NOTE TO THE DIRECTOR FROM ED PROCTOR
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01495R000600140028-4
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 14, 2005
Sequence Number:
28
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 18, 1975
Content Type:
NOTES
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Body:
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OF=ICU, ()F `T't tt nTCOl
18 July 1975
NOTE FOR THE DIRECT i OR
At the risk of being insubordinate after
you have made your decision, I feel compelled
to recommend that you reconsider the issue of
providing Congress with a daily intelligence
report--either the present NID or a report
especially designed for Congress.
I think I understand your views about
providing more intelligence to Congress. I
too believe that national decisions should be
based on the best information available and
that Congress has an important role in decisions
b
a
out foreign affairs and defense. I realize our
budgets do depend on Congressional support. I
also feel that the Agency and the Intelligence
Community would benefit greatly if Congress .
really appreciated how good our intelligence is.
And finally, I realize that our very existence
may be in the hands of Congress and that
serving them well may make the difference.
On the other hand, it is clear that some
people in the Executive Branch consider our
delivery of the NID to Congress as gratuitously
providing Congress with information which can
be used to frustrate certain Administration
policies. I fear that as this kind of thinking
increases, our access to sensitive information
will decrease as will the quality and pertinence
(continued)
J_
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Page Two
of our product. The proposal to send Congress
a new daily intelligence summary with the hope
that we can eventually wean them away from the
NID will be viewed by t:he Executive as yet
another instance of giving Congress even more
ammunition.
As I read the NID article on the SS-16
and SALT this morning, I found myself reading
it to see whether there was anything in it that
might be used by the Congress against the
Administration's efforts on SALT. I don't like
being in a position of reviewing and perhaps
omitting such material with this in mind. I
strongly believe that we must continue to "tell
it like it is", whether it conforms to Adminis-
tration policy or not. This is a proper role for
intelligence for the Executive. It's tough enough
trying to respond to Congressional questions on
diffi
cult problems. But to provide them with
this kind of information voluntarily and
continuously just won't work for long.
Furthermore, as the investigations come
to a close and Congress starts to formulate
legislation, it will probably be considering the
problem of intelligence support to Congress.
It will build on what it will then be getting and
develop new ideas. I think it would be wise to
have the delivery of the NID terminated well
before that time. If we wait much longer it will
be too late to try to stop the NID.
(continued)
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Page Three
(_0 HCE OF TI-II- 1)!)I
In simplistic terms, we must decide
whether we are working for the Executive or
the Congress. Obviously, it is not that simple,
but I believe that when we are faced with a hard
choice as we are now, we must decide in favor
of the Executive. Without access to sensitive
information, our intelligence on important
problems will wither and become less useful
to both the Executive and Congress specifically,
and to the country as a whole.
In practical terms, I believe it will be as
difficult to try to substitute a new publication
for the NID as it will be to try to terminate
the NID without a printed substitute. I
recommend that we face the real problem and
terminate the NID. We should be responsive,
perhaps even more responsive than we are now,
to Congressional requests with briefings and
with papers on individual subjects because we
do need Congressional support and Congress
needs our views. But, it is more important
to have the full support of the Administration
and not to antagonize it on less important
matters, especially at times like this.
We should talk about this further. I feel.
responsible for us being in this position now
because I didn't object more strongly to sending
the NID to Congress. I don't want to have the
same feeling about what I consider to be a
compounding of an error of the past.
Ed Proctor
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