COMMENTS ON THE INTELLIGENCE LOSS WHICH WOULD RESULT FORM RETURNING BUFFALO HUNTER DRONE PHOTORECONNAISSANCE ASSETS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA TO CONUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R001300070007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 13, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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KEY POINTS
Approved For Rel
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Comments on the Intelligence Loss Which Would Result from
Returning BUFFALO HUNTER Drone Photoreconnaissance Assets
from Southeast Asia to CONUS
The Military Intelligence Position
-- DIA, the intelligence arms of the three services, CINCPAC, USSAG,
and DAO Saigon believe that BUFFALO HUNTER is essential to the
mission of military intelligence in Southeast Asia. It provides
information of three kinds: contingency targeting information,
surveillance of Communist rear areas in South Vietnam, and warning
of a Communist genera], offensive.
-- The return of BUFFALO HUNTER assets to CONUS would seriously
degrade the current U.S. intelligence effort on Vietnam.
The CIA Position
-- CIA analysts do not work on the targeting problem, which is ex-
clusively handled by the military intelligence agencies.
-- On any subjects within CIA's area of responsibility, the loss of
BUFFALO HUNTER would not be critical so long as SIGINT, high
altitude photographic, and human-source collection continues at
present levels.
The State/INR Position
- The withdrawal of BUFFALO HUNTER would provide a political signal
to both Saigon and Hanoi that the U.S. was reducing its tactical
military support to South Vietnam.
-- For this reason, State/INR believes that, barring a change in
U.S. policy toward South Vietnam, BUFFALO HUNTER should for the
present be retained in Southeast Asia.
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November 13, 1974
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THE DETAILS
NOTE: Paragraphs 1 through 11 of this memorandum
have been prepared essentially by analysts
of the Defense Intelligence Agency and rep-
resent the views of that Agency. Paragraphs
12 and 13 contain the views of analysts of
the Central Intelligence Agency. Paragraphs
14 and 15 contain the views of the Department
of State/INR on the political implications
of removing BUFFALO HUNTER from Southeast
Asia.
1. The BUFFALO HUNTER photoreconnaissance program is flown by a
detachment of SAC's 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, operating out
of An average of 25 drone photographic missions a
month are now being flown over Communist-controlled areas of South
Vietnam. For each mission, a C-130E aircraft launches the drone, re-
motely monitors its flight o reconnaissance track, and then directs
it back to where it is recovered by a CH-3
helicopter. bUt'IYALU HUNTER oes not, under current guidelines, overfly
North Vietnam. Nor does it overfly Cambodia since TACRECCE is currently
available there. Its only overflight of Laos occurs while transiting
southern Laos at high altitude en route to or from a reconnaissance
sortie over South Vietnam. Over the target area, the drone drops to low
altitude -- between 500 and 5,000 feet -- and at those altitudes its
camera system produces photography of three to five inches resolution.
Flight paths are chosen to cover requirements levied by U.S. national
intelligence agencies, CINCPAC, USSAG elements, and the Republic of
South Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).
2. BUFFALO HUNTER offers several unique advantages:
- Being pilotless, the drone eliminates the possibility of
manned aircraft being lost with the attendant political
'complications.
- It can overfly areas where the air defense threat to
piloted aircraft is unacceptably high. This is an
important consideration because Communist antiaircraft
forces in South Vietnam are already at record levels
and could grow further.
- The drone's low altitude puts it beneath most cloud cover,
so it obtains useful photography when clouds obscure the
photography of higher altitude platforms. In Communist-
controlled areas of South Vietnam's central highlands,
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where low clouds and poor visibility prevail 30 to 60
percent of the time regardless of season, BUFFALO
HUNTER often provides the only photographic coverage
available.
- For spot coverage, the quality of BUFFALO HUNTER photog-
raphy is far superior to that obtained by higher altitude
platforms. Truck and ship cargoes, new weapon models,
even personnel in transit can be identified better by
BUFFALO HUNTER than by any other photographic platform
in the theater. (High altitude platforms provide wide
area coverage, and coverage of such things as the align-
ment and extent of construction of new highways and
pipelines.)
