PHOTOGRAPHIC CAPABILITIES TO MONITOR MIDDLE EAST CEASE-FIRE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R001200080022-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: October 22, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT ?hotographic-Capabilities to Monitor
7iiddle East Cease-Fire
This mera.randum reviews options and the alternative
capabilities available for photographic reconnaissance to
monitor a Middle East cease-fire. It assumes that the mon-
itoring requirement will be to verify that no actions are
being taken by either side to alter the relationship of the
combatant fore.es in the positions held on October 22, or as
otherwise agreed.
SUMMARY EVALU.TION
i. Experience with the initial GIANT REACH mission on
13 October, ar,d with monitoring of the Suez cease-fire zone
in 1970, indicates that photography will be limited, at
best, in its ubility to provide monitoring data unless a
base line exists and the cease-fire terms are explicit and
mutuality and-uniformly understood by both sides.
2. SR-71 and U-2R reconnaissance aircraft are the
only systems available to the US which are capable of pro-
viding regular photographic coverage of cease-fire lines
and related logistical and-support areas.
a. Baseline coverage of the areas included
in an agreement will be needed as close
to the effective time of the agreement
as possible.
b. While photography from SR-71 or U-2R
systems will be adequate to verify that
io major changes are taking place in the
disposition of opposing forces, these
:systems cannot provide warning of rapid
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changes, evidence of activities in rear
Leas, or preparations for limited scale
actions.
c. The SR-71 is capable of flying in either
a hostile or permissive environment.
d. The U-2R cannot operate effectively in a
hostile SA-2 environment and would there-
fore, require mutual acceptance for it to
be effective.
3. If photographic as=sets are to be used to monitor a
cease-fire on a sustained basis, forward base rights will
need to be negotiated and advanced logistical and support
arrangements will have to be provided.
4. The capability of-photography to provide essential
monitoring data is sensitive to the types of activities gov-
erned by provisions of an agreement--for example, bans on
new equipment by type; changes in manpower, substitution or
movement of equipment; construction; etc.--and the clarity
of the demarcation line between sides. Some of these
activities cannot be monitored solely by photography. Until
the provisions of an agreement are known a complete evalua-
tion of photographic capabilities cannot be made.
DISCUSSION
Geographic Areas Involved
5. Two areas of contest (Suez, and Golan Heights) are
assumed to be involved in any cease-fire agreement. Both,
at this point in time are rather extensive aria ill-defined.
in addition areas of interest to the rear of the fighting
fronts will need to be included.
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:.orth to Suez in the south. 3gyptian troop co.-cent
beyond this pone-tration are a-so of concern. This area
could only be monitored by an overflight--peri>herai mis-
sions flown to -he east of Egyptian dispositions along the
canal would not Provide coverage adequate to monitor
activity there. In addition, the absence of well defined
geographic features in this desert area will make the exact
fixing of a cease-fire line difficult if not impossible.
8. In both cases, the establishment by photographic
means of actual:cease-fire lines will be difficult.
Assessment of GIANT REACH Mission Over the Middle East
9. The SR-71 GIANT REACH Mission on 13 October pro-
vided extensive Middle East coverage, with summary informa-
tion from its film available some 48 hours after the over-
flight. Its coverage (see map) is typical of what would
be expected if used in monitoring a cease-fire.
What thee. Mission Showed
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SR-71 Options
17. Coverag-e of a Middle East cease-fire zone could
be best accomplished by SAC's SR-71s, two of which are
currently at Grifiss AFB, New York. These aircraft are
currently on a 24-hour response time status, but could go
back to a 12 hour status. (This timing is mostly a matter
of crew availability - on 12 hours status, the crew is on
base and resting; on a 24 hour status, they are. not so
required). To be added from the 12 hours would be the
optimum take-off times (0300-0.70OZ) which place the SR-71
over the target area in best light.. A decision to execute
a mission, if mabe late in the afternoon or early evening,
might not allow enough time for a take-off the next morning.
18. SAC bel-ieves that a'mission with all cameras
(optical bar for area coverage, technical objectives for
spot coverage) could be accomplished every 48 '-.ours (only
one optical bar camera is currently available at Griffiss).
Also, it takes aminimum of 36 hours to get the tankers up,
to_ their refueling points, land to top off again and back
in place at Torrcion, Spain. Tanker crew rest is also
important so SAC would prefer missions to be flown no more
frequent than 72= hours apart.
19. Several-pre-planned tracks covering the major
targets and conflict areas have been developed and the
necessary navigational and camera operation data are on
hand at Griffiss. The necessary tankers are deployed and
loaded with JP-7. Weather in one of the refueling areas.
could delay a mission. With,no further foreign constraints
on these missions, however, all that is needed is the word
to go.
20. Based o-n the above and on the performance of the
first mission on 13 October,a mission (if SAC is ordered
back on a 12 hours status, and if the decision is made by
about noon, EDT)_ could have an SR-71 over the target area
by noon (Mid-Eas-t time) the following day. After a 11-12
hour mission, the mission film could be at Eastman Kodak
at about 4 PM ED?T, about four hours after landing, pro-
cessed and deliv--red to NPIC by noon the following day,
the first readout becoming available some 4 to 5 hours
later (about 4 to 5 PM EDT), with all highlights co~pleted
by about 9 AM th-e following morning. Or, summarizing,
first readout co-iild be available about 50 hours after the
decision Co go was communicated to the operators.
