MBFR: MISSION THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS IN VERIFICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01500R000100030008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 4, 1974
• Content Type: CABLE

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FM USMISSION NATO
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RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1419
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 2440
EQO. 11652? GDS
TAGSB PARMP NATO
SUBJa MBFR? MISSION THOUGHTS ON. NEXT STEPS IN VERIFICATION
VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR
REFu BONN 7169
SUMMARY MISSION BELIEVES THAT GIVEN STRONG FRG RESERVATIONS ON
A RESLATIVELY ELABORATE OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM, NOW RECONFIRMED JY
REFTELP UPS. SHOULD NOW UNDERTAKE CAREFUL REVIEW OF OUR OVERALL
APPROACH TO VERIFICATIONS AND CONSIDER POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS TO
SOME ELEMENTS THEREOF. AS MISSION SEES ITP U.S. HAS BASIC CHOICE
o EITHER BASING LONG TERM VERIFICATION
SYSTEM LARGELY ON NTMP OR OF FINDING WAYS IN WHICH THE OVERT
SYSTEM COULD BE TAILORED TO MEET AT LEAST A MAJORITY OF GERMAN
CONCERNSS WHILE RETAINING ITS ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND
PURPOSESP THIS MESSAGE SEEKS TO STIMULATE THINKING ON SUBJECT
AND SUGGESTS SOME ILLUSTRATIVE WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT PROCEED
TO ADOPT OUR CURRENT POSITION, END SUMMARY
1. IN VIEW OF FRG2S STRONGLY HELD RESERVATIONS ON A RELATIVELY
ELABORATE OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEMP MISSION BELIEVES U.S. WILL HAVE
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A. t?AF-E IN ESSENCE PREPARED TO ABANDON LARGE ELEMTS OF AN
INS ECiIIQNSYS,U 1 FOR MBFR (ESPECI.ALLY WITH RESPECT TO MONITORING
POST-WITHDRAWL FORCE LEVELS) THUS RELYING LARGELY ON NTM BUT WITH THE
POSSIBILITY OF SOME STATIC POINTS AT EXIT POINTS TO VERIFY WITH-
DRAWLS (PER RUTHS4S LATEST COMMENTS IN REFTEL; OR
Q V WHETHER 4' 5H"QU CONT NUE TO PRESS FOR ACOMPREHENSIVf OVERT
SX,S _EM A{ ONG LINES OF THE ONE DEVELOPED IN 1"HE U.S. OCTOBER 5 PAPER.
2, IF WE ARE TO PURSUE OPTION (A) THE CURRENT STATE OF FRG THINKING
OFFERS US THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHIFT OUR POSITION GRADUALLY IN THE
DIRECTION OF A MORE NARROWLY FOCUSSED APPROACH TO VERIFICATION,
SUCH A CHOICE WOULD PRO;ABL,Y HELP US ON, OTHER ISSUES WITH fH t~iv'
SERVE TO INCREASE THE NEGOTIABILITY OF AN OVERALL MBFR AGREEMENT WITH
S E C R E T
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S F C R E T ISSUING (WI 1$ FI -5t1 I
O` ASK `F 0 H E FULL G A U M U T OF V E R I F I C A T I O N
REQUIREMENTS WHICH WE HAVE LAID BEFORE THE ALLIES',
5~ IT APPEARS TO THE MISSION THAT THE MOST DEFICIENT PART OF THE
GERMAN POSITIONS IN TERMS OF OBTAINING ADEQUATE VERIFICATION, IS
THE GERMAN SUGGESTION THAT OVER VERIFICATION COULD BE DISPENSED
