KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01500R000200110001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 9, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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No Foreign Dissem
DIRECTOR of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Key Intelligence Questions
For
Fiscal Year 1975
9 August 1974
DCI/NIO 1751-74
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 014522
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS
for
FISCAL YEAR 1975
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Table of Contents
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Page
Introduction ........................ .................... .. ...... 1
First Substantive Objective* . ..................... ....... . ........ 3
Soviet Political Dynamics ............................. .. ........ . 3
Second Substantive Objective ......... .. 4
................ . . . . . . . .
Soviet Strategic Objectives ................... ........... . ..... .. 4
Soviet ICBM Systems ............. ............. ....... . ...... . 4
Soviet Nuclear Weapons ....................... ......... ...... . 4
Soviet Long Range and Naval Aviation ................ . ......... ... 4
Soviet Naval Systems ................................................ 4
Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses ...... ...... .......... .... 5
Soviet Weapons Acquisition Process ............................. ..... 5
Arms Agreement Negotiations ............ 5
Europe: Warsaw Pact 25X6A 5
Warsaw Pact .25X6A .................. 6
Eastern Europe ................................................... 6
Third Substantive Objective ...................................... .. . 7
China: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy ... ................ . .. 7
Chinese Military Capabilities ............. .............. ...... . .. 7
Fourth Substantive Objective ... ......... .................... . ... 8
The Middle East and South Asia ............................ . ...... 8
Southeast Asia .............................................. ..... 8
8
Korea ..................................................... 9
9
.................. .. ... 9
Latin America ...................................................... 10
Fifth Substantive Objective ......................................... . 11
Prospects for Inflation and Recession ........................ ........ 11
Multilateral Trade and Financial Negotiations ................. . ..... 11
Major Oil Exporters' Activities .................................... 11
Policies of _ Producers of Important Raw Materials Other Than Petroleum . 11
Effects of Price Changes on Major LDCs .................. ...... 11
Foreign Demand for US Agricultural Products ................. 12
Foreign Trade Opportunities ................................... .. 12
Additional Key Intelligence Questions .................... ......... 13
Nuclear Proliferation ............................................. 13
Law of the Sea . ............................................. . .. 13
Narcotics .................................................. .. 13
Activities of Terrorist or Extremist Groups ........... ........ . . 13
*There were five substantive objectives submitted by the DCI with his letter to the
President of June 18, 1974. They were not numbered; but the order in which they appear here,
and hence the ordering of these groups of Key Intelligence Questions, follows the sequence
of that June 18 submission.
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Key Intelligence Questions
For FY 1975
Introduction
1. These Key Intelligence Questions are designed to be responsive to and
to support the Substantive Objectives of the Intelligence Community for FY
1975 as noted by the United States Intelligence Board on June 13, 1974, prior
to the submission of those Objectives to the President.
2. The Key Intelligence Questions for Fiscal Year 1975 are issued as guidance
to the Intelligence Community for the collection and production of intelligence
on subjects of major importance to national-level intelligence consumers during
FY 1975. These Key Intelligence Questions obviously do not exhaust the uni-
verse of consumer needs; there are additional important categories of intelligence
collection and production which are not included in this priority national in-
telligence guidance:
(a) Lower priority national intelligence subjects: These are deliber-
ately omitted in order to emphasize the importance of the Key Intelligence
Questions. It is recognized that some attention must be devoted to lower
priority subjects, such as developments in Africa, although wherever pos-
sible less expensive and less difficult collection techniques should be em-
ployed. A level of attention must also be devoted to countries and issues
deemed likely to become important some years from now, even though
they may not pose immediate or pressing major problems during FY 1975.
(b) Departmental and tactical intelligence: This includes the intelli-
gence requirements of the operational commanders, as well as certain
warning and surveillance activities. An appropriate portion of the national
intelligence effort must be devoted to meeting these needs, and the Na-
tional Foreign Intelligence Budget Recommendations will take them into
account. Continuing efforts will be made to improve the interaction and
mutual support of national and tactical intelligence programs so that the
needs of each level may be served by the same activities to the maximum
extent possible. In framing these Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1975,
careful consideration was also paid to departmental objectives with na-
tional implications or overtones. The Critical Near-Term Defense Intelli-
gence Objectives of the Department of Defense were given special attention.
