NOTE TO THE DIRECTOR FROM ED PROCTOR

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01495R000600140028-4
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 14, 2005
Sequence Number: 
28
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 18, 1975
Content Type: 
NOTES
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01495R000600140028-4.pdf221.58 KB
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Approved For Rele a 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R0QZ00140028= ,) e OF=ICU, ()F `T't tt nTCOl 18 July 1975 NOTE FOR THE DIRECT i OR At the risk of being insubordinate after you have made your decision, I feel compelled to recommend that you reconsider the issue of providing Congress with a daily intelligence report--either the present NID or a report especially designed for Congress. I think I understand your views about providing more intelligence to Congress. I too believe that national decisions should be based on the best information available and that Congress has an important role in decisions b a out foreign affairs and defense. I realize our budgets do depend on Congressional support. I also feel that the Agency and the Intelligence Community would benefit greatly if Congress . really appreciated how good our intelligence is. And finally, I realize that our very existence may be in the hands of Congress and that serving them well may make the difference. On the other hand, it is clear that some people in the Executive Branch consider our delivery of the NID to Congress as gratuitously providing Congress with information which can be used to frustrate certain Administration policies. I fear that as this kind of thinking increases, our access to sensitive information will decrease as will the quality and pertinence (continued) J_ Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000600140028-4 Approved For Releame 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80BO1495R00QS00140028-4 r 1""T OF f"F-iFi DDI Page Two of our product. The proposal to send Congress a new daily intelligence summary with the hope that we can eventually wean them away from the NID will be viewed by t:he Executive as yet another instance of giving Congress even more ammunition. As I read the NID article on the SS-16 and SALT this morning, I found myself reading it to see whether there was anything in it that might be used by the Congress against the Administration's efforts on SALT. I don't like being in a position of reviewing and perhaps omitting such material with this in mind. I strongly believe that we must continue to "tell it like it is", whether it conforms to Adminis- tration policy or not. This is a proper role for intelligence for the Executive. It's tough enough trying to respond to Congressional questions on diffi cult problems. But to provide them with this kind of information voluntarily and continuously just won't work for long. Furthermore, as the investigations come to a close and Congress starts to formulate legislation, it will probably be considering the problem of intelligence support to Congress. It will build on what it will then be getting and develop new ideas. I think it would be wise to have the delivery of the NID terminated well before that time. If we wait much longer it will be too late to try to stop the NID. (continued) Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000600140028-4 Approved For Relee&e 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495ROQ,QA00140028-4 Page Three (_0 HCE OF TI-II- 1)!)I In simplistic terms, we must decide whether we are working for the Executive or the Congress. Obviously, it is not that simple, but I believe that when we are faced with a hard choice as we are now, we must decide in favor of the Executive. Without access to sensitive information, our intelligence on important problems will wither and become less useful to both the Executive and Congress specifically, and to the country as a whole. In practical terms, I believe it will be as difficult to try to substitute a new publication for the NID as it will be to try to terminate the NID without a printed substitute. I recommend that we face the real problem and terminate the NID. We should be responsive, perhaps even more responsive than we are now, to Congressional requests with briefings and with papers on individual subjects because we do need Congressional support and Congress needs our views. But, it is more important to have the full support of the Administration and not to antagonize it on less important matters, especially at times like this. We should talk about this further. I feel. responsible for us being in this position now because I didn't object more strongly to sending the NID to Congress. I don't want to have the same feeling about what I consider to be a compounding of an error of the past. Ed Proctor Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600140028-4