TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH BILL HYLAND REGARDING SOVIET GRAIN REPORTING

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01495R000600150006-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 23, 2005
Sequence Number: 
6
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 8, 1973
Content Type: 
MFR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01495R000600150006-7.pdf99.14 KB
Body: 
Approved For Reese 2006/011 ~~G -F $~ i01495R 00150006-7 8 February 197 3 SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Bill Hyland Regarding Soviet Grain Reporting 1. I followed up yesterday's discussion with Tom Latimer by calling Bill Hyland that we had received the message regarding his interest in timely reporting on significant developments in Soviet agriculture, particularly as they pertain to Soviet grain purchases. I also noted that he was specifically interested in early notification of the entry into the US of people from Soviet grain trading organiza- tions. 2. I told Bill that we would be responsive to these requests but that I wanted to correct a misunderstanding on his part; namely, that this type of reporting would be through some interagency committee such as the one proposed by Andy Marshall. I told Hyland as far as I knew Ed Proctor had been able to dissuade Andy from going the interagency committee route. Bill seemed a little disturbed about this and thought that without a committee the reporting would not either get done or get to the right people. I told him that such was not the case; that a committee has several disadvantages; namely, the basic one of trying to do business in a committee form, the problem of getting a committee to react quickly on time-sensitive problems, and finally, the sensitivity of some of our most important and reliable sources. Bill said maybe this was all true but that without a committee, we would not get the right input from Commerce and Agriculture, who are really the ones who have the information. I told Bill that this was not so; that in fact the earliest and most significant information on last fall's purchases came from our sources. Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP8OB01R95R000600150006-7 "1n S..qr m-%-1 4 9 Approved For Rely 2006/ /IT:' a CIA-RDP$ B01495Rq 060.0150006-7 I pointed out to him that I was persuaded that the clearances and briefings and contacts that we had set up at the highest levels of Agriculture and Commerce meant that we had good working connections with the people who really counted when it came to a Soviet grain problem, and that we could establish similar procedures for bringing this information to the attention of designated people on the NSC Staff. Bill said, "Well, what would you do if a problem broke right now?" I said that we would implement a system of reporting to these officials on whatever frequency developments warranted, and that we would use a dissemination system to ensure that our reporting was addressed personally to each of the officials. I also said this reporting would probably be in some form of typescript control dissemination rather than a standard IM with community dis- semination. Hyland then indicated that this seemed all right with him and that for reporting to the NSC we should address our reports to Hal Sonnenfeldt and to Tom Latimer. He also opined that we might send reports to Marshall if he were still interested in the Soviet grain problem. PAUL V. WALSH Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence Distribution: Orig - M/R File _1 - DDI Chrono l Soviet Grain File 1 - D/OER - 2 - Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600150006-7