AIR DEFENSE WARSAW PACT DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK

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CIA-RDP80B01500R000100090003-2
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RIPPUB
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S
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127
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December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 31, 2002
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3
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REPORT
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Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET PART II SECTION 7 AIR DEFENSE WARSAW PACT DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK Basic Doctrine and Objectives 1. The objective of Warsaw Pact (WP) air defense is to 6 nullify or reduce the effectiveness of an enemy attack from 7 aircraft and missiles.(1) The WP doctrine for air defense is part of a total strategy which seeks to destroy enemy aircraft and missiles before they are launched, to divert or destroy enemy aircraft and weapons while airborne, and to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of air and missile attacks through passive air defense measures. A basic WP concept for air defenses includes a high concentration of firepower. Air defenses are deployed around important target complexes and across the most likely approaches to them. General 2. The Warsaw Pact stresses that coordinated use of all types of armed forces is required to achieve victory and regards strategic offensive and defensive forces as being of prime importance. It devotes significant military expenditures to the air defense of the homeland and of the armed forces. The Soviet defense program also includes a limited active defense against ballistic missiles (1). 3. Air defense of the USSR is assigned to PVO Strany (Air Defense of the Homeland) (2) which is divided into three known arms, each performing one of the key functions of the air defense mission, i.e., air surveillance and 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 (1) See Part II - Section 3: Antiballistic Missile Forces. 30 (2) See Glossary. 31 DIA review(s) completed. SECRET DS 161/76 11-7-1 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET control, fighter intercept, and surface-to-air missile 1 (SAM) operations. The antiballistic missile forces may 2 represent a fourth arm of PVC) Strany. PVO Strany is one of 3 the five type forces of the Soviet armed forces and is 4 co-equal in status to the Air Forces, the Navy, the Ground. 5 Forces, and the Strategic Rocket Troops. 6 4. The provision, maintenance, and operation of air 7 defense forces in individual Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) 8 countries are a national responsibility. However, the NSWP 9 national systems are closely coordinated and ultimately con- 10 trolled by a Soviet-dominated command structure to produce 11 a unified WP air dlfense organization. The NSWP systems thus' 12 form an extension of the Soviet national air defense system. 13 5. Although the primary mission of the air defense 14 elements of the Soviet groups of forces in NSWP countries is 15 the defense of their field forces, they would coordinate with 16 the national NSWP systems in the conduct of the air defense 17 battle. During wartime, these same groups of forces would 18 be absorbed into Fronts with identical responsibility for air 19 defense of field forces. The Front air defenses would be 20 21 provided by aircraft from Frontal Aviation (FA) and the ground-based air defense weapons -- along with their associated 22 command, control and warning networks -- of PV0 Voysk (Soviet 23 Ground Force air defense elements) (1). 24 SOVIET HOMELAND AIR DEFENSE FORCES(2) 25 26 General 27 6. The USSR is divided into 10 air defense districts 28 (ADD) (3), which are subdivided into 39 air defense zones 29 (ADZs). Most of the latter are further divided into sectors 30 (1) See Glossary. 31 (2) See Table A 13, Part III, Section 3. .(3) Western nomenclature. SECRET US 161/76 11-7-2 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET for air surveillance purposes. The ADZ is the lowest 1 echelon at which integrated control over all three 2 functional elements of the air defense forces is exercised. 3 Doctrine 4 7. Soviet air defense doctrine calls for the conduct of 5 a closely coordinated air battle using the combined strength 6 of PVO Strany interceptors and SAM forces, Frontal Aviation 7 (FA) Counterair units, ground force air defense elements, 8 and those naval units whose air defense systems can be 9 incorporated into the overall defense system. It appears the 10 Soviets rely primarily on SAMs for point defense of important 11 fixed targets. SAlls also are used to form barrier defenses 12 on approach routes to some important target complexes, 13 with fighters covering areas forward of the SAMs and gaps 14 between SAM defended areas. Available evidence points to a 15 centralized, tight control (at ADZ level) over all elements 16 which will rely on positive identification by radar and 17 Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF). In the event of system 18 degradation, the Soviets probably have procedures for 19 autonomous operation by SAM and air units. 20 Early Warning (EW) and Ground-Controlled Intercept (GCI) 21 8. The Soviet early warning and ground-controlled 22 intercept (EW/GCI) system is characterized by extensive 23 deployment of radar sites. There are 1,140 EW/GCI sites 24 containing 5,880 radars located in the USSR. Many sites 25 have several different types of radar sets operating 26 27 in many frequency bands and different IFF systems. At many locations radars have been mounted on masts to improve low 28 29 altitude coverage. The radar data can be introduced into the 30 31 SECRET US 161/76 11-7-3 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 DIA 25X5 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP801301500R000100090003-2 SECRET command and control network manually or by several data transmission systems. In general, this deployment provides a widespread, flexible, highly reliable ground based air defense radar network. 9. Nine MOSS aircraft, the Soviet Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), provide limited surveillance and 6 warning, primarily over the northwestern approaches to the 7 USSR. The primary mission of the MOSS is to extend radar 8 coverage seaward in portions of the Barents Sea. The Soviet 9 Navy also operates radar surveillance ships in each of its 10 fleet areas. As yet, however, radar surveillance ship 11 deployment remains very limited in the northern approaches. 12 1 2 3 4 5 Nevertheless, the radar ships have the potential to function as extensions of the land-based air surveillance system, particularly against low-altitude targets. 10. The PVO 'Strany and NSWP National Air Defense EW systems provide dense, overlapping radar coverage against aircraft at medium to high altitudes over almost all WP territory. The Leningrad region and some of the approaches through NSWP countries probably have effective cover Land others, some in the interior, 13 14 15 16 17 25Xe 19 DIA large areas in the USSR almost certainly remain without 20 21 22 25X5- DIA 25X5 DIA 25X5 effective cover The Soviets have passive bearings on active radars and aircraft Under and tracking for example However, this 23 24 warning units which would be able to obtain airborne radar or jammers. 11. Soviet fighter ground control system equipment have an all-weather capability against attempting to penetrate at medium and high altitudes. normal operating conditions, ground control at medium and high altitudes are assured -- 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 DIA review(s) completed. SECRET US 161/76 11-7-4 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET range is progressively reduced as aircraft penetrate at lower altitudes, primarily because of line-of-sight limitations. The MOSS AWAC aircraft can be used to provide limited control of interceptor fighters beyond the radar range of land-based control systems. A more advanced system than MOSS will be required to provide a true airborne intercept control capa- bility at all altitudes. In some coastal areas of the USSR a shipborne fighter control procedure is also apparently being developed. 12. During hostilities PVO Strany, FA, and pvo Voysk forces located in the USSR, will cooperate to provide an integrated, air deense under overall direction of PVO Strany. PVO Strany would support PVO Voysk during troop mobilization and movement until PVO Voysk leaves the USSR. Under conditions of strategic attack, FA counterair fighters and PVO Voysk located in the USSR undoubtedly would play a strategic air defense role in support of PVO Strany at the outset of war. The NSWP national air defense also would be coordinated by PVO Strany to maximize WP strategic air defense effectiveness. The national air defenses of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland are coordinated by a Soviet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 dominated WP staff at Minsk; those of Hungary, Romania, and -- 23 Bulgaria by a similar body at Kiev. -- 24 Command and Control -- 25 13. The command and control network of PVO Strany 26 displays redundancy, flexibility, and reliability, and has 27 semiautomatic systems for weapons control and air surveillance -- 28 reporting. High Frequency (HF), Very-High Frequency (VHF), -- 29 Ultra-High Frequency (UHF), Super-High Frequency (SHF), 30 microwave radio links and landlines are used to provide air -- defense system communications. Voice communications and SECRET US 161/76 11-7-5 PART 11 - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET a ground-to-air data link are used to control interceptors. 1 _ New data link systems have improved Soviet target handling 2 _ capability, as well as facilitating the command and control 3 _ of increased numbers and types of SAMs. 4 _ Weapons Systems(1) 5 _ 14. General. PV0 Strany forces are deployed to provide 6 _ an in-depth strategic defense of the USSR against air threats. 7 Penetrating aircraft would face a series of defenses once detected. The initial engagement would likely be with peripheral based interceptors or long range interceptors. The penetrator would than face the SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, and further interceptor aircraft. SA-1 terminal defenses are 8 9 10 11 12 located only around Moscow. The Soviets have the capability 13 to arm certain strategic SAMs with nuclear warheads and may 14 have already done so. If a period of tension preceded 15 hostilities, the Soviets probably would deploy some AAA 16 from storage. 17 15. SAM. 18 a. SA-2. An SA-2 barrier runs generally from the 19 Kola Peninsula along the western and southern borders of the 20 USSR into central Asia with deployment in the Baltic coastal 21 areas particularly dense. SA-2 point defenses have been 22 provided for most Soviet cities and industrial areas, naval 23 and port facilities, missile test ranges, strategic missile 24 sites, and airfields of Long Range Aviation (DA). It is 25 estimated that SA-2 deployment is complete, and a selective 26 phase-out of some units is taking place. Deployed SA-2 27 systems have been upgraded by improved electronics. 28 (1) See Table A 13, Part III -Section 3. SECRET US 161/76 11-7-6 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET b. SA-3. Apart from concentrations around Moscow and Leningrad, deployment of SA-3 has been for defense of important military installations and to form a partial barrier along the Baltic coast between Leningrad and the northern end of the Soviet-Polish border. NSWP SA-3 sites continue this partial barrier along the Baltic coast through the GDR. In addition, there has been extensive deployment in the Black Sea area of the USSR. The number of ready missiles at about 30 percent of the SA-3 sites have been increased by replacing two rail launchers with four rail launchers. c. SA-5 are deployed in barrier fashion to encompass most of the heartland of the USSR including an &A-5 ring around Moscow. SA-5 are also deployed in eastern USSR. 16. Aircraft. APVO interceptors provide the first line 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 12 13 14 15 of air defense and would attempt to intercept enemy aircraft 16 prior to launch of air-to-surface missiles (ASMs). APVO units 17 18 also provide a defense in-depth behind SAM barriers, fill gaps in SAM coverage, and augment point defense of special target complexes. APVO units are concentrated most heavily in the area west of the Urals and in the southern maritime region of the Soviet Far East. All interceptors in APVO have an all-weather intercept capability. Some, however, are FARMER and FRESCO whose capabilities are poor, but these aircraft are gradually being replaced. In recent years, improvements have been noted in the Air-Intercept (Al) radars employed by Soviet fighters. Because of the limited effectiveness of existing Air-To-Air Missiles (AAMs) when fired downward at targets at low altitude, the Soviets will either have to continue to engage targets from below or in near co-altitude intercepts, develop new missiles, or rely SECRET US 161/76 11-7-7 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET almost exclusively on guns for fighter armament at very low altitudes. Air defense aircraft may operate singly or in groups, depending on the number of targets. Approach to the target is usually made under close GCI control and may 1 2 3 4 be either a rear or head-on attack depending on the fighter 5 _ involved. 6 _ Electronic Warfare 2. 17. It is clear that the Soviets regard the use of 8 _ electronic warfare, particularly electronic countermeasures 9 _ (ECM), by an attacking force to be of great concern. The 10 Soviets have developed a variety of electronic counter- countermeasure (ECCM) techniques to counter this threat. ECCM measures include a proliferation of radars to provide frequency diversity across a wide region of the radar band. Soviet ECCM practices are also revealed in the design of their radars and by the training of air defense personnel to operate in an ECM environment. These steps serve to reduce the vulnerability of Soviet air defense radars to deliberate electronic interference but, nonetheless, Soviet air defense capabilities would be degraded by suitable ECM and other penetration aid techniques. Defense Alert 18. On selected airfields both in the Soviet Union and NSWP countries, some fighters and interceptors are held at varying states of readiness, depending for example, on the strategic importance of the area and the political climate at the time. On most strategic air defense airfields in the SECRET US 161/76 11-7-8 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET peripheral areas, some aircraft are maintained at readiness day and night. From the highest state of alert, i.e., cockpit readiness at the end of the runway, it is expected 1 2 DIAL that these aircraft 25X5 4 5 Combat air patrols in border areas are flown regularly. In time of increased 6 tension, many aircraft would probably be dispensed. 7 19. SAM sites in general are believed held at a readiness 8 condition consistent with the availability of warning and the 9 defensive posture for the respective area. Thus, the 10 missiles would not normally be activated until alerted by 11 an early warning net. 12 Logistics and Maintenance 13 20. APVO home bases are believed to have substantial 14 amounts of on-base Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL) 15 storage, and additional POL may be found at APVO dispersal 16 airfields. However, the stored POL would have to be augmented 17 during prolonged hostilities. The very large off-base, air- 18 subordinated POL stocks located at central depots would be 19 apportioned through the Rear Services Organization. Most APVO 20 home bases have ammunition and air-to-air missile (AAM) 21 storage facilities. Known off-base stocks of both POL and 22 ammunition are generally located near rail lines, the primary 23 means of delivery to the airfields. Squadron-level aircraft 24 25 maintenance and repair are accomplished by elements of the 26 Aviation Services on the individual operational airfields. 27 Major overhaul is performed at centralized aircraft main- tenance and repair facilities scattered throughout the USSR. 29 This system, which eliminates the need for extensive maintenance 30 facilities and highly specialized technical personnel and equipment at each operational airfield, has been effective 31 SECRET US 161/76 11-7-9 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 ? Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET in peacetime. However, the lack of specialized personnel and equipment at the operational level would probably prove detrimental to APVO maintenance capabilities in any sus- tained conflict, although it affords flexibility of operations at dispersal bases. 21. The WP air defense forces can draw on training aircraft and stored aircraft as a combat reserve(1). Some trainer aircraft assigned to APVO operational units could perform combat missions from the outset of hostilities. APVO could also draw on trainer aircraft in air defense pilot training schools for use as attrition fillers. Stored aircraft would not be immediately available, but could be brought into service after a short period of maintenance. 22. Little is known of PVO Strany SAM logistics and maintenance procedures. However, sufficient missiles are believed available, at site and depot storage, to support the expected high SAM expenditure rates during an initial phase of hostilities. NSWP HOMELAND AIR DEFENSES General 23. NSWP Homeland Air Defense forces generally follow the Soviet pattern of organization. The Homeland Air Defense forces of GDR, Hungary, and Romania can be considered to fill the strategic air defense role over their own territory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 protecting key national targets. Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, 25 and Polish Homeland Air Defense forces would provide a 26 similar defense for their national territories. The latter27 __ countries also have tactical air forces (see Part II - Section 6). The Homeland Air Defense forces are not expected to deploy forward with the ground forces. (1) See Part II - Section 3, Table A 10. SECRET US 161/76 11-7-10 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release SECRET 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 and Control and 65 GCI Soviet about 60 above part of in areas a capability DIA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Early Warning, Command 24. The NSWP countries radar sites utilizing equipment. Additionally, EW(2) and 40 GCI sites some in is targets have some 170 EW(1) of the most modern Soviet forces operate NSWP countries. Coverage complete along the major (ACE) border; however, Baltic coast there is the Allied Command Europe of the GDR and along the for tracking of targets of the radar. Over considerable terrain is favorable, 25X5 areas of the can be detected NSWP where 25X5 DIA 11 12 13 Sightings of many new additional ones with the concerted effort is being to consolidate the EW communications network provide flexibility and Weapons Systems SQUAT EYE radars with NSWP forces and Soviet forces suggest that a made by the WP to close gaps and and surveillance capability. The includes VHF, UHF and landlines to reliability. NSWP countries have deployed and sites. These sites are in defense of industrial areas, and are part of of the WP area as a whole. A new formation in the southwestern SA-2 systems could be made countries as the Soviets replace their not include 145 SAM target acquisition not include 110 SAM target acquisition 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 25. SAM 21 a. SA-2. The 22 manned about 135 SA-2 major cities and important the peripheral defense GDR SA-2 regiment is under area of the GDR. Additional available to the NSWP SA-2 with newer systems. 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 (1) Thi S figure does radars. (2) This figure does radars. SECRET US 161/76 11-7-11 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET b. SA-3. The first SA-3 sites manned by NSWP 1 personnel were seen in Poland at the end of 1970. They were 2 located around Warsaw, where to date four battalions are 3 deployed. Eight new sites have been constructed and 4 occupied in Poland along the Baltic Sea coast and five have 5 been constructed in Czechoslovakia, two of which are opera- 6 tional. Four GDR-manned SA-3 sites are operational, one 7 is under construction, and more could be expected. 8 26. AAA. The NSWP forces commonly use AAA up to 57 mm, 9 mostly radar-controlled. AAA of a larger caliber is still in 10 the inventory of some of the national forces although on a 11 very limited scale. Some SAM sites, radar sites, and 12 airfields have been observed with AAA defense, and it is 13 presumed that this would be common practice in wartime. 14 27. Aircraft. NSWP air forces are composed pre- 15 dominantly of Soviet fighter aircraft types. They are, 16 in general, less well-equipped than their Soviet counterparts, 17 but the numbers of all-weather FISHBED interceptors are 18 steadily increasing. The NSWP nations have about 1,440 19 fighters of which about 1,130 are in homeland air defense 20 units and 310 are in counterair units. At present about 21 80 percent have an all-weather capability. 22 Logistics 23 28. Logistics practices in the NSWP forces are generally 24 patterned after that of the Soviet. Each air force has off- 25 base central POL and ammunition depots. SAM storage 26 facilities exist to supplement stocks on hand at the SAM 27 sites. Rail is the usual means of delivery, and most depots 28 are within close proximity to rail lines. Maintenance 29 organization and procedures are also similar to those of 30 the Soviets, with squadron-level maintenance performed on the 31 SECRET VS 161/76 11-7-12 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET individual homebases and major overhaul accomplished at 1 centralized aircraft maintenance and repair facilities. A 2 problem likely to affect maintenance capabilities in all NSWP 3 forces is a shortage of some spare parts. When depleted, 4 many items must be ordered from the USSR where they are 5 tightly controlled and generally not readily forthcoming. 6 WARSAW PACT AIR DEFENSE OF FIELD FORCES 7 General 8 29. Warsaw Pact field forces will be organized in Fronts 9 during wartime. Air defense of the Front is the overall 10 responsibility of the Chief of the Air Defense Troops of 11 12 the Front (PVO Voysk). He also will be directly responsible for ground force air defense systems. The counterair fighters 13 of tactical air armies (TAAs) will coordinate with and support 14 the Chief of the Air Defense Troops of the Front as needed 15 while remaining under the control of the TAA commander. The 16 "NSWP tactical air defense forces have a structure similar to 17 18 that of the Soviets and are likely to function in the Front structure as described above. 