GUIDELINES FOR THE CIA IMAGERY EXPLOITATION REQUIREMENTS AND REPORTING PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R001200100022-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: June 25, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Guidelines for the CIA Imagery Exploitation
Requirements and Reporting Process
1. This memorandum recommends for your approval a rationale and
a set of guidelines for application to the CIA imagery exploitation
requirements and reporting process in light of the National Tasking Plan
(NTP) and the COMIREX basic support exploitation program. These guide-
lines_ tare. -the-.can.c. rrence__o the-CIA Menh r of COMIREX. the_.CIAMember
of the COMIREX/EXSUBCOM the Director of IAS and the Executive Director
'~of NPIC
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.
2. In developing the guidelines, I have taken into consideration
the views which have. emerged in previous draft papers by different people,
as well as the philosophies which were surfaced during our recent general
meeting on this topic. I believe these guidelines are consistent with the
intent of the JIIRG Report, with provisions of the National Tasking Plan,
and with the effort to maintain and improve the resource capabilities of
the Imagery Analysis Service for support of Agency production components.
Any set of guidelines must be flexible so that potentially. troublesome
requirements. and reporting questions can be considered on a case-by-case
basis. Therefore, I have tried to avoid absolute rigidity without
sacrifice of the value of clear definition. At the end of a year it may
be desirable to review the guidelines for possible revisions in light of
experience gained with operation of the NTP and those changes reflected
by the content of future basic support programs.
3. The FY-69 COMIREX basic support exploitation and reporting
program is to be implemented about 18 July 1968. CIA is participating via
the COMIREX/EXSUBCOM and is contributing those exploitation requirements
which can be identified in advance for inclusion in the FY-69 program.
This program will define the nature, scope and timing of the work to be
done under the NTP by the various imagery interpretation organizations.
As of this time, all targets (objects, installations, areas and activities)
in each substantive category are being reviewed to select those of
community interest for inclusion in the program. Following EXSUBCOM
coordination and COMIREX approval, the elements of this program will be
assigned to each of the responsible exploitation organizations and pre-
sumably will be accepted to the extent that these organizations believe
that they can complete the work as scheduled. If an assigned element of
the program exceeds the capability of the organization having NTP primary
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responsibility and the organization cannot complete the proposed task
during the next fiscal year, EXSUBCOM will either modify the task or request
another organization to do the work. Therefore, some Agency information
needs will be satisfied by the programmed work of imagery interpretation
organizations having primary responsibility for community basic support
under the NTP.
4, The Central Intelligence Agency, however, has a unique intelligence
role in the community. It must support the Director of Central Intelligence,
developing its own positions and contributions over a broad range of critical
intelligence problems; many of these are also of prime production concern to
another USIB-member agency. In this intelligence role, Agency production
components receive direct support from the Imagery Analysis Service whose
capabilities must therefore cover a broad range of substantive matters, as
evidenced by the IAS "black dot" assignments in the NTP. In addition, IAS
has primary community responsibility under the NTP for COMIREX-programmed
basic support in the field of non-military economics and logistics, There-
fore, IAS must have a cadre of well-trained and highly-motivated imagery
analysts with a continuing capability to respond on a broad range of
intelligence subjects,
5. IAS direct support exploitation activities include those concerned
with support of Clandestine Services operations; support of production
office special projects and studies; preliminary assessments of the results
of recent reconnaissance missions; independent assessments of imagery-
derived information on critical intelligence problems; and development and
testing of hypotheses and of new exploitation approaches. Some of these
tasks necessarily focus IAS effort on installations, objects, areas and
activities of community interest for which other exploitation organizations
have primary basic support responsibility under the NTP. This factor raises
the question of how best to avoid unnecessary duplication of the community
third-phase effort while ensuring that CIA's needs are met as effectively as
possible.
6. A concept for guiding assignment of CIA third-phase exploitation
requirements and for reporting significant findings to the community must be
based on more than rigid adherence to the NTP "black box" structure. As I
see it, the phrase "primary responsibility" as used in the NTP was not
intended to mean sole responsibility. In discharging its NTP-assigned direct
support responsibility to the Agency, IAS can contribute also to the COMIREX
basic support exploitation program and to other community needs but, of course,
should not compete needlessly with work scheduled by another organization.
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The general objectives should be to avoid unnecessary duplication, to
avoid unnecessary interruption of the basic support exploitation
and to share any significant results of CIA-sponsored direct su program,
exploitation. pport
7. Based on this rationale, I propose the followin as
lines for assignment of CIA-ori g general guide-
ginated third-phase exploitation requirements:
a. Some exploitation requirements can be scheduled in
advance on the basis of anticipated need and community interest.
Such CIA requirements will be incorporated in the COMIREX basic
support exploitation program and assigned by COMIREX to the
exploitation organization having NTP primary responsibility.
Both IRS and IAS will use the basic support exploitation program
for the current fiscal year as. a means of avoiding unnecessary
duplication of effort by IAS. There will be instances when CIA
needs as to timing* of the scheduled basic support exploitation
are such that it will be advantageous to have IAS undertake the
work. Under these circumstances, the CIA Member of EXSUBCOM
will ensure coordination of the proposed IAS undertaking with
the EXSUBCOM and with the organization scheduled to do the work.
The IAS findings may be reported to the CIA requester and to the
National Data Base by means of a typescript memorandum.
however, if the IAS findings fully satisfy the scheduled bGen
asically,
support requirement, IAS will publish a report with the
acknowledged coordination of the organization originally scheduled
to produce the report. In this instance the COMIREX-approved basic
report format will be used.
b. Additional CIA requirements for third-phase exploitation
will be categorized as direct support requirements and for the most
part will be assigned to IAS. There will be exceptions, of course.
For example., when a CIA production component expresses a valid
need for NPIC to respond to a direct support requirement, the
requirement may be so assigned by the Information Requirements
Staff after consultation with IAS. For the most part, IAS responses
CIA needs which differ in nature and scope from the scheduled basic
support exploitation will be treated as direct support requirements.
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to CIA direct support requirements will be in the form of typescript
memoranda from IAS to the requesting CIA component. If such a
memorandum contains significant findings which would be of value to
other agencies, IAS may transmit a copy to the National Data Base.
If IAS and the requesting office or division agree that the nature
of the direct support effort merits dissemination of significant
findings to the community in the format of a published report, IAS
may produce such a report noting clearly that it was prepared by IAS
in direct support of the Central Intelligence Agency. The COMIREX-
approved basic report format will be used for such reports when
feasible and appropriate.
8. Each Agency requirement will be considered in light of the foregoing
guidelines together with all other factors bearing on that particular case
and will be assigned to the most appropriate organization with the principal
objective of ensuring the best response to the production component of the
Agency which needs the information. The Information Requirements Staff will
serve a t focal point for ~rocessi all Agency
re uirements g -originated exploitation
q (except for those of the Clandestine Services). Validation of
requirements is the responsibility of the originating production component
and IRS will ensure such validation at the appropriate level within the
production components. In addition, IRS will monitor the overall effective-
..
ness of the Agency-imagery exploitation requirements and reports_rocessTnd
will_provide staff su -----
pport to the Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence
by reporting progress and problems together with any recommendations
concerning needed changes or unresolved problems.
9. I recommend that you approve the rationale and guidelines outlined
above as a basis for common action among Agency components. involved in the
imagery exploitation requirements and reporting process.
J
DDI/Information Requirements Staff
MAVALW W. OR
Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence
Dae
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