WITH ONCE WITHDRAWALS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED? AS WASHINGTON HAS
OFTEN POINTED OUTS AND AS THE MISSION HAS'UNDERSCORED IN ITS DISCUS-
SIONS HERE WITH THE ALLIESo IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE ADEQUATE
ASSURANCES THAT RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS ARE BEING MAINTAINED AT THE
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S E C R E T
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EXAMPLE, THE GERMAN IDEA OF INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE, DESPITE THE
DIFFICULTIES CITED BY HASHING"G', : PECEN GU1Dtk^CE=? COUL. r'
MODIFIED IN WAYS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT LESS OBJECTIONABLE9 TO
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ILLUSTRATE A POSSIBLE SOLUTION, THE WEST MIGHT ASK FOR A CERTAIN
QUOTA OF ON-SITE INSPECT`ONj~ THIS WOULD CORRESPOND ROUGHLY TO
9 r k' iaLnMAN IS~EC r TON BY CHALLENEGE BUT IT WOULD REQUIRE
THE WARSAW PACT TO ADMIT INSPECTORS FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF INS--
PECTIONS WITHOUT A REQUIREMENT THAT SUPPORTING EVIDENCE BE
PRODUCED BY THE NATO COUNTRIES WE COULD INDICATE PRIVATELY THAT THIS
APPROACH IS IN FACT A SIGNIFICATN DEPARTURE FROM THE TYPE OF FORMAL
MOBILE TEAM ACTIVITY WE HAVE HERETOFORE PROPOSED AND WHICH,
PER REFTELP THE GERMANS CONSIDER "UNACCEPTABLE."
7, TO STRENGTHEN OUR NEGOTIATING HAND FURTHER, BOTH VIS-A-VIS
THE GERMANS AND ULTIMATE-Y AGAINST THE WARSAW PACT THE UvS., COULD,
IN ADDITION TO THIS ON-SITE INSPECTION SYSTEMS PROPOSE A SYSTEM OF
A LIMITED NUMBER OF DESIGNATED CONT_RO, ,,.E?Q1j S t I ~E , SPECIFIC
CIRCUMS+:-TED GEOG 'A-PHIC__A_R~Pa `"SURROUND:NG TRANSPORTATION CF'i(lK
POINTS) TO WHICH INSPECTORS COULD MOVE AT ANY TIME AND WITH NO
RESTRICTION ON FREQUENCYQ
8, IF THE UQSQ WERE ABLE TO ACHIEVE THIS MUCH AGREEMENT WITH THE
FRG ON OVERT VERIFICATION,, WE WOULD HAVE COME V5RY_C, ~,S ,, .O
ACHIEVING THE ESSENTIALS OF A `? lE ` "` ` ESENTL' SEEKING, INDEED,
WE WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED MORE, IN ALL PROBABILITY, THAN WE ARE LIKELY
TO ACHIEVE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT,, HOWEVERa THERE
IS A THIRD ELEMENT OF THE GERMAN POSITION WHICH REMAINS TO BE
ADDRESSED& THIS IS THE ISSUE OF HOW LONG OVERT VERIFICATION SYSTEMS
WOULD REMAIN IN GERMAN TERRITORY TO MONITOR POSSIBLE REDUCTION
FORCE LEVELS:
9Q THE GERMAN VIEW, OF COURSE, IS THAT ALL OVERT SYSTEMS SHOULD
BE REPLACED BY RELIANCE ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ONCE WITHDRAWALS
ARE COMPLETED, EVEN IF WE WERE TO SECURE FRG AGREEMENT TO THE
DEGREE OF OVERT INSPECTION DESCRIBED ABOVE, THEY WILL PROBABLY CONTIN
Ur
TO INSIST THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD NOT APPLY IN PERPETUITY,
..IN SHORTL ONE OF THE MAIN SELLING POINTS IN PERSUADING THE GERMANS
TO 'ACCEPT OVERT VERIFICATION FOR POST-WITHDRAWAL FORCE LEVELS
WILL BE A US ASSURANCE THAT THERE MAY IN TIME BE A PHASING OUT OF
INSPECTION SYSTEMS ON GERMAN SOIL.
