TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH BILL HYLAND REGARDING SOVIET GRAIN REPORTING
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01495R000600150006-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 23, 2005
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 8, 1973
Content Type:
MFR
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP80B01495R000600150006-7.pdf | 99.14 KB |
Body:
Approved For Reese 2006/011 ~~G -F $~ i01495R 00150006-7
8 February 197 3
SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Bill Hyland
Regarding Soviet Grain Reporting
1. I followed up yesterday's discussion with Tom
Latimer by calling Bill Hyland that we had received the
message regarding his interest in timely reporting on
significant developments in Soviet agriculture, particularly
as they pertain to Soviet grain purchases. I also noted that
he was specifically interested in early notification of the
entry into the US of people from Soviet grain trading organiza-
tions.
2. I told Bill that we would be responsive to these
requests but that I wanted to correct a misunderstanding
on his part; namely, that this type of reporting would be
through some interagency committee such as the one
proposed by Andy Marshall. I told Hyland as far as I knew
Ed Proctor had been able to dissuade Andy from going the
interagency committee route. Bill seemed a little disturbed
about this and thought that without a committee the reporting
would not either get done or get to the right people. I told
him that such was not the case; that a committee has several
disadvantages; namely, the basic one of trying to do business
in a committee form, the problem of getting a committee to
react quickly on time-sensitive problems, and finally, the
sensitivity of some of our most important and reliable sources.
Bill said maybe this was all true but that without a committee,
we would not get the right input from Commerce and Agriculture,
who are really the ones who have the information. I told Bill
that this was not so; that in fact the earliest and most significant
information on last fall's purchases came from our sources.
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I pointed out to him that I was persuaded that the clearances
and briefings and contacts that we had set up at the highest
levels of Agriculture and Commerce meant that we had good
working connections with the people who really counted when
it came to a Soviet grain problem, and that we could establish
similar procedures for bringing this information to the
attention of designated people on the NSC Staff. Bill said, "Well,
what would you do if a problem broke right now?" I said that
we would implement a system of reporting to these officials on
whatever frequency developments warranted, and that we would
use a dissemination system to ensure that our reporting was
addressed personally to each of the officials. I also said this
reporting would probably be in some form of typescript control
dissemination rather than a standard IM with community dis-
semination. Hyland then indicated that this seemed all right
with him and that for reporting to the NSC we should address
our reports to Hal Sonnenfeldt and to Tom Latimer. He also
opined that we might send reports to Marshall if he were still
interested in the Soviet grain problem.
PAUL V. WALSH
Assistant Deputy Director
for Intelligence
Distribution:
Orig - M/R File
_1 - DDI Chrono
l Soviet Grain File
1 - D/OER
- 2 -
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