THE ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF THE LAW OF THE SEA ECONOMIC REVIEW FOR THE UNDERSECRETARIES COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000800140037-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: March 15, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT The Economic Dimensions of the Law
of the Sea Economic Review for
the Undersecretaries Committee
1. The economic dimensions of the Law of the Sea
negotiation have been magnified by too little concern
for them during the early phases and too much concern
for them in the last 9 months. I shall confine my
observations to a narrow definition of economic issues.
To explore a broader definition leads to political and
strategic considerations which will be treated in another
paper.
2. There are three principal economic interests
in the subject negotiation:
o The definition of the coastal waters over
which a state may exercise jurisdiction,
o The biological concept of fisheries
jurisdiction, and
o The region of the deepsea bed.
Definition of Coastal Waters
3. The definition of coastal waters will establish
both how far the jurisdiction of the state extends to
sea and the scope of state jurisdiction in its surrounding
waters. Most states seek exclusive jurisdiction over
12 miles from shore subject only to permission for innocent
passage of ships complying with the navigation regulations
of the coastal state. Most states seek jurisdiction
over economic activity whether fishing or mining for
a greater distance from the coast, some defining the
distance in terms of miles (200 miles is most common)
and others in terms of depth (200 meters and 4,000 meters
are most common).
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4. The definition sought by participants is a
function of their off-shore environment. The US which
held out to the bitter end on a 3 mile territorial sea
now seeks a mineral domain which extends to the edge
of the continental shelf, commonly defined as the 4,990 ?-00
meter depth -- a distance which extends in some areas
far beyond 200 miles. Coastal states with a deep trough
off the coast want a 200 mile domain. Land-locked states
want a minimum coastal domain and want to share royalties
from all seabed activities. All states want to maximize
their control. An acceptable definition will tend to
give a broad area to the coastal state yet restrict its
jurisdiction to interfere with relative freedom of
navigation. Thus the US will probably get a large part
of the wide offshore domain it seeks, but it will find
that the coastal states will almost certainly be given
greater control over navigation than the maritime powers
wish them to have, particularly control over naval ships
and tankers. Fisheries control will tend to coincide
with the mineral domain to simplify problems of enforcement.
Biological Concept of Fisheries
5. The US seeks a fisheries domain defined on a
biological basis. The definition treats 3 different
basic domains. Anadramous fish _..(salmon) may be controlled
only by the states in whose rivers they spawn. Ground
fish (cod) may be controlled only by the coastal state
off whose shores they are taken. Migratory fish (tuna)
may be controlled only by regional international commissions
composed of basin states. Finally the US proposes fishing
at the maximum sustainable yield which would require
the control authority to permit other states to participate
in the fishery if the control authority's own fishermen
did not take the maximum sustainable yield. The US
proposal is the.epitome of elegance, but it is icult
for the small states to comprehend and it is difficult
for all states to enforce. ~, The combination of factors
will probably pe'r`suade most of the states to opt for a
simple distance-depth domain. This will provide the US
a larger fishery than it now has. It will reduce the
US role in the migratory catch but greatly increase
its catch of ground fish and probably make little difference
to the US catch of anadramous species.
Control Over the Deep Seabed
6. Control over the deep seabed has posed the
greatest dissension among US participants. Originally
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proposed by the US as a sweetener to bring the LDCs to
accept free transit, an International Seabed Resource
Authority (ISRA) would be created to control the exploitation
of the deep seabed as the "common heritage of all mankind."
The LDCs have seized the concept, radicalized it to
maximize their control and potential income, and now
intend to browbeat the US if it refuses to espouse its
proposal. The US Delegation has-been reluctant to abandon
the ISRA in spite of the perversion of the original
concept.
7. Most of the US Delegation insists that it
will be difficult for the US as its sponsor to eliminate
ISRA or to restrict it to a negligible role as a registrant
of mining claims and collector of mining royalties. It
will be equally, if not more difficult to define a more
acceptable (to the LDCs) ISRA with sufficient precision
and clarity that the subsequent operation of the authority
will not offer the prospect of developing a set of controls
that would extract large sums from US exploitation off
its continental margin and the deep seabed. This is
held out as the alternative to a lesser role.
8. Tiese fears seem inflated. It would seem
perfectly plausible for the US to offer a limited ISRA
and to insist on disassociating itself from an ISRA which
is clearly a power grab by the LDCs. Indeed, a clear
definition of coastal state authority to include title
to receipts from exploitation of its domain would reduce
the residual-.area--.subject to ISRA to such a limited set
of resources that its income would be minimal in the
next decade or two. Such specific restrictions of the
deep seabed via the allocation of broad powers to the
coastal regime oul d esserjtiaa.,y,_,elimi.nate any need
for an ISRA. This would be particularly difficult for
the land-locked and shelf-locked states to accept, however,
because their pelf from the negotiation can come only
from a share of the revenues of the ISRA.
9. US...economic_concern has been magnified by
resort to "worst case" analyses on many of the issues.
Treasury's Concern about ISRA turns on (1) its objection
to any form of regulation of economic activity -- particularly
control over a technology which is unknown, and on (2)
its fear that large sums might be transferred from the
US to the LDCs. ISRA could well be constituted so that
it would regulate entry to the residual deep seabed,
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review the performance of the firms-exploiting this
domain and collect royalties without in any way intruding
on traditional freedom of access. The area is vast,
the concerns who can exploit it are few, and future
levels of production are highly uncertain. That uncertainty
should not lead us to negotiate an ISRA whicT would
become a monster should the deep seabed become an important
factor at some future date. The sums which have been
suggested, all of which are most tentative, do not exceed
$2 billion per annum in the worst case. Although, this
sum is not trivial, it is a negligible portion of US
imports, it could be offset against economic aid, and it
would imply a level of US activity in the seabed which
would generate US exports far in excess of the amount
transferred to ISRA.
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