19 30. Soviet doctrine is followed by relying on in-depth 20 21 defenses, a variety of systems deployed in large numbers, and a high concentration of fire. The Front air defense 22 23 resources tend to fall into four general categories: 24 a. Counterair fighters. 25 b. Highly mobile ground force systems. 26 c. Transportable ground force systems. 27 d. Mobile command and control, EW, and electronic warfare equipment. 28 29 31. The combined effect of these tactical air defense 30 systems is a complex and effective threat to attacking 31 aircraft. The SAM/AAA system provides the WP ground SECRET US 161/76 11-7-13 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 ?4Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET forces a mobile, virtually self-contained capability to 1 defend against air attack. Frontal Aviation counterair 2 fighters could provide in-depth defense (within GCI coverage), conduct offensive counterair operations, fill gaps resulting from the mobile nature of the conflict, and provide a flexible reserve should ground force resources be depleted in combat. Ground based electronic warfare equipment would be used to attack aircraft avionics and communications 3 4 5 6 8 equipment. The mobility, large numbers of systems, redundancy 9 of coverage and continuing improvement of the overall air 10 defense network will make the WP defenses increasingly 11 difficult to neutralize. The WP now can engage targets 12 at all altitudes, although the low altitude defenses are generally effective only for point targets. Nonetheless, for the near term future, the tactical air defense system will likely continue to be susceptible to ECM, saturation raids, standoff weapons, and nuclear effects. Early Warning, Command and Control 32. The WP tactical air defense weapons are netted together by a dense and overlapping system of early warning, acquisition, and GCI radars and command and control systems. The radar systems give excellent coverage at medium and high altitudes but experience degradation at low altitudes. However, in specific areas, mast-mounted systems, better siting, and improvements to the radars will enhance low altitude coverage. Almost all of the radar and command and control systems are mounted on wheeled or tracked vehicles and can rapidly shift their operating areas. The WP employs HF, VHF, UHF, and microwave radio links in addition to landlines, to 29 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 30 31 SECRET US 161/76 11-7-14 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 iApproved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET provide the communication required for the air defense system. 1 In most areas, ground-to-air data link reporting has been 2 introduced and the threat of saturation during low-altitude 3 attack has compelled the WP to expend great effort to improve 4 performance and capacity of their overall data link systems. 5 33. Under wartime conditions, there would probably 6 be a variety of systems used to integrate and control SAM 7 and air systems. Altitude layering, zonal restrictions, time 8 separation, and IFF could all be used to facilitate weapon 9 use. The use of zonal restrictions in the area of the 10 forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) would provide 11 relatively free fire zones for Soviet ground force air 12 defense weapons. 13 Weapons Systems 14 34. General. The WP ground forces appear to be attempt- 15 ing to develop and deploy an organic air defense system capable 16 of defending the ground forces from air attack, even in the 17 absence of FA counterair fighter support. This system 18 provides area defense at medium altitudes, and provides 19 defense at low altitudes for point as well as some larger 20 areas due to overlap of point target coverage. The trend 21 is toward a mobile air defense system which can move at the 22 pace of battle. 23 35. SAMs . The transportable SA-2 probably will be 24 phased out eventually in favor of a mobile system. The 25 SA-4 has already replaced some tactical SA-2s in the GSFG, 26 and is doing the same in the USSR. The SA-2 is currently 27 deployed with each of the Soviet Groups of Forces in Hungary 28 and GDR. The SA-2 is used primarily for defense of relatively 29 static rear area installations, as it is not sufficiently 30 31 SECRET US 161/76 11-7-15 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 4 t'Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET mobile to provide continuous support to maneuvering troops. The transportable SA-3 is deployed at a number of Soviet airfields in Poland, Hungary, and GDR. 36. The SA-4 brigade is organized into three battalions with three batteries per battalion. The battery is the basic firing unit and consists of three transporter-erector- launchers (TELs) which carry two missiles each. The conversion of an SA-2 regiment to an SA-4 brigade provides three times the firepower with about a 15 percent increase in manpower. In addition to providing medium and high altitude defense of the FEBA, it will probably be retained for front and army- level area defense., The SA-4 is presently deployed with some Soviet forces, and initial equipment acquisition and possible deployment has been made to Czechoslovakia and East Germany. A new short nose variant of the SA-4 missile has been observed in the USSR and also in a Czechoslovakian parade. 37. The nucleus of the low altitude, ground-based air 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 defense system is based on the SA-6, SA-9, and ZSU-23-4 19 20 systems. These systems will be further augmented by 21 deployment of the SA-8. The large number of SA-7, AAA, 22 and hand-held weapons effectively supplement the other -- 23 weapons to provide a point target with a low altitude -- 24 screen having a rapid reaction capability. To defeat ECM -- 25 and low altitude tactics, the Soviets have introduced optical -- 26 tracking for most of these SAM/AAA systems. -- 27 38. The SA-6 has been observed with the Bulgarian, -- Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, and Polish ground forces, as well as the GSFG, CGF, and SGF. In addition to the proven combat performance of the SA-6, the system is extremely difficult to locate in a combat environment. The SA-6 can SECRET US 161/76 11-7-16 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET be moved rapidly and readied for firing in approximately 15 minutes. A battery consists of a radar and four TELs with three missiles each. SA-6 regiments are deployed with some Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions where they have replaced the towed 57mm S-60 AAA guns. 39. The mobile SA-8 is a self-propelled, low altitude, short range system mounted on a wheeled vehicle and fitted with a radar. It is now being deployed with Soviet ground forces in the USSR. It should further enhance low-to-medium altitude coverage for ground force point targets. The SA-8 is believed to be ultimately the replacement for the 57mm S-60 AAA gun in div,isions which do not receive the SA-6. 40. The SA-9 is a low altitude system mounted on the armored amphibious reconnaissance vehicle BRDM-2. It is now deployed with all the groups of forces, some Soviet naval infantry units, the Soviet airborne forces, Polish units and probably Czech and GDR units. Four IR seeking missiles are pod mounted on top of the vehicle. Vehicle mounting offers advantages in command and control, chemical-biological- radiological (CBR) protection for the crew and the coordination of fire. Four SA-9 and four ZSU 23-4 are employed within a mixed missile/gun battery at tank and motorized rifle regiment level. Some SA-9 are located at Soviet airfields in Hungary, in conjunction with the SA-3 and may be used for airfield defense or training. 41. The SA-7 is a man-portable SAM which has been most effective against targets with a speed of less than 700 km/hr and at altitudes below 3,000 meters. During the October Middle East War, the SA-7 made close-in attacks against front line troops hazardous. The SA-7 is being widely distributed in WP ground force maneuver elements. SECRET US 16T/76 11-7-17 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET 42. AAA. AAA systems complement the SAM weapons, particularly in low altitude air defense. The WP relies heavily on AAA up to 57mm, much of which is radar-controlled, for air defense of ground forces (1)s The towed 57mm 5-60 AAA gun is still the standard divisional air defense weapon although it is being replaced by the SA-6 or the SA-8 in some Soviet divisions. The proliferation of the combat proven ZSU-23-4 indicates a continuing Soviet interest in improving their AAA capability. Many WP armored fighting vehicles (AFV) are fitted with AA machine guns. It is estimated that the WP and particularly the Soviets maintain a significant stock of various types of AAA weapons in depots or field storage. In addition, provision is made for AAA defense of some static installations, particularly airfields and SAM sites. Also, the WP soldier is trained to utilize his individual or crew-served weapon for air defense. Taken together, these large and small caliber AA weapons establish a density of firepower which makes low-altitude operations over the FEBA difficult. In addition to downing aircraft, they have the effect of forcing them into the more lethal field of the SAMs and fighter aircraft. 43. Aircraft. (See Part II - Section 6) The counterair fighters of the Soviet Tactical Air Armies and the NSWP Tactical Air Forces would be used for air defense or field forces. For this mission the air army would use aircraft for attacks on enemy airfields, for engagements of enemy aircraft as far forward as possible, and where necessary for the immediate defense of ground forces. The goal, in any event, will be the achievement of at least local air superiority (1) See Part 11 - Section 3. SECRET US 161/76 11-7-18 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 e-Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET over the battlefield. The FISHBED and increasing numbers of 1 FLOGGER are the primary counterair fighters in the WP. The 2 FISHBED probably does not have a highly effective intercept 3 4 capability at low altitudes (below 500m). However, the FLOGGER is believed to have a limited capability to detect, 5 track, and engage targets flying below the interceptor altitude. Electronic Warfare 44. The WP will use electronic warfare as an integral 9 part of its tactical air defense system. The WP has various 10 types of vehicle-mounted electronic warfare equipment. This 11 includes noise and deception jamming systems as well as 12 intelligence collection systems for electronic detection and 13 14 other purposes. Active and passive jammers would be used to interfere with attacking aircraft avionics, particularly 15 16 radars, and communication systems. The equipment is likely to be widely deployed and would be used in defense of all 17 18 important targets. The large numbers of radar, frequency diversity, and operator training combine to give the WP 19 a certain inherent ECCM capability. Despite this, the WP 20 21 is believed to be susceptible to sophisticated ECM operations. Logistics 22 45. The WP forces probably have stores of SAMs and 23 AAA ammunition at storage sites in the NSWP countries. These 24 stores are probably sufficient to sustain WP forces during 25 the initial stages of a conflict even though an extremely 26 high expenditure rate of munitions is expected. Resupply 27 under combat conditions from depot stocks could be done by 28 29 helicopters or ground vehicles. SAM logistics could become 30 a probleM if the period of hostilities is prolonged or 31 involves rapid troop movements. Additional stocks are 6 7 SECRET US 161/76 11-7-19 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 k-Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET available in the USSR. Large amounts of AAA are in storage 1 and in military depots in the USSR. 2 46. Refer to Part II - Section 6, Air Forces, for 3 Frontal Aviation logistics. 4 TRAINING 5 47. APVO operates two training schools which provide a 6 general engineering education and military training, as well as pilot training, during the 4-year curriculum. Newly 8 graduated pilots are assigned to operational units for 9 further training. Unit training is characterized by 10 repetitive missions with little or no deviation from a 11 standard syllabus. i Strict discipline is enforced, which 12 insures meeting of training requirements but allows little 13 in the way of pilot initiative, realistic aerial combat 14 maneuvers, and individual target acquisition without close 15 ground radar control. Live air-to-air missile firing is 16 regularly practiced. See Part II - Section 6 for further 17 18 details of WP pilot training. 48. The ground force air defense personnel train 19 20 extensively in all aspects of the air defense problem. They 21 continually exercise against simulated and real targets with emphasis on an ECM/ECCM environment. Mobility and all-weather 22 training are included in their training syllabus which has 23 generally resulted in a high level of readiness for these 24 forces. 25 PASSIVE DEFENSES 26 27 49. An important part of the WP strategic and tactical air defense is passive defensive systems and measures. These 28 29 include hardening, dispersal, and use of dummy 30 equipment. Camouflage can be carried out by laying down 31 smokescreens, setting up corner reflectors to confuse aircraft SECRET US 161/76 11-7-20 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 k- Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET radar systems, and using various deceptive paints and covers. 1 Furthermore, SAM sites no longer operational can be used for 2 deception. 3 50. Hardened aircraft shelters have been provided at 4 almost half of the APVO bases particularly those located along 5 the periphery of the Soviet Union. The PVO interceptor force, 6 as a whole, however, is not as extensively protected at 7 bases in the interior as their counterparts in FA. Those 8 interior bases without shelters in APVO are equipped with 9 open aircraft revetments. The apparent lack of hardened 10 shelters at APVO bases, however, is explained in part by 11 expected APVO dispersal tactics and the fact that many bases 12 are beyond the range of enemy tactical aircraft. In all 13 other respects, hardened aircraft shelters for APVO are not 14 markedly different from those of FA discussed in Section 6. 15 As in FA, construction programs for hardening of POL storage, 16 command and control, and other facilities are continuing. 17 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 18 51. The great strength of WP strategic and tactical air 19 defenses lies in the capability and number of systems deployed, 20 the commonality of equipment, general standardization of 21 operational procedures, and the effectiveness of the newer 22 systems. Within the USSR, aircraft and missiles are deployed 23 to defend against the entire air threat. However, the PITO 24 Strany system has no effective defense against sophisticated 25 ASMs, such as SRAM, once the ASM is launched. The FOXBAT and 26 SA-5 may have some capability against HOUND DOG type ASMs 27 flying at medium to high altitudes. Other SAM systems may 28 have a marginal capability under favorable circumstances 29 against ASM of the HOUND DOG type. 30 31 SECRET US 161/76 11-7-21 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET 52. In a defense environment not subject to defense suppression, current APVO fighters and SAMs are capable of inflicting heavy losses on aircraft at medium and high altitudes. Except at certain point defended targets, defenses in the USSR will not be effective against aircraft operating at low and very low altitudes. The PVO Strany system in most areas cannot provide continuous low-altitude tracking. Soviet reliance on close GCI and current aircraft weapon system limitations also restrict interceptor defense capa- bilities at low altitudes. 53. The NSWP air defense forces provide an additional barrier to the West, which provides an additional depth to defense of the USSR. However, NSWP national air defense forces, in general, are less effective than those of the Soviets. 54. The WP has a significant ECCM capability by virtue of the large number and variety of radars deployed. None- theless, the system is believed to be vulnerable to ECM, saturation attacks, and standoff weapons, particularly at night or in conditions of bad visibility. 55. The air defense system protecting the ground forces presents an effective threat at all tactical altitudes: 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 defense against aircraft at low-altitude is limited to point 24 targets except where defenses overlap. The WP forces in the 25 NSWP countries, particularly those facing the NATO Central 26 Region, have a virtually complete medium to high altitude 27 air defense envelope as well as large areas of low-altitude 28 coverage due to the overlap of point target coverages. The 29 mobility and concentration of firepower available to the 30 Soviet ground forces, and to a lesser extent the NSWP ground 31 forces, provide a dense and flexible air defense cover. This SECRET US 161/76 11-7-22 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET system is capable of a massive rate of fire, particularly at I. low and medium altitudes. The system may be susceptible to 2 logistics problems and possible local weapon exhaustion due 3 to the anticipated high rates of fire, especially during 4 mobile warfare. In the NSWP countries, the density of air 5 movement is likely to be extremely high, and in the case 6 of a fluid ground situation, the successful integration of 7 the various national and Soviet air and ground defense 8 elements will be difficult. It probably will be approached 9 by strictly separating fighter and ground based air defense 10 on the basis of established engagement zones. Although not 11 commonly exercised, procedures for autonomous operation by 12 SAM and air units exist. If the Soviets attempt to maintain 13 a strong centralized control of the tactical air battle, 14 their overall effectiveness will probably suffer. 15 FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS 16 PVO Strany 17 56. PVO Strany will probably emphasize qualitative 18 improvements during the next 5 years: 19 a. Soviet air surveillance and control forces will 20 continue to have good detection and tracking capabilities 21 against aircraft at medium and high altitudes. It is likely 22 that the Soviets will continue to improve radars and techniques 23 specifically designed to counter low-altitude penetration. 24 Although additional deployment of radars on towers will 25 enhance coverage in limited areas, little Soviet improvement 26 in ground-based continuous tracking capability at low altitude 27 for large areas of the USSR is foreseen in the near future. 28 Deployment of new AWACS aircraft with a look-down capability 29 over-land represents the best potential solution for large 30 area coverage and tracking, but this development is unlikely 31 SECRET US 161/76 11-7-23 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 4- Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET until the early 1980s. It is likely that the Soviet will attempt to force attackers to fly at higher altitudes by using ECM against their terrain-avoidance radars. It is reasonable to expect further Soviet attempts to improve the capacity, flexibility, and security of air defense command and control communications, thereby permitting improved coordination of interceptor and SAM operations. Continued efforts to harden command and control facilities at regional headquarters and at operational sites are also expected. b. Problems of intercepting and destroying strategic attack aircraft at low altitudes will remain formidable and ?are unlikely to be overcome in the near future. Despite probable improvements to SAM systems, their limited range at very low altitudes would require such a large number of systems as to preclude their deployment as area defense systems, except in very special circumstances. Given the limited capability of the SA-1 system, it will probably be phased out by the early 1980s. c. PVO Strany is currently seeking advances in the low-altitude capability of its current interceptor force. Modernization of the fighter defenses, e.g., the increasing use of automation and fighters equipped with mixed air-to-air missiles (AAM), has improved effectiveness at medium and high altitudes, but this has not solved the problem at low altitude. The interceptor force effectiveness will improve as more FLAGON E are deployed and possibly new aircraft are added to APVO. FLOGGER, believed to have a limited capability to detect, track, and engage targets flying below the inter- ceptor altitude, is a candidate as a new low-altitude APVO interceptor and could begin deployment in 1976. A variant of some other existing aircraft is also possible during the SECRET US 161/76 11-7-24 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 4? Approved For Release 2002/09/05: CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET late 1970s. AAM improvements are expected; it also is 1 likely that the Soviets will develop a look-down Al radar 2 and compatible shoot-down AAM which are better than the 3 capability attributed to FLOGGER. AIN? interceptor strength 4 has declined gradually over the years, and this trend is 5 expected to continue as obsolescent aircraft are replaced 6 by smaller numbers of more capable aircraft. 7 d. Emphasis will remain on destruction of ASM 8 carriers before weapon launch as no effective defense against 9 sophisticated ASMs in flight is likely in the near future. 10 e. It is not likely that the Soviets will be able 11 to develop and deploy any exotic new weapons, such as a 12 laser weapon capable of downing an aircraft, during the 13 next 5 years. The Soviets are conducting research on OHD 14 radars which, if successful, may be able to provide a 15 significant increase in early warning time against aircraft 16 approaching at any altitude several hundred miles from the 17 Soviet border.(1) 18 NSWP Homeland Air Defense 19 57. The NSWP National Air Defense forces are expected 20 to improve qualitatively by addition of new aircraft, e.g., 21 late model FISHBED and probably FLOGGER, additional modern SAMs, 22 as well as upgraded and new radar systems. It is also 23 expected that command and control systems and procedures 24 will evolve toward improved integration of NSWP and Soviet 25 strategic defense forces. 