3. The Key Intelligence Questions are circulated for the following purposes:
(a) First, to insure that these subjects are given priority in the regular
collection and production activities of appropriate elements of the Intelli-
gence Community.
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(b) Second, to enable review of collection and production planning
by the member agencies of the Intelligence Community via a brief, succinct
report prepared on each KIQ under the aegis of the appropriate National
Intelligence Officer. In a few cases involving subjects of particular im-
portance, a supplementary, more detailed review will highlight specific
matters deemed appropriate for special collection or production attention.
(c) Third, to provide the basis for a recapitulation and evaluation,
after the close of the fiscal year, of the performance of the Intelligence
Community-and of individual agencies-on each of the Key Intelligence
Questions.
(d) Fourth, to permit the conclusions drawn from the recapitulation
and evaluation of the FY 1975 effort to be used as factors in Community
resource allocations, and in the preparation of the National Foreign In-
telligence Budget Recommendations which the Director of Central Intelli-
gence will be sending to the President in November 1976.
4. The Key Intelligence Questions have been grouped, where possible,
under one of the five Substantive Objectives for the Intelligence Community
as submitted to the President by the Director of Central Intelligence. The
order in which the FY 1975 questions are listed should not be regarded as
implying an internal priority: by definition, all the Key Intelligence Questions
are of major importance.
5. Additions or modifications to the Key Intelligence Questions may be
issued from time to time during FY 1975, if major changes in the international
situation or the foreign intelligence environment should so dictate.
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Substantive Objectives
and
Key Intelligence Questions
Substantive Objective
To provide reliable, timely and comprehensive assessments of Soviet policies
and intentions in the political, security and economic fields, to include the
dynamics of and factors affecting Soviet leadership and decision making.*
Key Intelligence Questions
Soviet Political Dynamics
1. What major trends and changes are likely in Soviet foreign policies relating
to the US?
Include the Soviet perception of the level, nature and geographic
focus of the competition with the US.
2. What internal trends and developments-including factions and policy
differences in decision-making circles-are likely to affect Soviet behavior,
both in the near and long terms?
3. What are the policies and activities of the Soviet Union with respect to
maintaining and expanding its influence in Eastern and Western Europe, the
Middle East and the Indian Ocean area?
4. What are the capabilities, intentions and expectations of the two sides
in the Sino-Soviet relationship-conflict, confrontation, reconciliation or con-
tinued uneasy stalemate?
Include reporting on any qualitative or quantitative changes in the
military balance between the USSR and China, particularly changes
that might indicate an increasing likelihood of hostilities.
5. What are Soviet economic policies toward the developed nations?
Particular attention should be given to the importation of technology.
Large-scale trade in food and materials is also highly important.
*The Substantive Objectives set forth in italic type are the five Substantive Objectives
for FY 1975 submitted by the DCI with his letter to the President of June 18, 1974.
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Substantive Objective
To provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments
of current and future Soviet military and political capabilities to exert influence
or power outside the USSR, especially with respect to the United States, its forces
and its allies, and other key areas such as the Middle East and China. In par-
ticular, monitor Soviet compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation agree-
ments, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction and
similar negotiations.
Key Intelligence Questions
Soviet Strategic Objectives
6. What are Soviet objectives, policies, deployment plans and perceptions
relating to strategic weapons and the strategic balance?
Soviet ICBM Systems
7. What are the accuracies of the Soviet SS-X-16, 17, 18 and 19 ICBM
systems?
8. What progress are the Soviets making, and what are their objectives, in
increasing the counterforce capability and survivability of their ICBM forces?
9. Are the Soviets developing land-mobile ICMBs; and if so, what progress
is being made?
Soviet Nuclear Weapons
10. What doctrine and plans do the Soviets have for the deployment, com-
mand and control, and use of nuclear forces, including Soviet reactions to US
policy on selective uses of nuclear weapons?
11. What are Soviet objectives in nuclear weapons technology, and what
progress are the Soviets making in this area?
