NSC STAFF SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISIONS AND ADDITIONS TO THE PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE 1976-1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01500R000200150006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

DS
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NSC Staff Si-ggestions for Revisions and Additions to they Perspectives
for Intelligence 1976 .. 1981
worldts energy situation is likely to be followed by#urthe: attempts at:
cooperative efforts-by small nations to exert greater contrpl. over other
important raw materials, such as copper, :a-dxi:te, and phosphates As
Paragraph 7 (pp. 7 and 8) New Powers and Blocs
after "followed by further" and before "cooperative's in, li
delete the last part of the second sentence, line .7 and 8 .
"to the disadvantage of th.e1eadi*ag industrial, powerst1
replace the newly rich nations will's in line 8 by, .
"these nations may"
delete "adversely" in line 8, page 8
Paragraph 7 (p. 15) Other Priorities
after "U.S. installations and" and before "private'enterprises"
New Powers an.d Blocs. The example of OPEC's diisr:uption of the free
this process develops, these nations may seek to use their. economic
international' forums. Aside 'from these, several nations having - -
regional great powers and are playing more substantial roles in World
power for political purposes. Iran and Saudi Arabia. are already doing
so. Brazil,, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Zaire are also becoming at.least
-
considerable influence within regions and whose tie tg the U.S. have
XCDS
*NSC. lias No Objection to Declassification and Release
economic field but may also affect certain U.S. strategic interests.
relations with the U. S. This will be particularly prevalent in the
traditionally been close will display greater independence in their .
Examples of such powers are Canada, Mexico, Panama, Australia, and
Thailand.
Part II The Role of Intelligence
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 s r:r
me"- -rx DS
-Appruveu 00.0/08130 CIA-RDP80BO1500R0002-00156006'=1,
after "priirate enterprises" and before "abroad" in. H ne 12,,
add "and citizens'
after "nuclear" and before "weapons" in - ne
"and other mass casuualty"".
National policies with respect to military sales, receipt
of foreign military and economic assistance, and foreign
business activity and investment, including policies toward
citizens abroad and, beyond that, the risk that some terx: oxri st:"I May
U. S. installations and officials as well as private ex tc rlara se s a.xxcl
will be called upon more often to assess the threat of terror_isthh against
between societies, cultures, and national personalities. Xntell.igence
efforts on our part to xx .derstand and communicate the differences .
countered with appropriate mechanisms. This may xequire. a.:rterzsif er.,.
element of these problems can be isolated, negotiated about or
and political terrorism in Third World co?. retries, so the component
An example will be to identify the causes of social chang . turbulence,:
of and explain new situations posing problems to American. inl:ezests:
Other Priorities. Intelligence will increasingly be e- pect:ed :o- warn.
acquire nuclear and other mass casualty weapons.
activity" in section f, add "receipt of foreign. x);,Mitary arid
after "military sales" and before "and fore:i.gn. business
Paragraph 8 (p. 15, 16)
economic assista,n.ce,i?
on Southeast Asia with special emphasis on Indochina and Thailand,
multi--national corporations.
In addition, it is suggested that a section be added in both. Parts- I and 1
XGDS
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UWE
PA&E Suggested Re-Draft on the DCI Perspectives for Intelligence 1976.1981
OASD(PA&E) has provided an example of the kind of detail required
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in the DCI perspectives for intelligence:
Part I - Major World Problems
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 Major World Problems
1. General..
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The balance of power between the US and USSR is
unlikely to change fundamentally. But the power of the US t_.o. infiu_er. c.e:
international developments will continue to decline, as the power of
additional. nations possessing nuclear weapons or having significant
control over critical economic resources continues to increase_- -The
use of this new power by smaller nations will.appear to.imp%.rzge More
heavily on US strategic interests than. on, the strategic interests: of the
USSR Many will thus perceive the balance of power as tilting :in.
the USSR's favor..
of the free worlds oil 'resources has already critically strained. the
economies of most of the worldts industrial (and less developed) nations,
and?the fabric oLinterznatiErral finance and trade, v.?h,ile leavrng;the-
USSR and other communist nations relatively' unaffected.. These and
other strains. are helping to undermine the political stability- and change
Ii,
the foreign orientation of many nations. NATO coh.esireaess is in
jeopardy.and America's traditional friends and allies are less di.
than in the past to accommodate US strategic requirem.errts:_-..Thee
trends are likely to continue. They will provide the USSR with
tempting opportunities, even within the constraints of detente",- to
expand its influence in world affairs at the expense of the US. U tent
will at times be severely strained but is likely to hold together..
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Assumption by tie V.E-'..E!;C:. countries of near -m-oaopo1y--.c-ontr.o1,
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detente and an absence of armed conflict, the USSR. will continue to
seek a measure of strategic superiority over the US both in its weapons
systems and in its influence over international developments. It will
regard the US as its major security threat, and act accordircgly_
In foreign policy, it will continue to seek ways to e.icpand its
international influence and reduce that of the US. In Western ? Europe,
it will continue to attempt to undermine the concepts of both A.tlanticisra
and ^uropeanism,, employing both political action and trade policies
.for this purpose. Its primary aim in the Middle East. will be to -achieve.."