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21. One or-two SR-71 missions operating from Griffiss AFB.
should he able to obtain photography adequate to establish
an initial baseline. If the-environment dictated continued
SR-71 overflights, a forward operating base would be desir-
able. Several such bases a SR-71
operations. These include: Zaragosa,
Spain; Souda Bay, Crete; or igone a, ice y. e agreement
of foreign governments to operate from these bases would be
required. The film from missions operating from these bases
could be expedited to the US for processing and readout or,
alternatively, flown to Wiesbaden, Germany. In the latter
case, initial readout would become available some 20 to 25
hours after the SR-71 landed.
U-2 IDEALIST Aircraft
Political Considerations
22. Utilization of the U-2 in this area is highly
sensitive and diplomatic approvals of the governments
involved would be required prior to operational missions.
The following items are considered significant:
a. Flights to provide coverage of both sides
of the Suez Canal would require boch Israeli
and Arab approval. Should either Israel or
Egypt not concur in this overflight, modi-
fied coverage from the air space of the
concurring nation would be possible.
23, Photographic coverage can be provided i:1 the area
affected by the cease-fire from several Mediterranean areas.
Specifically, operations could be crnducted from Italy
(Brindisi, Sigonella), Greece (Elefsis), Crete (Souda Bay),
or Cyprus (Akrotiri). Another opticn could be operation
from Tel Aviv proper. Operation from Spain wo,ila not allow
desired altitude of 69,000 feet in target area. Incirlik AB,
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Turkey would also be a suitable basEe for opera-ions. All
of the foregoing options would require approval by third
party governments prior to utilization of their territory
as a: forward base for operational sorties.
Vulnerability
24. In general, areas of intelligence interest in the
UAR and Syria are assumed to-be SAM defended. Present hos-
tilities have iadicated a nonstatic defense. A well
developed early warning and GCI radar network exists. A
U-2R overflight would be identified and tracked accurately.
Pr,r nr1V Pmnlnyed SA-2 defenses would constitute a valid
Operational-Concept
25. Operational sorties flown from an advanced base
in the mid or eastern Mediterranean area (exclusive of
Spain) would allow suitable altitude capability and
desired coverage.
26. Operational sorties, can be flown from our present
deployed positio However, a
return cannot be. aeeuTuPiisTleu a nn lancl-L11- ue accom-
plished at a forward base. After refueling and download of
take, the aircraft would return
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.27. The "H" camera, "B" camera and IRIS are available
configurations that can be utilized dependent upon the
physical location of the target area and political re-
straints or overflight prohibitions. The "H" and "B"
cameras are the-most capable of providing the resolution
required for photographic interpretation.
28. If two aircraft were deployed to the operating
location, a sortie rate of one per clay can be maintained
for an indefinite period. The specific sortie rate would
be an influencing factor in the amount of the logistic
support required.
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Logistics
it y away it is sufficient to maintain
oval _apability until normal logistic channels
can be brought :into use for the support of the operating
location. Normal military airlift channels would be used
~transport supplies to the European theater. Intratheater
airlift would be used to support the operating base.
Ten fuel- reserves Toned at Torrejon AB,
Spain! for the initial phases
of this operation.
30. Should the decision be made to process the take
at OPIC-E, the cake could be del' d-to
Akrotiri in approximately 8 hour
ro iri to
Eastman Kodak, 1:oc ester, New or or processing would
require approxin.nately 18 hours. Delivery of the finished
product to the -i=ntelligence Community would then be de-
pendent upon processing and duping times involved plus
the delivery tide from OPIC--E to the CON;US should it be
utilized or alternately from Eastman Kodak. This schedule
can only be maintained by utilization of dedicated aircraft
on a continuing basis. Utilization of normal MAC channel
traffic could generate an unknown delay.
Overall Reconna-"..ssance Environment
31. The utility and effectiveness of the aircraft
platforms will be affected by the nature of the recon-
naissance environment which is established. We have con-
sidered three general alternative assumptions:
a. Pe-missive. If the US and USSR agree on
the need to monitor cease-fire provisions by
me::ns of photography and the Arabs and Israelis
agree to not interfere, then either the SR-71
or the U-2R singly or in combination would be
e"ective in providing baseline and continuing
photographic coverage. Forward basing would
be required for sustained operations.
b. Pa-, tial. If the US and USSR agree on the
nee for photography, and the Israelis agree
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to cverflight of Israeli-held territory
but the Arabs to not agree, it will be diffi-
cult to monitor an irregular cease-fire line
such as that related to presently held posi-
tions. If in the future a demarcation line
is established which follows natural divisions
with a demilitarized zone between sides, then
such a zone could be monitored from one side
without overflying the other.
c. Hostile. If the US and USSR agree on the need
to monitor by photography but the Arabs and
Israelis do not, then the SR-71 would be the
only aircraft which could safely operate.
While technically able to overfly, the missions
would be lengthy and there.would continue to
be some risks associated with them.
If photographic flights are performed in a permissive environ-
meat,there will be related considerations concerning the
handling and dissemination of the derived information to
foreign governments (if any) and the mechanisms for utilizing
this information in subsequent negotiations and discussions.
These considerations have not yet been evaluated in detail.
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