Soviet Long Range and Naval Aviation
12. What is the intended size, role and armament of the Backfire force?
13. What progress have the Soviets made in development of improved
tankers, a follow-on heavy bomber and air-launched stand-off weapons?
Soviet Naval Systems
14. What programs do the Soviets have to increase SLBM capabilities
against the United States by deployment of DELTA/ SS-N-8 submarines, devel-
opment and deployment of follow-on SSBN systems, and/or changes in SSBN
operational practices and patrol areas, and command and control capabilities?
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15. What progress are the Soviets making in expanding their international
political influence through the use of their distant fleet operations and sea-power
presence?
16. What progress have the Soviets made in development of follow-on
anti-ship missile systems?
Include the characteristics of the guidance systems.
17. What progress are the Soviets making toward acquisition of an effective
capability for open ocean submarine detection and localization?
Pay particular attention to progress in non-acoustic sensors.
18. What is the status of Soviet RDT&E, and what progress is being made
toward deployment of, and reporting improvements in, a satellite-borne ocean
surveillance system?
Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses
cA 1 -19. What progress are the Soviets making in ABM development, and what
are their plans for further deployment?
d) co / 20. What is the status of Soviet development of a look down/shoot down
capability for interceptor aircraft and improved air defense warning and control
systems?
21. What progress are the Soviets making toward strategic defense applica-
tions of lasers and beam weapons?
Soviet Weapons Acquisition Process
22. What are the costs of Soviet and Warsaw Pact weapons systems and
defense programs, and how do these costs affect Soviet defense decision making?
Include information on how the Soviet weapons research and develop-
ment and acquisition processes work.
Arms Agreement Negotiations
23. What are Soviet and Warsaw Pact objectives and positions in arms
limitations negotiations?
24. What are Soviet and Warsaw Pact intentions and actions with respect
to adherence to arms limitations agreements with the United States?
Europe: Warsaw Pact-NATO-MBFR 25X6A
25. What are the size and composition of the Warsaw Pact_
forces in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) ?
This information must be in sufficient detail to support the MBFR
negotiations. It must include identification and location of all Warsaw
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25X6A Pact militar units and installations in the NGA; aggregate manpower
levels of Warsaw Pact round and air forces personnel
25X6A in the NGA; Warsaw Pact ground forces
in the NGA (with a breakdown of personnel assigned to combat,
rear services, command and support activities) ; composition of_
25X6A _ Warsaw Pact air and air defense forces, listing personnel by service
and function; aggregate counts of key items of equipment--tanks, air-
craft, artillery, nuclear weapons and missiles-in the NGA by force
and country; and Warsaw Pact unit TOE data.
Warsaw Pact-NATO Balance
26. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Warsaw Pact forces for
theater war?
The information must include the combat effectiveness of ground forces,
frontal aviation and-in Eastern Europe-national air defense forces
as well as Pact perceptions of NATO strengths and weaknesses.
27. What are Warsaw Pact views, plans and doctrine for conducting war
in Central Europe, including readiness, mobilization commitment and reinforce-
ment o Pact forces?
28. What are Warsaw Pact capabilities to fight a sustained non-nuclear
war in Europe, including critical stockpiles and the operation of the rear services?
25X6A
Eastern Europe
30. What are the prospects for Yugoslavia following the departure of Tito?
Consider especially the potential political role of the Yugoslav armed
forces, and Soviet efforts to increase Russian influence.
25X6A
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Substantive Objective
Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments
of Chinese internal and external policies and capabilities with respect to the
United States, its allies, the USSR, Southeast Asia and the Third World.
Key Intelligence Questions
China: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy
31. What major trends and changes are likely in Chinese foreign policies
relating to the US and the USSR?
32. While Mao and/or Chou remain alive, how are the internal stresses
and relationships within the upper echelons of the Party likely to affect China's
main lines of foreign, economic and military policy? Should Mao and/or Chou
die, how are these policies likely to be affected by the succession process?
33. What are Peking's attitudes and objectives regarding the US' and
USSR's role in Asia, and Peking's intentions toward attaining a role as leader of
the Third World?
