BREZHNEV'S POSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000600040004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 15, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: Brezhnev's Position
15 January 1975
1. A number of developments - Brezhnev's admission
to a hospital, cancellation of his Cairo visit, certain
setbacks to his policies, and Moscow rumors of political
infighting -- make it useful to examine the General
Secretary's position.
The Public Record
2. In official terms, Brezhnev had an active early
winter. On his way back from meeting President Ford in
Vladivostok, Brezhnev visited Mongolia on November 25-27.
On December 4 he left for Paris for a stay that lasted
to December 7. He spoke on domestic and foreign policy
to a meeting of the party Central Committee on December 16.
He then attended 'a three-day session (December 18-20) of
the Supreme Soviet, and a similar session of the RSFSR
Supreme Soviet on December 24, his last public appearance
before entering a hospital on the 26th.
The Private Record
3. In actuality, Brezhnev's pattern of activity was
not quite what the public record indicated. Between the
Vladivostok summit and Christmas, a good deal of the time
when he was not on public view was spent at the polyclinic
or his dacha. It is not clear what the trouble wage
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on the 26th. Given his history, however, he could have
suffered mild heart failure, although evidence on this
score is lacking. (There is no evidence of a new, more
sinister disease, such as leukemia.)
4. Brezhnev may have been suffering from the flu
as well, but at any rate it seems that his hospitalization
was not an emergency matter. On 1 January he was able to
leave the hos ital for a short while; he attended his
mother's ying-in on 6 January, and is reportedly now back
at work. -The suspicion is strong that Brezhnev found it
convenient to enter the hospital in order, among other
things, to be able to back out of his commitment to a
Cairo visit which, as it approached, appeared increasingly
unpromising.
The Recent.Political Scorecard
5. In assessing Brezhnev's status, it is important
to consider how his policies are faring. In recent months
Brezhnev has experienced both pluses and minuses. His
meeting with President Ford falls into the former category,
and his Paris visit probably does so as well. Soviet
economic plans, US trade restrictions, and relations with
Egypt are in the latter group.
6. The Vladivostok summit allayed concerns about
the Ford administration and produced a highly visible
symbol of mutual commitment to continued detente. In pri-
vate, Soviet officials have been highly positive both about
the Brezhnev-Ford meeting and the arms agreement reached at
Vladivostok. The arms understandings have also enjoyed ex-
tensive and uniformly favorable coverage in the Soviet press,
even while criticism of the US on other issues increased.
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7. It is possible that there is some dismay among
the military over the details of the Vladivostok accord,
particularly Brezhnev's acceptance of a 1977 ceiling on
central systems which will require a small Soviet re-
duction and the dropping of FBS demands. But there is
no evidence that the General Secretary has been under
actual pressure on the resulting agreements.
8. While these successes accrued, problems
apparently arose in December concerning other elements
of Brezhnev's policies, including the higher priority
given industries producing consumer goods and economic
relations with the US.
9. Next year's economic plan specifies that group
A industries (largely producer goods) will grow at a
higher rate than group B industries (largely consumer
goods). This reverses the rates of growth laid down in
1971-75 plan. Those rates were linked,.at least in
propaganda, with Brezhnev's promise to improve living
standards, which was called the "main task" of this and
future five-year plans. Planning chief Baybakov admitted
that the original 1975 consumer targets have "proved un-
reachable," and a Pravda editorial reported that the
plenum noted the need first of all "for a further successful
development.of heavy industry which is the basis of our
economy."
10. On December 18, two days after the Central
Committee met, Moscow published Gromyko's letter of
October 26 to Secretary Kissinger and a TASS statement,
both denying that the Soviet Union had agreed to foreign
demands on emigration in connection with the US foreign
trade bill. Soviet media changed focus from euphoric
treatment of the Vladivostok summit to criticism of US
trade restrictions and attempts to interfere in internal
affairs, with hints about negative consequences for re-
lations with the US.
11. Although public treatment of the plenum has been
routine, there are some indications that all may not have
gone smoothly. The unusual one-day gap between the party
meeting and the Supreme Soviet session suggests that a
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two-day plenum may have been planned and for unknown
reasons was cut short.
The US Embassy has heard rgports t a
dissatisfaction was voiced at the plenum over the US
trade bill and the compromise on emigration, with local
officials complaining about problems posed for main-
taining local controls.
