MEMO FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE FROM E. H. KNOCHE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000700010049-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: May 2, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for
Intelligence
Attached is a brief item which we have
run in this week's issue of the FBIS TRENDS
concerning Communist reaction to the
Watergate business.
Also attached is a more detailed rundown
of the nature of this reaction. We have
made no dissemination of the Director ofpOCI.
except to send a copy
E. CHE
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information) Service
(DATE
2 May 1973
REPL ES O 10-101
FORM NO. IOI W
HICHCMAYFBEMUSED.
I AUG 54
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[IN THE "NOTES" SECTION OF THE FBIS TRENDS OF 2 MAY]
WATERGATE DEVELOPMENTS: Neither Moscow nor Peking has mentioned the
White House staff resignations or President Nixon's 30 April address
on the Watergate affair. Peking has been silent from the outset,
and Moscow's earlier coverage was negligible. The last monitored
mention in Soviet media was on 29 April, when PRAVDA carried a TASS
report on FBI Director Gray's resignation. Other communist media
have shown less reticence. Reports of the latest events have been
monitored from all the East European countries except Albania and
Bulgaria. Some harsh comment has come from East Germany and
Czechoslovakia in particular, playing up the involvement of top-level
White House officials and reporting dissatisfaction in the United
States over the President's handling of the affair. By and large,
however, East European media have treated the President's personal
role in a gingerly fashion. Vietnamese communist media, by contrast,
have cited Western sources to depict the President's national
leadership role as "threatened." Hanoi radio on 1 May cited the BBC
in observing that "the future of some high-ranking officials, and
probably that of President Nixon himself, seems to be at stake."
Havana has commented caustically and at length, with PRENSA LATINA
saying on 1 May that the affair had by no means reached its culmination
and that evidence implicating the President himself was likely to emerge.
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2 May 1973
COMMUNIST REACTION TO WATERGATE DEVELOPMENTS
Moscow and Peking have remained silent to date on the White House
staff resignations and President Nixon's 30 April speech on the
Watergate affair. Moscow had reported some earlier developments in
the Watergate case, but Peking had ignored it from the outset. North
Korea, like the PRC, has remained silent. By contrast, most of the
East European countries, North Vietnam, and Cuba have promptly reported
the recent developments and commented on them.
THE USSR Moscow's earlier coverage of developments in the Watergate
case was negligible. PRAVDA on 19 April published a factual
TASS dispatch on the President's 17 April statement about "major
developments" in the case, though TASS' international services are
not known to have carried the item. The PRAVDA report presented the
affair strictly in terms of domestic political rivalry and reported
the measures announced by the President to further the investigation.
On 28 April, TASS reported FBI Director Gray's resignation in connection
with Watergate and President Nixon's appointment of Ruckelshaus to
replace him. PRAVDA carried the report on the 29th. There has been
no Soviet reportage on the case since then.
EAST EUROPE Bulgaria and Albania are the only East European countries
not known to have reported the most recent developments.
Polish and Romanian broadcast media carried brief factual reports of
the 30 April events, while East German, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian
media reported at greater length and commented on U.S. domestic reaction.
Most East European reaction skirted the issue of Presidential involve-
ment, but East Germany and Czechoslovakia--characteristically harsher
than the others in the Soviet bloc--played up the involvement of
top-level White House officials and reported that there was dissatis-
faction in the United States over the President's handling of the
affair.
East European media for the most part did not dwell on the possible
implications of Watergate either for domestic politics or for the
U.S. position in world affairs. Only Budapest reported, in passing,
the remarks on U.S. foreign policy goals in the President's 30 April
speech. But Budapest radio concluded only that the United States had
"exposed its worst political features to the world." ADN reported a
commentary in the GDR youth paper JUNGE WELT which played down the
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possibility of major domestic ramifications, including a move by some
to impeach the President, since "even Nixon's opponents in the Democratic
Party are ultimately in the same boat." Watergate, the paper said,
is thus "a Waterloo only for people in the United States and elsewhere
who still believe in the honesty and democratic nature of the imperialist
system."
Belgrade radio said the President would now try to convice domestic
opponents not to capitalize on the Watergate developments, in order to
minimize its impact on the U.S. position in upcoming talks with Brezhnev
and West European leaders and in international forums.
THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS Hanoi and PRG media during the past week
have carried reports--credited to Western
news sources--calculated to point up the difficulties the Watergate
developments pose for President Nixon. For example, a Liberation
Radio broadcast on 26 April cited Western newspapers as commenting that
the President's political apparatus has become almost paralyzed and
that his role as national leader might be "threatened." A Hanoi broad-
cast on 1 May, citing the BBC as its source, observed that "the future
of some high-ranking officials, and probably that of President Nixon
himself, seems to be at stake." Like some other Vietnamese communist
broadcasts, it suggested that "even Kissinger has become involved,
because modifications are to be made in U.S. foreign and domestic
policies." Liberation Radio on 28 April took note of an AFP report
which it said indicated that an Administration group "entirely loyal"
to the President had been most seriously involved in the Watergate
case and that Kissinger was the leader of another such group composed
of diplomats. A disparaging report on President Nixon's 30 April
address was carried on 2 May by Hanoi radio, which said the President
had "accepted the blame for the Watergate affair in hopes of appeasing
the American public's indignation over this vicious political spying
case." A similar report of the speech over Liberation radio concluded
by quoting AFP as saying that Thieu is reportedly concerned lest U.S.
domestic political problems affect American policy in South Vietnam.
CUBA Havana has followed the Watergate developments closely and has
commented caustically and at length on both Presidential
statements. A domestic radio commentary on 26 April and a commentary
carried by PRENSA LATINA on 1 May both emphasized that the Watergate
affair had by no means reached its culmination and that further evidence
linking the President himself to the affair would likely emerge.
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