?east equal status with the US in efforts to control and defuse the `-_.._
Arab/Israeli. c7onfrontation. It will also attempt to weaken the special
relationships the US has: enjoyed with. Turkey and Iran_ Soviet political
action in South Asia, the Far East, and Latin.America-zvill belm re
limited and directed as much to counteracting Chinese as Axrxericarz,
influence. In its economic policy, Mosco\vv will continue to give high
priority to the kinds of growth which increase national powver and its
projection abroad, but will also fashion its trade policies to achieve
specific foreign policy objectives.
The circumstances which commend detente to the.. U SR,
however, have complicated this picture. These are: the need to
control local crises lest they lead to general war; the burden of Ehe
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Sino-Soviet conflict; and the desire for economic and technological
assistance from the West. The Soviets will have to deal in the coming
years with a number of dilemmas as they attempt to square traditional
attitudes with the requirements of a detente posture.
These dilemmas may take an acute form in the strategic field.,
While continuing to modernize its ground, naval, and tactical air
forces, the USSR is vigorously pursuing the opportunities left open
by SALT I. Except to the extent restrained by arms limitation'
agreements, the Soviets will make substantial improvements is
the* irmissile. forces, including MIRVig
throw-weight,. and better survivability.
At the same time, they will.
continue to maintain and to improve their defenses- They will be working
to develop effective v capon-s-and suppor}:r sf stains in such areas as
ASW, satellites, and lasers. Expecting strategic equality with the US,
the USSR gives indications of angling further for a measure of strategic
superiority, if that can be obtained at reasonable risk-
In attempting to exploit the Arab/Israeli confrontation. and
other international crises, Moscow will be confronted with similar
dilemmas, will be similarly inhibited, but will take reasonable risks
4
to obtain advantages. As noted above, some Soviet advantages will
result from actions taken by third powers rather than from Soviet
initiatives.
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Domestically, the pressure for modernizing reforms of the
Soviet system, and particularly its economic administrative structure,
will grow. Prolonged detente may also eventually have Borne effect
on the Communist Party's ability to wield its authority effectively is
all areas of public life. But these are long--term possibilities, an.ci
over the next five years the essentials of the Soviet domestic system
are not likely to be substantially altered.
3. China.. Almost certainly, China will undergo a change is
an authoritarian;, aggressive anad xenophobic leader. ` _TThe-.i.nitial,
'period could also be followed by fragmentation into a variety of contesting
military, party, and provincial elernents. For plahnis~g purpoaes,however,
it would seem most appropriate to assume that the follow--ori leaderuhip
in China will maintain the unity and authoritarian aisci;pliue imposed by
the Communist Party, that it will be primarily corcerrted internal
unity in meeting the social and economic problems witb.ir.. China, and that
it will retain a somewhat paranoid attitude toward the outside world and
particular suspicion of countries on its periphery.
No change from July 1974 edition.
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China Nvi,ll continue? gradually to develop its, strategic, forces
and will present a retaliatory threat to the Soviet Union. By 1980,
it will have the capability of threatening the United States with a
dern.onstration (or desperation) strike by a.sraall number of ICBMs
and SLBMs. China will maintain large general purpose forces capable
of operations on its periphery but will be unlikely to commit them in
the absence of major provocatioh or concern.
Internally, China will continue its authoritarian economic.
programs, which are likely to keep agriculture abreast of popu.latiox.,,
to enable industry to expand capacity and output, and to .support: an
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increasingly modern defense establishment. rnternatzanaU , 'Ch a:
will endeavor ,to-becoxne the ideological leader of the Third World-
It will .participate in aid programs and s'rnilar political gesti res.,%vitl
other Third World powers but will not establish substantial authority
over Third World countries.
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Ea tern Europe While East
errx Europe trill ceantactae to
ome oosenina of ties
under Soviet control, recurrent pressures for
.see 9A e_. plosion "from tf=ittii:~ e:~e.:o- _niox e asC Euro e~ri
'against Soviet dominance, but Moscow would quickly reestablish ins
hegemony (by force if necessary), what9ver the price ih.'terrns of
other policies. internal discipline may be alleviated somewhat in
these countries so long as they adhere. to Soviet guidance in. diplomatic
and security matters. Economic relations with the Wriest and'tviM the
Third World will grow in quantity and in independence, from Soviet
' No change from July 1974 edition.
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with Moscow %vill complicate the picture. The five-year period `could
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control. The passing of Tito could opexi~ an arena of difficulty and.