26 WP Air Defense of the Field Forces 27 58. WP air defense of the field forces will likely continue to be based on a dual system of aircraft and ground- based equipment. The trend of quantitative and qualitative (1) See Part 11 - Section 3. SECRET US 161/76 11-7-25 PART 11 - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 28 29 30 31 DI 25X5 41- Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET to continue. Emphasis and firepower. The the WP mobile low altitude a minimum capability Further SA-4, SA-6, SA-7, radar system deployments toward a completely will receive limited counterair capabilities will also improve A new Soviet counterair early 1980s. In use of ECM against bombing Refined electro- to be deployed designator could be homing-type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 improvement of these forces is expected will likely be placed on ECCM, mobility, SA-8 is expected to further increase defense capabilities probably achieving SA-8, SA-9, ZSU-23-4, and mobile are expected in Soviet forces, pointing mobile air defense. The NSWP forces numbers of these systems also. The of the Frontal Aviation fighter force as FLOGGER deployment continues. aircraft could enter service in the tactical as strategic, increasing and terrain-avoidance radars is likely. optical sighting aids will continue for ECCM purposes, and a laser target used in the late 1970s to guide semiactive, missiles. OTHER EUROPEAN COMMUNIST AIR DEFENSES 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Albania by approximately 100 Chinese military of both FARMER and training personnel, has of this force. Many of by the USSR are old and the to be poor. The EW and generation Soviet to be Slow due to age there are four operational eight systems were provided, 21 59. Fighter defense is provided aircraft (FAGOT/FRESCO/FARMER/FISHBED). aid, which has included the delivery FISHBED-type aircraft as well as improved the air defense capability the aircraft originally supplied serviceability rate is estimated control function is provided by older equipment whose capability is thought and shortages of spares. Presently, SA-2 sites in Albania even though 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 SECRET US 161/76 11-7-26 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 '114111. Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP806015NR006100090003-2 SECRET three by the USSR and five by the Peoples Republic of China. 1 _ Yugoslavia 2 _ 60. The air defense capability in Yugoslavia, based on 3 _ the Soviet pattern, is considered to be good. Of about 120 4 _ air defense aircraft, essentially of Soviet origin, 75 have all-weather capability (F1SHBED D/F/Jx), the remainder being day fighters. EW and control are achieved by using Soviet radars, French radars, and a progressively decreasing number of obsolescent United States radars. 61. There are seven operational SA-2 sites with one additional site under construction. At least four SA-3 battalions, equipped with four rail launchers, have recently been observed with at least two battalions (sites) being deployed along the northern border opposite Trieste. Additionally, SA-6 and SA-7 SAMs have been introduced into the ground forces. Coordination of these air defenses is generally effective, and continuous efforts are being made towards improvement of deficiencies. SECRET US 161/76 11-7-27 PART II - Section 7 Approved For Release 2002/09/05: CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET PART III SECTION 1 GROUND FORCES TABLES TABLE G 1 DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET MAJOR LINE UNITS BY CATEGORY AND TYPE (MID-1976) TABLE G 2 DISTRIBUTION OF NSWP MAJOR LINE UNITS BY CATEGORY AND TYPE (MID-1976) SECRET US 161/76 III-1-1 PART III - Section 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Z-?00060001.000t10091.0809dCltl-VIO : 9O/60/OOZ eSeeleti -10d peACLIddV TABLE G 1 DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET MAJOR LINE UNITS BY CATEGORY AND TYPE (MID-1976) (i) GROUPS OF FORCES AND MILITARY DISTRICTS TANK DIVISIONS MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS AIRBORNE DIVISIONS CATEGORY TOTALS DIVISION TOTALS CAT A CAT B CAT C CAT A CAT B CAT C CAT A CAT C CAT A CAT B CAT C GDR (GSFG) 10 - - 10 - - - - 20 - - 20 POLAND (NGF) 2 - - - - - - - 2 - - 2 CZECHOSLOVAKIA (CGF) 2 - - 3 - - - - 5 - - 5 HUNGARY (SGF) 2 - - 2 - - - - 4 - - 4 NORTHWESTERN USSR: LENINGRAD MD - 1 - 2 1 4 1 - 3 2 4 9 WESTERN USSR: BALTIC MD 3 - - 1 3 1 1 1 4 4 9 BELORUSSIAN MD 1 7 - 1 - 1 1- 3 7 1 11 CARPATHIAN MD 1 2 - - 5 3 - - 1 7 3 11 SOUTHWESTERN USSR: ODESSA MD - - - 3 4 1 - 1 3 4 8 SOUTHERN USSR: TRANSCAUCASUS MD - - - - 3 8 1 - 1 3 8 12 NORTH CAUCASUS MD _ 1 - - - 5 - - - 1 5 6 TURKESTAN MD - - - - 1 4 1 - 1 1 4 6 WEST CENTRAL USSR: MOSCOW MD - 2 - - 1 2 1- 1 3 2 6 KIEV MD - 6 - - - 4 - - - 6 4 10 EAST CENTRAL USSR: URAL MD - 1 - - - 2 - - 1 2 3 VOLGA MD - - - - - 3 - - - - 3 3 EASTERN USSR: CENTRAL ASIAN MD 1 - - 1 3 2 - - 2 3 2 7 SIBERIAN MD - 1 - - 1 3 - - 2 3 5 TRANSBAIKAL MD 1 1 - 3 1 4 - _ 4 2 4 10 FAR EAST MD 1 - - 4 6 8 - - 5 6 8 19 MONGOLIA 1 - - 1 - - - - 2 - - 2 TOTALS 22 25- 27 26 60 7 1 56 51 61 168 (1) For details of Naval Infantry see Part II - Section 5. Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV U.) i uo-F4as - III IIIVII TABLE G 2 DISTRIBUTION OF NSW MAJOR LINE UNITS BY CATEGORY AND TYPE (MID -1976) (i) TANK DIVISIONS MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS AB DIV SLD MTN BDE DIV/BDE CATEGORY TOTALS DIV/BDE TOTAL PERSONNEL TOTALS CAT A CAT B CAT C CAT A CAT B CAT C CAT A CAT B CAT C GDR 2 - - 4 - - - - - 6 - - 6 POLAND 5 - - 3 3 2 1 1 - 10 3 2 15 CZECHOSLOVAKIA 3 - 2 4 - 1 - - - 7 - 3 10 HUNGARY 1 - - 3 - 2 - - 4 - 2 6 ROMANIA 2 - - 5 3 - - - 2 7+ 3 - 10+ 2 Bdes 2 Bdes BULGARIA 5 - - 5 1 2 - - - 5+ 1 2 8+ Bdes 5 Bdes 5 Bdes TOTALS 13+ - 2 24 7 7 1 1 2 39+ 7 9 55+ 5 Bdes 7 Bdes 7 Bdes (i) For details of amphibious units see Part II - Section 5 Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET PART III SECTION 2 NAVAL FORCES TABLES Table N I Estimated 00B of Soviet Submarines by Fleets (Mid-1976 to Mid-1978) and Total 00B (Mid-1981 and Mid-1985) Table N 2 Estimated 00B of Soviet Submarine Support Ships by Fleets (Mid-1976) Table N 3 Estimated 00B of Soviet Surface Combatants by Fleets (Mid-1976 to Mid-1978) and Total 00B (Mid-1981 and Mid-1985). Table N 4 Estimated AOB of Soviet Naval Aviation by Fleets (Mid-1976 and Mid-1979) and Total AOB (Mid-1982 and Mid-1985) Table N 5 Estimated 00B of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Navies by Countries (Mid-1976) Table N 6 Estimated AOB of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Navies by Countries (Mid-1976) Table N 7 Estimated 008 of Warsaw Pact Amphibious Ships, Landing Craft, and Air Cushion Vehicles by Fleets/ Countries (Mid-1976) Table N 8 Merchant Shipping of the Warsaw Pact - 1 Jan 1976 Table N 9 Fishing Fleets of the Warsaw Pact - 1 Jan 1976 Table N 10 Estimated Naval Hydrographic/Oceanographic Fleets of the Warsaw Pact (Mid-1976) SECRET US 161/76 111-2-1 PART III - Section 2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Z uoT33aS - III DIU TABLE N 1 ESTIMATED 00B OF_SOVIET SUBMARINES BY FLEETS (MID-1976 TO MID-1978) AND TOTAL 00B (MID-1981 AND MID-1985) (Additional submarines estimated to be in reserve are shown in parenthesis) CLASS TYPE No. MISSILE TUBES Mid-1976 Mid-1977 Mid-1978 Mid-1981 Mid-1985 NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL .TOTAL TOTAL - BALLISTIC MISSILE NUCLEAR DELTA OR SUCCESSOR SSBN 12/16(115 - - 3 18 19 - - 5 24 19 - - 7 26 ) ) )62(ii) )62(ii) YANKEE SSBN 16 22 - - 12 34 22 - - 12 34 22 - - 12 34 ) ) HOTEL II SSBN 3 4 - - 2 6 - . - - - - - - - - - - - HOTEL III SSBN 6 1 - - - 1 1 - - - 1 1 - - - 1 1 1 TOTAL SSBN 42 - - 17 9 42 - - 17 59 -I 42 - - 19 61 63(ii) 63(ii) 4 BALLISTIC MISSILE DIESEL . GOLF I SSB 3 2 - - 5 7 - - 5 7 2 - - 5 7 7 7 I GOLF II OR OTHER CONVERSIONS SSB 3 8 - - 7 15 8 - - 7 15 8 - - 7 15 ' 15 15 TOTAL SSB 10 - - 12 22 10 - - 12 22 10 - - 12 22 22 22 CRUISE MISSILE NUCLEAR PAPA OR NEW CLASS SSGN 8/UNK 1 - - - 1 2 - - - 2 4 - - - 4 10 18 CHARLIE I SSGN 8 8 - - 3 11 7 - - 4 11 6 - - 5 11 11 11 , CHARLIE II SSGN 8 3 - - - 3 4 - - - 4 5 - - - 5 - 7 7 ECHO II SSGN 8 15 - - 14 29 15 - - 14 29 i15 - - 14 29 29 25(4) TOTAL SSGN 27 - - 17 44 27 - - 18 45 27 - - 19 46 59 61(4) Z-?00060001.000t10091.0809dCltl-VIO 9O/60/OOZ eseeieu Jod peAoiddv Z-?00060001.000t10091.0809dCltl-VIO : 9O/60/OOZ eSeeleti -10d peACLIddV Z uoT43aS - III .111Vd TABLE N 1 (continued) CLASS TYPE No. MISSIL TUBES Mid-1976 Mid-1977 Mid-1978 Mid-1981 'Mid-1985 NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL CRUISE MISSILE DIESEL JULIETT SSG 4 12 - - 4 16 12 - - 4 16 12 - - 4 16 16 10(6) WHISKEY-CONV (LONG BIN) SSG 4 - (1) 1(1) (1) 2(3) - (2) 1(1) (1) 1(4) - (2) 1(1) (1) 1(4) (2) - WHISKEY-CONV (TWIN CYL) SSG 2 - - 1(1) 1(1) 2(2) - - 1(1) (2) 1(3) - - (2) (1) (3) (2) - TOTAL SSG 12 (1) 2(2) 5(2) 20(5)-12 (2) 2(2) 4(3) 18(7) 12 (2) 1(3) 4(2) 17(7) 16(4) 10(6) ATTACK NUCLEAR ALFA SSN 3 - - - 3 4 - - - 4 4 - - - 4 4 VICTOR I OR SUCCESSOR SSN 13 - - 4 17 13 - - 6 19 14 - - 8 22 31 32 VICTOR II SSN 3 - - - 3 4 - - - 4 5 - - - 5 8 8 NEW CLASS SSN - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 11 NOVEMBER SSN 9 - - 4 13 9 - - 4 13 9 - - 4 13 11(2) 3(10) ECHO SSN i _ _ - 5 5 - - - 5 5 - - - 5 5 5 4(1) TOTAL SSN ! 28 - - 13 41 30 - - 15 45 32 - - 17 49 60(2) 62(11) ATTACK, LONG RANGE, DIESEL TANGO OR SUCCESSOR SS 3 - 2 - 5 5 - 2 - 7 6 - 3 - 9 13-15 20 I FOXTROT (iii) SS I 38 2 - 20 60 ,38 2 - 20 60 36(2) 2 - 20 , 58(2) 49 36 Z U UL 1 ?iiTOTAT LONG RANGE RR 14(8) 2(2) - 2 4(5) 24(5) 10(15)12(10)1(3) 75(15M45(10)3(3) - 2(7) 2 22(7) 5(20) 72(20) (10) (3) 42(12)2(3) - 3 (7) 20(7) -(20) 67(22) 1 (10) 1 - 52-54(10 56 (i ; 45(8)4(2) Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 TABLE N 1 (concluded) CLASS TYPE No. MISSILE TUBES Mid-1976 Mid-1977 Mid-1978 Mid-198 d-1985 NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL ATTACK, MEDIUM RANGE, DIESEL BRAVO SS 1 - 2 1 4 1 - 2 1 4 1 - 2 1 4 4 ROMEO (iii) (iv) SS 6(2) 2 2 - 10(2) 6(2) 2 2 - 10(2) 6 (1) (1) - 8(4) 2(8) - WHISKEY (iv) SS 10/ 10/ 10/ 10/ 40/ 5/ 5/ 5/ 5/ 20/ 2/ 2/ 3/ 3/ 10/ (15) - (10) (25) (15) (15) (65) (10) (20) (15) (15) (60) (10) (20) (15) (15) (60) TOTAL MEDIUM RANGE SS 17/ 12/ 14/ 11/ 54/ 12/ 7/ 9/ 6/ 34/ 9/ 3/ 6/ 4/ 22/ 6(23) (12) (25) (15) (15) (67) (12) (20) (15) (15) (62) (12) (21) (16) (15) (64) ATTACK, SHORT RANGE, DIESEL QUEBEC (iv) (5) (4) - (9) - (5) (4) - (9) (5) (4) - (9) _ _ TOTAL NUCLEAR POWERED 97 - - 47 144 100 - - 50 150 104 - - 55 159 180(2) 186(15) TOTAL DIESEL POWERED 84/ 17/ 18/ 52/ 171/ 79/ 10/ 13/ 44/ 146/ 73/ 5/ 10/ (W 128/ 96-98/ 92(6) (20)(33) (21) (22) (96) (22) (30) (21) (25) (98) (24) (31) (23) ? j (102) (37)) GRAND TOTAL 181/ 17/ 18/ 99/ 315/ 179/ 10/ 13/ 94/ 296/ 177/ 5/ 10/ 95/ 287/ 276-278/ 278/ (20) (33) (21) (22) (96) (22)(30) (21) (25) (98) (24)(31) (23) (24) (102) (37) (21) (i) It is estimated that a second DELTA successor class may have about 20 missile tubes. (ii) The composition of the SLBM force in the 1980s cannot be estimated with confidence. The total of 62 SSBN is based upon the 1972 SAL Interim Agreement limits. (iii) The total number of FOXTROT, ZULU, and ROMEO class submarines for the Northern and Baltic fleets represents an estimated average 008. The actual disposition of units may vary slightly, from time to time, due to interfleet transfers for refit/overhaul. (iv) The rate at which ROMEO, WHISKEY, and QUEBEC classes will be Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 TABLE N 2 ESTIMATED 00B OF SOVIET SUBMARINE SUPPORT SHIPS BY FLEETS (MID-1976) CLASS TYPE NOR SUBMARINE TENDERS MOD DNEPR AS UGRA AS DON AS DNEPR AS WM BAUER AS TOTAL AS 1 4 2 2 2 BAL SMALL SUBMARINE TENDERS TOMBA ASL ATREK ASL MISCELLANEOUS ASL TOTAL ASL 1 3 2 6 BLA PAC TOTAL 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 5 2 7 6 3 2 20 REPAIR SHIPS (i) AMUR AR 5 OSKOL AR 4 TOVDA AR 1 MISCELLANEOUS AR 1 TOTAL AR 11 SUBMARINE RESCUE SHIPS NEPA ASR PRUT ASR EX-T-58 ASR TOTAL ASR MISSILE SUPPORT SHIPS MP-6 AEM AMGA AEM LAMA AEM TOTAL AEM 2 1 5 2 8 3 3 2 2 8 - 1 3 6 4 7 7 1 3 14 3 12 1 I 1 4 7 31 - 1 3 9 1 13 4 23 (i) Repair ships are not employed exclusively as submarine support ships, but they have this capability. SECRET US 161/76 PART III - Section 2 111-2-5 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 cn cn 17d rti tzi TABLE N 3 ESTIMATED 00B OF SOVIET SURFACE COMBATANTS BY FLEETS (MID-1976 TO MID-1978) AND TOTAL 00B (MID-1981 AND MID-1985) (Black Sea 00B includes the Caspian Flotilla) (additional ships estimated to be in reserve are shown in parenthesis) CLASS TYPE No. MISSILE LNCHRS. SSM SAM Mid-1976 Mid-1977 Mid-1978 Mid-1981 Mid-1985 NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL TOTAL !TOTAL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS KIEV OR SUCCESSOR CVSG UNK - - 1 - 1 - - 1 - 1 - - 2 - 2 2 4 ' SAM HELICOPTER CRUISERS MOSKVA CHG 4 - . 2 - 2 - - . 2 - 2- . - 2 - 2 2 2 , . SSM/SAM CRUISERS KARA OR SUCCESSOR (i) CLGM 8 8 1 - 3 - 4 2 - 3 - 5 2 - 3 - 5 8 8 KRESTA I CLGM 4 4 3 - - 1 4 3 - - 1 4 3 - - 1 4 4 4 KRESTA II OR SUCCESSOR(i) CLGM 8 4 5 1 - 2 8 6 1 - 2 9 6 1 - 3 10 12 12 KYNDA CLGM 8 2 - - 2 2 4 - - 2 2 4 - - 2 2 4 ' 4 4 TOTAL CLGM 9 1 5 5 20 11 1 5 5 22 11 1 5 6 23 28 28 CRUISERS SVERDLOV CLCP 2 - - 1 1 , 2 - - 1 1 2 - - 1 1 2 2 2 i SVERDLOV CLG 2 - - 1 t - 1 1 - - 1 - 1 - - 1 - 1 1 (1) i SVERDLOV CT 2 1 2(1) 2(111 7(2) -1 2 1 2(1) 2(1)1 7(2) 2 1 2(1) 2(1) 7(2) 6(3) 4(2) 1 CHAPAEV CL 1 1(1) - - 1(1) - 1W - - 1 1(1) - 1(1) - - 1(1) (1) - Z-?00060001.000t10091.0809dCltl-VIO : 9O/60/OOZ aseeieu JOd peACLIddV Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 TABLE N 3 (continued) CLASS TYPE No. MISSILE LNCHRS. SSM SAM Mid-1976 Mid-1977 L Mid-1978 Mid-1981 Mid-1985 NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL OR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL KIROV CL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - TOTAL CLCP/CLG/CL 2 2(1) 4(1) 3(1) 11(3) 2 2(1) 4(1) 3(1) 11(3) 2 2(1) 4(1) 3(1) 11(3) 9(4) 6(3) MISSILE DESTROYERS NEW CLASS DLGM/DDGM UNK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 9 RRIVAR DDGSP 4 4 4 8 - - 12 4 8 1 - 13 i 5 7 20 1 15 20 20 RASHIN DLGM 4 4 1 2 2 - 5 1 3 3 - 7 3 4 1 9 12 12 RASHIN DLG 4 1 0(1) 7(1) 4 12(2)j - (1) 6(1) 4 10(2) i -: 0(1) 5(1) 3 8(2) 7 7 RANIN DDG 2 4 1 - 2 7 4 1 - 3 8 14 1 - 3 8 8 5(3) KRUPNYY DDGS 2 - - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - MOD KILDIN DDGS 4 - 3 - 3 - 3 - 3 - - 3 3 3 KILDIN DDGS 1 - - 1 1 - - 1 1 - - - 1 1 3 3 SAM KOTLIN DDG 2 2 1 3 2 8 2 1 3 2 8 2 1 3 2 8 8 6(2) TOTAL DLGM/DDGM/DDGSP/DLG/DDGS/ 12 12(1) 15(1) 10 49(2) 11 13(1) 16(1) 10 50(2) 12 12(1) 17(1) 11 52(2) 59 62(5) DDG/ DESTROYERS KOTLIN DD 2 3 3(1) 8(1) 16(2 2 3 3(1) 8(1) 16(2) 2 3 2(1) 7(3)14(4) 12(2) 8(2) Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 IN) Z uoT1DaS - III DIV,I TABLE N 3 (continued) CLASS (ii) iiVE No. MISSILE mull Mid-1976 Mid-1977 Mid-1978 _ Mid-1981 Mid-1985 NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL kNOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL -Turn- TOTAL SKORYY DD 4(4).5(4) 5(5) 4(5) 18(18)3(4) 4(4) 5(5) 4(5) 16(18) 3(4) 3(4) 5(4) 3(4) 14(16) 8(10) - TOTAL DD 6(4) 8(4) 8(6) 12(6) 34(20)5(4) 7(4) 8(6) 12(6) 32(20) 5(4) 6(4) 7(5) 10(7) 28(20) 20(12) 8(2) DESTROYER ESCORTS UNK NEW CLASS - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - - 3 - 3 12 24 RIGA DE 4(3) 6(2) 8(2) 12(2) 30(9) 4(4) 5(2) 6(2) 10(2) 25(10) 3(4) 4(2) 5(2) 8(2) 20(10) (5) KOLA DE 1 - (1) - (1) - - (1) - (1) - - (1) - (1) - - MIRKA DE - 14 6 - 20 - 14 6 - 20 - 14 6 - 20 20 12(8) PETYA I and III DE 8 2 6 6 22 7 2 4 6 19 7 2 4 6 19 19 13(6) PETYA II DE 13 - 4 10 27 13 - 4 10 27 13 - 4 10 27 27 26(1) TOTAL DE 26(3)22(2)24(3) 24(2) 100(10)24(4)21(2) 21(3) 26(2) 92(1) 23(4)20(2) 22(3) 24(2) 89(11) 83(12) 75(20) COASTAL ESCORTS GRISHA OR SUCCESSOR (i)PCEP/PCE 2/- 10 - 10 6 26 10 2 10 7 29 12 4 10 8 34 40 POTI PCE 15 20 16 14 65 15 20 16 14 65 14 18 15 13 60 50 TURYA OR SUCCESSOR PCH 3 8 6 13 30 4 10 8 15 37 5 12 9 17 43 50 STENKA OR SUCCESSOR PCS - 29 10 29 68 - 30 10 30 70 30 10 30 70 70 SO 1 PCS - 17 12 6 35 - 7 5 3 15 - 3 2 - 5 - TOTAL PCFPWR/PcH/Prs 28 74 54 68 224 29 69 49 69 216 31 67 46 68 212 110 Z-?00060001.000t10091.0809dCltl-VIO 9O/60/OOZ eseeieti JOd peACLIddV Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Z uoT30aS - III .1111/cl TABLE N 3 (continued) CLASS (ii) TYPE No. MISSILE LNCHRS. SSM SAM Mid-1976 Mid-1977 Mid-1978 Mid-1981 NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL TOTAL MISSILE PATROL CRAFT NANUCHKA OR PGGP SUCCESSOR (i) 6 2 2 5 8 1 16 2 6 8 2 18 3 7 8 3 21 24 OSA I PTFG4 17 16 10 29 72 15 16 10 29 70 15 16 10 27 68 44 OSA II OR SUCCESSOR (i) PTFG4 9 18 6 15 48 9 18 6 15 48 9 18 6 15 48 48-64 TOTAL PGGP/PTFG 28 39 24 45 136 26 40 24 46 136 27 41 24 45 137 116-132 TORPEDO PATROL CRAFT SHERSHEN OR PT SUCCESSOR 17 15 10 8 50 17 15 10 8 50 17 15 10 8 50 40 P6/P4 PT 8 12 10 10 40 6 10 9 10 35 - 7 6 7 20 - TOTAL PTF/PT I 25 27 20 18 90 23 25 19 18 85 17 22 16 15 70 40 HIGH SPEED CRAFT PGM SLEPEN - - 1 - 1 - - 1 - 1 - - 1 - 1 1 PBH PCHELA - 13 7 - 20 - 13 7 - 20 - 12 6 - 18 12 TOTAL PGM/PBH - 13 8 - 21 - 13 8 - 21 - 12 7 19 13 FLEET MINESWEEPERS (iii) NATYA OR SUCCESSOR MSF 6 8 7 3 24 7 9 8 4 28 8 10 9 5 32 40 YURKA MSF 11 13 10 11 45 11 13 10 11 45 _. 13 10 11 45 45 T.58 MSF 4 - - 11 15 3 - - 10 13 2 - - 10 12 - L 1 Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV TABLE N 3 (concluded) CLASS (ii) TYPE No. MISSILE LNCHRS. SSM SAM Mid-1976 . Mid-1977 Mid-1978 Mid-1981 NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL NOR BAL BLA PAC TOTAL TOTAL T.43 MSF 15 20 10 20 65 10 20 10 20 60 10 15 5 20 50 10 TOTAL MSF 36 41 27 45 149 31 42 28 45 146 31 38 24 46 139 95 SMALL MINESWEEPERS (iii) SASHA MSM - 9 3 - 12 - 8 2 - 10 - 5 2 - 7 - T.301 MSM - 2 1 - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - SONYA OR SUCCESSOR MSC 4 8 - 4 16 4 10 4 6 24 6 12 6 8 32 48 VANYA MSC/MHC 17 23 16 17 73 17 23 16 17 73 17 23 16 17 73 65 ZHENYA MSC - 3 - - 3 - 3 - - 3 - 3 - - 3 3 TOTAL MSM/MHC/MSC 21 45 20 21 107 20 43 24 19 110 123 43 24 25 115 116 (i) Successor class may not have the same missile system or number of missile launcher uoT33aS - III 1-11Vd (ii) 00B for the various classes of coastal escorts, patrol and high speed craft, and minesweepers cannot be estimated with confidence beyond 1981. (iii) About 15 percent of the total number of fleet minesweepers and 10 percent of the small minesweepers are likely to be in a reserve status. Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV uot43aS - III 111Vd 'Si TABLE N 4 ESTIMATED AOB OF SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION BY FLEETS (MID-1976 AND MID-1979) AND TOTAL AOB (MID-1982 AND MID-1985)(1) STRIKE SUBSONIC MID-1976 M1D-1979 MID-1982 MID-1985 NORTH BALTIC BLACK(ii) PACIFIC TOTAL NORTH BALTIC BLACK(ii) PACIFIC TOTAL 65 72 56 100 293 (iii) 55 66 45 84 250 205 120 pc I.J.J CO E co STRIKE SUPERSONIC ? 24 40 ( i vd ? 64 15 (iv) 38 42 (iv) ? 95 (V) 150 (0) 190 (vii) TANKERS 23 13 28 79 20 15 20 25 80 80 65 RECCE SUBSONIC 56 9 6 53 124 (viii) 55 20 10 50 135 (viii) 100 (viii) 80 (viii) SUPERSONIC ? 3 3 ? 6 ? 3 3 ? 10 15 20 HELICOPTERS 6 5 7 8 26 8 5 10 7 30 25 10 ce 1-- V') < ?cm. FIXED WING (ix) 56 21 36 55 168 63 21 41 55 180 210 225 HELICOPTERS 55 30 85 70 240 40 15 120 50 225 275 305 UNKNOWN V/STOL ? ? 15 ? 15 ? ? 60 (x) ? 60 70 105 (i) (ii) Forty-five Medium Fixed Wing and 85 Helicopter transport not included here, Numbers shown do not include 24 BADGER, 7 MAIL, 12 HORMONE A, 2 BACKFIRE, 2 Kulbakino (Training a/c.). (iii) Includes 11 BADGER A and 10 BEAGLE free fall bombers in the Baltic Fleet, b (utility) tow target role (10 Baltic Fleet, 6 Northern Fleet). (iv) Includes 15 BACKFIRE. (v) Includes 40 BACKFIRE. (Possibly some for use in reconnaissance role.) Fleet (vi) Includes 95 BACKFIRE. (Possibly some for use in reconnaissance role.) (vii) Includes 140 BACKFIRE. (Possibly some for use in reconnaissance role.) (viii) Includes two CUB signal intelligence collection aircraft in each Fleet. (ix) MAIL, MAY, and BEAR F. (x) Fleet subordination may vary. but included in Table A 1. MAY, and 2 BEAR F at Nikolayev/ ut does not include 16 BEAGLE subordination not known. Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET TABLE N 5 ESTIMATED 00B OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT NAVIES BY COUNTRIES (MID-1976) (Excluding Amphibious Ships and Craft) CLASS TYPE /Itg- 'POLAND BULGARIA ROMANIA SUBMARINES MEDIUM RANGE 'WHISKEY SS - 4 2 ROMEO SS - 2 SAM DESTROYER SAM KOTLIN DDG 1 NEW CLASS DDG 1 DESTROYER ESCORTS RIGA DE 2 2 COASTAL ESCORTS HAI KRONSHTADT SO 1 OBLUZE GDANSK OKSYWIE SHANGHAI POTI PC 12 PC - - 2 3 PC 4 - PCS - 14 (i) PC - 9 PC - 4 PCS/ PGM PC 12 (i) 3 MISSILE PATROL CRAFT PTFG 12 12 3 OSA I TORPEDO PATROL CRAFT SHERSHEN PTF 15 - 6 _ WISLA PT - 12 - - P6 PT - 3 - - P4 PT - - 8 ILTIS PT 38 - LIBELLE PT 5 - - _ HUCH WAN PTH - - - MINE WARFARE SHIPS 143 MSF - 12 2 - KRAKE MSF 3 - - - M 40 MSF - - - 4 KRONGULEC MSF - 12 - - KONDOR MSC 34 - - - VAN VA MSC - - 4 - T301 MSM - - 1 10 PERSONNEL STRENGTH (ii) 17,500 26,000 10,500 11,000 (i) Numbers include some units from GDR Coastal Border Brigade (GBK) Polish Maritime Frontier Guard (W0P), and Romanian Maritime Frontier Guard. (ii) Numbers include Border Guards etc., and all naval elements. SECRET US 161/76 111-2-12 PART III - Section 2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV ?a rs.) 3 uomaS - III JAM TABLE N 6 ESTIMATED AOB OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT NAVIES BY COUNTRIES (MID-l976) AIRCRAFT ROLE GDR POLAND BULGARIA ROMANIA TOTAL FIGHTER BOMBER RECCE - 10 - - 10 FIGHTER BOMBER ATTACK - 36 - - 36 ASW HELICOPTER (HOUND) 10 5 6 4 25 TRANSPORTS - FIXED WING - 2 - - 2 TRANSPORTS/RECCE HELO 6 27 (i) - - 33 TRAINING AIRCRAFT - 3 - - 3 (i) This figure includes 25 HARE. Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV TABLE N 7_ ESTIMATFD 008 OF WARSAW PACT AMPHIBIOUS SHTPS,_LANDING CRAFLANILAIR__CUSHION VEHICLES BY FLEETS/COUNTRIES (MID-1q7) -1 611 Fri C) rrl ?4 A. Amphibious Vessels with a Primary Amphibious Role. (Those vessels used regularly to land amphibious troops and judged to represent the primary assault lift of the navy.) CLASS SOVIET NAVY Total NSWP NAVIES Grand Total TYPE North Baltic black Laspian Pacific UN Poland bulgaria Komania ALLIGATOR LST 2 3 4 - 4 13 - - - - 13 ROPUCHA LST - 3 - - - 3 - - - - 3 POLNOCNY LSM 13 16 13 9 11 62 - 23 - - 85 ROBBE LSM - - - - - - 6 - - - 6 VYDRA LCU - - - - - - - - 10 - 10 LABO 100 LCU - - - - - - 12 - - - 12 MFP LCU - - - - - - - - 9 - 9 EICHSTADEN LCP - - - - - - - 15 - - 15 MARABUT LCVP - - - - - - - 3 - - 3 Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV z uot438S - III lad TABLE N 7 (Continued) B. Amphibious Vessels with a Residual Role Only. (Units designed as amphibious vessels and retaining a physical capability to land amphibious troops but which have not been observed to be used in that capacity in recent years.) (i) SOVIET NAVY NSWP NAVIES CLASS TYPE North Baltic Black Caspian Pacific Total GDR Poland Bulgaria Romania Grand Total MP-8 LSM 1 - - - - 1 1 MP-4 LSM 1 - - - 5 (10) 6 (10) 6 (10) SMB-1 LCU - (5) (15) (10) 5 (5) 5 (35) 5 (35) VYDRA LCU - 5(5) 3(3) 5(5) 13(13) 13(13) MP-10 LCU - - - - (5) (5) (5) T-4 LCM Numerous in all fleet areas for use in on/off- loading follow-up units. Air Cushion Vehicles AIST LACV - 3 - - - 3 3 LEBED LACV - 2 - - - 2 2 GUS LACV - 7 4 - 7 18 18 (i) Additional units estimated to be in reserve are shown in parenthesis. Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Z uoT333S - III IIIWI TABLE N 8 MERCHANT SHIPPING OF THE WARSAW PACT (1 JAN 1976) (Seagoing hips of 100 GRT and Over, in Thousands of DWT) COUNTRY DRY CARGO (i) CONTAINER RO/RO REFRIGERATED BULK CARRIER TANKER (POL) TANKER (SPE.) PASSENGER (ii) TOTAL No. DWT No. Dia No. DWT No. DWT No. DWT No. DWT No. DWT No. DWT No. DWT USSR (over 1000 GRT) Northern Fleet 195 988 - - - - - - 23 210 4 12 - - 9 6 231 1,216 Baltic Fleet 270 1,800 5 38 9 90 20 100 10 50 45 585 2 5 7 18 368 2,686 Black Sea Fleet 335 3,300 4 32 9 55 5 23 51 810 160 4,000 10 28 30 70 604 8,318 Pacific Fleet 330 2,175 5 38 -- _ 2 - 9 24 170 63 450 - - - - 23 58 447 2,900 Total 1130 8,263 14 108 18 145 27 132 108 1,240 272 5,047 12 33 69 152 1650 15,120 USSR Caspian Sea Fleet 25 63 - - - - - - - - 50 275 1 4 2 1 78 343 River-sea Fleet 230 640 - - - - - - - 60 280 - - - - 290 920 Under 1000 GRT 65 31 4 4 58 - - - - 2 2 - - - - 76 45 Total 320 734 4 4 5 8 - - - - 112 557 _ 1 _ 4 _ 2 _ 1 444 1,308 USSR: Grand Total 1450 8,997 18 112 23 153 27 132 108 1,240 384 5,604 13 37 71 153 2094 16,428 NSWP: Poland 177 1,400 - - 1 2 4 9 97 1,863 10 830 3 30 5 10 297 4,144 GDR 108 812 - - 3 11 8 53 14 270 16 607 - - 5 13 154 1,766 Bulgaria 57 390 1 2 - - - - 29 362 22 506 - - 5 8 114 1,268 Romania 67 335 - - - - - - 26 561 7 435 - - 1 2 101 1,333 Czechoslovakia 8 43 - - - -- - 6 177 - - - - - 14 220 Hungary 20 90 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 20 90 Total 437 3,070 1 2 4 13 12 62 172 3,233 55 2,378 3 30 16 33 700 8,821 NSWP: Under 1000 GRT 72 55 20 18 - - 1 1 - - 14 10 - - 3 1 110 85 NSWP: Grand Total 509 3,125 21 20 4 13 13 63 172 3,233 69 2,388 3 30 19 34 810 8,906 GRAND TOTAL: WP 1959 12,122 39 132 27 166 40 195 280 4,473 453 7,992 16 67 90 187 2904 25,334 (i) Includes timber carrier, cargo-passenger, cargo-training (ii) Includes short-sea passenger and passenger-car/rail ferries Z-?00060001?000t10091.0809dCltl-VIO : 9O/60/OOZ eseeletl JOd PeA0AdV Z-?00060001.000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ aseeieu -10d peACLIddV z uoTapaS - III IVIcl tzi TABLE N 9 FISHING FLEETS OF THE WARSAW PACT (1 JAN 1976) (Trawlers and Support Ships of 100 GRT and Over, Rounded to the Nearest 100 GRT) COUNTRY TRAWLERS FACTORY TRAWLERS FACTORY SHIPS & REF. TRANSPORTS AUXILIARY SHIPS (i) RESEARCH SHIPS TOTAL No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT USSR 868 305,000 164 57,600 469 227,900 1,033 384,600 245 31,300 264 809,700 145 409,500 158 505,200 204 597,000 - - 139 846,600 32 253,300 44 409,100 196 1,277,900 95 98,900 105 109,100 38 23,400 58 98,200 170 254,200 48 15,100 6 1,300 24 31,900 14 12,700 39 44,100 4 2,100 1,382 2,071,700 403 775,700 743 1,253,100 1,642 2,557,800 392 147,400 Baltic Fleet Black Sea Fleet Northern Fleet Far East Fleet Caspian Sea Fleet Total 4,562 6,805,700 87 92,100 506 2,885,800 419 500,000 2,779 1,006,400 771 2,321,400 NSWP 182 56,500 133 57,200 - - - - 83 174,000 13 39,300 29 89,900 29 76,400 7 48,000 8 42,500 4 36,300 6 33,300 8 11,600 5 1,600 - - - - 3 3,700 5 2,900 - - - - 283 293,800 164 143,700 33 126,200 35 109,700 Poland GDR Romania Bulgaria Total 515 673,400 8 6,600 25 160,100 13 13,200 315 113,700 154 379,600 GRAND TOTAL 3,094 1,120,100 925 2,701.000 531 3,045,900 432 513,200 95 98,700 5,077 7,479,100 (1.) Includes tankers, tugs, training and floating workshop ships Z-?00060001.000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ aseeieu -10d peACLIddV Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET ESTIMATED NAVAL TABLE N 10 HYDROGRAPHIC/OCEANOGRAPHIC FLEETS OF THE WARSAW PACT (MID-1976) COUNTRY TYPE CLASS NUMBER USSR (i) AGOR ABKHAZIYA 4 NEVELSKOY 1 AKADEMIK KRYLOV 3 NILOLAY ZUBOV 9 POLYUS 3 AGS BIYA 9 KAMENKA 9 LENTRA 8 MEL ITOPOL 3 MOMA 23 TELNOVSK 4 SAMARA 16 T-43 20 MP-8 1 MOD TELNOVSK 2 MOD KEYLA 1 MOD LENTRA 5 AGSB MOD DOBRYNYA NIKITICH 1 TOTAL 122 POLAND AGS MOMA 1 TOTAL 1 GDR AGSC JORDAN 1 KFK 1 SCHOLLE 1 TOTAL 3 BULGARIA AGS Single Ship 1 AGSC VARNA 1 TOTAL 2 ROMANIA AGS FRIPONNE 1 TOTAL 1 (1) There are, in addition, approximately 100 Soviet non-naval units, mostly of 500 GRT and over, subordinated to various research institutions. SECRET US 161/76 111-2-18 PART III - Section 2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET TABLE A 1 TABLE A 2 TABLE A 3 TABLE A 4 TABLE A 5 -TABLE A 6 TABLE A 7 TABLE A 8 TABLE A 9 TABLE A 10 TABLE A 11 TABLE A 12 SECRET US 161/76 PART III SECTION 3 AIR FORCES TABLES SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES BY MAJOR COMPONENTS (MID-1976) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE (MID-1976) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF INTERCEPTORS OF SOVIET AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE (MID-1979, MID-1982, AND MID-1985) ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION (MID-1976, MID-1979, MID-1982, AND MID-1985) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET FRONTAL AVIATION (MID-1976) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET FRONTAL AVIATION (MID-1978, MID-1982, AND MID-1985) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION (MID-1976, MID-1979, MID-1982, AND MID-1985) ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES (MID-1976) ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES (MID-1979, MID-1982, AND MID-1985) WARSAW PACT RESERVE COMBAT AIRCRAFT (MID-1976) ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET CIVIL AVIATION (MID-1976, MID-1979, AND MID-1985) WARSAW PACT HARDENED AIRCRAFT SHELTERS (MID-1976) 111-3-1 PART III - Section 3 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 E uoT3DaS - III IIIV43 TABLE A 1 SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES BY MAJOR COMPONENTS (MID-1976) AIRCRAFT ROLE SOVIET FRONTAL AVIATION SOVIET AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION(i) SOVIET MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION TOTAL SOVIET TOTAL NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT TOTAL WARSAW (ii) PACT(iii) ix wInterceptor E"Counterair x - 2465 - - - 2465 1130 3595 2030 - - - - 2030 310 2340 2iGround 4,Reconnaissance Attack 1640 - - - - 1640 542 2182 405 - - - - 405 66 471 TOTAL 4075 2465 - - - 6540 2048 8588 Bomber 200 - 735 357 - 1292 18 1310 Reconnaissance 330 9 (iv) 35 156 (v) - 530 170 700 Electronic Warfare 75 - 50 35 45 205 - 205 Tanker - - 65 79 - 144 - 144 wHelicopter -43 Fixed Wing - - - 168 - 168 - 168 - - - 240 - 240 - 240 Transport Medium/Heavy 44 40 30 48 760 922 25 947 Helicopter Medium/Heavy 1950 115 10 77 370 (vi) 2522 356 2878 GRAND TOTAL 6674 2629 925 1160 1175 12563 2617 15180 (i) (ii) Does not include about 85 aircraft of NSWP naval aviation (see Table N 4). (iii) Excluding 4555 reserve combat aircraft (s e Table A 10). (iv) AWAC aircraft. (v) Includes 26 HORMONE B Reconnaissance helicopters. (vi) Miscellaneous helicopters not accounted for in other air force tables including helicopters subordinated to Soviet military transport aviation. Does not include some 15 V/STOL aircraft estimated for SNA by mid-1976. cra BCf3 CD 0- 0 0 0 8 CD8 th . . 0 CO 0 0 th0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CD 0 0 0 C.4 c uoTaDas - III 111Vd ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION TABLE A 2 DEFENSE (MID-1976) "0 "0 0 OF SOVIET AVIATION OF AIR CD H AIR DEFENSE DISTRICTS tzl 0 AIRCRAFT CD TYPE ARKHANGELSK LENINGRAD MINSK KIEV BAKU TASHKENT MOSCOW(i) SVERDLOVSK NOVOSIBIRSK KHABAROVSK TOTAL to INTERCEPTORS 260 180 170 270 330 165 385 170 145 390 21465 co AWAC 9 9 MEDILIM/ 0 HEAVY TRANSPORT 2 3 20 2 3 40 MEDIUM 03 0 HEAVY/ CO HELICOPTER 14 5 7 9 LI 27 1 22 26 115 0 0 (i) Includes PVC Headquarters. 0 0 0 0 0 0 c.0 0 0 0 TABLE A 3 ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF INTERCEPTORS OF SOVIET AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE (MID-1979, MID-1982, AND MID-1985) YEAR AIR DEFENSE DISTRICTS TOTAL ARKHANGELSK LENINGRAD MINSK KIEV BAKU TASHKENT MOSCOW SVERDLOVSK NOVOSIBIRSK KHABAROVSK, MID- 1979 230 150 150 250 310 140 350 150 130 370 2230 MID- 1982 230 150 145 240 305 140 335 150 125 360 2180 ID- 985 230 150 145 225 290 125 300 150 125 300 2040 E up-P.09S - Ill DM 0 CD a -n 102 CD CD 0 CD 0 . . -0 CO 0 CO 0 (11 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 CD 0 0 0 C.4 E uoT309S - III IIIWI TABLE A 4 ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION (MID-1976, MID-1979, MID-1982, AND MID-1985) 1st ARMY 2nd ARMY 3rd ARMY TOTAL 1st ARMY 2nd ARMY 3rd ARMY TOTAL 1st ARMY 2nd ARMY 3rd ARMY 1st 2nd TOTAL ARMY ARMY 3rd ARMY TOTAL BACKFIRE 20 20 10 50 60 40 25 125 75 75 50 200 75 75 50 200 BEAR/BISON BOMBERS 20 65 55 140 20 50 40 110 10 40 20 70 - 20 20 40 BADGER/BLINDER BOMBERS 280 165 100 545 215 145 _ _ 90 450 170 100 50 320 110 90 25 225 TOTAL BOMBERS 320 250 165 735 295 235 155 685 255 215 120 590 185 185 95 465 BEAR E/BADGER F/ BLINDER C RECONNAISSANCE 5 15 15 35 15 15 10 40 20 20 10 50 20 20 20 60 BADGER A/BACKFIRE ELECTRONIC WARFARE 20 15 15 50 15 15 10 40 10 10 10 30 10 5 5 20 TANKER 35 - 30 65 30 - 30 60 30 - 30 60 30 - 30 60 TOTAL COMBAT SUPPORT 60 30 60 150 60 30 50 140 60 30 50 140 60 25 55 140 TRANSPORT MEDIUM/HEAVY 15 5 10 30 15 10 10 35 15 10 10 35 10 10 10 30 HELICOPTER MEDIUM/HEAVY 5 10 5 5 5 15 5 5 5 15 5 5 5 15 225 165 GRAND TOTAL 400 285 240 925 375 280 220 875 335 260 185 780 260_ 650 0 citTja tx9 8 co 8 th0 -0 co 0 0 (73.1 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 CD 0 0 0 C.4 cs, C-' E uoT1DaS - III IIIVd TABLE A 5 ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET FRONTAL AVIATION (MID-1976) LALIBLE2A_FT TYPE NORTH pH .? CENTRAL SOUTHERN RESERVE CENTRAL ASIAN -)11 MD x' TRANSBAIKAL MD FAR EAST MD ---1 jr- (3 .2 CY cl m z CL- I? m c:c 0 44 crl 0 V) 4.nm = a = MOSCOW MD KIEV MD . m gOld 2Bomber(iii) 4'Nonnuc1ear N e w Counterair(i) 375 130 50 70 55 130 120 50 70 55 40 30 15 60 100 1350 Counterair(i ) _ - - 30 50 25 - 10 85 60 40 40 60 105 I 145 30 680 Nuclear Fighter/ 55 215 80 - 90 90 50 45 40 1 75 40 - 20 , 10 90 90 990 Fighter/Bomber i 70 35 35 - 80 35 70 - - 40 - 30 40 125 90 650 Reconnaissance(iv) 15 65 40 15 25 25 15 15 25 35 15 - e 41 p_SILEIQTAL 140 690 285 95 315 230 265 1190 200 280 150 80 155 195 445 360 4075 BEAGLE/BREWER Bomber - 50 40 - 1 1 30 - 20 - - - - 30 30 200 7?nectronic Reconnaissance 30 30 20 5 15 15 25 10 38 35 10 - - 25 35 45 330 Warfare 5 20 10 5 5 10 5 1 - 5 5 - - - - - 5 75 TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT 175 740 315 105 385 295 295 230 235 340 160 80 155 220 510 440 4680 Helicopters(v) 70 280 55 20 175 15 140 65 90 190 80 60 75 50 275 285 1925 Medium Transport 3 8 3 5 2 - - 3 3 7 7 44 1--- GRAND TOTAL 248 1028 373 130 562 310 435 298 325 530 240 140 233. 273 792 732 6649 (1) FISHBED J/K/L. (11) FIREBAR. FISHB (iii) FITTER A/C, FL (iv) FISHBED H, FOX (v) Medium and hea FLOGGER. ED D/F, FRESCO. OGGER, FENCER. BAT B. vy helicopter regiments and flights assigned to TAAs. NOTE: There are no Frontal Aviation formations in the Volga, North Caucasus, Ural, and Siberian MDs. C ucippaS ? III IllVd TABLE A 6 ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET FRONTAL AVIATION (MID-1978, MID-1982, AND MID-1985) AIRCRAFT NORTH CENTRAL SOUTHERN 44 . = - z ,, COCO. CO? w 6Co n 0 9 . m -4 0 COC;?) 0R RESERVE 8 . h D EMI E-I FAR 9 m ?=4 E C. ) STERN 2 a g H m E-I . Q pl TOTAL 2 2 u z . z 41 u . . aF . . 44 z . 1 a 0 44 44 u 0 ,,.? Co m . 2 . . . 5 .., C.) R u . 1-1 M R z < c'7' . . w ,-4 w M m m 74 P i-i x _ p4 V,Fighter EReconnaissance '-4 4. ttl'Fighter 5Reconnaissance 1-1 4, Counterair - 370 125 80 120 80 125 100 120 120 80 80 80 120 210 160 1970 Bomber 125 259 120 - 190 185 120 60 40 130 40 - 55 40 220 145 1720 25 60 30 15 30 35 25 15 30 30 20 - 15 40 40 60 470 SUBTOTAL 150 680 275 95 340 300 270 175 190 280 140 80 150 200 470 365 4160 omber - - - - 20 20 - 10 - 10 - - - - 30 30 120 econnaissance 25 30 15 - 10 10 25 - 30 30 - - 30 30 35 270 CM 5 30 15 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - - 5 5 5 100 SUBTOTAL 30 60 30 5 35 35 30 15 35 45 - - - 35 65 70 490 TOTAL 180 740 305 100 375 335 300 190 225 325 140 80 150 235 535 435 4650 e1icopier(i) 90 280 100 60 200 60 140 100 110 200 90 80 100 120 240 280 2250 cv m m -1-1 m 1-; Z Counterair - 350 120 80 120 80 120 100 120 120 80 80 80 120 210 160 1940 Bomber 125 250 120 - 190 185 120 60 40 130 40 - 55 40 220 145 1730 25 80 40 15 45 45 40 15 35 35 20 15 40 40 60 550 SUBTOTAL 150 680 270 95 345 310 280 175 195 285 140 80 150 200 470 365 4220 Bomber - - - - 20 20 - 10 - 10 - - - - 30 30 120 Reconnaissance 20 15 - - - 5 10 - 30 25 - - 25 30 30 190 ECM 5 30 15 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - - 5 5 5 100 SUBTOTAL 25 45 15 5 25 30 15 15 35 40 - - - 30 65 65 410 TOTAL 175 725 285 100 370 340 295 190 230 325 140 80 150 230 535 430 4630 Helicopter (i) 90 280 120 60 200 80 140 100 100 200 90 80 100 120 240 300 2300 Lc, m 1 r: 1-t Z a4Counterair 41 E,Fighter m LD I ;ECM - 330 110 80 120 80 120 100 120 120 80 80 80 120 200 160 1900 Bomber 120 230 120 - 190 200 120 80 40 130 40 10 55 40 220 135 1730 Reconnaissance 30 85 45 15 50 50 50 20 30 45 20 - 15 40 40 60 595 SUBTOTAL 150 645 275 95 360 330 290 200 190 295 140 90 150 200 460 355 4225 Bomber - - - - 20 20 - 10 - 10 - - - 20 20 20 120 Reconnaissance 15 10 - - - - - - 30 20 - - - 20 30 30 155 5 25 15 5 5 5 5 5 5 S - - , 5 5 5 100 SUBTOTAL 20 35 15 5 25 25 5 15 35 35 - - 5 45 55 55 375 TOTAL 170 680 290 100 385 355 295 215 225 330 140 90 155 245 515 410 4600 elicopter (i) 90 280 120 60 200 80 140 100 100 200 90 80 100 120 240 300 2300 NOTE: It is estimated that the Volga, Siberian, and North Caucasus MDs will not have TAAs throughout the period. (1) Medium and heavy helicopter requirements and flights assigned to TAAs. 0 tri 0 CD TABLE A 7 ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION (MID-1-976, MID-1979, MID-1g82, AND MID-1985) YEAR AIRCRAFT CATEGORY LENINGRAD MD VOLGA CARPATHIAN BALTIC BELORUSSIAN MOSCOW MDs ODESSA KIEV MDs NORTH CAUCASUS TRANSCAUCASUS TURKESTAN URAL MDs TRANSBAIKAL CENTRAL ASIA SIBERIA FAR EAST MDs TOTAL MID- 1976 Electronic Warfare , - 45 - - - 45 Medium Transport , 95 -2730 225 70 70 690 Heavy Transport- 50 20 - - 70 TOTAL ------ 95 325 2,5 70 70 805 ----i MID- n979 Electronic Warfare - 60 - -- - 60 C70- --- Medium Transport 95 220 T 5.- ir TO f--- 70 PfeavY-7FiFsport 15- -- 4-5--- 2-7 15 5-- 10-5 --g-35 TOTAL 110 325 240 - 217- 85 75 MID- 1982 Electronic Warfare - 's 60 21-5 - -TO -60 Medium Transport 77 655 1 HeavyTransport 20 1-1-0 15-17-- -- 40 20 15 rum. 3n ' 250 90 85 865 MID- 1988 Electronic Warfare - 60 - - - 60 -- Medium Transport ---8-5- I 205 TU 77 TUTU Heavy_Transport TOTAL 25 11T ? C5? 50 2-5-5 25 20 185 335 95 - - -90 885- E uoT 4Das 03 H E uo-p3a5 - III JWd TABLE A 8 'ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES (MID-1976) (i) AIRCRAFT ROLE GDR POLAND CZECHOSLOVAKIA HUNGARY ROMANIA BULGARIA TOTAL FIGHTERS National Air Defense 280 215 90 85 180 30 880 All Weather Clear Air Mass - 85 30 55 40 40 250 Counterair - 100 80 - - 20 200 All Weather Clear Air Mass - 20 30 - - 60 110 Ground Attack 42 195 155 - 80 70 542 Reconnaissance - 36 25 - - 5 66 SUBTOTAL 322 651 410 140 300 225 2048 BEAGLE - 18 - - - - 18 Reconnaissance (ii) 18 54 45 - 18 35 170 Helicopter (iii) 52 41 140 40 47 36 356 Transport Medium 10 10 2 - 3 - 25 SUBTOTAL 80 123 187 40 68 71 569 TOTAL 402 774 597 180 368 296 2617 (i) Does not include aircraft of NS14P naval aviation (See Table N 4). (ii) BEAGLE (includes some BEAGLE ECM), CRATE SIGINT collection aircraft. (iii) HOUND and larger < M W O. t=1 C) 11 PV 0 t.i -I H 0 CO 0 CO 0 th 0 0 0 0 0 0 CD 0 0 0 CA.1 It) Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 E uo-nDaS - III LIVd TABLE A 9 ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES (i) (MID-1979, MID-1982, AND MID-1985) Aircraft Role GDR POLAND CSSR HUNGARY ROMANIA BULGARIA TOTALS c. r--. a, ,--1 National Air Defense 290 290 125 125 200 70 1100 Counterair 40 124 110 - 10 76 360 Ground Attack 60 180 140 25 80 70 555 Reconnaissance (ii) 35 95 60 - 28 40 258 TOTAL 425 689 435 150 318 256 2273 Helicopters (iii) 77 69 170 55 78 45 494 co r-i National Air Defense 290 275 120 115 190 70 1060 Counterair 75 124 110 - 25 74 408 Ground Attack 84 155 130 30 80 60 539 Reconnaissance (ii) 40 100 60 5 40 36 281 TOTAL 489 654 420 150 335 240 2288 Helicopters iii) 84 100 170 60 80 54 548 u-1 co -1 National Air Defense 290 285 115 100 190 70 1050 Counterair 80 120 100 _ , 35 70 405 Ground A tack 96 150 120 40 80 60 546 r Reconnaissance (ii) 40 J 100 60 10 40 36 286 TOTAL 506 655 395 150 345 236 2287 Helicopters (iii) 82 100 170 60 80 55 547 (i) Does not include NSWP naval aviation. (ii) All fixed wing type. (iii) HOUND and larger. Z-?00060001.000t10091.0809dCltl-VIO 9O/60/OOZ eSeeleti -10d peACLIddV TABLE A 10 WARSAW PACT RESERVE COMBAT AIRCRAFT (i) (MID-1976) TRAINING AIRCRAFT (ii) Storage Aircraft Total Combat Units Operational Conversion Units Schools SOVIET 725 205 2135 (iii) 500 3565 NSW? 345 - 505 (iv) 150 1000 TOTAL 1070 205 2630 650 4555 (i) Excluding DOSAAF,for which insufficient data is available to assess overall numbers. (ii) Including MIDGET. (iii) Excluding 1130 MAYA and 30 L-39. (IV) Excluding 250 MAYA. E uoTlpaS ? III .LIIVci 0 CD c-) ?n 1-3 CD c7 CD 8 co 8 th0 0 -0 co th co rt.) Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV C uonDaS - III DIVd TABLE A 11 ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET CIVIL AVIATION (MID-1976, MID-1979, AND MID-1985) YEAR , JET TURBOPROP HELICOPTERS AND LIGHT PISTON LIGHT MEDIUM HEAVY LIGHT MEDIUM HEAVY TWIN PISTON 1976 400 450 70 750 690 35 900 13,000 1979 750 600 115 940 650 30 750 10,000 1985 I 900 I 750 150 875 580 25 750 10,000 i Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV m m H ? uoT3DaS - III DIVA TABLE A 12 WARSAW PACT HARDENED AIRCRAFT SHELTERS (MID-1976) NSWP SOVIET BULGARIA 180 CZECHOSLOVAKIA 250 55 GDR 95 695 HUNGARY - 185 POLAND 120 280 ROMANIA 1 USSR - About 2700 (i) TOTAL 646 3915 (i) About 2000 shelters are located at FA basel,,, and the remainder at APVO bases in the USSR. (See Part II - Section 7). Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET PART III SECTION 4 ALBANIAN AND YUGOSLAV TABLES TABLE Z-1 Summary of Albanian Armed Forces TABLE Z-2 Summary of Yugoslav Armed Forces SECRET US 161/76 111-4-1 PART III - Section 4 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET TABLE Z-1 SUMMARY OF ALBANIAN ARMED FORCES Data on the Albanian Armed Forces are provided in the table below. For further details see SHAPE studies on countries bordering ACE. GROUND FORCES Personnel Strength Army (including 5,000 personnel sub- ordinated to ground elements of National Air Defense 30,000 Frontier Troops 7,500 Interior Troops 5,000 TOTAL 42,500 Order of Battle Infantry Brigades 5 Armored Brigade 1 Artillery Regiment 3 NAVAL FORCES Personnel Strength 3,000 Order of Battle Submarines 4 Large Submarine Chasers 4 Other Coastal Patrol Types 60 Minesweepers 8 AIR FORCES Personnel Strength (excluding 5,000 personnel of ground forces subordinated to elements of National Air Defense 7,600 Order of Battle Fighters 95 Transports 5 Helicopters 35 TOTAL 135 SECRET US 161/76, 111-4-2 PART III - Section 4 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET TABLE Z-2 SUMMARY OF YUGOSLAV ARMED FORCES Data on the Yugoslav Armed Forces are provided in the table below. For further details see SHAPE studies on countries bordering ACE. GROUND FORCES Personnel Strength Army (including 15,000 personnel assigned to ground-based elements of Air Defense) 208,000 Frontier Guard 15,000 TOTAL 223,000 Order of Battle Infantry Divisions 9 Artillery Regiment 9 Infantry Brigade 11 Infantry Regiment 2 Mountain Brigade 2 Armored Brigade 7 Parachute Battalion 1 NAVAL FORCES Personnel Strength 19,300 Order of Battle Submarines 5 Destroyers 1 Large Submarine Chasers 19 Guided Missile Boats 10 Other Coastal Patrol Types 58 Minesweepers (including 14 MSM/MSI) 28 Utility and Miscellaneous Landing Craft 41 SECRET US 161/76 111-4-3 PART III - Section 4 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET AIR FORCES Personnel Strength (excluding 13,700 personnel of ground forces subordinated to elements of National Air Defense) 31,100 Order of Battle Day Fighters 40 All-Weather Fighters 80 Ground Attack 135 Reconnaissance 40 Transports (Light and Heavy) 55 Helicopters (Light and Medium) 95 TOTAL 435 SECRET US 161/76 111-4-4 PART III - Section 4 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET PART IV ILLUSTRATIVE CONCEPTS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF 1 2 WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE EARLY STAGES OF WAR WITH NATO 3 (1976-1977) 4 SECTION 1 5 INTRODUCTION 6 1. This Part describes examples of major military 7 operations the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies might undertake 8 in a war with NATO during the period from mid-1976 to mid- 9 1977. It is emphasized that the campaigns illustrated which 10 have been selected from a whole range of scenarios are only 11 a guide to what is generally and logistically possible, and 12 must not be taken to indicate what is considered to be the 13 most likely operation. Therefore, these illustrative concepts 14 must not be used as the only basis for defense planning. 15 2. The operations presented do not consider any assistance 16 which the Pact forces might receive from subversive elements 17 located outside the Warsaw Pact. No allowance is made for 18 military requirements associated with non-NATO contingencies or 19 for damage caused by the effects of Allied military actions. 20 3. As discussed in Part I, Section 1, there is a 21 possibility that Albania and Yugoslavia might become aligned 22 with the Warsaw Pact. The capabilities of their armed forces 23 are therefore described in Part II and their numerical strengths 24 in Part III, Section 4, although their participation in 25 operations is not considered in this part. 26 27 28 29 30 31 SECRET US 161/76 IV-1-1 PART IV - Section 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET PART IV SECTION 2 ILLUSTRATIVE CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IN A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR EXCHANGE OBJECTIVES 1. Warsaw Pact (WP) objectives in a strategic nuclear exchange would be to destroy the NATO capability and will to wage war, while defending key control, military, industrial, and population centers -- particularly those of the USSR. The selection of targets and the choice of weapons would be dependent on the WP presumed desire to secure specific NATO industrial facilities and resources relatively intact. OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPEAN NATO Land-Based Missiles and Aircraft 15 2. Land-based missiles of all types would be used against 16 key targets such as urban/industrial areas, bomber and tanker 17 bases, missile sites, military control centers, governmental 18 control centers, naval bases, and probably nuclear storage 19 centers in North America and European NATO countries. The USSR would seek a high initial salvo capability with these 4422 missile systems. Attacks by Long Range Aviation (LRA), Frontal Aviation (FA), and Naval Aviation (SNA) would likely follow 23 initial ballistic missile strikes. LRA bombers would probably 24 have a mission of striking preassigned targets and might also 25 have a mission of assessing the success of missile attacks, 26 striking surviving targets, and providing targeting data for 27 residual missiles. Air-to-surface missiles (ASM) would be used 28 against some targets and their stand-off capability would add 29 to the bbmbers' survivability. WP air forces would employ a 30 1 2 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 20 31 combination of high and low altitude penetration techniques, SECRET IV-2-1 PART IV - Section 2 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET and could be expected to take advantage, within their 1 capabilities, of poor weather, darkness, deception techniques, 2 and electronic countermeasures. 