DEAR JOHN:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01500R000100040022-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: September 20, 1974
• Content Type: LETTER

1
Approved For Release 1/03/04: CIA-RDP80BO150ORQ00100040022-6
TH IRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
20 September 1974
Major General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA
Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Dear John:
Per our 18 September conversation, attached is a xerox
copy of the version of the Secretary's letter to General
Goodpaster that you gave me, on which I have made a few
editorial suggestions. These are all made in red ink, with
one exception: the suggested insert which, if you want to
use it or some modified portion of it, could be run as a
new second paragraph of the letter.
As I discussed in our meeting with the Secretary there
is little I would be inclined to disagree with in the draft
text as it now stands, but I do think one or two additional
ideas could perhaps profitably be incorporated. The
language of General Goodpaster's 28 iv1ay letter suggests
some confusion in his mind about what is entailed in the
concept of "warning time" (or at least what 1 consider
entailed in it). Also, for.enti-rely understandable reasons
General Goodpaster is concerned (quite properly) with NATO's
need for a proper readiness posture, but this focus seems
to have deflected him from paying much attention to the
inherent risks of what I call "ping gong escalation." You
will note a passing reference to this in my suggested
addition to the draft text's final paragraph. Though that
reference is quite brief, what I have in mind is simply
the danger of our making certain prepar1>.tory moves in
response to any initial augmentation of Warsaw Pact capa-
bilities, with our moves -- in turn -- generating Soviet
concern that leads the Soviets to make further augmentation
of their capabilities, to which we then respond, etc., etc.
As ind,c,ated in the informal note I gave the Secretary on
this matter, we should not Corget the lessons of July 1914.
014522
t; _.%7 J.-4
Approved For Release 2001/03
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Approved For Release 2Q,Q~1/03/04 : CIA-RDP80BO1500ROQ,1100040022-6
If I can be of any further help, or if you or the
Secretary want any further amplification of these thoughts,
please let me know.
George1. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
Attachment
O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/mee
Distribution
Orig - Addressee
1 DCI w/att
1 - DDCI w/att
1 - NIO/USSR w/att
1 - NIO/CF w/att
1 - Department of Defense
1 - D/NIO Chrono w/att
1 - NIO/RI w/att
file w/att
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80BO150OR000100040022-6