12. Clearly the current status of this issue, and
particularly the Congressional limits on credits, is
a setback to Soviet detente hopes and to Brezhnev. We
do not know whether Moscow's public reaction was due to
complaints at the plenum, or a desire to avoid tacit
acceptance of Congressional conditions, or both. But
the issue must be a significant debit in Brezhnev's
current balance sheet.
13. The collapse of Brezhnev's projected triumphant
.Middle East tour has probably not done his internal
standing any good. His hard-nosed policy with respect
to Egypt is not one that domestic critics would easily
fault. It seems unlikely that any Soviet would argue
that he should quit making demands on Sadat and proceed
to give the Egyptians everything they want in hardware
and economic assistance. Brezhnev -- or Gromyko -- can
be faulted for bad tactics; that is, publicly announcing
a trip to Egypt before the success of that trip was
assured, but he cannot be accused of bowing to Sadat's
demands. On the other hand, it is possible that he was
prepared to go some distance in this direction, and
cancelled the trip only after his colleagues raised policy
objections.
Future Implications
14. The mixed nature of the evidence and the many
unknowns do not point to a simple prognosis. In the near
term, the best guess is that Brezhnev will overcome his
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recent difficulties and resume the vigorous leadership
he has exercised in recent years. The immediate cause
of his hospitalization is apparently not of a critical
nature, and he has shown an ability to adapt to his
other more basic ailments and reduced stamina. Favorable
developments and his skill at politics may soon restore
Brezhnev's image of political vigor. In this case, the
list of recent policy checks will look no more impressive
than similar lists drawn up by analysts many times in the
past.
15. As the months go by, however, Brezhnev's health
problems may take a greater toll. If this happens, the
need for treatment and rest will begin to erode the
authority that comes from active and visible leadership.
Should this process coincide with a period in which policy
disappointments predominate over successes, the weakening
of his political position would be the greater.
16. In such circumstances, Brezhnev might rather
willingly retire. This would not be out of character,
and it would be in keeping with his desire to preserve
his reputation and policies, which would be jeopardized
if he elected to hang on as long as possible. Doubtless
he hopes to remain in charge until the next Party Congress,
due in 1976, and to use that occasion to secure his
position in Soviet history. Retirement is in fact beginning
to be mentioned to Westerners by Soviet sources, including
the well-connected journalist Yury Zhukov, but this is
happening so far in advance of the Congress as to raise a
question whether Brezhnev's interest is being served.
17. Retirement would initially leave power in the
hands of the senior leaders on whom Brezhnev has relied
over the years, with Kirilenko filling his shoes. This
leadership would make for continuity in policy, but that
policy would probably be conducted with less vigor and
more caution. Collectivity would become more operative,
and Kirilenko obviously-could not immediately wield the
authority and exercise the skills of his predecessor in
fashioning political decisions. Furthermore, the interim
nature of this arrangement could prompt a rise in political
maneuvering by younger leaders and encourage inertia within
the bureaucracy. Negotiations with the US, such as SALT,
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might encounter increasing difficulties in the absence
of a preeminent leader highly concerned, at the end of
all the hard bargaining, to get an actual agreement.
18. A more dramatic departure can never be
entirely excluded. Adversities could pile up with a
snowball effect. These might include deterioration
of Brezhnev's health, economic problems, damaging events
in the Middle East or elsewhere in the foreign`arena,
and an increase in political infighting among the leader-
ship. In 1975, both five-year and fifteen-year plans
must be approved and these matters, plus preparations
for the Party Congress, provide plenty of opportunity
for contention.
19. If events should take such a downhill slide,.a
power grab would become a greater possibility. In this
case, turnover at the top might go beyond Brezhnev, and
new policies would probably be advanced as a rationale
for a coup. But at present, the size and self-interest
of the senior core of Politburo members suggests that,
even should Brezhnev have to depart, a power grab of
this sort is several stages off in the future.
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NIO/USSR
The
The
Dr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
DCI
President
Vice President
Kissinger
Schlesinger
Hal Sonnenfeldt,State
William Hyland,State
Robert Gates, NSC
Arthur Hartman, State
DDCI
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D/DCI/NIO
DDI
.OCI-
OPR
OSR
NIO/SP/Mr.Stoertz
NIO Reg.
NIO/USSR
NIO/USSR
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