THE STRATEGIC WARNING PROBLEM (CHINA)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R001300130005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 12, 1969
• Content Type: MF

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12 December 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: The China Intelligence Activities
Coordination Group
SUBJECT: The Strategic Warning Problem
(China)
1. By USIB action in Executive Session, 20 November
1969, the Director of Central Intelligence has directed that our
Group prepare a report on the strategic warning problem as it
relates to Communist China. Although no specific deadline
was set, we were directed to proceed expeditiously; we should
accordingly aim for submission of the report to USIB in the
second quarter of 1970.
2. This will be the first such report concerning China.
There have been four strategic warning reports produced con-
cerning the USSR: National Intelligence Estimates in 1957, 1961,
and 1966; and the Report of the Strategic Warning Working Group,
"The Strategic Warning Problem" (Special Limited Distribution),
approved by USIB on 20 November 1969. This latter report
raised the China strategic warning problem; USIB discussion of
that paper gave rise to the.request for the present China paper.
3. Preparing a China report will, certainly, entail
a number of problems: e. g. , definition, scope, time-span,
intelligence gaps, uncertainty concerning future US collection
and monitoring systems, etc. We will doubtless also encounter
a set of procedural problems, not least that of exotic special
security classifications. We nevertheless should have a lively
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and educational time of it in breaking new ground, and in
helping to discipline and refine collective USG wisdom on
the inscrutable China problem.
4. Attached to this memo is a draft outline and
scope paper for our report. I would appreciate your meeting
with me -- on those questions, on the general problem of how
best to proceed, and on the best division of labor to accom-
plish our report -- on Thursday, 18 December. 1969, at
Headquarters Building, Langley, Virginia, in the Director's
Conference Room (7D64), at 2:00 P. -M.
5. Please confirm b telephoning
indicating as
well any additional officers (and their clearances) from your
agencies whom you may wish to sit in with us on the 18th.
Mr. William Gleysteen, State
China Intel igence Activities coordinator
Attachment
Copies to:
Mr. John I-Ioldridge, NSC
Mr. Herbert Taylor, Army
Capt. E. F. Rectanus, Navy
Col. Lowell E. May, Air Force
Dr. Charles Reichardt, AEC
Mr. Fred Cassidy, FBI
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Introduction
12 December 1969
THE STRATEGIC WARNING PROBLEM (CHINA)
PROPOSED OUTLINE AND SCOPE
Summary
Conclusions
TOP .SE i E 1
Present and future situations
Sources and their capabilities
Analysis of warning information
Recommendations
Annexes
I. The definition of strategic warning with respect
to Communist China, East Asia, the USSR, and
the US; the problem of assessing the China threat.
a. "Strategic warning" in this context is not
a concept of magnitude of intent, but.
essentially one of time, as distinguished
from "tactical warning" of attacks already
launched or underway.
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b. Accordingly, the paper will include dis-
cussion of strategic warning of possible
attacks (major and limited) by Chinese
regular or irregular forces or means
-- including MRBM's -- upon Japan,
South Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, the
Nationalist-held offshore islands, Hong
Kong, the Philippines, South Vietnam,
Laos, Thailand, Burma, and India.
c. Discussion of strategic attack against
the USA will for the most part assume
a late 1970's situation. Treatment of
US ability to monitor' such questions at
such a time will of course be difficult
-- but manageable.
d. Among the substantive problems to be
tackled in c will be that of differentiating
between a Chinese and a Soviet ICBM
attack upon the USA and US targets.
e. The paper should include the question of
possible Chinese-initiated clandestine
entry of nuclear weapons into US territory
and bases.
provements should be reasonably
expected in the event of future US
diplomatic representation in Ulan
Bator. Ditto re Peking.
The paper should take a stab at what
intelligence and strategic warning im-
The paper should include discussion of
strategic warning of Chinese attack
against the USSR and Soviet targets,
now and in the future.
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II. Chinese Communist Attack Forces and US
Monitoring Capabilities
III. Strategic Warning in the Political Field.
IV. Strategic Warning in the Economic Field
VI. Overhead Reconnaissance as a Source for
Strategic Warning
VII. SIGINT as a Source for Strategic Warning
VIII. FBIS and Strategic Warning
X. Indications Reporting by US Military Attaches
and Foreign Service Personnel, wherever located
XI. Third Country Liaison Assets
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