.contest over the succession internally and over the future orientation
of Yugoslavia externally.
as a participant in international economic affairs generally, expanding
6. Japan. Japan will continue to play a major econornc role and
its contacts and relations with other countries, including the USSR anal
China. It will probably still place priority on cooperative relations
with the United States although, or. issues it considers vital to its
own?well bei..ng,-it-will be less amenable to-American influence.. -:Th,*
internal Japanese scene is not apt to change so substantially as to
New Pov?ers'and Blocs. The p'.he ome!1or_ of s*iall powers,
singly 6r in combination, exerting influence on world affairs out of
all proportion to their.intrinsic power will grow apace. The example
of OPEC's disruption of the free world's energy situation is likely
to be followed by further cooperative efforts by small nations to
exert greater control over other important raw materials, such as
copper, bauxite, and phosphates, to the disadvantage of the leading
industrial powers. As this process develops, the newly rich nations
affect Japan's role abroad.
-No change from July 1974 edition.
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The Third World will present other major problems to US -
will seek to use their economic power for political purposes. Iratt
and Saudi Arabia are already doing so. ?Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria, and
Zaire are also becoming at least region a1 great powers and are. playing
rn e substantial roles in world international forums. Aside from
these, several nations having considerable influence within regions
and whose ties to the US have traditionally been close will display greater
independence in their relations with the US. This will be particularly
prevalent in the economic field but may also adversely affect certain
US strateg
ic interests. Exam.ple-Sof such powers are Canada, AMexic.o,
C> I
policy-makers. The existing confrontations between the Arabs and
Israel, North grid South Vietnar_:,' and \o th and South corea'ho?d tine
potential of unravelling detente at a time when the power of the US to
influence their outcome is declining. Other regional disputes--between
China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan, Greece and Turkey, and blacks
and whites in southern Africa--could also rekindle and threaten the
tenuous equilibrium between the great povi-ers-
The newly" i icli powers
will rapidly expand their military capabilities; some Nvzll develop
nuclear armaments, however primitive. Some Third Vorl d nations
will seek outlets for their frustrations in assaults on their economic
Parzar a, "A.cistrali.a' and Thailand.
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relationships with great powers and in hamstringing the effectiveness
of a variety of international forums. A few may resort to blackmail.
through terrorism--of a conventional or nuclear variety.
9. Social change will cause turbulence and possibly create power
vacuums, in a number of areas, These will stem from increased
expectations and a perception of the growing economic gap between
less developed countries (and classes within countries) and the developed
world. Areas particularly susceptible to this process will be the Persian
Gulf, certain. other Arab states such as Morocco, India,Rpossibly.
Indonesia, the Philippines, and, in Latin America, Argentina, Peru,
Colombia, and possibly even Brazil. Internally this turbulence may be
tempox~arily stilledby''sorne authoritarian governrnents,'particularly
those benefiting from increased oil revenues, but these will have
difficulties in maintaining themselves over the longer term and
transferring power to successors. The resulting turbulence can
present temptations to neighboring states to exploit long--standing
differences or to great powers desirous of extending their x flounce.
Such turbulence will also exist within advanced nations, as economic,
racial, ideological, or regional minorities turn,to violence And
terrorism to press their claims against more and more delicately
tuned and interdependent societies.
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is -
10. The acceleration of events will be characteristic of the years
ahead. This will come from improved communication and transportatiora,
sharply reducing the time available to reflect on, negotiate, and resolve
international problems. It will also raise many local, events to later-
national prominence and inflate national or political pride,, posing
further handicaps to successful negotiations. There will "tse a resulting
tendency towards shorter attention spans for individual situations and
a need for simultaneous perception and managernent.of a multiplicity-
of international relationships. Many national or int eraat.ional iizstztL tzons
are simply not structured to cope with accelerating change.:. Such. change-
will occur xriost conspicuously in the fields of science and technology,
..but the pace. t:here,will ha%,e.-substantia-L effects on the pace :of, sociological,
industrial, and institutional change, with resultant political and economic
impacts. Identification and accurate assessments of such changes anad
their effects will be needed on an increasingly rapid or even, immediate
No change from July 1974 edition-
10
or-rYrA
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Part 11---The Role of Intelligence
1. General. No changes
2. The USSR. Change final sentence to read as follows: "The
Soviet role abroad, either directly through diplomatic or economic
means or indirectly through party or subversive means, will be a
matter of special attention, particularly with respect to Western
Europe and the Middle East, "
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7. Add, as the first and second sub-paragraphs, the fdfowing:
6. Other Priorities. No change.
c. Split off last sentence and make into separate
section headed Eastern Europe.
5. Economics- No change.
'Ka) Developments in critical regional confrontations:
(1) Aral;/Israeli
(2) North Vietnam,/ South Vietnam
"(b) Indications of a resurgence of other confrontations:
(3) North. Korea/South' Korea,
(1-)'. Pakistan /India
(4) Black Africans/White Africans
(~) 'Greece/Turkey
(3) China/Taiwan
(57 China/USSR"
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