NARCOTICS - - INTER-AGENCY MEETINGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000900100008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 19, 1975
• Content Type: MF

I~
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September 19, 1975
11 Dupe of DOJ-54-1 RIF by DOJ - ER&L - BN - 5;;30/2007
TO ADY
FROM DDI/CINM
SUBJECT: Narcotics--Inter-Agency Meet-
ings
Attached for your information are
reports from recent meetings of the Inte
American (ARA), NEA, and East Asia Inter
Agency Narcotics Control Working Groups.
The DDI was represented at the first two
meetings, and the NARCOG was represented
at the East Asia session. These meeting
were called specifically to review the
draft Narcotics Control Action Plans
(NCAPs) submitted by the various mission$
The chairmen wanted to review all of the
draft NCAPs prior to the annual regional
meetings that are currently being held.
DOJ Review
State Dept. review
You will note that Colombia was higa
lighted in the ARA meeting and received
rather high marks for effort. In the
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SUBJECT: Narcotics--Inter-Agency Meet-
ings
You will note there is growing con-
cern, both in Washington and in the mis-
sion, that significant amounts of legal
opium in India may be leaking into illic
channels. There is an acnkowledged lack
of solid intelligence on the Indian opiu
situation, and a greater intelligence
effort was recommended.
The East Asia Working Group concen-
trated on the proposed NCAP for Burma,
which is part of the overall Golden
Triangle picture. The use of herbicides
is now being considered for possible use
as a control weapon against the illicit
growth of opium poppy in Burma, where
some 100,000 acres are grown annually,
providing the Burmese Government will
approve and support such a program. Al-
though there are inherent problems in
the widespread use of herbicides for
poppy eradication, the potential gain
may be worth the risk. But this is a
policy, rather than an intelligence,
matter and, therefore, does not directly
affect CIA. If herbicides are used
effectively in Burma, however, it might
encourage Mexico to use them in its ex-
tensive and costly eradication effort.
cc:. D/OCI
Is
0
0
IN
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
W eshIngton, D.C. 20520
September 9, 1975
TO: S/NM - Ambassador Vance
FROM: NEA/RA - Richard C. Searing
Narcotics Coordinator
SUBJECT: NEA NCAP Reviecq
A meeting was called on Thursday, August 28 to review
the NCAP submissions from the various NEA posts prior
to the NEA Narcotics Conference in Islamabad..,' Repre-A
sentatives from State, AID, DEA"(only one), Customs,
Treasury, CIA and OMB attended.
For the most part there was little questioning of the
overall programs from those posts from which we had
received submissions at the time of the meeting (we
have not yet received submissions from Beirut, Cairo,
or Algiers). In fact the group concurred in sending
a commendation to one of the posts (Kathmandu) for a
job well done.
PAKISTAN
1. Not surprisingly, the greatest time was spent on
the NCAP for Pakistan. The post recommends moving
forward on the crop-substitution project in the Swabi
Tehsil and proposes obligation of $2 million in the
fifth quarter of FY 1976 and an additional $1 million
in FY 1977. The post also proposes obligation of
$800,000 for 15 additional FIU's and related enforce-
ment activities in FY 1977. The group recommended
that you accept this proposal by the post at least for
planning purposes pending review thereof during your
visit at the post.
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2. When discussing the crop substitution project with
the mission, the group recommends that the Mission and
the GOP be urged to formulate the project so as to maxi-
mize the linkage between progress on crop substitution
and GOP regulation and control efforts. The group also
recommends that the Mission be urged to follow up GOP
plans to encourage IBRD and ADB interest in financing
general development programs in the area of our crop
substitution project.
3. Questions were raised over the fact that Pak-is-tani
authorities apparently have not issued licenses for
the opium crop being planted this year although the
crop is being planted. This gives rise to real doubts
concerning the intentions of the Pakistanis to control
this production'
4. f~cause other countries are affected by illegal
export of opium from Pakistani, it was suggested that
an effort be made to interest the countries concerned
to bring pressure on the Pakistanis to make greater
efforts to control such activity. There was some
disagreement within the group as to the best means of
accomplishing such cooperation. Some felt the Embassy
should take the lead in setting up a formal committee
of representatives from other embassies to work out
a program along these lines. Others felt a more
informal arrangement (unspecified) might be more
appropriate or that we might find it best to work
through UNFDAC, perhaps working with the UN Resident
Representative. It was finally agreed that this
matter would best be settled on the scene in direct
conversation with the Embassy.
