FURTHER RAND REQUESTS FOR EXEMPTION FROM 'NEED TO KNOW' CONTROLS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000600100011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 23, 1974
• Content Type: MF

STAT Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000600100011-6
Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000600100011-6
 Approved For Release 2005(0 1 - OB01495ROO p0100011-6
23 April 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DDI,
1 -1
SUBJECT Further RAND Requests for Exemption from "Need
to Know" Controls
1. This memorandum responds to your request for two actions
on the latest round of RAND and the FCRCs versus security.
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2. In response to your second question: I only 25X1
role in this affair was to see that the RAND letter got to Mr. Colby.
has written nothing and has only casual views on the
matter which can be summarized as (a) the rules for the dissemination
of classified documents are inconvenient to RAND; and (b) clearly all
FCRCs are not equal and cannot be treated as part of a unity.
3. The following are comments on the 17 April 1974 letter
from D. B. Rice, President of RAND, to W. E. Colby, and its enclosure.
The letter itself attributes to Mr. Colby the concern about dis-
tribution of materials to RAND, says that the rules are unnecessary
and counterproductive and notes that RAND probably could get the
other FCRCs to join in a complaint.
4. The attachment consists of five paragraphs. Paragraph 1
says that the use of the term "Controlled Dissemination" and the
term "Sensitive Sources and Methods" inhibit dissemination to
RAND and that the procedures attached to these terms do not distinguish
between profit and nonprofit contractors to the Federal Government.
These are true statements and, in my view, are proper. The intent
of DCID 1/7 on Controlled Dissemination is not only source protection,
including the proprietary interests of commercial sources but
to prohibit dissemination of any intelligence material which by
category or USIB policy should not be disseminated to any contractor.
As indicated earlier, some of the FCRCs are trying to become profitable.
Some of them are not now dealing exclusively with the Federal
Government. They have a vast variety of functions and sponsors.
Some FCRCs are working for foreign governments. Outside of the
individual corporation, no one knows at any given moment in time
the amounts and kinds of contract work in process or the customers
for the particular FCRC.
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 Approved For Release 2005/07 1495ROdO`00100011-6
SUBJECT: Further RAND Requests for Exemption from "Need to Know"
Controls
5. Mr. Rice's second paragraph attempts to distinguish between
the work done by the FCRCs and other contracting institutions
to the Federal Government. The paragraph is, in my view, self-
serving and self-seeking and inaccurate. It attempts to elevate
the status of the FCRCs well above that of the free enterprise
or university research facilities that are not primarily federally
funded.
6. Paragraph 3, Problems with the Present System, is basically
a complaint against the. Air Force by RAND. It says dissemination
instructions require the contracting federal agent to obtain release
of certain materials on a document-by-document basis for the con-
tracting research institution (true), then complains that this
results in common delays of five to six months, some of them a
year. This time lag hurts the research (also true). In my view,
the proper remedy is for the Air Force to support those contracts
which it writes with RAND. I do not believe it CIA's or USIB's
responsibility to do the work when the Air Force does not support
its own contract.
7. Paragraph 4, Proposed Solutions, recommends that the
FCRCs be distinguished from all other contractors and not be limited
by DCID 1/7 or other instructions concerning dissemination controls
and that, in effect, the FCRCs be treated like a USIB agency.
Direct dissemination to FCRCs would also permit them to build
libraries of intelligence material. Under existing rules (USIB-
D-71.8/2) all intelligence material released to a contractor must
be returned to the sponsoring agency upon expiration of the contract.
I believe most strongly that the FCRCs cannot be treated as a
group and I believe that "need to know" should prevail with the
individual nonprofit research centers.
8. The final paragraph states that RAND is beautiful, security-
wise. I am not in a position to comment on this but I tend to
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