FINISHED INTELLIGENCE ON STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01500R000200240015-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 24, 1998
Sequence Number: 
15
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 14, 1975
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01500R000200240015-1.pdf109.99 KB
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Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200240015-1 S;' l7//5 1 February 1.975 MEN "M FOR. i_xcecutive AssistarrL to the Deputy for Nation- I Intelligence Officers SUBJECT: Finished Intel l iclence on Strategic Programs 1.. Attached is a bibliography of intelligence products on Soviet ICBMs. I t shows that 424 finished intelligence products were issued during the period January 1973 to June 1974. An additional 6+ articles in periodicals were listed because they were considered substan-ttive rather than transient event reporting- - 2. T am forwarding you this bibliography because I believe it dramatically demonstrates what I believe is a major iianageria} problew for the NIOs and the IC Staff. It required more than six months: merely to compile the bibliography, which shows the lack of a central reference for intelligence products and the inadequacy of bibliographies rcaintained by many agencies. Compilation of lists of finished intelligence. planned for production would be an even more difficult task. 3. 1 know you are aware that in attempting to oversee the production of intelligence, the NIOs and the IC Staff are missing a managerial mechanism for telling us what is planned for production and what has been produced. It is not only the NIOs and IC Staff who are disadva.n ajed. I believe we would introduce some production efficiencies merely b 3f rnaki ng intelligence managers at all levels aware of community-:tide proet:ction programs. 4. I t is possible that all of the some 500 reports on ICBMs listed in the bibliography might .be attributed in one way or another as contributing to several KIQs dealing with ICBMs. Pn sure the candidate list,of production responses to our present K1Qs on ICB~Mls will be of lesser magnitude, but may still be too long for detailed analysis and evaluation- cr;. ..~ ? ?r 005836 ----- ITpossible to Determine --r-J L3 Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200240015-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80B01500W000466 40015-1 SUL3Ji T: Finished z cll igencc on Stra ejiic Progra;ii1' 5. We are all aware of the lack of a sys tern by which the DCI can i;Tdnage 1nt0! ligence col,tnuuity Y-esa1rces. In whajever iOrtn That system evolves, a mechanism for knowing what has been produced and.~what is planned for production would he a basic requirement. Therefore, action. to establish such a mechanism now would not be lost motion- 6. I recommend that the DJDCI /HLO stimulate the establishment of a system for recording in a central location all finished intelligence produced and to be produced. This is a job which I believe should be undertaken by the IC Staff in collaboration with the ASDJI_ I see this as a difficult task, one involving reporting problems, bureaucratic prerogatives and one which will probably raise more concerns than optimistic expectations on the part of intelligence managers.. There will be fears that it will expose duplications, eliminate needed products, bring about central direction of intelligence production, provide- a basis for Congressional reviews and will ultimately have resource implications. One-time efforts of this kind in the past raised just such concerns.. In any case I believe the Intelligence Community must get on with the task 25X1A Assistant Natiorhl Intelligence Officer ..for Strategic Programs Attachment Approved For Release 200 00RO00200240015-1