5. A discussion of the agricultural research program
being carried on by the U.S. Department of Agriculture
in Pakistan was stymied by the fact that no represen-
tative of USDA was present. We were unable to determine
whether USDA plans to finance these continuing programs
out of its own funds or expected to use CCINC funds.
Action Required:
That USDA be contacted by S/NM in order to determine
the answer to the question raised above.
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6. The group generally felt that the portion of the
Pakistan NCAP devoted to training was somewhat confusing.
The group feels that training programs for the Pakistanis
should be aimed at training instructors in order to
enable the Paks themselves to take over this job in the
not-too-distant future.
7. The group strongly supported the Embassy's
intention to evaluate the use of equipment already
provided before requesting more. It was suggested
that people at the Washington end could usefully
contribute to such an evaluation.
8. As a part of the review mentioned above, it was'
suggested that we should require the Paks to train
additions to their narcotics staffs in the use of
equipment already provided before new equipment is
given to them.
9. The group noted that the NCAP figures on narcotics
manpower as supplied by the Embassy took into account
only American manpower. Figures on Pak manpower also
are needed.
Action Required:
NEA/PAB should ask the Embassy to supply the additional
information.
10. The Paks have requested a special training program
for an official from Punjab province who is responsible
for overseeing the storage, distribution and sales of
licit narcotics and dangerous drugs. Through over-
sight, this was not discussed during the NCAP review.
Action Taken:
We have informed the Embassy that we agree in principle
to provide the requested training and have asked the
Mission to supply biographic data.
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Nuli - -4_ NW -
1. There were few comments on the NCAP for Afghanistan.
The group felt there was perhaps too much emphasis in the
pro osed information program on drug addiction as an
1169Eican problem. More play should be given in any such
program to the international aspects of the problem.
Action Required:
This point should be discussed with representatives
from Embassy Kabul. Inasmuch as the NEA Narcotics
Coordinator plans to visit Kabul following the
Islamabad Conference, he will undertake this assign-
ment.
2. It was generally felt that the Government of Iran
could be materially helpful in moving the Afghans to
greater effort in drug enforcement. The Iran Desk
Officer felt, however, that it was unlikely that any
effort in this direction on our part would prove
fruitful.
Action Required:
This matter should be discussed with the representatives
of Embassy Tehran at the Conference.
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-5-
3. The group felt that the best route to follow in
Afghanistan was through UNFDAC. It was felt in particu-
lar that the German police adviser should be retained
and that we should make every effort to encourage the
German government to agree to his extension.
Action Required:
That S/NM discuss the UNFDAC program in Geneva and with
the Germans.-`
Everyone agreed that the Iran program is not moving for-
ward very well!, but the group was unable to come up with
any constructive suggestions as to how to make progress.
The group agreed that further discussions on this subject
should be held both during the Islamabad Conference and
following your trip to Tehran
Action Requested: That S/NM discuss the problems of the
Iran program with the Embassy in Tehran and that further
discussions be held here in Washington following your
return.
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Action Required:
That NEA/ARN send a cable to Embassy Amman setting
forth the problem and asking the Embassy to suggest
actions that might be possible to solve it.
Although an NCAP has not been received from Cairo, it
was generally agreed by the group that cooperation
with the Egyptian authorities has shown a commendable
increase They have indicated an interest in training
programs both here and in Egypt and the group believes
that every effort should be made by us to be as forth-
coming as possible in this direction. This is now being
carried out and several grants have been approved for
such training.
INDIA
Given the stress in the Indian NCAP on the possibility;
that the illegal export of the legal poppy crop is;
growir~ and that there is a lack of solid intelligence
on.this point, the group believes DEA should be
encouraged to increase its intelligence capability in
India,;.