- Under present schedules, drones are flown more frequently
than manned platforms and provide the majority of photog-
raphy of South Vietnam. OLYMPIC MEET (U-2R) is not
currently targeted against South Vietnam and GIANT SCALE
(SR-71) at two missions per month, is currently targeted
against only northern portions of the country.
3. The information obtained from BUFFALO HUNTER is applied to several
intelligence functions. The DIA and the CIA are not in full agreement
as to the value of BUFFALO HUNTER's contribution to each of these functions.
The DIA position is expressed in paragraphs 3 through 11 of this memorandum.
The CIA position. is expressed in paragraphs 13 and 14.
Targeting:
r (,Jlf ,
Military intelligence employs BUFFALO HUNTER as the
primary source of intelligence for identification and
monitoring of potential targets for air strikes within
Communist-controlled areas of South Vietnam. It has
provided invaluable targeting information to U.S.
contin ency planning.. However likely or unlikely it is
that the U.S. will again carry out air:sstrikes in Vietnam,
DIA. is still under instructions to engage in such con-
tingency target planning. If BUFFALO HUNTER assets are
removed from the Southeast Asian theater, a decision should
also be made that this particular function of military
intelligence detailed target planning in Vietnam --
need no longer be performed.
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;Wa~ NOW
- In addition to its use in U.S. target planning, much of
the "take" from BUFFALO HUNTER photography is also given to
the South Vietnamese for their on contin enc targeting
program. In fact, BUFFALO HUNTER provides about 90 percent
of the useable aerial photography available to the South
Vietnamese. The percentage is so high because the South
Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) has no adequate reconnaissance
platforms of its own. Because of funding cutbacks, only
three RF-5A's and ten RC-47's remain operational. Neither
of these types of aircraft can perform reconnaissance in
high threat areas. In addition, their camera systems are
inadequate, and fuel restrictions have reduced their
monthly operation to 10 flight hours per RF-5A and 15 flight
hours per RC-47.
Surveillance of 'Communist Rear Areas:.
- From the standpoint of the military. intelligence mission,
which operates on both a highly general level (national.
estimates, current intelligence for national policy makers)
and a highly specific level (order-of-battle studies,
quantitative appraisals of logistic movements, etc.), DIA.
considers BUFFALO HUNTER a primary source of intelligence
on Communist rear service activity. In the past it revealed
development of the highlands logistic route, North Vietnam's
most important link to southern South Vietnam. It documented
construction of Dong Ha, the Communists' largest port in
South Vietnam. And it provided the bulk of the information
from which DIA photo-interpreters and analysts estimated
the quantity of supplies the Communists have stockpiled
in South Vietnam -- enough to sustain. them in. heavy combat
for over a year. BUFFALO HUNTER has also confirmed the
movement of weapons systems into areas where they had not
previously been identified, such as the movement of radar-
controlled antiaircraft artillery into GVN MR 3. This
variety of intelligence has proven to be a key element, in
the opinion of DIA analysts, in estimating Communist capabilities
and intentions in South Vietnam.
Warnin :
- DIA also believes BUFFALO HUNTER has the potential to
confirm. indications of an impending Communist general
offensive. If the Communists were to attempt such a blow --
in the fashion of Tet 1968 or Spring 1972 -- DIA believes
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they would move their strategic reserve divisions
southward from North Vietnam, which would necessitate
logistic movement from stockpiles inside South Vieetnam.
This movement of supporting arms probably would b
detected - or more likely confirmed -- by BUFFALO
HUNTER.
4. Thus in the view of the military intelligence services, BUFFALO
rincipal areas: (a) its contribution to U.S.