3 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) 4 3. Soviet SLBMs would be primarily targeted against 5 North America in the event of general war. As more DELTA 6 class ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs) have become 7 available in recent years, the long transit from Soviet 8 bases required for large scale participation in an initial 9 attack on North America by YANKEE class SSBNs, with their 10 shorter-range SLBM, has become less of a constraint on the 11 weight and timing of Soviet SLBM participation in a strategic 12 nuclear exchange. The number of SLBM deployed (or maintained 13 on station) would be influenced by such variable factors as 14 requirements for surprise, transit time, the duration of any 15 pre-hostilities period of tension, and the extent of NATO 16 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) surveillance. 17 4. Some ballistic missile firing submarines, mainly 18 diesel-powered units, are more suitable for use against 19 Europe. Their targets could include SSBN bases; communication 20 and control centers are other likely targets for initial 21 attack. 22 OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO NAVAL STRIKE FORCES 23 Method of Employment Against Carrier Strike Forces 24 5. In the Atlantic and Pacific, the burden of detecting, 25 tracking, and attacking the NATO carrier strike forces would 26 be borne primarily by the Soviet HF/DF net, submarines, SNA 27 aircraft, and some LRA aircraft. Reconnaissance satellites and 28 Intelligence collection ships (AGI) would also assist in this 29 endeavor but would primarily be used for surveillance. 30 31 SECRET IV-2-2 PART IV - Section 2 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET Surface forces are likely to be deployed in the Norwegian Sea, operating in conjunction with air and submarine elements. In the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea, the majority of submarines would probably be deployed in a wide band across the approaches to the likely carrier launch areas -- although CHARLIE and VICTOR class nuclear powered submarines could deploy independently to intercept the strike forces. I The extent of deployment undertaken would depend on the time available to the Soviets and the need to conceal such movements from NATO detection. If such deployments were achieved, the attacks by submarines -- particularly by those armed with missiles -- in conjunction with attacks by ASM- equipped BACKFIRE and BADGER aircraft, could pose a considerable threat to NATO carrier forces. ASM-equipped BEAR and BACKFIRE aircraft of LRA would also be a threat in more distant waters. 6. In the Mediterranean, submarines, aircraft, and surface forces could all play a part in integrated anti- carrier operations. From the observed operations of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (SOVMEDRON), it is believed that surveillance and reconnaissance would be performed by surface combatants, AGIs and any aircraft available in the area at the time, and probably reconnaissance satellites. Some submarine and surface components would seek to be within range of the carrier groups prior to the outbreak of hostilities and thus in position, when ordered, to fire first. Attacks by Black Sea Fleet Air Force ASM-equipped aircraft would be probable. SECRET IV-2-3 PART IV - Section 2 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET 1 Method of Employment Against NATO Ballistic Missile Submarines 7. Because of the widespread area to be searched, Soviet _ 2 _ naval forces have little chance of countering the NATO SSBN 3 force at sea. Nonetheless, the Soviets may employ their forces in the following manner in an attempt to counter this threat: 4 6 a. Submarines, particularly nuclear-powered attack 7 types, could deploy in an attempt to intercept SSBNs when they 8 leave their bases or while they are in transit to patrol areas. 9 b. ASW aircraft could attempt to detect and destroy 10 submarines in open seas areas. 11 c. Surface ships could be used for anti-SSBN 12 operations in certain focal areas. d. Mines could be placed in SSBN focal areas and 14 harbor entrances. 15 DEFENSE OF WP AGAINST AIR AND MISSILE ATTACK 16 General 17 8. The present WP air defense system has a formidable 18 capability against aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes, 19 13 and a limited one against targets 1 25X5 I except in heavily defended areas(1). Soviet and NSWP air DIA defense forces in the NSWP countries would be coordinated and controlled by the Soviets. Antiballistic missile (ABM) defense would allow for a limited defense in the Moscow area. Method of Employment 9. The WP could probably obtain good warning of air attacks. It would attempt to disrupt NATO air attacks by ECM. The high density of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and radars (1) See Part II - Section SECRET IV-2-4 PART IV - Section 2 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET within the NSWP area and the peripheral of the USSR, and the 1 - diversity of frequencies they use, reduce the vulnerability of 2 - the air defense system to NATO ECM. 3 - 10. WP air defense forces are intended to provide an 4 _ in-depth strategic defense. Once detected, penetrating aircraft 5 would face a series of defenses. Interceptors would provide 6 the first line of air defense. Then penetrating aircraft 7 would face SAM barrier defenses and point defenses of important 8 targets. Interceptors would also provide a defense in depth 9 behind SAM barriers as well as point defense of special target 10 11 complexes outside areas of SAM point defense. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 SECRET IV-2-5 PART IV - Section 2 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET OBJECTIVES PART IV 1 SECTION 3 2 ILLUSTRATIVE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 3 TO DENY NATO NATIONS FREE USE OF THE SEAS 4 5 1. In any war with NATO, Warsaw Pact (WP) general 6 purpose naval forces would conduct operations aimed at 7 achieving the following major objectives (not in order of 8 priority): 9 a. Location and destruction of NATO naval forces; 10 b. protection of WP shipping and sea lines of 11 communications; 12 c. establishment of naval supremacy in those 13 maritime areas considered crucial to the security of the WP 14 countries; L. d. disruption and denial of NATO sea lines of 16 communications; and 17 e. offshore defense and support of ground operations 18 CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING OPERATIONS 19 General 20 2. The Soviets would not willingly undertake hostilities 21 at sea with NATO without being prepared for escalation to 22 general war. However, naval incidents of various kinds could 23 occur as accidental or isolated events in peacetime or during 24 periods of tension. 25 3. In a war with NATO the extent to which WP naval forces 26 would undertake operations toward the foregoing objectives 27 depends in general upon: 28 a. The nature and relevance of the conflict to 29 maritime theaters; 30 31 SECRET US 161/76 IV-3-1 PART IV - Section 3 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET b. the circumstances under which the conflict started; c. the strength and disposition of available WP naval forces; and d. the strength and disposition of NATO naval forces. 4. If the Soviets were to initiate hostilities deliberately, they probably would seek to maximize the strength and disposition of their predeployed forces at least risk of compromising the element of surprise. If hostilities were to break out suddenly, WP naval forces probably would seek both to ensure the immediate security of their home waters and to initiate operations against NATO naval forces and sea lines of communication. A protracted period of preparation prior to hostilities would be needed to enable the WP countries to maximize the readiness of their forces. Logistic Considerations 5. Applicable considerations of logistics and supply are discussed in Part II - Section 5, paragraphs 47 through 52. Forces and Weapon Systems 6. In the initial stages of hostilities a large proportion of Soviet submarine, naval air, and major surface forces would be concerned primarily with locating and destroying NATO naval forces capable ?of delivering nuclear strikes. In 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 addition, a number of submarines, naval aircraft, and major 28 surface combatants could be available for allocation to other 29 tasks. Almost all naval forces, including about a third of 30 Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) aircraft, have a mining capability. 31 A portion of SNA has a free fall bombing capability. Soviet SECRET PART IV - Section 3 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP801301500R000100090003-2 _SECRET Long Range Aviation (LRA) and to a lesser degree Frontal Aviation (FA) and Soviet Homeland Air Defense Troops (PVC) Strany) would also be used in support of maritime operations to the extent they were available and considered necessary. Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) 7. ASW operations involving surface, submarine, and air forces probably would be mounted in the areas bordering the WP countries in the early stages of hostilities. As required, the Soviets would also initiate ASW operations in the eastern North Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, Mediterranean, western Pacific, and perhaps the Indian Ocean. Mine Warfare 8. The WP would probably lay extensive minefields at or before the outbreak of war. For offensive mining to be effective during the initial phase of a war, minefields would need to be laid before hostilities commenced; if such mine- fields were laid, the task probably would be carried out by submarines. Such minefields could be reinforced by air-dropped mines on the outbreak of hostilities. It is difficult to assess what effort would be allocated to mining. If there were to be in an extended period of hostilities, the WP might undertake mining to deny NATO freedom of movement and use of ports. Minelaying by merchant and fishing vessels is also possible in certain areas. OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC, INCLUDING THE BARENTS SEA, THE NORWEGIAN SEA, AND THE APPROACHES TO EUROPE Composition of Forces 9. Soviet naval forces available in these areas are those of the Northern Fleet augmented by suitable units able to deploy from the Baltic.(1) (1) See Part III - Section 2, Tables N 1 through N 6. SECRET IV-3-3 PART IV - Section 3 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET Methods of Employment 1 10. In addition to those forces concerned primarily 2 with location and destruction of NATO nuclear strike forces, 3 Soviet attack submarines and some cruise missile units 4 probably would be deployed in focal areas and across shipping 5 routes for attacks on NATO warships and merchant ships; 6 suitable surface forces would be used to defend Soviet 7 coastal sea lanes, to support any ground forces campaign 8 aginst the Scandinavian Peninsula, and to attack NATO 9 surface forces and merchant ships; naval air forces are 10 likely to be used for offensive operations and reconnaissance 11 against ships and shore targets, in ASW, and in electronic 12 warfare roles; amphibious forces would be used to conduct 13 assault operations and support land campaigns. Offshore 14 installations may also be possible targets. 15 11. The capture of bases in Norway could benefit the 16 Northen Fleet forces by making the passage through the 17 Norwegian Sea into the Atlantic more secure, increasing the 18 range of air cover, making further dispersal bases available, 19 and by reducing transit distances to operating areas. 20 OPERATIONS IN THE BALTIC AND ADJACENT WATERS 21 Composition of Forces 22 12. Soviet naval forces in the Baltic, some of which 23 are better suited for operations on the high seas than in 24 this enclosed area, are assessed to exceed the requirements 25 for gaining and maintianing local naval supremacy. There are 26 thus likely to be some deployments to other areas or transfers 27 28 to another fleet prior to hostilities, if circumstances allow. However, the naval forces of the GDR and Poland would be 29 available to augment the Baltic Fleet. (1) 30 31 (1) See Part III - Section 2, Tables N 1 through N 6. SECRET US 161/76 IV-3-4 PART IV - Section 3 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET Methods of Employment 1 _ 13. Suitable naval and naval air units, supported by 2 _ WP air forces, would be used to neutralize NATO defense 3 capabilities. This would be followed by flank support and 4 amphibious assault operations, designed to secure the Baltic 5 approaches in conjunction with other forces. Thus, the WP 6 naval forces would be freed for operations in adjacent waters 7 and open oceans. Control of the Baltic approaches is vital to 8 subsequent naval operations in this area. Once this control 9 has been established, remaining suitable Baltic Fleet forces 10 could deploy outside the Baltic area. 11 OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 12 Composition of Forces 13 14. Soviet naval forces in the Black Sea appear to 14 exceed the requirements for maintaining naval supremacy and 15 for conducting amphibious operations in that area, mainly due 16 to the commitment to provide the majority of Soviet surface 17 naval forces in the Mediterranean. The submarine component 18 of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (SOVMEDRON) is provided 19 from the Northern Fleet. In addition, the naval forces of 20 Romania and Bulgaria would be availabe to support the Black 21 Sea Fleet. (1) It is expected that the Soviets would build up 22 their forces in the Mediterranean prior to hostilities.(2) 23 Method of Employment 24 15. Suitable naval and naval air units in the Black Sea, 25 supported by WP air forces, would be used to neutralize NATO 26 defense capabilities, in support of land campaigns, to conduct 27 amphibious assaults, to secure the Turkish Straits, and then to 28 establish maritime supremacy in the Aegean, thus freeing WP 29 30 (1) See Part III - Section 2, Tables N 1 through N 6. (2) The composition and normal operations of SOVMEDRON are 31 discussed in Part II - Section 5, paragraphs 79 and 80. SECRET US 161/76 IV-3-5 PART IV - Section 3 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET naval forces for operations in the Mediterranean. Control 1 of the Black Sea approaches is vital to subsequent naval 2 operations in the whole area. Once this control has been 3 established, ramaining suitable Black Sea Fleet forces 4 could deploy to the Mediterranean. 5 16. Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean, especially 6 the missile-equipped submarines and surface units, would try 7 to be in position, either prior to the outbreak of hostilities 8 9 or shortly thereafter, for immediate action, when ordered, 10 against major NATO naval units. Soviet units not in position to contribute to this task would probably attack other NATO 11 naval forces, merchant ships, or key shore installations as the 12 opportunities arose. In addition, SOVMEDRON would strive to 13 assist the WP main effort against NATO's southern flank including southern Anatolia, or in the Balkans. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS Compostition of Forces 17. Soviet naval forces normally available in the Pacific and Indian Oceans are those of the Pacific Fleet. (1) Soviet naval deploments to the Indian Ocean are usually made by units of the Pacific Fleet, although ships and submarines from the other fleets in transit to the Pacific occasionally deploy there. With the reopening of the Suez Canal, Soviet options for transfers via this route have increased, but the Soviets will recognize the risk of sudden closure of the Canal. (1) See Part III - Section, Tables N 1 through N 5. SECRET US 161/76 PART IV - Section 3 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET Method of Employment 1 18. Upon the outbreak of hostilities between the WP 2 and NATO, the foremost concern of the Pacific Fleet would 3 be to protect the Soviet coastal areas against air or ground 4 attack. It would also be concerned about any enemy carrier 5 strike forces or missile submarines which might be in 6 position to pose a threat. Little early assistance would 7 likely be available for the European fleets due to concern 8 over China's intentions and US actions. Withdrawal of some 9 SNA units from their primary bases to dispersal airfields, 10 along with sorties of available naval units from the naval 11 bases to off-shore positions, is likely. Out-of-area 12 activity may increase, but would not necessarily be directed 13 toward Chinese waters or the eastern Pacific. Naval Infantry 14 would be employed as required to help secure egress through 15 the Japanese Straits and to secure or retake Soviet coastal 16 or inland waterway areas (to include ports, naval bases, 17 and shipyards) along the Sino-Soviet border in the event of 18 Chinese action. Antishipping activity would be directed 19 against any naval forces attempting to penetrate the Sea of 20 Japan. Those Soviet units deployed to the Indian Ocean would 21 22 likely attack NATO naval units in the area and attempt to either harass, blockade, or sink NATO merchant shipping, 23 24 especially oil traffic. 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 SECRET IV-3-7 PART IV - Section 3 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET PART IV SECTION 4 ILLUSTRATIVE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AREA OF ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE 4 INTRODUCTION 5 1. Purpose. The purpose of this Section is to provide Illustrations of the sort of operations which might be carried 7 out by the Warsaw Pact (WP) in the area of Allied Command 8 Europe (ACE) and adjacent areas, having regard to the Pact's 9 assumed knowledge of NATO dispositions and capabilities, to 10 Pact concepts of operations, to the forces available to it 11 and to NATO in varying circumstances, to the constraints to 12 which the WP is likely to be subject, and to the terrain. 13 2. The Soviets would expect Central Europe to be the 14 decisive theater of general purpose forces' operations in a 15 large-scale NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Whether they would 16 launch offensives all along NATO's flanks concurrently with 17 any campaign in Central Europe is uncertain. The WP has the 18 means, described in Annex A of this Section, to conduct 19 offensive operations in Scandinavia and southern Europe while 20 simultaneously carrying out an offensive against the NATO 21 center. Early Pact offensives toward the Turkish Straits and 22 northern Norway are more likely than in the other flank areas 23 such as Italy and the rest of Scandinavia. 24 3. As noted in the introduction to Part aV, these 25 descriptions are not intended to imply predictions. The 26 evidence on which reliable predictions could be based is not 27 available; calculations as to forces and objectives could be 28 wrong; terrain has been considered only in its broadest aspects; 29 and perhaps above all, no account has been taken of the Soviet 30 predilection for surprise. FOR THESE REASONS AMONG OTHERS, 31 1 2 3 6 SECRET 1V-4-1 PART IV - Section 4 Us 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO REGARD THE CONTENTS OF THIS SECTION 1 AS ANYTHING MORE THAN EXAMPLES OF SOME POSSIBLE WAYS IN WHICH 2 OPERATIONS COULD DEVELOP. The theaters considered are: 3 Western Continental Europe; the Scandinavian Peninsula; 4 Southern Europe and Western Turkey; and Eastern Turkey. There 5 are brief references to Iran and Berlin. 6 4. Contingencies. There can be little doubt that the 7 Warsaw Pact has plans to cover all contingencies such as 8 defense against a NATO attack; a war arising quickly from 9 local clashes, or spreading quickly from other geographical 10 areas; or a Soviet attack mounted in a period of deteriorating 11 relations, after partial or complete mobilization and 12 reinforcement of forward areas. There is extremely little 13 evidence as to any WP preference for a surprise or deliberate 14 attack. 15 5. Options. In this Section, since it is impossible to 16 cover every contingency, only examples approaching the two 17 extremes are considered: 18 a. Option 1. A war in which hostilities commence 19 with little preparation and before forward reinforcement takes 20 place; 21 b. Option 2. A war in which hostilities commence 22 only after the WP preparations are substantially complete. 23 The mobilization status of NATO is not addressed. There are 24 of course intermediate situations, which to a limited extent 25 can be developed by a process of interpolation, but this 26 27 process has some appreciable dangers, since plans for Option 2 28 are not necessarily mere extensions of plans for Option 1. Such intermediate situations, for example, could permit the 29 WP to mobilize and deploy East European-based forces with no 30 31 SECRET IV-4-2 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET comparable activity occurring in the Western Military Districts (WMD) of the USSR until it is perceived that a war is likely. As 6. In this Section, it is assumed that in both options, the WP would mobilize and would reinforce potential combat areas as soon and as quickly as possible; thus in Option 2 reinforcements would arrive before hostilities commence, while in Option 1 they would arrive only in the course of hostilities, but the speed of the Pact buildup would be the same in both cases. It is reasonable however to conclude that, taking military considerations alone, they would prefer to attack at the moment when the balance of forces is most favorable to them. It is quite impossible to predict this moment, which depends upon WP perceptions and actions, the intelligence gained by NATO, and consequent NATO reactions, as well as on non-military considerations, the dynamics of which are impossible to portray. These issues are discussed fully in Part I - Section 6. It should be repeated that what follows are illustrations; these are, of course, guided by such basic intelligence as is available but are not intelligence predictions of the actual course of events. 7. It is assumed that all the campaigns illustrated would be carried out as nearly simultaneously as possible. A concurrent attack on Iran as well as against NATO is assumed to be unlikely, but since the Soviets must provide for the contingency of hostilities with Iran, appropriate forces have been allotted. For the same reason, no forces normally facing China have been considered in the illustrations. 