HISTORY OF THE 'MISSILE GAP'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000700070001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 29, 1970
• Content Type: MF

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DATE: 29 December
SUBJECT: History of the "Missile Gap"
Last year you asked Howie to prepare
a history of the "Missile Gap" for possible
use by the Director with the new Admin-
istration.
is writing the history of
the Agency which includes this period and
would like to reference this document rather
than writing his own history. To do so
requires that Howie's paper become part
of an official record. He has asked me to
see that this be done. Howie and I see no
reason to refuse to do so.
The best way of doing this is to turn
the document over to the Agency's Historical
Staff with its present high classification and
"Limited Distribution". I recommend that
you authorize me to negotiate this with
(Deputy Chief of the Historical
a E
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Subject: Documentation for the Alleged "Missile Gap"
ADDI Endorsement:
The DDI has approved the request in paragraph 2. The
steps outlined in paragraph 3 are acceptable; however, we do
not have an extra copy of the study which we can dedicate to
this purpose. I understand that ONE has two copies and
recommend that one of these copies be acquired for your
purposes.
EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence
9 February 1970
q 44- 1 "1 v
ST
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: Documentation for the Alleged "Missile Gap"
20 January 1970
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1. Pursuant to our telephone conversation of 16 January,
the CIA Historical Staff requests a retention copy of Mr.
Howard Stoertz' study, "Intelligence Aspects of the 'Missile
Gap,"' November 1968, Codeword, Limdis.
This, study is requested on behalf of
I -J
currently writing the "CIA History during the Dulles
Period." desires permission to extract from the
Stoertz report summary information relevant to the tenure of
Mr. Dulles as DCI, and to cite the report as a more complete
treatment of the alleged "missile gap."
will:
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3. If the above request is granted, the Historical Staff
a. Identify the Stoertz report for permanent retention
as a source reference in an Agency history.
b. Index the report in the Master Index of the CIA
Historical Staff (subject to limited access).
c. Lodge the report in the e., egistry of
the DCI for the use of during the
writing of his project.
Eventually transfer the report to a secure
Agency historical archive.
e. Maintain Limdis controls over access to the
report subject to DDI instructions.
Deputy Chief, CIA Historical Staff
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 SECRET
6111 G11 r r .,. w
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Di rector for i ntl I igence
I AS - 102/68
16 November 1968
Copy z
1. Attached are the papers I have prepared at your request on the
subject of the ,Missile Gap." Three items are included;
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b. a historical review on which the talking paper
Is based, including Annexes reproducing key source material.
c. An unpublished draft briefing note dictated by Sherm Kent In
1961 and just found. It is pertinent to page 16 of the historical
review and should be added to Annex B.
2. I'm available for consultation on this at your convenience. Would
and Ed Proctor
suggest late this week, and would suggest also thatI eaOtan with an
be included in the discussion. I'm sending a copy
Eyes Only Injunction. They provided assistance in the form of documents and
good memories.
HOWARD STOERTZ, J R.
Director
Imagery Analysis Service
Distribution:
Cy I - Addressee
2 - ADD I
3 - ONE Staff
4 -- ODir/IAS
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a talking paper.
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Briefinj Note for DCI in preparation
for Congressional and other brief-
ings in early 1961.
Dictated by Sherman Kent, slightly
edited by H. Stoertz
Unpublished Draft
14 February 1961
Secret
. I. There is, of course, hard evidence to the effect that the USSR has
developed an ICBM. The critical sources of this evidence have been the
monitoring of Soviet test range firings and photography of the test range-
head itself. We are confident that we have detected virtually all success-
ful ICBM and space launchings, and we know something about failures as well.
2. On the basis of this evidence, we can determine with reasonable
confidence the range of the Soviet ICBM, its general configuration, the
type of propulsion and guidance employed, and the likely type and weight
of its nosecones. Drawing upon this and other evidence, we can estimate
within what we believe to be tolerable margins of error the probable accuracy,
reliability, and warhead yield of the ICBM system.
3. Thus when we speak of development, testing, and performance,
we feel that we stand on reasonably firm ground. Our views have been
checked out and accepted by a large number of knowledgeable American
scientists, engineers, and technicians who consult on a regular basis with
the many components of our intelligence community.
4. But when we come to the question of Soviet ICBM production and
deployment, we are on very different ground. Here, to be sure, there is
evidence, but it is fragmentary and equivocal. Indeed, this evidence is of
such a character that we would prefer to pass over it completely and not
make estimates with respect to numbers. Were the weapon in question of a
lower degree of importance we could refrain from quantitative estimates
until the evidence had accumulated in greater quantity and quality. But we
realize that the Soviet ICBM is presently the single unanswerable threat to
US security. In these circumstances, we feel that we do not have the option
whether or not to talk in numbers.
5. The evidence being what it is, no one should be surprised that dispar-
aties appear when we attempt to arrive at an agreed community view. The
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unpleasant fact is that we do not know precisely how many ICBMs the USSR
now" has, nor'how many it will have by 1963. We are in no sense complacent
about this. We are doing all in our power to gather the new information
which will make possible a narrowing of the disparities and the uncertainties
in our estimates.
6. The Soviets on their part, fully aware of the importance to us of
the data we seek, do all in their power to deny it to us.
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IS November 1968
Draft: H.S.
SUBJECT: Talking Paper on INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF THE "MISSILE GAP"
A. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) issued in 1957-1960
contributed to the "missile gap" crisis, but they did not cause it.