HUNTER's value lies in two p its contribution to U.S`
and VNAF contingency targeting, and (b) lacing the
knowledge of the situation in South Vietnam. The impact of p
program's assets in a contingency status in CONUS during FY 1976, there-
xtent on the answer to two questions:
large e
, depends to a fore
- Do U.S. policy makers consider a viable U.S. or VNAF
contingency targeting program. necessary?
What quality of intelligence on Vietnam will U.S.
decision makers require beyond FY 1975?
On the first question above, without BUFFALO HUNTER the VNAF
rear areas in South
5.
ist
Commun
will be deprived of its "eyes" in the a
.. xegu a-Ur-o-gramof strikes
~T~?o r~t _any
--
Vietnam. The VNAF Zs n?t n-ot? cam impossible for the
in these areas, but without BUFFALO HUNTER it would be mvital targets such
South ietnamese to pre-plan strikes against it
as stockpiles and transportation facilities. Inch thetrikes event ofuadCgmmuni t a
general offensive, the immediate launching of s way toward blunting Communist otheroffensivewords,
BUFFALO HUNTER photography rp ior
the ability of the Vietnamese Air Force to counter that offensive.
"what quality of intelligence
(. On the second question above -- FY 1975 ' "- DIA
on Vietnam will U.S. decision. makers require Ubeyo ngHF 51 -_ D the
analysts believe that without-an operating
detail.. . DApiepicture of Communist:-activity will lose considerable
IA points out that it will be unable to answer with as much
confidence.as at present such questions as:
- What is the ability of North Vietnam to support a
general offensive in the South?
- Are large Communist units on the move through rear
areas?
- Have any new weapons systems moved into South Vietnam?
And are they of Chinese or Soviet origin?
jam
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- Is there a logistic buildup underway?
- Where are the Communists building roads?
DIA believes that the decline in our ability to provide detailed answers
to these questions will significantly degrade our confidence in rendering
more general judgments about North Vietnamese intentions and capabilities.
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7, Alternative collection systems. High altitude photo reconnaissance,
human-source collection and SIGINT would presumably continue after a redeploy-
ment of BUFFALO HUNTER to CONUS. Although each Of these sources makes a
valuable contribution, DIA analysts believe that none is as reliable, consis-
tent, or yields data with as much definition~.a.nd certainly as BUFFALO HUNTER.
As indicated earlier, high altitude photo reconnaissance is rendered useless
for parts of the year by cloud cover. Human sources that can report reliably ~.
on the areas that BUFFALO HUNTER covers are rare. And SIGINT remains
valuable only as long as Communist communications security practices permit.
DIA analysts therefore believe that deactivation of BUFFALO HUNTER will
significantly degrade the ability of military intelligence to discharge
its current mission in Southeast Asia.
8. The option of redeploying BUFFALO HUNTER back to Southeast Asia
from CONUS does not affect any of the above considerations. In DIA's view,
the movement of BUFFALO HUNTER back to Southeast Asia would presumably
only be carried out after some dramatic development like an all-out Communist
offensive. By then it would be too late for contingency targeting, too
late to obtain the intelligence we might have garnered from surveillance
of Communist rear areas, and too late to take advantage of BUFFALO HUNTER's
warning capability.
9. The redeployment of BUFFALO HUNTER back to Southeast Asia, however,
would have considerable value in terms of enhancing the tactical intelligence
available to the RVNAF after,a Communist all-out offensive had begun. As
presently estimated by the U.S. Air Force, BUFFALO HUNTER could redeploy
from CONUS and within 15 days be operating at a rate of 15 sorties per
month. Within 30 days, the current average of 25 missions per month could
be resumed.~Once it had returned to Southeast Asia, BUFFALO HUNTER would
be able to support whatever type of aerial operations were underway --
close air support, armed reconnaissance, flak suppression, interdiction,
etc. It could also supply photography for support of ground combat, and
for determining armor and artillery strength and dispositions. DIA notes,
however, that BUFFALO HUNTER could only provide raw photography. A film
processing unitand staff of photo interpreters would also have to be
available to the field to process that photography into useable intelligence.
