DDS&T ASSESSMENT OF FORECASTING CAPABILITY OF NIE'S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000700160007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 18, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Re Q A5/ 222 T(MA.WO
,#13
SUBJECT:
DDS&T Assessment of Forecasting
Capability of NIEs
You are invited to comment
before it is sent to the DCI. -j
The DCI has asked Wheelon to
assess the accuracy of the
strategic estimates. The general
conclusion of the survey is that
the forecasts in the NIEs have
been "amazingly accurate."
Wheelon has also invited
comment from ONE, OCI and ORR
et al. by 22 October. I don't
believe that it is necessary for
you to comment substantively
unless you have a particular wish
J- _,
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IMF
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20 October 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Comments on Forecasting Capability as Reflected in NIE`s
of strategic strike weapons. Other estimative aspects vsuch yasidentifi-
v
cation of new types of offensive and defensive systems to be deployed
and the qualitative nature of Soviet weapons systems are not evaluated..
2. Concerning the numerical evaluation given, the composite unit
deviations are reassuringly small. In the examples given, however, it
should be recognized that for 1963-65 we were low in our estimates of
bombers and high in our estimates of ICBMs, a fortuitous counterbalancing
effect.
3. The comments in para. 5 omit one of the reasons for gross
overestimates of ICBM capabilities. The Soviets twice have apparently
planned more ICBM deployment than they carried out--the two instances
being their first and second generation ICBM systems. The estimative
deviation in each instance would have been significantly less if the
Soviets had carried out plans in existence at the time the estimates
were made.
25X1
Chief, Military Division
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I
ORANDUM FORt Director of National Estimates
Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Current Intelligence
Director of Research and Reports
Director of Scientific Intelligence
Director, foreign Missile and Space
Analysis Center
Forecasting Capability as Reflected
in NIR's
1. One of the action items flowing from the
recent Hyland Panel meeting had its origin in their
question as to how accurate our strategic estimates
have been in the past and what sort of closed loop,
ex ~t facto evaluation did we make of the estimating
accuracy, a Director assigned this study to me, and
I asked to take an analytical look at the
problem,. since he has personally not been involved in
the estimating business.
2. the.attached study byl represents
his clinical analysis of our past performance, which
I find quite gratifying. However, before forwarding
this to the Director, I should like to have your
comments, criticisms or enlargements. May I have these
by Friday, 22 October?
ALBERT D .
Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology
Enclosure:
25X1
25X1
25X1
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