Include what progress Peking is making and how these Third World
activities affect its support of revolutionary movements in the less de-
veloped countries.
Chinese Military Capabilities
' 34. What is the present status of China's nuclear capabilities?
Include the types and locations of delivery vehicles, the numbers and
types of weapons in stockpile and weapons technology.
v-"35. What progress are the Chinese making toward acquiring missile capa-
bilities against the US and against the USSR west of the Urals?
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Substantive Objective
Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments
on, political and security situations or crises significantly affecting US interests
or requiring US action (e.g., Arab-Israeli relations, South and Southeast Asia,
the European Community, Latin America.)
Key Intelligence Questions
V 36. What are Arab (especially Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian,
Saudi and Palestinian views on and strategies toward the major issues of a
peace settlement?
25X6A
37. What are Arab military capabilities, plans and intentions? 25X6A
,/'38. What are the threats to the political stability of major Middle East
countries, and the points of conflict and cooperation between countries such
as Saudi Arabia and Iran?
Include major developments in the Middle East which could have a
significant effect on the success of US programs for economic cooper-
ation.
39. What indications are there of internal and regional instability in South
Asia, especially concerning India?
Southeast Asia
40. What are Communist intentions and capabilities in Indochina and
Thailand?
Are the USSR and/or China willing to support major hostilities, par-
ticularly on the part of the North Vietnamese?
What are Soviet and Chinese interests in the area?
41. Will non-Communist elements in Indochina and Thailand be able
to maintain internal stability and will they continue to cooperate with the US?
25X6A
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43. What developments within North and South Korea are likely to ad-
versely affect the political, economic or military balance on the peninsula?
Include how these developments might significantly increase the possi-
bility of hostile action by Pyongyang or, short of that, substantially
increase pressure for greater US involvement in or support of South
Korea.
25X6A
Western Europe
w 45. How do the new leaders in Western Europe weigh the compatibilities
and contradictions between "Atlanticism" and "Europeanism"?
Include the effects of domestic considerations (including political op-
position, especially in cases where Communist parties are large or in-
fluential) and what these attitudes imply for Europe's external relations,
participation in NATO and European defense cooperation. Also include
the role and influence of inter-governmental (e.g., the EC, NATO,
Eurogroup, WEU) and non-governmental (e.g., labor unions and fed-
erations, management groups, etc.) organizations and leaders.
4- 46. What are West European policies, strengths and vulnerabilities in their
relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in trade, political and
security terms?
Include the impact of US policies toward the East on West European
policies, and how various East-West negotiations (CSCE, MBFR) fit
into West European concepts of the overall fabric of detente.
47. How do national and international economic problems-such as in-
flation, employment and trade balance questions-and related social pressures
impinge on European domestic politics and on the foreign and defense policies
and options of the principal European states?
The critical situations in Italy are of particular concern. 25X6A
48. What are the major trends in politics and policies in Portugal and its
African territories under the new regime, and in Spain, as the transition from
Franco comes closer?
a 49. What are the implications of developments in Cyprus, Greece and
Turkey for US and NATO political and security interests?
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50. What are the reactions of governments and interest groups, particularly
in Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Venezuela and Mexico, to current US initiatives
toward Latin America?
51. What will be Latin American policies and attitudes-especially in multi-
lateral forums, international or regional-on issues of importance to the US?
Include what blocs or alignments are being formed among the Latin
American states.
52. What major actions are likely to be taken against US economic. interests
in Latin America?
Include attitudes toward US investments in Latin American countries.
53. What are Panama's intentions and bargaining vulnerabilities in nego-
tiations for a new Canal Treaty or related agreements?
Include the willingness and ability of the Torrijos government to make
concessions and the attitude of other Western Hemisphere governments
toward the Canal question.
54. What are the attitudes of other Latin American states regarding diplo-
matic and trade relations with Cuba and US policies toward Cuba?
55. What changes are there in Cuban attitudes regarding the normalization
of relations with the US?
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Substantive Objective
Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments
relevant to US international economic policy decisions and negotiations.