8. It is assumed that WP forces generally would be directed against NATO countries closest to their peacetime SECRET IV-4-3 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET locations and that mobilized forces which have not reached standard combat effectiveness would not be withheld from commitment on that account. The effect of Allied interdiction 3 on movement and supply has not been considered, nor the possible 4 effect of hostile action by disaffected indigenous elements. 5 Clandestine and subversive operations by the WP are also not 6 considered. Isolated and local acts of aggression are not 7 addressed. 8 FORCES EMPLOYED 9 9. General. With the exceptions noted in the paragraphs 10 above, all Warsaw Pact Armed Forces could be committed to war 11 against NATO. Sections 2 and 3 of this Part deal with strategic 12 and naval operations, however, so these forces are here 13 considered only insofar as they might contribute to the combat 14 or general purpose forces facing ACE. 15 10. Strategic Forces. In nuclear operations, strikes 16 by tactical missile and air units could be supplemented by 17 strategic missile strikes against targets of importance to 18 theaters and Fronts, such as nuclear delivery systems, air 19 defense facilities, headquarters (HQ), and logistic and 20 reinforcement facilities, which might be beyond the range or 21 capability of tactical weapon systems. 22 11. Air Forces. The bulk of air operations in the 23 combat zones would be provided by Soviet and NSWP tactical 24 air forces.(1) These operations would be initiated by 25 aircraft already within range of most areas of ACE, 26 reinforced by the forward deployment of other Frontal 27 Aviation (FA) aircraft from within the Soviet Union. In 28 addition, aircraft of Soviet Long Range Aviation (LRA) would 29 30 (1) See Part II - Section VI. 31 2 SECRET IV-4-4 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET support general purpose forces by executing offensive air 1 operations requiring greater range and bomb-carrying capa- 2 bilities. Units of Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) could also 3 be employed for maritime and coastal, including amphibious, 4 operations. Most of the foregoing forces are capable of 5 nuclear or nonnuclear operations. Additional electronic 6 warfare support could be provided by Military Transport 7 Aviation (VTA). Because of the speed with which aircraft can 8 deploy, the geographical location of air forces in peacetime 9 is not necessarily a guide to their wartime operational 10 deployments. Air power would be allocated roughly proportion- 11 ately to theater and Front objectives. 12 12. Naval and Amphibious Forces.(1) Amphibious assault 13 operations often in conjunction with airborne (ABN) assaults, 14 would be carried out. Naval units, including naval aviation, 15 would be likely to provide support on the sea flanks of 16 ground operations. 17 13. Ground (including Airborne) Forces. Operations 18 would in virtually every case be initiated by forces already 19 in or close to the combat zones. These could be strengthened 20 as soon as possible by additional forces, many of them 21 initially at a lower state of combat effectiveness and sometimes 22 of equipment, from rearward areas. Concepts for the operations 23 24 of ground forces are set out in Part II - Section 4, paragraphs 24 to 32. The intensity of operations, and to25 some extent their nature, would be influenced by the forces 26 27 available at the opening of a conflict, but would not be the 28 (1) Details of Naval Infantry and Assault and Administrative 29 Lift Capabilities are given in Part II - Section 5. 30 31 SECRET IV-4-5 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET same in all areas. Strong offensive thrusts in key areas would be balanced by secondary operations in others. Airborne operations, subject to a favorable air situation, could be used in various ways, to extend ground forces' operations beyond the range of heliborne attacks; for intelligence and sabotage activities; and for distant tasks not directly connected with ground operations.(1) 14. Assumed Allocation of Ground and Air Forces. The ground and tactical air forces assumed to be employed are set out in tabular form in Annex A to this section. Additional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 details of the grouping of these forces for both options are 11 provided in the text relating to each campaign. Reinforcements 12 for use against ACE or elsewhere could be drawn from forces 13 in the Kiev, Moscow, Ural, and Volga Military Districts (MDs). 14 In these illustrations, Soviet and indigenous forces in 15 Hungary are assumed to operate against NATO's Southern Region. 16 However, they could be employed to reinforce operations 17 against the NATO Central Region. 18 GENERAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES 19 15. The principal objectives of the WP in campaigns 20 described in this section would be to destroy NATO's will 21 and capability to fight. To this end they would aim in each 22 theater to: 23 a. destroy NATO nuclear delivery means. 24 b. destroy other NATO forces. 25 c. seize strategic areas to further their own or 26 hamper NATO's operations. 27 d. prevent NATO reinforcement. 28 29 (1) See also Part II - Section 4, paragraph 71. 30 31 SECRET PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET CAMPAIGNS AGAINST WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 16. Concept. These campaigns may be regarded as constituting a single Theater of Military Operations (TVD) stretching from the Baltic to the Austrian Alps. Operations could be initiated by three Fronts; a Northern Front, comprising three Polish armies and the Polish airborne and sea-landing divisions, responsible for operations against Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark, and developing operations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 westwards on the flank of the Central Front, to the 9 Bremerhaven-Wilhelmshaven area; a Central Front comprising 10 Soviet (GSFG and NGF) and GDR forces responsible for operations 11 into the Federal Republic of Germany developed from the 12 remainder of the GDR; and a Southern Front comprising Soviet 13 (CGP) and Czech forces responsible for operations against the 14 Southern Federal Republic of Germany and possibly Austria 15 developed from Czechoslovakia. The Northern, Central, and 16 Southern Fronts could subsequently aim to exploit across the 17 Rhine to the North Sea, Atlantic and Mediterranean Coasts, 18 but such exploitation phases are not illustrated further in 19 this Section. The organization of WP forces is flexible and 20 operations subsequent to the initial days of a conflict may 21 take several forms. In both options it might well be that 22 a fourth Front, comprising some of the forces initially 23 engaged and some of those arriving from USSR, could at some 24 stage be constituted as the area of operations widened, but 25 in Option 1 at least it is more likely that all early 26 reinforcements would be placed initially under the operational 27 control of the leading Fronts. A Theater Reserve could be 28 constituted from divisions not initially allotted to 29 reinforcing armies. Subject to lift availability, airborne 30 31 SECRET IV-4-7 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET divisions from Western USSR could be committed at any stage of the campaigns. 17. Air Operations. The prime aim of the WP air forces would be to neutralize as quickly as possible NATO's tactical nuclear response capability and to establish air superiority. This would involve widespread attacks on NATO airfields as well as attacks on other nuclear weapons facilities and control centers. It seems likely that for the foreseeable future their overall strategy will remain the same, although there may be some changes in the tactical implementation as more new aircraft and weapons enter service. A maximum effort would probably be critical to the success of such an air campaign. In order to achieve a maximum effort consideration would likely be given to reinforcement. However, early movement of reinforcement aircraft could provide warning to NATO. Not all these aircraft could be accommodated in existing shelters. Many would be exposed to severe attrition on the ground. Therefore, in the interests of surprise, and to reduce the risk of attrition, the initial assault in Option I may be conducted by aircraft presently based in Eastern Europe as well as those FA and LRA aircraft in the Western USSR which could reach targets within ACE. Aircraft in East Europe could be reinforced by aircraft from rear areas during or immediately following the initial attack. Most of the air operations described are not likely to be carried out other than in daylight and in reasonable weather conditions. 18. Forces Available. See Annex A to this Section. Further details of possible groupings are given under each Front below; in addition to the forces set forth in Annex A, units of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and of the Polish and GDR SECRET IV-4-8 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET navies, including amphibious units, would support land 1 operations of the Northern Front. 2 Northern Front 3 19. In pursuit of the general objectives stated in 4 paragraph 15, forces of the Northern Front would seek to 5 destroy NATO forces in Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland, with 6 the further objectives of control of the Baltic Sea and exits, 7 assuring passage to the open ocean, and the elimination of 8 Denmark from the war. Airborne and amphibious forces would 9 support the main effort with attacks both on the flanks and 10 in the Danish Islands. Other forces of the Northern Front 11 could be used west of the Elbe to control North Sea ports, 12 and to protect the flanks of the Central Front. 13 20. In Option 1, depending on the preparation time 14 allowed, assault forces could initially consist of four 15 Soviet divisions (2nd Guards Tank Army) and three GDR divisions 16 which are already facing Schleswig-Holstein and the Hamburg 17 area. These forces could be assisted by the Polish airborne 18 and sea-landing divisions whose movements would depend largely 19 on the availability of Soviet transport. Upon arrival of the 20 Polish Front, the Polish 1st (Silesian) and 2nd (Pomeranian) 21 Armies would probably assume first echelon roles, allowing 22 2nd Guards Tank Army and East German divisions to revert to 23 operations on the northern flank of the Central Front. The 24 Polish 3rd (Warsaw) Army would probably become available as 25 a second echelon of the Northern Front within several days. 26 In Option 1, local control of the ground forces might be 27 exercised initially by the Central Front Hq until the Northern. Front Front Hq became operational. 29 21. In Option 2, it would be possible to establish the 30 Polish Front organization in the GDR prior to D-Day. The 31 SECRET IV-4-9 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET three Polish armies, airborne division, and sea-landing 1 division would conduct broadly similar operations in both 2 options. Reinforcement of the Front would be drawn from the 3 theater reserve, which probably would be formed primarily 4 from units in the Baltic MD. Baltic Fleet Naval Infantry 5 units would also be available to support operations in this 6 area. 7 Central Front 8 22. The objective would be the destruction of NATO forces 9 in the area by penetration of NATO defenses in perhaps two 10 main zones. Operations could be directed to the crossing of 11 the Rhine to secure North Sea, Channel, and Atlantic ports and 12 airfields through which reinforcements might come. GDR 13 Border Troops and other paramilitary forces could be committed 14 initially to the reduction of Berlin. 15 23. In Option 1, operations could be initiated by GSFG, 16 NGF, and units of the GDR under Soviet control, less those 17 elements initially committed to the Northern Front sector. 18 Major thrusts, dictated largely by terrain factors, could 19 develop along the general axes Magdeburg-Hanover and 20 Eisenach-Frankfurt, with holding or flank protection operations 21 in other areas. Of the 21 divisions initially available. most 22 could be committed to the Front first echelon. The remainder 23 would be available to rapidly exploit success or major gaps 24 25 in NATO defenses. A division of NGF and those elements initially employed in the Northern Front sector could 26 reinforce Central Front operations. Airborne forces would 27 also be available to conduct operations as required. 28 24. In Option 2, 28 Soviet and GDR divisions would 29 probably constitute the Front organization. A portion of the 30 theater reserve, possibly comprising 10-12 Soviet Category A 31 SECRET IV-4-10 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP801301500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET and B divisions from the Western MDs, could be available to support this Front. In these circumstances, the two main 1 2 thrusts could develop largely as described above, but the 3 intensity of combat within them, and on the flanks, could be 4 higher. Southern Front 5 6 25. The initial objective of the Southern Front might 7 be to engage facing NATO forces by two thrusts on the line 8 Karlovy Vary - Karlsruhe and Pisek - Stuttgart with sufficient 9 intensity to secure flank protection of the Central Front and 10 to prevent any redeployment of NATO forces. The additional threat of an attack by Hungarian-based forces through Austria ?into the southern FRG cannot be discounted. NATO forces would be engaged all along the Front; at an appropriate stage, forces from Czechoslovakia could intensify their frontal assaults to complement operations of the Central Front. Their further objectives could be the crossing of the Rhine and penetration of France. 26. In Option I, the initial attacks would be carried out by forces of the Czech 1st and 4th Armies. Control, although perhaps nominally Czech, would be exercised in effect by the Soviets. CGF, and available forces from the Czech Eastern MD, could constitute the Front second echelon. 27. In Option 2, it would be open to the Soviets to Initiate hostilities with the forces of CGF and the Czech 1st and ilth Armies in the first echelon. The second echelon could initially comprise available forces from the Czechoslovak Eastern MD, but these could readily be augmented by Soviet forces from the theater reserve (primarily the Carpathian MD). If a fourth Front is introduced, it is conceivable that part of the forces of the Southern Front could be allotted to it. SECRET IV-4-ll PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET 28. Air Forces. In all the above illustrations, the term Front is taken to include WP air forces in support as 1 2 well as those air armies from the WMDs which could be available 3 for operations in advance of the arrival of corresponding ground forces. Logistic Considerations 29. General. The operations described above envisage 4 5 6 7 the employment of up to 70-80 divisions before it becomes 8 necessary to engage parts of the theater reserves or forces 9 from the Kiev, Moscow, Ural, and Volga MDs. At the opening 10 of hostilities, up to 35 divisions of this force could be 11 actively engaged, and this figure might rise to 45-50, as 12 operations develop and a possible fourth Front enters combat. 13 However, all divisions, once present in the theater, would be 14 consuming POL and other supplies, and even rearward divisions 15 could have limited expenditure of air defense ammunition. In 16 both Options, the consumption of forward stocks by air forces 17 could reach a peak within the first few days, then decline as 18 a result of attrition. The following paragraphs consider 19 successively the forward movement of reinforcements (but not 20 of general reserves), of ground support elements of air forces, 21 and of logistic stocks; the availability of stocks in the 22 forward area; and the question of stock distribution within 23 the forward area. 24 Forward Movement 25 30. Available transportation resources for the forward 26 movement of reinforcements, ground support elements of air 27 28 forces, and logistic stocks include rail, road, sea, and air. 29 Sealift, however, is quite vulnerable, and except for the Northern Front, would be slow and involve difficult lateral 30 31 movement. The bulk of reinforcement and resupply movement SECRET IV-4-12 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP801301500R000100090003-2 SECRET must be met by road and rail. The airlift of the VTA could 1 be required for ABN forces, although logistic requirements, 2 such as the movement of nuclear warheads, might have priority. 3 Supplementary airlift could be accomplished by Aeroflot. 4 31. It is expected that units based within 300 kms of 5 their alert locations would deploy by road on wheels and tracks 6 along pre-planned routes. About 47 divisions therefore have 7 the capability for direct movement to initial deployment sites using organic transport. Beyond this distance units may use rail or move wheeled vehicles only by road. Tank trans- porters may be used either to ferry tracked elements to high- capacity rail lines or for the long haul forward delivery of up to four tank divisions. However, railroads are the main means of long distance transportation and the capacity of the seven principal through-routes from the Soviet frontier to the western borders of East Germany and Czechoslovakia is estimated to be over 500,000 metric tons per day. Soviet and WP forces are generally well situated to take advantage of the comprehensive nature of the transportation network. Many units could move on routes other than the main through-lines while others could use only sections. Only reinforcing forces from the Soviet Union are likely to use the full through-routes. A good highway network is also available and adds flexibility to the lines of communication. If highways had to be used for long distance movement, the through-put capacities of the eight major routes is assessed at about 120,000 metric tons per day. It is further estimated that it will take four to five days to convert the CEMA pipeline system west of Brest to carry refined POL products. Thereafter the POL resupply capability into East Germany is estimated at about 70,000 metric tons per day and at about SECRET IV-4-13 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET 45,000 metric tons per day into central Czechoslovakia. 1 Establishment of this capability would substantially reduce 2 the demand on road and rail resupply resources. However, it 3 should be recognized that in practice these theoretical road, 4 rail, and pipeline tonnages could decrease due to possible 5 technical failures, the need for maintenance, and the need to 6 make space for other essential traffic. 7 32. Activities affecting the speed of forward movement 8 include the mobilization time of units, the availability of 9 road and rail capacity and, for units moving by rail, the 10 positioning of rolling stock, movement to rail facilities, 11 loading on trains, transloading at the Soviet frontier and 12 offloading at destinations. Unit and logistic movement would 13 occur at the same time, frequently over the same elements of 14 the network, and would, to some extent, compete for route 15 capacity. A number of operating problems, such as those 16 described in paragraph 31, could also occur when the lines 17 of communication are subjected to a sudden and heavy demand. 18 These impediments would probably not stop the overall 19 transportation system from functioning, but could cause local 20 delays which would increase the number of potential warning 21 indicators. 22 33. Under Option 2, a deliberate buildup of about 86 23 divisions, together with full army and Front level support, 24 air elements and logistic stocks, could be moved into 25 26 deployment locations opposite the NATO Central Region in 27 10-14 days depending on movement priority, stockage levels, 28 and operating conditions. In this illustration the movement of 560,000 metric tons of logistic stocks into the theater to 29 achieve operational planning levels and the redistribution of 30 just over 100,000 metric tons from base depots in the theater 31 SECRET IV-4-14 PART rv - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET to field echelons, were taken into account. It should be noted, however, that these calculations reflect demands placed on the assessed movement capability of the transportation network during an operation when speed is essential. The 1 2 3 4 entire process of forward movement, of course, has never 5 been rehearsed on a scale approaching that required for war 6 and it is uncertain whether the Pact could actually accomplish 7 this operation in the time frame indicated. There is also no 8 way of knowing when the Pact would initiate such a movement or 9 whether it would even seek to carry out a reinforcing 10 operation in the manner described herein. Conversely, the 11 WP does have the capability to undertake some of the required 12 preparations covertly prior to M-Day. Such actions could 13 include collection of rolling stock, induction of key 14 reservists or depreservation of stored equipment. 15 34. Under Option 1 the time frame would be significantly 16 lower depending on the size of the force involved, the degree 17 of surprise intended, the amount of overt preparation 18 permitted, the logistic stock level selected, and the phasing 19 of pre- and post- D-Day activity. 20 Storage Capacity(1) 21 35. General. According to Soviet logistical doctrine, 22 each Front should maintain enough supplies in its depots, 23 and in the mobile stocks in its armies and divisions, for 30 24 days of combat. Altogether, in a theater of military 25 operations--which might contain several Fronts--the Soviets 26 prescribe stockage of from 2 to 3 months of supplies. 27 28 Ammunition and POL would make up the bulk of Pact logistical 29 stocks. There is little information on the actual contents of Pact depots in Central Europe, but we have calculated the 30 31 (1) See Part II - Section 4 and 6 for Ground and Air Force Logistics. SECRET US 161/76 IV-4-15 PART IV - Section 4 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET theoretical capacities of the identified Pact ground force 1 ammunition and POL depots. 2 36. Ammunition and POL. The capacity of WP ground 3 force ammunition depots within the GDR, Poland, and 4 Czechoslovakia is estimated to be about 1.6 million metric 5 tons. Based on 80 percent capacity, and on an average 6 consumption of 35,000 metric tons per day in the theater, 7 this provides an estimate of over 30 days of combat supplies 8 for the whole force, in addition to stocks on wheels. POL 9 stocks in GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia are so large (about 10 4 million metric tons available for military use, based on 11 80 percent of storage) as initially to place no constraint 12 on military operations of a force of the size envisaged. 