PART I - MAJOR WORLD PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01500R000200270004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2005/O HM'''DP80B01500R000200270004-0
PART I MAJOR WORLD PROBLEMS
1. General. The balance between the US and USSR
in the tangible elements of national power, while con-
tinuing to be marked by offsetting assymetries, is
unlikely to change fundamentally. Perceptions of the
less tangible aspects of the balance of power -- national
attitudes, will, the momentum and direction of interna-
tional events -- may change importantly in either Moscow
or Washington or elsewhere. In a situation of rough
equality in intercontinental nuclear forces between the
US and USSR, other national assets will gain importance
as elements of the "strategic" balance of power.
While the Soviet-American relationship will remain
the most important single factor, power will continue to
diffuse, both because of the spread and changes in tech-
nology and because of the growth of interdependence. Issues
not susceptible to conventional methods of diplomacy or
force will grow in importance. The spread of nuclear
weapons, the existence of the OPEC cartel, and to a lesser
extent the growing demand for raw materials have made
coercive power available to additional states and non-
governmental groups including terrorists. The United States
therefore will be faced not only with a persistent threat
to its interests from the USSR, but also with turbulence
and challenge in its relations with other nations.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80B01500R000200270004-0
 Approved For Release 2005/0~N ~kTDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
2. The USSR. The United States and the Soviet Union
will remain principal adversaries during the next five
years. Their relationship will probably continue to be
marked by an absence of armed conflict and at least
public adherence, by both governments, to the desirability
of cooperation and the need to avoid a reversion to
cold-war relations. Disagreements between the two powers
will continue to abound, however, in the application of
this approach to specific problems. There is little
reason to believe that the USSR will accept and act
on Western views about the content of a normal, fruitful
relationship.
The Soviet leaders seem convinced that in the overall
"correlation of forces," world events are moving over the
long run in favor of the USSR. They will attempt to further
this movement through a variety of political, economic,
and subversive activities, backed with growing military
capabilities. in doing so, the Soviets will be cautious,
trying to avoid confrontation with the US and foreign
policies so assertive as to jeopardize what the Soviets
see as favorable trends in US-USSR relations and world
affairs generally. They will also favor the use of state
power in the economic, diplomatic, and conventional military
- 2 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
 Approved For Release 2005/0~/ R~.DP80BO1500R000200270004-0
fields over the revolutionary approach which, however,
will continue to be utilized in favorable situations..
The USSR will seek to keep "detente" as the leading
feature of its foreign policy with the US and Western
Europe for at least the next five years, largely for
pragmatic reasons -- i.e., because they think it offers
them more advantages than any other alternative to:
-- reduce the risk of nuclear confronta-
tion;
-- control local crises which could lead
to general war;
-- minimize China's chances of developing
anti-Soviet combinations with other major
powers;
-- obtain Western economic and technological
assistance;
-- promote the disintegration of US-Allied
power blocs; and
play a superpower role with the US with
respect to world affairs.
The Soviets are not likely to be substantially
restrained by arms control arrangements, although for
political imagery they will not only espouse a variety of
disarmament proposals, but work to approve some actual,
albeit limited, agreements. In the field of strategic
~- 33 -T
Approved For Release 2005/0~/'I ``~CT7X-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
 Approved For Release 2005/0 Rf$-'FDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
offensive forces, the modernization program now underway
will give the Soviets larger numbers of more accurate missile
warheads, improved missile survivability and greater opera-
tional flexibility. In their strategic offensive and
defensive programs, research and development is aimed at
unique applications of existing technologies and applica-
tions of advanced technology based on theoretical or techno-
logical breakthroughs. Given present and planned US
capabilities, we believe that the Soviets could not
develop in the next five years a first-strike capability
so overwhelming as to prevent substantial retaliation.
However) in the conventional field, the Soviets will
continue to build and modernize their ground, naval,
and air forces for theater warfare along the periphery
of the USSR and for distant limited operations. These
programs will increase a variety of Soviet capabilities
and strain the credibility of Soviet professions'of
peaceful intent.
The USSR will continue to see China as a major
hostile competitor and will expend considerable foreign
policy support in a global struggle with the Chinese for
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
influence and leverage. At the same time, now that Mao
is dead, Moscow will try to influence the Chinese succession,
seeking to identify and strengthen any elements in the
leadership sympathetic to less hostile, more pragmatic
Sino-Soviet relations.
In its economic policy, Moscow will continue to give
high priority to the kinds of growth which increase national
power and facilitate its projection abroad. A new aware-
ness of the high burden of the Soviet defense effort,
however, raises important questions about the relative
efficiency of, and structural differences between, the
military and civilian sectors of the Soviet economy.
