SOVIET ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL BENEFITS FROM DETENTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000600170026-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: April 18, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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18 April 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR. Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT : Soviet Economic and Technological
Benefits from Detente
1. Last week you sent me a memo relaying some criticism
of the OER paper on the Soviet economic and technical benefits
flowing from detente. The criticism was that the paper was unduly
soporific in its impact on possible US efforts to restrain the leakage
of military-related technology. Your memorandum concludes with
an injunction that our evaluations of foreign situations should give
special attention to how they might impact on the US, in order to
increase their relevancy to our decision-making processes.
2. In my view the paper accomplished two objectives with
respect to relevancy to our decision-making processes. First,
it concluded that the overall effects on Soviet economic growth
resulting from detente-generated US-Soviet trade will be small.
A corollary of this conclusion is directly related to US decision-
making: The Soviet economic motivation for increased trade with
the US is not so great as to induce the Soviets to make important
concessions in political and military negotiations. OER and OCI
are now preparing a follow-on paper, in a question-and-answer
format, which expands on the nature of the specific economic
benefits the Soviets might expect from US trade.
3. Secondly, the paper concludes that "Moscow could benefit
substantially... if it is able to acquire key military-related technology
under the umbrella of detente". This constitutes a warning to US
decision-makers that care must be taken in relaxing export controls.
CDP
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The technology at issue is not the kind that supports the Kama
Plant or a new oil pipeline to the Far East. Better trucks and POI,
distribution are not the kinds of technology that are of great military
concern. But the benefits of certain high technology sectors of the
West like computers and advanced electronics might well make a
substantial difference in the tin-Le and costs involved in the Soviet
acquisition of military capabilities. Although the paper raises this
issue, it does not examine in detail the specific areas of technology
where this may be true. In this respect.the criticism you raise is
valid.
4. What is needed is a direct attack on the question of military-
related technology with emphasis on the high technology products and
production know-how that are especially important for strategic
military programs. Such a study should be undertaken by the S&T
organizations in the intelligence community. I am sending a copy
of this memorandum to the DDS&T with the suggestion that he organize
such a study, perhaps under the aegis of the Scientific Intelligence
Committee of USIB perhaps with participation from ISA. and DDR&E.
The results of sudh a study would be very useful in the review of the
COCO.I'I list which is scheduled for later this year.
5. Directly related to this problem of the export of technology
is the problem of the informal access to technology which the Soviets
are getting through visits and discussions with US scientists and
industrial firms. This kind of access has increased markedl hinder
the detente atmosphere and is very difficult to control
EDWARD W. PROCTOR
D >p_cty Director for Intelligence
cc: DDCI
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1.0 April 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
INFO Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the DCI for.the Intelligence
Community
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
Officers
SUBJECT Soviet Economic and Technological Benefits
from Detente
1. I had some free criticism on this paper from certain
outside readers, which I will share with you. The basic
comment was that the fundamental line of the paper, to the
effect that U. S. technology is not apt to produce major:
impact on the Soviet economy, was thought to be unduly
soporific in its impact on possible U. S. efforts to restrain
the leakage of military-related technology which the report
itself notes could be of value to the Soviets. There may-15e
some political position involved in this criticism, but I -,
thought I would share it with you.
2. I think the basic theme of the report is accurate,
and certainly its subject matter was specifically the impact
of Soviet economic and technological benefits rather than the
military benefits. We certainly have no doubts as to the
accuracy of our judgment in this regard, either. At the same
time, perhaps the military-related point comes in as a bit
too much of an afterthought in view of its significance in
U.S.-Soviet relations and the balance of power. Certainly
let us not rewrite all our papers into scare papers, and let
us try to give an accurate reflection of the problems we face
rather than merely crying Wolf, , WWolf. At the same time, I
think there is some justice in the contention that the
intelligence community exists primarily for its contribution
to the national security and welfare. Thus our evaluations
of foreign situations should give special attention to how
they might impact on the U. S., in order to. increase their
relevancy to our decision-making processes.
W. E. Colh
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