own timely stra-
tegic deployments, the increased threat in-
herent in the anticipated deployrfient of the
new family of Soviet strategic systems. it is
by no means clear that the programs which
have been authorized and which have re-
ceived appropriations in the latest action by
Congress---including the Trident and B-1
programs-will, in themselves, be adequate
for the purpose.
It is in the Soviet interest as well as that
of the. United States to minimize the risk
that conflicts in local areas will result in di-
rect military confrontation between the two
superpowers, and to limit the proliferation
of nuclear weapons to additional states.
Within detente, a special relationship has
therefore evolved between the two super-
powers, characterized by the Hot Line and
a continuing process of high-level bilateral
discussion. Recent Soviet experience in for-
eign policy allows the Russians to present
their understanding of this special relation-
ship in terms which Malcolm Mackintosh
puts as.follows:
We welcome detente and a special rela-
tionship with you, and we want them to
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cover a wide variety of international ac-
tivities, and to become institutionalized
and irreversible. We also want you to ac-
cept our definitions of parity in military
strength. But you must recognize that we
belie,?e that our policies and outlook are
scientifically based and historically correct;
that if we seek a change in the balance of
power in our favor and a move in indi-
vidual countries toward regimes favor-
able to us, we are justified in doing so be-
fore history and our political beliefs; and
you, whose policies fly in the face of his-
tory, cannot match the soundness of our
views or the forward march of our influ-
ence. If you want to play the power game
within this special relationship, and we
believe you do, we will play it too; and
you may win temporary successes. But
our successes will turn out to be the ir-
reversible ones; we shall never give up our
attempts to change the political alignments
of countries we regard as important. If
you think that detente or our new rela-
tionship will lessen the intensity of the
ideological (i.e., political) struggle be-
tween us, you are making a great mistake.
The question for the United States is that
of how best to react to such a position. It is
my impression, after many years of negotiat-
ing with the Soviets, that they respect com-
petence in their opponents; that they see no
reason not to exploit weakness or incompe-
tence. I see it as extremely important to pre-
serve the special relationship that has evolved
with the Soviets, particularly insofar, as it
assists in minimizing the prospects of direct
military confrontation. I do not, however,
believe that the effectiveness of this special
relationship would be enhanced by our agree-
ing to unequal SALT agreements favoring the
Soviet side or by a deterioration in the pre-
sent high quality of the U.S. deterrent pos-
ture in the strategic arms field.
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