1. It was caused by the influence, on estimators and policy-
makers and legislators and the public, of the Soviet surge
in ICBM development and space flight beginning in the summer
of 1957.
2. Caused also by public comparison of estimated Soviet ICBM
capabilities and programs with planned US programs.
3. US Intelligence did not make comparisons as such, and did not
make its estimates public.
4. But general thrust and sometimes specific conclusions of NIEs
were used publicly to support such comparisons by defenders and
critics of the Administration.
B. NIEs of the period grossly overestimated Soviet ICBM prospects for
early 1960's. Intelligence did not discover error and correct its
overestimates until 1961.
1. Greatest overestimate, made soon after Sputnik in December
1957, anticipated Soviet initial operating capability (IOC)
with ICBMs in mid-58 to mid-59, and indicated USSR could have
operational capability with 500 ICBMs in mid-60 to mid-61.
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2. NIEs issued over next two years backed away from these very
early dates somewhat. Intention of estimators was to make
relatively gradual adjustments.
3. Estimate of probable Soviet buildup in operational ICBM
launchers, first made in February 1960, projected 140-200
for mid-1961. This estimate substantially unchanged by time
of Presidential election.
4. In mid-1961, Intelligence discovered that Soviet deployment
program bore no resemblance to existing estimates and made
sharp downward revision in NIEs.
5. NIE issued in September 1961 carried only 10-25 Soviet launchers
operational at that time and projected very little increase for
months immediately ahead. (Even this number was somewhat high
and was further adjusted downward later.)
C. Fundamental problem facing estimators was inadequate evidence caused
by inability of collection programs to penetrate stringent Soviet
security, plus inadequate US base of missile experience against which
to evaluate evidence.
1. US Intelligence would have preferred not to make quantitative
projections, but did so because of importance of Soviet threat
and pressure of US defense planning needs.
2. Estimators also influenced by the historical context of late
1950's, which included:
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--implications of Sputnik about Soviet missile and scienti-
fic progress;
--sense of intensified Soviet competition with US, fostered
by Khrushchev in his policy statements and private
conversations with US officials;
--earlier curtailment of Soviet intercontinental bomber
programs presumably in favor of missiles;
--earlier Soviet progress in short and medium range missiles;
--concern for viability of strategic retaliatory forces to
which US committed for deterrent power.
3. Operating in this context, estimators had to try to bring to
bear whatever elements of indirect evidence and limited US
experience they thought relevant to the ICBM deployment problem.
D. Overestimates were based on US Intelligence expectation of much more
rapid ICBM deployment program than Soviet leaders probably authorized,
and on smooth buildup of deployed ICBM forces which did not actually
occur.
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2. Test program and space launchings gave picture of powerful and
reliable first-generation ICBM system but gave little hint that
Soviets might encounter problems in producing and deploying this
cumbersome system in quantity.
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3. US collection programs at that time could not get evidence
on production of ICBMs and supporting equipment and could not
effectively monitor the vast areas of USSR in which deployment
might occur.
4. Estimators drew conclusion that absence of firm evidence of
deployment could not be interpreted to mean absence of deployment.
5. Estimated large, steady buildup in light of recognized Soviet
capabilities and estimated high value of ICBMs to Soviet strategy.
E. Conclusion drawn by Intelligence was that in mid-1961 USSR would
have its greatest opportunity to gain political, psychological and
military advantage over US through rapid deployment of operational
ICBMs.
1. Thought long range missile would enable USSR to overcome its
previous strategic inferiority.
2. Considered numbers of US targets Soviets could threaten and
concluded that reasonable and probable Soviet ICBM buildup
would be very dangerous to soft bases of US deterrent forces
in 1961, though this US vulnerability would be short-lived
because of subsequent advent of hardened US facilities.
F. These conclusions not drawn by Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) and CIA alone.
1. NIEs passed upon by USIB under DCI's chairmanship. Drafted
by DCI's Board of National Estimates from contributions by all
intelligence agencies.
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2. Contributions on missiles also prepared by committees of
technical specialists (e.g., GMAIC) in intelligence community.
3. Advisers from industry, universities, and elsewhere in govern-
ment also consulted. CIA consulted 40 such advisers in missile
field in 1958-59. DCI also regularly called on special panel
of US missile experts (Hyland Panel).
4. All evidence shared among agencies, discussion encouraged, and
estimates re-examined whenever new evidence or analysis or need
warranted it.
5. Dissents invited from any member of USIB. On ICBM problem, for
example, Air Force member often estimated numbers of launchers
higher than those estimated by DCI, and registered these estimates
as dissents in NIEs. Army member often registered dissents on the
low side.
G. Clarification and correction of the ICBM estimates came relatively
suddenly in 1961, as result of
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1. Concluded that some time in 1958 the Soviets had decided to
deploy only a small force of first-generation ICBMs while
pressing toward second-generation systems.
2. Effect of Soviet decision was seen to have produced a low plateau
of deployed strength in operational launchers which would not
increase markedly until second-generation program began to bear
fruit in 1962.
3. Further refinements and adjustments were made thereafter, and
some loose ends like USAF dissents on the high side remained.
4. But since that time it has been possible for US Intelligence
to follow and record an accurate, up-to-date picture of current
and near-term Soviet strength in operational ICBM launchers.
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This was sent to the DDCI
for his reading on 27 January.
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FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67 GJ I