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FM USMISSION NATO
TO RUEHCJSECSTATE WASHDC 5504
RUEKJCS/SECDEE
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 4977
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1420
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 2440
10, THERE ARE PROBABLY SEVERAL WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD PROVIDE
SUCH ASSURANCES FOR EXAMPLE, WE COULD GIVEN THE GERMANS PRIVATE
ASSURANCES THAT IN PERIODIC REVIEWS OF THE OPTIONS OF THE MBFR
AGREEMENTO THE U,S, WILLN WITH ITS ALLIES, REVIEW WHETHER THERE IS
NECESSITY FOR A CONTINUATION OF OVERT VERIFICATION, THE U0S, COULD
PERHAPS GO FURTHER THAN '(HIS AND PROVIDE THAT OVERT VERIFICATION
WOULD BE PHASED OUT AT THE END OF' A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME UNLESS THE
PARTIES AGREED TO CONTINUE THE SYSTEM? ALTERNATIVELYP THERE COULD
BE PROVISIONS FOR A GRADUAL PHASING OUT OF THE MORE OBTRUSIVE ELEMENT
S
OF THE SYSTEM, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
WILL AT THE END OF A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME REPLACE OVERT SYSTEMS
OF VERIFICATION,
11, WHATEVER ASSURANCE WE CAN GIVE TO THE FRG IN THIS REGARD WILL
OF COURSE HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED AGAINST THE LONG-RUN
VIABILITY OF THE MBFR TREATY: IT APPEARS TO THE MISSION., HOWEVERP THA
SOME ASSURANCES OF THIS KIND WILL BE NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO SECURE
FRG AGREEMENT TO OVERT VERIFICATION OF POST-WITHDRAWAL FORCE LEVELS,
WITH.REGARD TO OVERT VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS THE GERMANS
ALREADY ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE A REQUIREMENT FOR OVERT VERIIFICATION~
THE PROBLEM HERE IS TO DESIGN A SYSTEM WHICH PROVIDES SOME MEASURE
OF MOBILITY WHILE REASSURING THE GERMANS ABOUT THE DEGREE OF
OBTRUSIVENESS AND THE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH MIGHT MAKE THE FRG A
9ISPECIAL FONE:"
13,- BENELUX AGREEMENT TO FIXED CONTROL POSTS IN THEIR TERRITORY
SHOULD BE OF SOME HELP WITH THE GERMANS ON THE "SPECIAL HONE" PROBLEM
So
AND ON BASIS OF WHAT GERMANS HAVE SAID, MISSION BELIEVES THAT WE
CAN NEGOTIATE WITH THE GERMANS
AN ADEQUATE SYSTEM OF FIXED CONTROL POSTS ~ THE RFMA I NI NG PROBLEM
IS WHETHER WE CAN INTRODUCE MOBILE VERIFICATION ' EAMS INTO "I HE S` -El'Et
S E C R E T
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ANDP IF SOP IN WHAT WAYS WE THINK IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DO THIS IF
ONLY TO AVOID A POSSIBLE DEADLOCK WITH THE UuK, AND BELGIUM/
NETHERLANDS,
14, ONE WAY WOULD BE THROUGH THE TACTICAL DEVICE OF AGREEING TO THE
BRITISH POINT OF VIEWP I,E.P THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD PROPOSE BOTH
FIXED AND MOBILE VERIFICATION TEAMS TO THE SOVIETS AND BE PREPARED
TO SETTLE FOR ONLY FIXED POSTS IF THE WARSAW PACT REJECTSQ AS IS
LIKELY, MOBILE TEAMSoTHE U,S: COULD TRY THIS APPROACH ON THE
GERMANS AS A FIRST STEP, THIS APPROACH IS LIKELY THAT WE BE PREPARED