ALGERIA, MOROCCO,-TUNISIA
In -ail three of these North African countries, the NCAPs
stressed rather ambitious training programs. The group,
wh,lp commending the idea of training programs, felt the
NCAP11 proposals were perhaps too ambitious given our
limited interest and capability in these countries.' It
was recommended that a program should certainly continue
but on a more modest scale. The group was particularly
impressed by the argument of the Algerian Desk officer
that our program in that country was one of the few
avenues the Embassy can use to obtain direct access to
the government. It was also felt that given the nature
of the drug traffic patterns in Morocco, that it might
be possible to interest European countries in bringing
more pressure on the Moroccans to control this traffic.
Action Required:
That the EUR Conference in Paris discuss the possibility
of interesting their respective governments to take action
which would put pressure on the Moroccans in this area.
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S/NM:JMcLaughlin
DEA/IGIN:PSFotopoulos
CUSTOMS:FKeenan
AID/NES.A/ME:WHFaulkner
AID/NESA/ME:KHTeil
AID:MWampler
S/NM:DCohen
S/NM:CBuck
TREASURY:MBach
NEA/PAB:MAustrian
M/MED:FKJohnson
A/BF/OB:MCRadnot
AID/NESA/NENA:SBowens
AID/NESA/SA/P:GTMcCloskey
AID/NESA/NENA-TUNISIA:JNBrooks
CIA/OCI/MEA:
OMB:MPerky
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fr
9 September 1975
Subject: Meeting of the ARA Interagency Working Group
on International Narcotics Control
1. The Inter-American (ARA) International Narcotics
Control Committee met on September 8 under the Chairman-
ship of George Brown, the regional coordinator. The meet-
ing was called to review the proposed Narcotics Control
Action Plans of Curacao, Barbados, Colombia, Jamaica, and
Paraguay for FY-77. The meeting was attended by repre-
sentatives from the Department of State, DEA, OMB, AID,
USIA, Customs, Treasury, CIA, and the Office of the Senior
Advisor to the Secretary of State for Narcotics Matters.
2. Chairman Brown opened the meeting with some
general notes about the ARA Narcotics conference in
Caracas on November 5 and 6. He solicited comments on
the proposed agenda and asked for an estimate of the
number of Washington attendees. He hopes to keep the
number of Washington participants to a minimum due to
the embassy's fairly limited conference room accomodations.
3. The Curacao and Barbados NCAPs were approved with
a minimum of discussion. Both programs are small, con-
sisting mainly of training for the local police.
4. Deputy Assistant Secretary Williams Luers joined
the meeting for the discussion of the Colombian program
and made some general remarks about the narcotics situation
in Colombia. He said that he is generally pleased with
the way things are going there. The government is giving
narcotics sufficient priority and appears to be more honest
than most in Latin America. The major problem with Colombia
is its geography and the variety of narcotics enforcement
agencies and their lack of coordination.
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5. The Bogota Embassy narcotics coordinator traveled
to Washington for the meeting and presented the embassy's
program in detail to the committee members. Several
points on training programs, equipment deliveries, and
financial aid were clarified and some minor changes in
these areas were made. The Embassy coordinator noted
that corruption is prevalent on a large scale at lower
levels. He said that extradition is a major problem,
as it is in all of Latin America. It was noted that
President Lopez would be coming to Washington for a state
visit at the end of this month and that narcotics is on
the agenda for the meeting with President Ford.
6. After much discussion, the Colombian NCAP was
approved in total with only minor changes.
7. Due to the length of the meeting, I was not able
to remain for the discussions on the Jamaican or Paraguayan
action plans.
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
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09 September 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Discussion of Burma Narcotics Control Program
(NCAP) by East Asia Interagency Working
Group on Drug Control, 05 September 1975
. 1. The undersigned. attended a meeting of the
Interagency Working Group specifically arranged to
discuss and approve, where possible, the NCAP for
Burma,. submitted in early August. Present were the
usual members from State, DEA, Customs, AID, 'etc.
The meeting was chaired by Mr. William Gallagher,
State's EA referent for narcotics.
