FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01500R000200120019-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2001
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: December 6, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Dec'em'ber.' ~`-.174
FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY 'REPORT
KIQ 26: What are the strengths and weaknesses of Warsaw
Pact forces for theatre war?
I. COMMUNITY COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY
A. The effort with regard to this KIQ will be concentrated
on providing a good estimate of the combat effective-
ness of Warsaw Pact ground forces and tactical aviation
in Eastern Europe, and also on non-Soviet national air
defense forces there -- and on Pact perceptions of NATO
strengthsi,.and weaknesses.
II. AGENCIES WORKING ON THIS KIQ
A. Collection.
25X1X4
25X1 D6a
25X1 D6a
TOP S
NSA & DIA Declassification/Release Instructions
on File
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B. Production. The primary community output will be in the
US MC-161 position paper/NIE 11-14 effort. DIA, CIA and
25X1X1 _ will be the principal participants under the aegis
& NSA 25X3 of the NIO. NOTE: Readiness, mobilization and reinforce-
ment are considered in KIQ 27; logistics in KIQ 28.
III. COMMENTS OF THE NIO/CF
A. The greatest evident deficiency at the outset of work on
this KIQ is the insufficient number of analysts assigned
at CIA and DIA to work in this area in the short term
because of the demands for MBFR support. Although gener-
ally speaking adequate amounts of information are collected
there are some areas where additional effort is needed.
More useful data can probably be provided by:
-- improved disSeminat.i.or'.
- reporting throughout DIA and CIA. 25X1X1
-- greater effort toward the exploitation of emigre,
refugee and defector sources especially on the subjects
of Soviet mobilization and reserve training.
B. It does not seem profitable to reduce the present level
of analytic effort devoted to MBFR, but if the Intelligence
Community:is to provide the support required by Secretary
Schlesinger in his attempts to optimize NATO conventional
KIO 26 - 2
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77
force structure, more analytic effort will be required
for this and KIQs 27 and 28.
C. In addition to more analysts, there is a need for
improved analytic methodologies to support assessments
of Warsaw Pact strengths and weaknesses in-~_relation
to current and future' NATO pos'tur e .
KIQ. 26,,-''3
RUFF UMBRA
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