TO FALL BACK TO AN APPROACH WHICH WOULD PLACE LIMITATIONS ON THE
FREQUEN OF THE ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AS DESCRIBED ABOVE:
SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD THEN FORCE THE U_K, AND BENELUX TO
ACCOMMODATE THEIR POSITION TO STRONG FRG VIEWSP THUS REMOVING THE
U,,S, FROM THE CENTER OF CONFRONTATION WITH BONN
1.5. WASHINGTON SHOULD CONTINUE TO BEAR IN MIND THAT NTM ISSUE
REMAINS HIGH ON FRG LIST OF? VERIFICATION ISSUES REQUIRING RESOLU-
TION IN INFORMAL CONVERSATIONSP 'RG DEL HAS TOLD US CATEGORICALLY
THAT BONN MUST' HAVE AN INDICATION OF NTM CAPABILITY (AS NOTED IN
REFTEL) BEFORE IT REACHES ANY DEFINITIVE CONCLUSIONS ON AN OVERT
INSPECTION SYSTEM. IN VIEW OF CONTINUING DIFFERENCES WITH FRG
GOVERNMENT ON VERIFICATION WE CANNOT DETERMINE FROM HERE HOW FIRM
THIS POSITION 'S, WE HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT THE FRG MILITARY (AND
THE DEFENSE MINISTRY IN GENERAL) CONTINUES TO FAVOR AN OVERT SYSTEM
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE ALLIES HAVE MUCH TO GAIN rN ESTABLISHING AN
OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM IN PACT AREAS OF THE NGA~ WHEREAS A RECIPROCA
L
DEPLOYMENT OF A PACT INSPECTORATE ON THE NATO SIDE WOULD MERELY
LEGALIZE ?A PROCESS WHICH THE PACT ALREADY ENGAGES IN THROUGH A VARIET
Y
OF WAYSP INCLUDING CLANDESTINE: MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE FRG DEL
POINT OUT THAT PRINCPAL SOURCE OF RESISTANCE TO THE NVISIONED
OVERT SYSTEM APPEARS TO BE EMANATING FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY,, OR
CERTAIN SUBSECTIONS THEREOF.
16, IN ANY CASE, NTM QUESTION WILL STILL BE VERY MUCH ALIVE
UNTIL UPS, REACTS: WE DO SEE ANY U.S. ACTION ON NTM AS VERY MUCH OF
A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD, HOWEVER, SINCE MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS OF NTM
CAPABILITY WOULD PROBABLY GIVE FURTHER ENCOURAGEMENT TO THOSE IN FRG
GOVERNMENT FAVORING A MINIMAL OVERT SYSTEM: WHILE THIS PROBLEM
DOES NOT NEED TO BE RESOLVED IN IMED r?E FUTURE. WE HOPE
WASHINGTON IS GIVING CONSIDERATION OF NIM SHARING QUESTION.
S'E C R E T
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THE MISSION IS ADVANCING THE ABOVE SUGGEST IONS IN THE HOPE
THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES WILL CONSIDER MEANS OF ACCOMMODATING
GERMAN POLITICAL PROBLEMS; WHICH& AS WE NOTE COULD EXACERBATE
OUR NEGO" AT I NG PROBLEMS WITH THEM ON OTHER ASPECTS OF MBFR
THE MISSION IS SUGGESTING ABOVE APPROACHES ON AN ILLUSTRATIVE
BASIS AND SIMPLY TO STIMULATE THINKING ON WAYS IN WHICH TO REACH
COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS WITH THE FRG, WE BELIEVED HOWEVER THAT
WASHINGTON REACTIONS WILL BE REQUIRED EXPEDITIOUSLY ONCE FRG HAS
PUT FORWARD ITS SPECIFIC AMENDMENTS TO SPC?S VERIFICATION
PAPERS WHICH WE NOW EXPECT DURING WEEK OF MAY 6. MISSION WOULD
APPRECIATE USDEL MBFR Y S AND EMBASSY BONN a S COMMENTS RUMSFELD
1 i G
E
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