Key Intelligence Questions
Prospects for Inflation and Recession
56. What are the changes in the measures of current performance and
leading indicators of future performance of the economies of the major non-
Communist industrial nations, especially Italy, France, the 25X6A
Include these governments' domestic and foreign economic policy
responses to those changes, and the likely effect of these responses on
the future performance of these economies and the US economy.
Multilateral Trade and Financial Negotiations
57. What are the Principal objectives of the economic powers
(especially France, and Brazil) 25X6A
in forthcoming multilateral trade (GATT) and financial negotiations (IMF) ?
Include their possible negotiating tradeoffs and the electoral and intra-
governmental factors that affect these objectives and tradeoffs. With
respect to multilateral trade negotiations, appraise the consequences of
alternative trade agreements to the US foreign trade balance.
Major Oil Exporters' Activities
58. What are the changes in composition and location of the foreign assets
of the major oil exporting countries, and what are their policies with respect to
channeling funds on longer terms than heretofore through multilateral institu-
tions, the Eurodollar market, US financial markets and direct loans or grants
to the LDCs?
59. What are the policies, negotiating positions and vulnerabilities of the
major petroleum exporters with respect to the production and marketing of oil,
and how are these policies affected by the prospects for development of non-
OPEC energy sources?
Policies of Producers of Important Raw Materials Other Than Petroleum
60. What changes in production, control and pricing policies are the major
producers of important raw materials or primary products,
considering either individually or in concer .
Effects of Price Changes on Major LDCs
61. How have changes in the relative prices of imports and exports (petro-
leum, fertilizer and grain in particular) affected the food supply, foreign trade
and prospects for economic growth and political stability of the major LDCs
(especially India, Pakistan, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico and South Korea) ?
25X6A
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25X6A
Foreign Demand for US Agricultural Products
25X6A 62. What is the likely demand (especially by the USSR, China, India,
- for imports of wheat, soybeans, rice, corn and cotton, and what are the
capabilities of countries other than the US (especially Argentina, _ 25X6A
Brazil and Thailand) for supplying these commodities to the world market?
25X6A
Foreign Trade Opportunities
63. What actions are being taken or planned by foreign governments or
private groups that could substantially affect the ability of American business
to compete for foreign sales or construction contracts whose size or circum-
stances are such as to involve the US interest in an important way?
Examples are sales of aircraft, nuclear power plants, enriched uranium
and major construction programs such as the Suez pipeline.
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Additional Key Intelligence Questions
Nuclear Proliferation
L- 64. What are the objectives, programs and capabilities of countries other
than the US, USSR, UK, France and the PRC for developing or acquiring nuclear
weapons and delivery systems?
Include policies and actions of other countries (including nuclear
powers) toward assisting the non-nuclear states in acquiring a nuclear
capability.
Law of the Sea
65. What are the negotiating positions and bargaining vulnerabilities of
key countries on the form and content of a Law of the Sea treaty?
Give particular attention to issues on which the attitudes and intentions
of these countries are likely to be so contentious as to jeopardize
prospects for a treaty even minimally acceptable to the United States.
66. Who are the major producers and traffickers in illicit narcotics, and
what are their methods of operation?
Include the location of their production areas, laboratories and storage
facilities, and how and by what routes and timing they move illicit nar-
cotics to the United States.
67. How effective are the anti-narcotics programs of Mexico, France, Turkey,
Thailand, Burma and Laos?
Include the willingness of these governments to cooperate with US
efforts to expose and prosecute producers, traffickers and their col-
laborators.
Activities of Terrorist or Extremist Groups
68. What are the composition, intentions and capabilities of foreign ter-
rorist or extremist groups?
Include their sources of funds and weapons, the possibility of seizure
or production and use of weapons of mass destruction (BW-CW as
well as nuclear), the issues with which they identify, their relations
with other like-minded groups, the extent of government support or op-
position, their impact on government policy and stability in their host
countries, and any evidence that Moscow or Peking is influencing or
rendering direct support to the terrorist groups.
69. What indications are there that the oil exporting countries plan to use
their increasing wealth for political or subversive purposes?
Include such activities as support for terrorist groups, loans to third
parties for the purchase of arms and loans and subsidies to political
groupings or national governments.
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