13 These stocks would suffice for more than 80 days of operations 14 at normal rates for the entire force without counting oil 15 deliveries by pipeline to refineries in the GDR, Poland, and 16 Czechoslovakia. These figures are, at best, a rough U. approximation of Pact supply status, but they do suggest 18 Pact stocks in Central Europe accord with the doctrinal 19 requirement to stock for 30 days. 20 37. Stock Distribution in the Forward Area. Stocks held 21 on wheels in the forward area would be adequate for initial 22 combat consumption. It is estimated that any necessary 23 redistribution of stocks from forward area depots to field 24 depots on the lines of advance can be completed within some 25 48 hours by the transport resources of ready forces, and not 26 interfere with resupply or reinforcement. Calculations based 27 28 on consumption rates have tended to show in the past that 29 road transport available in peacetime forces in the forward 30 area (for example GSFG) have been adequate for nuclear war or 31 for conventional operations of short duration, but could be SECRET IV-4-16 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET insufficient in other circumstances. However, improvements 1 in Front, army, and divisional transport scales noted 2 throughout 1974 suggest that these constraints are being 3 eased. It would still be necessary however for reinforcing 4 formations to arrive with a full scale of their own logistic 5 transport, whether organic or autokolonna, and allowance for 6 these vehicles, travelling forward loaded, has been made in 7 movement calculations. 8 CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE SCANDINAVIAN PENINSULA 9 38. General. Campaigns against the Scandinavian 10 Peninsula would probably constitute a TVD with operations 11 being implemented by HQ Leningrad MD and HQ Northern Fleet. 12 Plans would be harmonized with at least the Northern Front 13 command of the Western TVD. WP objectives would be to destroy 14 NATO forces and facilities in Norway, leading to extensions of 15 the Soviet early warning and air defense systems, to the 16 dispersal of Northern Fleet base facilities to convenient 17 18 Norwegian fiords and to protection of the access routes of the Northern Fleets. 19 39. Forces Available. Details of ground and air forces 20 are provided in tabular form in Annex A to this section. 21 22 Additional ground and air forces could, if required, be drawn from Baltic MD or what is believed to be a general reserve, 23 at the expense of other compaigns. ABN forces would probably 24 be included and amphibious support would be provided by naval 25 infantry of the Northern Fleet. The fleet itself would 26 provide direct support to operations. 27 28 Operations 40. Operations against Norway could he -mounted either 29 30 Into North Norway directly, or into North Norway through Finnish Lapland or even through aweden into Norway. In 31 SECRET IV-4-17 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET Option I readily available forces would not be sufficient to mount simultaneous attack against Norway and Sweden. 41. In Option 1 the main initial operation could be a land attack through Finnish Lapland as well as across the Norwegian-Soviet border by the two divisions readily available in the area. This operation could be supported by airborne forces seizing key areas ahead of the advancing troops and by amphibious attacks along the coast. Second echelon forces of a further two or three divisions could be drawn from the central or southern portions of the Leningrad MD suoject to movement limitations. It would also be open to the Soviets to exert pressure on Finland to permit the passage of forces across her territory. No effective Finnish opposition should be expected in the north, although the Soviet Union might have to employ forces to secure her position in Finland. 42. In Option 2, the size of the initial assault could be extended by a further two divisions in addition to employing up to one division and naval infantry on amphibious tasks. These further divisions could be provided by the lower category forces from Leningrad MD. Option 2 could also open to the Soviet Union the possibility Sweden, an operation which would require of attacking through sizeable land, air, and missile forces. It is probably beyond the capacity of Leningrad MD alone on Sweden to allow through Sweden are to supply the necessary forces. Pressure free passage might be exercised. Operations not developed in this document, but some relevant logistic information is given in paragraphs 43 and 45. Logistic Considerations 43. Forward Movement. The roads in the north have greatly improved over the last decades. The Soviets are presently building a road from Leningrad to Murmansk. When SECRET IV-4-18 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET completed, this highway will increase ground movement 1 capability toward Finland and Norway. Roads in the north 2 are subject to periods of severe adverse climate, such as 3 heavy snowfall and spring thaw, the effect of which varies 4 from occasional closure to restricted movement especially 5 on the secondary roads. In an advance direct from USSR into 6 North Norway about one motorized rifle division (MRD) could 7 be moved per day, if required, and about two divisions could 8 be moved through Finland. In addition, a seaborne force of 9 one division could be landed through ports in Northern Norway. 10 Between Narvik and the Bodo area the movement capability may 11 be reduced to less than a division per day pending reestab- 12 lishment of bridges, ferries, etc. The capacity of the 13 existing rail and road network is adequate to support the 14 deployment of units. 15 44. Resupply. The roads into and through North Norway 16 toward Narvik have a daily resupply capacity estimated at 17 18,000 metric tons. Further south the road between Narvik, and 18 Bodo could also supply about 18,000 metric tons per day, Provided that suitable craft are available to utilize ferry crossings. South of Bodo, road and rail could resupply nearly 30,000 metric tons per day, provided that the supplies came by sea through Bodo. The transportation system in this region is capable of conducting resupply of ammunition and POL to meet operational requirements of force deployment. 45. Availability of Stocks. Stocks in Leningrad MD are more than adequate to initiate and support operations at the scales indicated above. The stocks are indeed so large (87 days ammunition, 93 days POL) that it is likely that part of them is destined for Central Europe. SECRET IV-4-19 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET CAMPAIGNS AGAINST SOUTHERN EUROPE AND WESTERN TURKEY 46. General. These campaigns could represent the major part of a single TVD stretching from the Alps to the Caspian Sea. The theater could comprise three, and possibly at a later stage four Fronts, including Soviet, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Romanian forces.(1) A Danube Front, formed initially of Hungarian and Soviet forces in Hungary, could be responsible for operations through Austria into southern FRG or against Northern Italy, which could also involve the engagement of Austria and/or Yugoslavia or the cooperations of the latter. This Front may also operate into Greece via Yugoslavia. A Balkan Front, formed initially from Bulgarian forces, supported by Soviets, and including Romanian forces, could be responsible for operations against Greece and Turkey; as operations against these two countries diverged, it might be reconstituted into two separate Fronts. A theater reserve could be formed from forces in Odessa MD not initially committed. Soviet forces in the Kiev, Moscow, Ural, and Volga MDs are also considered available for employment in southern Europe. Airborne forces could be committed at any stage of the campaigns, subject to the availability of aircraft. Amphibious forces in the Black Sea could also be involved. 47. Forces Available. Details of the ground and air forces available for this theater are provided in tabular form in Annex A to this Section, and further details of possible grouping are given under each Front below. In (1) This TVD would probably also include the Caucasus Front oriented against Eastern Turkey and/or Iran. However, for the purposes of this document, details concerning operations in Eastern Turkey and/or Iran are discussed as a separate campaign in paragraphs 60-68. SECRET US 161/76 IV-4-20 PART IV - Section 4 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET addition, units of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and of the Bulgarian and Romanian navies, including amphibious units, could supplement and support operations against Turkey. Some role might initially be played by units of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (SOVMEDRON). Danube Front 48. In pursuit of the general objectives stated in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 paragraph 15, forces of this Front could aim to destroy NATO 9 forces in Northern Italy, Greece, or the southern FRG. 10 Employment of this Front in an offensive role would be 11 dictated largely by the status of Austria and Yugoslavia 12 the outset of hostilities or the willingness of the Soviets 13 to violate neutrality. 14 49. In Option 1, the forces initially available could 15 be one Soviet and one Hungarian army from Hungary, comprising eight divisions and supporting air forces. A second echelon consisting of the remaining Hungarian forces could be available, but at a lower state of combat effectiveness. The capability of such a force would be heavily conditioned by the attitude of Austria and/or Yugoslavia. Tn the event of total Yugoslav cooperation, the threat to Italy and Greece would increase. 50. In Option 2, it would be open to the Soviets to build up forces in Hungary to a level permitting major offensive operations against Italy or Greece if Yugoslav forces cooperated, or operations to "hold" Italian or Greek forces if Yugoslavia were uncooperative. In both cases, forward bases for naval and air operations could be obtained. The level of forces required to carry out such an offensive operation would probably not be less than an additional six to eight Soviet divisions, since in even the most favorable SECRET IV-4-21 PART IV - Section 4 Us 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET situation, the Soviets would possibly retain sizeable forces 1 2 for security within Yugoslavia. Such an addition to the 3 Danube Front could only be achieved with a considerable 4 deployment of forces from outside the area. There could be 5 some limitations on the speed of deployment of a force of 6 this size. 7 Logistic Considerations 8 51. Forward Movement. There are three road and two rail routes crossing the USSR/Hungarian frontier, with an 9 10 optimum initial movement capability of five divisions or 11 190,000 metric tons of resupply per day. The combined use 12 of present roads, and railways would allow the movement of four 13 divisions or 175,000 metric tons of resupply per day through 14 Yugoslavia to Italy. Using main rail lines and roads through 15 Austria, about two divisions or 40,000 metric tons of resupply 16 could be moved daily under the best conditions. Routes do not 17 impose any effective limitation on the resupply of the forces 18 envisaged in the preceding pargaraphs. 19 52. Stocks. Stocks of ammunition and POL currently 20 held within Hungary amount to about 55 and 65 days supply 21 respectively for the forces already within that country. In 22 the event of reinforcement, there are sufficient stocks of 23 ammunition and POL within the country for some 40 to 45 days 24 respectively and additional stocks could be moved forward 25 from the Soviet Union concurrently with the movement of 26 forces. 27 Balkan Front 28 53. Operations against Western Turkey and Greece could 29 be intended to destroy NATO forces within these two countries 30 and eliminate them from the war. Early objectives could 31 certainly include the seizure of the Turkish Straits that SECRET IV-4-22 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET control the exit from the Black Sea and selected Aegean 1 Islands, and seizure of a direct outlet to the Aegean coast 2 3 in Northern Greece. Subsequent objectives might be the rest 4 of Western Turkey and mainland Greece. This could have the 5 effect of completing control of the Aegean Sea including the acquisition of air and naval bases and facilities there. 6 54. In Option 1, the forces initially available would 7 8 be six divisions and five tank brigades of the Bulgarian Army, together with the Bulgarian national air force and Soviet air 9 units from Odessa MD. Romanian forces could constitute a 10 second echelon until further Soviet forces became available. 11 12 Fleet units, amphibious and ABN forces could cooperate in this 13 option. These forces would not be sufficient to launch 14 simultaneous large scale attacks on both Greece and Turkey, 15 and indeed Bulgarian forces alone could not support a sustained major offensive against either country. However, with Soviet 16 17 support, Bulgaria could develop operatons against Turkish or 18 Greek Thrace. Such operations could open into separate thrusts 19 against the Turkish Straits or against Thessaloniki. 20 55. In Option 2, it could be expected that significant 21 Soviet ground and air forces from Odessa MD and Romanian 22 ground and air forces would have arrived in Bulgaria before 23 the opening of hostilities. In these circumstances, it 24 would be open to the Soviet Theater Commander to launch 25 simultaneous large scale attacks against Greece and Turkey. -- 26 The attack on Turkey could be led by Bulgarian.forces as -- 27 above, with Soviet and some Romanian forces ready to reinforce -- them in simultaneous operatons against the Bosporous and 29 Dardenelles. With the additional time to prepare, amphibious 30 and possibly ABN operations on the Black Sea coast of Turkish 28 31 Thrace and the eastern parts of the Bosporous could be more SECRET IV-4-23 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 lek Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET extensive. Bulgarian forces in the west, supported by some Romanian forces and possibly by Soviet forces, could mount an attack on Greece through the passes of the Rhodope mountains, probably with Thessaloniki as an initial objective. An attack could also be mounted through Yugoslavia. After the seizure of the initial objectives in Greece, operations could be directed towards control of the Aegean Sea area. 56. Granted initial success in these operations, forces facing Greece could be likely to develop their operations into the Greek mainland, while forces attacking Turkey could seek to secure and widen their control of the Black Sea exits in preparation for deeper operations. A feature of the possible operations into Southern Europe and Western Turkey is the extent to which it might be necessary to call upon forces from the interior of the Soviet Union if these operations are to be pursued to a logical conclusion. Such a course would present obvious dangers to the Soviet High Command. Logistic Considerations 57. Movement of Forces. Movement from USSR into Bulgaria would mainly be restricted by the limited Danube crossing points. The combined rail and road routes could support the initial movement of about two divisions per day or 143,500 metric tons of resupply. Under good conditions, forces already in Bulgaria could move nearly three divisions or 88,000 metric tons of resupply per day into Turkish Thrace, ana about three divisions per day or 87,000 metric tons of resupply per day into Greece. These modest figures may lay the WP open to some risk of defeat in detail. If rail and road routes through Yugoslavia also became available in the Monastir Gap and Vardar Valley, their combined use could add SECRET IV-4-24 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET about two divisions or 64,000 metric tons of resupply per day 1 to the threat against Greece, but this is only likely to occur 2 at a later stage. 3 58. Stocks. Stocks of ammunition in Bulgaria and 4 Romania are sufficient to support operations for up to 50 5 days for the force envisaged in Option 2. POL stocks are 6 so large as to place no constraint on military operations of 7 the scale envisaged. Stocks from the Odessa MD could be used 8 to support Soviet forces in operations bordering on the Black 9 Sea. 10 59. Resupply. The resupply requirements of the forces 11 mentioned above are not limited by movement considerations. 12 13 CAMPAIGNS AGAINST EASTERN TURKEY (AND IRAN) 60. General. A campaign against Eastern Turkey (and 14 15 if necessary against Iran) could constitute either a separate 16 Front within the Soviet Southwestern TVD or an additional TVD. 17 Operations against Iran are unlikely to be undertaken 18 voluntarily by the Soviet Union while engaged with NATO but 19 she would be obliged to maintain sufficient forces free of 20 other commitments to conduct at least an aggressive defense. 21 Against Eastern Turkey, The Soviet Union has the option of 22 conducting limited offensive operations designed to prevent 23 redeployment of NATO forces, or to strike into Turkey in 24 order to destroy her forces, secure the southern flank of the 25 WP, and link up with thrusts into Anatolia. In this section 26 the latter course is assumed. ABN forces would be used in 27 either case, and amphibious forces could be used against the 28 Black Sea coast. 29 61. Forces Available. Details of ground and air forces 30 available for this theater are set out in tabular form in 31 Annex A. They comprise those available in the Transcaucaus SECRET IV-4-25 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET and North Casucasus MDs, and in the case of Iran, the five divisions in the Turkestan MD; ABN forces; and probably elements of the Black Sea Fleet including amphibious elements and naval aviation. In the event of operations against Iran, the Caspian See Flotilla could also be available. Additional forces from the interior of the Soviet Union could be allotted if required. Operations 62. In Option 1, the attacking forces could comprise seven divisions in Transcaucasus MD (excluding divisions which could be reserved for Iran). A second echelon could be provided, after some delay, from the low category divisions in Transcaucasus and North Caucasus MDs. These forces could be inadequate to advance deep into Turkey until reinforcements arrive, but they might aim to open the way for follow-up forces to advance along the Black Sea coast road and through Erzerum. 63. In Option 2, a higher category division from North Caucasus MD could be added to the first echelon forces; a 1 2 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 second echelon could still be constituted from low category 20 21 divisions. Operations could follow the same course of action, 22 in somewhat greater intensity, but the possibility of immediately exploiting a breakthrough would be enhanced. 23 Logistic considerations (see pargaraph 65) could, however, 24 limit the concentration of Soviet forces. 25 64. In both Options, small, lightly armed forces, could 26 be landed almost at will on the northeastern Turkish coast. 27 Logistic Considerations 28 65. Forward Movement. Along the west coast of the 29 Caucasus there is one rail and one road leading into the Turkish frontier area. These routes have a combined optimum SECRET IV-4-26 PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 30 31 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET initial movement capability of about one division per day or 67,500 metric tons of resupply. In an attack, under good conditions, forces could be moved through border areas at the rates given below, but the movement rate by road may rapidly decrease: a. from Transcaucasus into Eastern Turkey, the 1 2 3 4 5 6 movement capability is two and a half divisions per day or 2.. 42,000 metric tons of resupply; 8 _ b. from Transcaucasus into Iran, the movement 9 _ capability is about four to four and half divisions per day 10 __ or 88,000 metric tons of resupply; 11 c. from Turkestan into Iran, the movement capability 12 is three divisions per day or 34,000 metric tons of resupply; 13 and 14 d. from Trabzon to Erzurum the movement capability is one division per day or 6,700 metric tons of resupply. 66. Stocks. Ammunition stocks held in the Transcaucasus, North Caucasus, and Turkestan MDs are sufficient to support operations of the force envisaged in Option 2 for up to 25 days. POL stocks are so large as to place no constraint on operations of the scale envisaged. 67. Resupply. The resupply of the forces mentioned 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 above is not limited by movement considerations. 23 Further Developments 24 68. If successful in initial operations, the Soviet 25 Union might aim to extend this campaign to reach the 26 Mediterranean near Iskenderun. 27 28 29 30 31 SECRET PART IV - Section 4 US 161/76 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 0%. SUMMARY OF SOVIET AND NSWP GROUND AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES BY REGION NATIONALITY AND LOCATION CATEGORY A DIVISIONS CATEGORY B CATEGORY C TACTICAL AIRCRAFT (i) COMBAT AIRCRAFT HELICOPTERS (ii) MISSION SOVIET Northern part of Northwestern USSR NATO's Northern (Leningrad MD) 2 2 4 175 70 Region SOVIET GSFG 20 0 0 740 280 NGF 2 0 0 315 55 NATO CGF 5 0 0 105 20 Central Region Western USSR (iii) 3 18 7 975 330 and Southern part of NSWP NATO's Northern Region GDR 6 0 0 42 52 Poland 10 3 2 369 41 Czechoslovakia 7 0 3 290 140 SOVIET SGF 4 0 0 230 65 Central or Southern Region of NATO NSWP Hungary 4 0 2 0 40 (i) FA or NSW? tactical air forces only. Does not include LRA, AVMF, VTA, or national air defense aircraft. (ii) Medium and heavy helicopters only. (iii) Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian MDs. Z-?00060001.000t10091.0809dCltl-VIO : 9O/60/OOZ eseeieu Jod peAoiddv Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 cn NATIONALITY AND LOCATION DIVISIONS TACTICAL AIRCRAFT(i) CATEGORY A CATEGORY B CATEGORY C COMBAT AIRCRAFT HELICOPTERS (ii) MISSION SOVIET Moscow MD 0 3 2 160 80 Considered Strategic Kiev MD 0 6 4 80 60 Reserve Ural MD 0 1 2 0 0 Volga MD 0 0 3 0 0 Airborne Divisions 7 0 1 0 0 See Text SOVIET Southwestern USSR (Odessa MD) 0 3 4 235 90 NSWP Bulgaria 5 + 5 Bdes 1 2 155 36 NATO Romania 7 3 0 80 47 Southern Region SOVIET Southern USSR (Transcaucasus MD) 0 3 8 340 190 (North Caucasus MD) 0 1 5 0 0 (Turkestan MD) 0 1 4 155 75 (i) FA or NSWP tactical air forces only. Does not include LRA, AVMF, VTA, or national air defense aircraft. (ii) Medium and heavy helicopters only. Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 # SECRET Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 ANNEX 1 GLOSSARY GENERAL TERMINOLOGY AA Anti-Aircraft AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery AACV Airborne Armored Combat Vehicle AAICV Armored Amphibious Infantry Combat Vehicle AAM Air-to-Air Missile AAMG Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile ABN Airborne ACV Air Cushion Vehicle ACW Anti-Carrier Warfare AD Air Defense ADD Air Defense District ADP Automatic Processing ADZ Air Defense Zone AEM Missile Support Ship AEROFLOT Soviet Civil Aviation AFV Armored Fighting Vehicle AGI Intelligence Collector (Sometimes, SIGINT Ship) Al Airborne Intercept (Radars) Aircraft Operational Altitudes Very High Altitude above 16,000m High Altitude 8000-16,000m ' Medium Altitude 300-8000m Low Altitude 100-300m Very Low Altitude below 100m AMM Anti-Missile Missile AOB Air Order of Battle AO Naval Oiler AOR Underway Replenishment Ship APC Armored Personnel Carrier APVO Aviation of PVO SECRET US 161/76 1 Annex 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET AR Repair Ship Armed Assault A helicopter with an armament and troop Helicopter cargo lift capability. Used in con- junction with heliborne assault operations. AS Submarine Tender ASL Submarine Tender (small) ASM Air-to-Surface Missile ASR Submarine Rescue Ship ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare AT Anti-Tank ATB Air Technical Battalion ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile AW All-Weather AWAC Airborne Warning and Control Ballistic Missile A Missile Without Airfoils BEPO Bereitschaftspolizei - Emergency Police in GDR BMD Soviet Airborne Armored Combat BMP Soviet Amphibious Armored Infantry Combat Vehicle BRDM Soviet designation for Amphibious Reconnaissance Vehicle BTR Armored Personnel Carrier BW Biological Warfare CBU Cluster Bomb Unit C3 Command, Control and Communications CC Gun-Armed Cruiser CEMA Council for Economic Mutual Assistance. An international communist body for coordinating trade and economic planning comprising the following countries, in alphabetical order: Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, USSR. Associated country: Yugoslavia. (Also abbreviated as COMECON, CMEA, CAEM (French), RGW (German), and SEV (Soviet). SECRET US 161/76 2 Annex 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET CEP CL CGF Chaff CHG CLCP CLG CL CM Clear Air Mass Fighter Combat Aircraft Combat Effectiveness Common User Equipment Composite Materials COMSAT Counterair Cruise Missile SECRET US 161/76 Circular Error Probable. A measure of the accuracy of a missile/projectile, used as a factor in determining probable damage to a target. It is the radius of a circle within which half of the missile/ projectiles are expected to fall. Light Cruiser Central Group of Forces (Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia). The general name applied to radar confusion reflectors, normally of thin, narrow metallic strips of various lengths and frequency responses to generate echoes. Helicopter Ship (SAM armament). Guided Missile Cruiser (SAM armament) with Command Facilities. Missile Cruiser (SAM armament). Missile Light Cruiser (SSM and SAM armament). A fighter which requires visual acquisition of the target in order to conduct its attack. An aircraft used in operations against the enemy directly or indirectly but excluding transport aircraft. The ability of a unit to accomplish its mission in combat. Items of equipment common to military and civilian use. Layers of metallic or non-metallic materials bonded together. Communications Satellite. Air operations, both air-to-air and air-to-ground, conducted to attain and maintain air superiority. Both air offensive and air defensive actions are involved. (The former range throughout enemy territory and are generally conducted at the initiation of friendly forces. The latter are conducted near to or over friendly territory and are generally reactive to the initiative of enemy air forces.) A flat-trajectory aerodynamic guided missile. 3 Annex 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET CVSG Aircraft Carrier, whose primary mission is to engage in sustained ASW operations and escort convoys. Also, provides close air support for amphibious assault and to ground forces. Equipped with surface-to-air missiles with a range of over 10 miles. CW Chemical Warfare. DD Gun Armed Destroyer. DDG Missile Destroyer (SAM armament only). DDGM Missile Destroyer (SSM and SAM armament). DDGS Missile Destroyer (SSM armament only). DDGSP Missile Destroyer (SSM and point defense SAM armament). DE Destroyer Escort. Designation Laser DICBM DLG DLGM DOSAAF DWT ECCM ECM Illumination of a target by a laser beam whose reflected energy may be used by a homing weapon. Depressed Trajectory ICBM. An ICBM travelling on a trajectory lower than the normal minimum energy trajectory. Destroyer, Large (SAM armament only). Destroyer, Large (SSM and SAM armament). All-Union Voluntary Association for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet. Deadweight Tons. Electronic Counter-Countermeasures. Electronic Countermeasures. EEC European Economic Community. Electro-optics Electronic Warfare Field of study concerning devices such as image intensifiers, infrared devices and lasers which employ a combination of electronic and optical principle. That division of the military use of electronics involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of radiated electro-magnetic energy and actions taken to insure our own effective use of radiated electro- magnetic energy. SECRET US 161/76 4 Annex 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET ELINT Endo-Atmospheric Intercept ESM EW Exo-Atmo spheric Intercept FA Fluorescent Antibody FOBS Frequency Diversity FRG FROG Front Divisional Slice Fuel Cell GATT GBK General Purpose Forces GCA GCI GDR General War GHz SECRET US 161/76 Electronic Intelligence Intercept of one missile by another at an altitude where the atmosphere has an effect on the terminal phase of the intercept. Electronic Warfare Support Measures Early Warning Intercept of one missile by another at an altitude where the atmosphere has little or no effect on the terminal phase of the intercept. Frontal Aviation A technique for the rapid identification of BW agents. The agents combine with specific substances (antibodies) which are obtained with fluorescent dye and are therefore readily detected under a microscope. Fractional Orbital Bombardment System The use of several radars operating against the same target at the same time to minimize countermeasures and mutual interference. Federal Republic of Germany Free Rocket Over Ground A division and its proportional share of Army and Front troops of all sorts. For further details see MC 200. Device which transforms chemical energy directly into electrical energy. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Coastal Border Brigade (in GDR Navy) For definition see 'Soviet General Forces' Ground Controlled Approach (radar) Ground Controlled Intercept (radar) German Democratic Republic Unrestricted conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO Gigahertz (109 Hertz) 5 Annex 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET GM Guided Missile. A missile directed to its target while in flight or motion. GNP Gross National Product. The total value of goods and services produced per year, including depreciation. GOSPLAN The State Planning Committee of the USSR Ground Attack Any air weapon delivery against surface targets -- normally performed by air- craft of Frontal Aviation. GRP Glass Reinforced Plastic GRT Gross Registered Tons GSFG Group of Soviet Forces Germany GTT Soviet Tracked Oversnow Vehicle HE High Explosive Helicopter Gunship A helicopter performing as a ground attack aircraft with a permanent armament capability and no troop lift capability. HF High Frequency. (Frequencies in the bank 3-30 MHz) Hypersonic Aircraft Generally, those aircraft capable of air speeds of Mach 3.5-5.5 and above. ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IDF Interceptor Day Fighter (Clear Air Mass Fighter) IFF Identification Friend or Foe. A system of radio interrogation and reply generally used in connection with radar for identifying an aircraft, ship or craft. IMF International Monetary Fund IR Infrared IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile KGB Soviet designation for Committee of State Security kt Kiloton (equivalent in explosive power to one thousand tons of TNT) LACV Landing Air Cushion Vehicle Laser Device to generate a beam of coherent radiation SECRET US 161/76 6 Annex 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET LCM LCP LCU LCVP LF Limited Aggression* Landing Craft, Mechanized Landing Craft, Personnel Landing Craft, Utility Amphibious Craft (small) Low Frequency (frequencies in the band 30-3000 KHz) Any armed attack against NATO forces or territory, or actions at sea or in the air, under conditions of self imposed military restraint in which it appears that an armed attack imperils neither the survival of nation(s) nor the integrity of military forces as indicated in a. and b. of Major Aggression. Restraints include voluntary restriction on the objective sought, the areas involved and on the weapons and forces used by the enemy. Limited aggression is considered to include overt incursions and hostile local actions as defined in MC 14/3. Limited War Any international armed conflict which is not General War LORO Lob-on-Receive-Only, a passive scan technique used as an ECCM LRA Long Range Aviation LSM Medium Landing Ship LST Tank Landing Ship Mach Number Major Aggression* A number representing speed as a ratio relative to the speed of sound in the surrounding atmosphere. Any nuclear or non-nuclear armed attack against NATO forces or territory, or actions at sea or in the air, in which it has been clearly determined that the aim and scope of an armed attack are such as to imperil, directly, either: a. One or more NATO countries, to the extent that survival as free and independent nation(s) is immediately at stake, or b. The integrity of military forces, to the effective accomplishment of NATO strategic objectives are immediately subject to unacceptable deterioration. * See Annex A to MC 14/3, dated 16 January 1968. SECRET US 161/76 7 Annex 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET MBFR MCM MD MF Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Mine Countermeasures Military District Medium Frequency (frequency in the band 300 KHz to 3 MHz) MHC Coastal Minehunter MHz Megahertz Microwave A radio communications system employing Link wave lengths of less than one meter (usually high directional and confined to line-of-sight distances). MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle MOB Mod MOD Monovalent Vaccine Main Operating Base(s) Modification Ministry of Defense Sepcific against a particular disease MPD Main Political Directorate MPO Soviet designation for Maritime Frontier Guard MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile MRD Motorized Rifle Division MRV Multiple Re-entry Vehicle MSC Coastal minesweeper MSF Fleet Minesweeper MSM Medium Minesweeper Mt Megaton (Equivalent in explosive power to one million tons or TNT) MVD Ministry of Internal Affairs (USSR) NBC Nuclear Biological and Chemical NGF Northern Group of Forces (Soviet Forces in Poland) NIS NRE Soviet designation for the Soviet Navy's Observation and Communication Service Non-Rotating Earth (used, e.g., as a reference for standardizing the description of missile ranges) SECRET US 161/76 8 Annex 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET NSR Northern Sea Route NSWP Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact OB Ground Forces Order of Battle 00B Naval Order of Battle Operational Aircraft An aircraft which can be used for a military role in offense, defense, or support thereof. OT Territorial Defense in Poland PBH Hydrofoil Patrol Boat PBV Post Boost Vehicle PCE Coastal Escort, Large Subchaser (500-1000 tons) PCEP Patrol Escort, Point Defense PCH Hydrofoil Submarine Chaser PCS Small Submarine Chaser Penetration Devices such as decoys or chaff which Aid are used to facilitate the penetration of defenses. PGGP Patrol Guided Missile Boat (SSM and SAM armament) PGM Motor Gunboat Phased Array A type of radar aerial in which scanning is achieved by changing the phase of the signal fed to the antenna by electronic means instead of by mechanical means. POL Petrol, Oil and Lubricants Polyvalent Those having a simultaneous capability Vaccines against several diseases PT Motor Torpedo Boat PTF Fast Patrol Boat PTH Hydrofoil Motor Torpedo Boat PTFG Large Guided Missile Boat Pulse A radar pulse modulation technique Compression which achieves some resolution advantages of using shorter pulses. PVO Soviet designation for Air Defense SECRET US 161/76 9 Annex 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET PV0 Strany Soviet designation for Air Defense of the Homeland PVO-Voysk Soviet designation for Air Defense of Theater Forces Re-entry Profile The path followed by a body re-entering the earth's atmosphere R&D Research and Development Repeater A receiver-transmitter device which Jammer when triggered by enemy electronic radiations, returns synchronized impulses to the enemy equipment for purposes of deception of jamming. RSFSR Russian Soviet Federated Socialistic Republic RT Voice Transmission RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle RV SALT SAM Secondary Radar System Semi-Conductors SGF Re-entry Vehicle. The payload and equipment which return to earth through the atmosphere SAL(T) Strategic Arms Limitation (Talks) Surface-to-air missile A radar system in which the aircraft or ships under surveillance carry trans- ponders which are activated by signals from interrogating radars. The signals from the transponders may be coded. Materials with Special Electrical Properties Southern Group of Forces (Soviet Forces in Hungary) SHE Super High Frequency SIGINT Signal Intelligence (electronic and communications). See also ELINT SLAR Sidelooking Airborne Radar. An airborne radar, viewing at right angles to the axis to the vehicle, which produces a presentation of terrain or moving targets SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile SLD Sea Landing Division SLOC Sea Lines of Communication SNA Soviet Naval Aviation SECRET US 161/76 10 Annex 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET Software The programs which translate human instructions into forms which can ,be understood and acted upon by computers. Soviet General Include: Purposes Forces a. Theater forces, i.e., ground combat and tactical air forces plus their associated command, support and service elements up through the level of military districts and groups of forces; b. Naval general purpose forces, i.e., naval forces subordinate to fleets and separate flotillas, including naval air forces, but excluding strategic attack missile submarine forces; and c. Military airlift and sealift elements. In addition, Soviet command and service elements providing general support to all components of the Soviet military establishment are considered where appropriate. SOVINDRON Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron SOVMEDRON Soviet Mediterranean Squadron SRF Strategic Rocket Forces SS Diesel-Powered Torpedo Attack Submarine SSB Diesel-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine SSBN Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine SSG Diesel-Powered Cruise Missile Submarine SSGN Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Submarine SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile SSN Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine S&T Science and Technology STOL Short Take-Off and Landing TAA. Tactical Air Army TASM Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile TEL Transporter-Erector Launcher Terrain A radar that enables aircraft to fly Following at a constant altitude above the ground Radar contours. SECRET US 161/76 11 Annex 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET Theater Forces See 'Soviet General Purpose Forces' TV Theater of War (Soviet designation) TVD Theater of Military Operations UHF Ultra High Frequency (frequencies in the band 300-3,000 MHz) VG Variable Geometry. A term referring to an aircraft which is capable of altering the sweep of the wings while in flight. VDS Variable Depth Sonar VHF Very High Frequency (frequencies in the band 30-300 MHz) VLF Very Low Frequency (frequencies in the band 3-30 KHz) VOPO Volkspolizei - Peoples' Police in GDR. VOR VHF Omi-Range V/STOL Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing VTA Soviet designation for Military Transport Aviation VTOL Vertical Take-off and Landing VVS Air Forces (USSR) WOP Maritime Frontier Guard (Polish Navy) WP Warsaw Pact SECRET US 161/76 12 Annex 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET REGIONAL TERMINOLOGY Political Regional Definitions The communist world consists of the following: USSR Communist China Albania Bulgaria Cuba Czechoslovakia Hungary Mongolia North Korea North Vietnam Poland Romania German Democratic Republic (GDR) Yugoslavia The Soviet Bloc is defined as consisting of the following members of the Warsaw Pact: USSR Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Romania GDR For a fuller discussion of the political alignment of Albania, Cuba and Yugoslavia, see Part I, Section 1. Geographical Regional Definitions Europe: All European countries on the continent from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. Eurasia: Europe and Soviet Asia. North America: United States and Canada. Nordic Area: Denmark Finland Iceland Western Continental Norway Sweden Europe: Austria Belgium Denmark France Federal Republic of Germany Luxembourg Netherlands Switzerland Western Insular Europe: British Isles and Eire Scandinavian Peninsula: Iberian Peninsula: Southern Europe: SECRET US 161/76 Norway and Sweden Gibraltar, Portugal and Spain Greece, Italy, Turkish Thrace and Yugoslavia 13 Annex 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET Eastern Europe: Albania Bulgaria Czechoslovakia German Demo- Hungary Poland cratic Republic Romania Yugoslavia South Eastern Europe: Albania Romania Bulgaria Turkey Greece Yugoslavia Middle East: Cyprus Israel Iran Jordan Iraq Lebanon Turkey Egypt Saudi Arabia Syria Far East and Southeast Asia: Bhutan Japan South Vietnam BurmaLaos Pakistan Cambodia Macao Philippines Ceylon Malaysia Sikkim Communist China Mongolia Soviet Territory in Formosa Nepal the Far East Hong Kong North Korea SW Pacific Islands India South Korea Thailand Indonesia North Veitnam Tibet North Africa: Algeria Egypt Morocco Tunisia Libya SECRET US 161/76 14 Annex 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 SECRET : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 ANNEX 2 AIRCRAFT 1 _ 2 _ DESIGNATION OF CURRENT SOVIET FIGHTERS 3 _ Fixed Wing 4 _ Single Jet FAGOT MIG-15 5 _ FISHBED MIG-21 6 _ FISHPOT B/C SU-9(U)/SU-11(S) 7 _ FITTER A SU-7 8 _ FRESCO MIG-17 9 _ Twin Jet FARMER MIG-19 10 FIDDLER TU-128(S) 11 FIREBAR YAK-28P 12 FLAGON SU-15(C) 13 FLASHLIGHT YAK-25 14 FOXBAT MIG-25 15 Variable Geometry Wing (VG) 16 FITTER B/C SU-17(C)/Unknown 17 FLOGGER MIG-23 18 FENCER SU-19(C) 19 BOMBERS 20 Fixed Wing 21 Twin Jet BEAGLE IL-28 22 BREWER YAK-28 23 BADGER TU-16 24 BLINDER TU-22 25 Four Turboprop BEAR TU-95 26 Four Jet BISON M-4 27 Variable Geometry Wing (VG) 28 BACKFIRE TU-Unknown 29 30 31 SECRET US 161/76 1 Annex 2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET ANNEX 2 DESIGNATION OF CURRENT SOVIET AIRCRAFT FIGHTERS Fixed Wing Single Jt Twin Jet Variable Gometry BOMBERS Fixed Wing Twin Jet Four Turboprop Four Jet 1 2 3 4 FAGOT MIG-15 5 FISHBED MIG-21 6 FISHPOT B/C SU-9(U)/SU-11(S) 7 FITTER A SU-7 8 FRESCO MIG-17 9 FARMER MIG-19 10 FIDDLER TU-128(S) 11 FIREBAR YAK-28P 12 FLAGON SU-15(C) 13 FLASHLIGHT YAK-25 14 FOXBAT MIG-25 15 Wing (VG) 16 FITTER B/C SU-17(C)/Unknown 17 FLOGGER MIG-23 18 FENCER SU-19(C) 19 20 21 BEAGLE IL-28 22 BREWER YAK-28 23 BADGER TU-16 24 BLINDER TU-22 25 BEAR TU-95 26 BISON M-4 27 Variable Geometry Wing (VG) 28 BACKFIRE TU-Unknown 29 30 31 SECRET US 161/76 1 Annex 2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET COMBAT TRAINERS 1 Single Jet MAIDEN USU-9 2 MAYA L-29 3 MONGOL UMIG-21 4 MOUJIK USU-7 5 MIDGET UMIG-15 6 ISKRA(1) TS-11(1) 7 L-39 (1) 8 Twin Jet MASCOT UIL-28 9 MAESTRO UYAK-28 10 MAGNUM YAK-30 11 MANTIS YAK-32 TRANSPORTS 12 Criteria(2) 13 Light Transport Payload under 6,800 kg. 14 Medium Transport Payload 6,800 to 21,000 kg 15 and a combat radius of at 16 least 1,100 km. 17 Heavy Transport Payload over 21,000 kg and a 18 combat radius of at least 19 2,200 km. 20 Light(3) 21 Twin Reciprocating CAB LI-2 22 COACH IL-12 23 CRATE IL-14 24 25 (1) These aircraft have not been given designations by the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee. ISKRA is 26 the indigenous designation. (2) These cri_teria are based on most economical fuel loads. 27 (3) A large number of small transports are used for liaison and light cargo duties but are not considered in AOBs. 28 These aircraft include the CLOD (AN-14), CO1T (AN-2), and CREEK (YAK-12). 29 30 31 SECRET US 161/76 2 Annex 2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET Twin Turboprop COKE AN-24 CURL AN-26 CASH AN-28 CLANK AN-30 CUFF BE-30 Twin Jet COOKPOT TU-124 Three Jet CODLING YAK-40 Medium Twin Turboprop CAMP AN-8 Twin Jet CAMEL TU-104 CRUSTY TU-134 Three Jet CARELESS TU-154 Four Turboprop CAT AN-10 COOT IL-18 CUB AN-12 Heavy Four Turboprop CLEAT TU-114 COCK AN-22 Four Jet CLASSIC IL-62 CANDID IL-76 CHARGER TU-144 HELICOPTERS Light Single Reciprocating HARE MI-1 Twin Reciprocating HEN KA-15 HOG KA-18 HOODLUM KA-26 Twin Turboshaft HOPLITE MI-2 SECRET US 161/76 3 Annex 2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 SECRET 1 Medium - Single Reciprocating HOUND MI-4 2 - Twin Turboshaft HIP MI-8 3 _ HORMONE KA-25 4 _ HIND MI-24 5 _ Heavy 6 _ Twin Turboshaft HARKE MI-10 7 HOOK MI-6 8 _ MISCELLANEOUS 2. ASW 10 -- Twin Reciprocating/Amphibian MADGE BE-6 11 __ Twin Turboprop/Amphibian MAIL BE-12 12 Four Turboprop MAY IL-38 13 BEAR F TU-95 (modified) 14 AWAC 15 Four Turboprop MOSS TU- (unknown) 16 Reconnaissance 17 Twin Jet MANDRAKE(1) YAK-27RV(S) 18 MANGROVE YAK-27R 19 PROTOTYPES 20 Fighter 21 V/STOL 22 Jet Undesignated Unknown 23 Helicopter 24 -- Heavy Four Turboshaft 25 Twin Rotor HOMER MI-12 26 (1) Primarily a high-altitude target aircraft. SECRET US 161/76 4 Annex 2 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 27 28 29 30 31 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/09/05: CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2 ANNEX 3 SUBMARINE RANGE CATEGORIES AND ENDURANCE 1. For convenience, submarines are arbitrarily categorized for range according to their endurance capability. 2. The following tables show Warsaw Pact and Yugoslav submarines, divided into these categories. RANGE CATEGORIES CLASS MAX. OPERATIONAL ENDURANCE a. Warsaw Pact Units All nuclear classes 90 days (i) Long (over 10,000 nm) GOLF 75 days FOXTROT 75 days JULIETT 75 days TANGO 75 days ZULU 75 days Medium (5,000-10,000 nm) BRAVO 50 days ROMEO 50 days WHISKEY 50 days Short (under 5,000 nm) QUEBEC 30 days b. Yugoslav Units Short (under 5,000 nm) HEROJ 30 days SUTJESKA 30 days (i) Limited only by crew endurance and availability of consumables. SECRET US 161/76 A-3-1 Annex 3 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2