2. The first item discussed, following some
general comments on the submission of the Rangoon
Embassy, was herbicides. Although it is U.S. policy
not to get involved th herbicides, according to one
of the participants, Ambassador Vance has reportedly
said he is willing to consider Burma as an exception
to this rule. It was agreed that, if the Burmese
Government were willing to use herbicides on the
approximately 100,000 acres of poppies planted an-
nually there (and it is uncertain what Burma wishes
to do in this area!), that they should foot the bill
(because of Congressional problems) which could cost
in the neighborhood of $100-800,000.
3. Mr. Standifer from the DEA enforcement side
next broached the matter of inserting two Agents into
the NCAP for the coming fiscal year. He was im-
mediately set upon by the others around the table,
including his colleague from the intelligence side of
DEA. This portion of the discussion ended with the
conclusion that not much chance existed for a DEA
presence in Rangoon in the near future.
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SUBJECT: Discussion of Burma Narcotics Control Program
(NCAP) by East Asia Interagency Working
Group on Drug Control, 05 September 1975
Page 2
4. The F-27 aircraft came up at this point, in-
cluding the various requests pertaining to the aircraft.
It will cost about $750,000 and the radio equipment,
propellers and automatic pilot requested were also
approved. The 532 type engines were not because of a
two-year lead time involved. A heated discussion took
place over the Burmese request for a civilian con-
figuration of the plane and it was finally decided to
recommend a troop (i.e. military) configuration, unless
the Embassy comes up with compelling reasons not to.
The night vision devices were approved to the tune of
$450,000.
5. The, next subject, heliopters, was discussed
for most of the remainder of the meeting. An acri-
monious exchange revealing strong differences of
opinion on this matter surfaced. The Embassy recom-
mended in their submission that twelve (12) additional
choppers be approved for FY-76. The main bone of
contention was whether six or 12 should be approved
prior to January 1976, or until the Burmese has proven
that they intended to use the helicopters against
narcotics-related targets. (Note: During the exchange
the undersigned was asked for CIA's feelings on the use
of the helicopters by the Burmese military. The reply
was that all indications to date are that they appear
willing to use them against narcotics targets; it was
doubted that any long-range plans would ever he forth-
coming from the Burmese, but on an ad hoc or target
of opportunity basis, based on discussions so far, we
felt they would use them as intended.)
6. Following a description by an AID official on
the uses of Type 205 helicopters (what the Burmese have
now) and type 206 (lighter, mainly used for herbicides),
it was decided the 205's should suffice, since they can
both ferry troops and be used for herbicides (with a
few problems involved); however, the Group was willing
to entertain a request for any mix that the Burmese
might wish to submit.
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SUBJECT: Discussion of Burma Narcotics Control Program
(NCAP) by East Asia Interagency Working
Group on Drug Control, 05 September 1975
Page 3
7. The big debate on helicopters got sidetracked
for several minutes on pare parts. The Embassy did
not include it in their submission and another heated
argument developed. After weighing the pros and cons
it was agreed that $450,000 should be included (12
helicopters) in the NCAP. A contract would have to
be set up with Bell Aircraft and a slot would probably
have to be set up either at Singapore (where Bell has
a storage depot) or Rangoon to watch over the program.
The rdain reason this item was approved is that most
members thought it would assist the Embassy to gain
some leverage over the Burmese to work actively against
narcotics targets.
8. Back to the 12 versus six discussion. The
people desiring 12 pointed out that if 12 slots were
not set aside on the Bell Assembly line, some other
customer could enter an order which might mean a two
or more years wait. Their opponents argued vehemently
that because of congressional problems we must make
certain we have proof the Burmese intend to use them
on narcotics targets (intelligence reports). Several
votes were taken during this discussion and the pre-
ponderance was always on the side of the larger amount
(the undersigned did not vote). Finally, the budget
expert on Ambassador Vance's staff did some figures on
a piece of paper and came up with the conclusion that
no funds would be available to order the third group
of six helicopters until after 01 January. The bitter
discussion had been moot. Everyone wearily went home.
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