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10. DIA Conclusion and Recommendation: DIA analysts believe
that in the final analysis, the question of whether to continue BUFFALO
HUNTER missions as currently scheduled or to place the BUFFALO HUNTER
assets in a contingency status in CONUS during FY 1976 hinges directly
on U.S. policy toward Vietnam. If the current U.S. policy toward South
Vietnam is to be continued, then BUFFALO HUNTER assets should remain in
place to provide the required intelligence support to U.S. decision
makers, U.S. contingency plans, and to the South Vietnamese.
11. The current dry season campaign, extending from now trough
May 1975, wi e a critical period far large-scale military operations
ir -S"Ciui ietnam. The whole intelligence community expects moderate
t-o Teavy con'bat in Vietnam during these months. DIA believes that at a
minimum the decision to remove BUFFALO HUNTER assets to CONUS should not
be made until late next
fighting will be known.
BUFFALO HUNTER missions
military situation, and
Vietnam.
CIA Comment
spring, when the outcome of this dry season.'s
At that time, a decision on whether to continue
in FY 1976 can be made in the light of the general
in the light of then-existing U.S. policy toward
12. In the paragraphs above, DIA analysts have expressed the view
that BUFFALO HUNTER provides essential information in three broad cate-
gories -- targeting information, surveillance of Communist rear areas,
and warning of a Communist general offensive. CIA analysts on Indochina
do not presently work on the targeting problem, which is exclusively handled
by the military intelligence agencies.
13. As for the other-two categories of information -- surveillance of
Communist rear areas and warning of a general offensive -- CIA analysts do
not believe that BUFFALO HUNTER photography makes as vital and important
a contribution as DIA. analysts do. In these areas, CIA analysts use
SIGINT, high-altitude photography and human-source reporting as primary
sources, and BUFFALO HUNTER as a supplementary source which provides
additional detail. With respect to significant changes in North Vietnamese
intentions and capabilities, CIA analysts believe that other intelligence
sources have been far more important. The targeting question aside, the
placement of BUFFALO HUNTER on contingency status in CONUS would not
seriously degrade our ability to make estimates in these areas. Specifically,
CIA analysts recognize that there would be a loss of detail on Communist
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construction activities, and a loss of confidence concerning logistic
buildups and in detecting new Communist weapons. systems in South Vietnam.
But CIA analysts believe that such.losses would be acceptable.
State/INR Comment
14. The withdrawal of BUFFALO HUNTER would provide a political signal
to both Saigon and Hanoi that the U.S. was reducing its tactical military
support to South Vietnam. For Saigon, the reduction in intelligence,
besides making the military's job more difficult, would be a psychological
blow, coming on top of more newsworthy indications of dropping American
support such as Congressional reductions of funds. For Hanoi, the with--
drawal would mean.that American congressional aid limitations were being
felt in operations in South Vietnam. This would provide a modest psycholog-
ical boost for the North, although it would not of itself affect their
operational plans.
15. For these reasons, State/INR believes that, barring a change of
U.S. policy toward South Vietnam, BUFFALO HUNTER should be retained in
Southeast Asia through the current dry season.
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OFFICE. OF -THE DIRECTOR OF CEN1N INTELLIGENCE
DATE: 13 Nov 1974
The Director
Intelligence Community Views on Returning
BUFFALO HUNTER Drone Photoreconnaissance
Assets from Southeast Asia, to the U.S.
REMARKS:
1. The attached memorandum is for your
ntGraham
information and background. Bo. Danny
and Bill Hyland have taken a personal
in this memo, and have themselves edited and
approved the views attributed herein to their
agencies.
2. The memorandum was prepared at the
request of AD/DCI/IC, to assist
the IC Staff in evaluating an ASDI proposal to
put BUFFALO HUNTER in a contingency status in
the United States.
Bill Christison
Attnrhment
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