A better understanding is needed of the process of West
to East technology transfer, particularly the differen-
tial ability of these two sectors to absorb and pro-
liferate this technology. Domestically, pressures will
grow for modernizing reforms of the Soviet economic
system, particularly its administrative structure. As
has been the case elsewhere in Eastern Europe (e.g.,
Czechoslovakia), reforms which seek the managerial bene-
fits of some type of demand system could have implications
- 5 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
 Approved For Release 2005/0$/ 1,IJi-I? DP80BO150OR000200270004-0
for liberalizing other areas of Soviet life, and will
accordingly encounter powerful resistance. Prolonged
detente could threaten to erode the pervasive authority
of the Communist Party over the Soviet populace. But
these are long-standing and chronic problems, and over
the next five years the regime is quite capable of
resisting unwanted changes in the essentials of the So-
viet domestic system.
A key intelligence focus over the next five years
will be the Soviet leadership succession, as Brezhnev
and the other aging seniors leave the political scene
and their replacements consolidate power. Both the new
leadership's policy modifications and the relative smooth-
ness or turmoil of the succession process will have
implications for bilateral relations with the US and the
Soviet stance abroad generally, as well as for domestic
Soviet priorities and the Party management of the country.
While the odds heavily favor continuity, Soviet politics
are so centralized -- and so secretive -- that signifi-
cant change under a new leadership cannot be wholly ex-
cluded.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
3. The People's Republic of China. The controversy
which has accompanied the death of Chou En-lai, and the
purge of Teng Hsiao-ping has demonstrated that the suc-
cession will be contested. Mao's death has not altered
this. The leadership appears to be split on factional
lines. Contentious issues have emerged which are not.
susceptible to early solutions. An authoritarian com-
munist leadership dedicated to the creation of a great
socialist power by the year 2000 is commonly accepted --
disagreements are on means to achieve this and on who will
run the party and the state. Internal strength and ex-
ternal security will be China's main preoccupations.
China will continue to develop its strategic forces
gradually, though it will present an increasingly serious
retaliatory threat to the Soviet Union. In the early
1980s, it should have the capability of striking the
United States with an ICBM and possibly an SLBM. China
will maintain large general purpose forces capable of
operations on its periphery, and the gap between Chinese
military might and that of its neighbors (other than the
USSR) will probably widen. China will be unlikely to
commit its forces, however, in the absence of major
provocation or concern, but China will become increasingly
- 7 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
 Approved For Release 2005/O Iqfp-I DP80BO150OR000200270004-0
concerned about achieving a solution to the Taiwan problem.
There are pressures in China to get the US to end its
military involvement with Taiwan and to establish full
relations with Peking within a shorter time frame. At
the same time China will seek to combat what it perceives
as encirclement by the USSR. As a consequence China will
face some hard decisions:
How to deal with a continuous Soviet
threat while also exerting pressure
for the neutralization of Taiwan.
How to reconcile its support for a
belligerent North Korea with its de-
sire for stability in North Asia and
fruitful relations with Japan and the
US.
Internally, China will continue its agriculture--
focused economic programs that are essential to keeping
food supplies abreast of population. These programs
will nevertheless enable industry to expand capacity
and output selectively and permit some modernization
of the defense establishment. Internationally, China
will seek to play a major role with the developing
countries. It will participate in aid programs and
similar political gestures and will increase its
- X82 -
Approved For Release 2005/07 1/"I-~DP80B0150OR000200270004-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/MCIE-1POP80BO150OR000200270004-0
stantial authority over developing countries. China
may become a significant producer and exporter of oil
by 1980 and problems could arise in conflicting off-shore
oil claims.
China still has to decide on the role of foreign
imports, particularly advanced technology, in its
growth process. This has been an historic issue in
China now further complicated by ideology and the demands
of modern military-industrial complex. China's approach
in the past has been erratic and there is evidence
that this is one issue which divides the current leader-
ship.
Despite the death of Mao, the prime architect of
China's anti-Soviet policy, China will probably not seek
a reconciliation with the USSR. The consequences of the
present hostility, however, have been so important to
Asia and to the US that even a moderate improvement
(which is possible) would alter foreign policy calcula-
tions in numerous capitals; outright military conflict,
a lesser possibility, would be a critical world event.
Changes in either direction will almost certainly depend
on the policies of new leaderships -- in the USSR and
- 9 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
 Approved For Release 2005/Of C '4NbP80BO150OR000200270004-0
While Eastern Europe will con-
tinue to be under Soviet control, economic uncertainties
and recurrent pressures for some loosening of ties with
Moscow will complicate the picture. Poor in natural
resources, the region is faced with a slowdown in economic
growth rates which could have repercussions at the politi-
cal level. The five-year period could see an explosion
within some East European country against Soviet dominance,
but Moscow would quickly reestablish its hegemony, by
force if necessary, whatever the price in terms of other
policies. Less spectacularly, individual regimes may
find themselves able gradually to expand some areas of
autonomy, primarily in domestic policy, while adhering
to Soviet guidance in foreign policy and security matters.
The passing of Tito could open a period of difficulty
and contest over the succession and over the external
orientation of Yugoslavia, a period that could be risky
should the Soviets try to intervene, either to prevent
a westward drift or to pull the country eastward.
6. The Middle East. Progress toward a long-term
resolution of the Arab-Israeli confrontation seems un-
likely to proceed at a pace rapid enough to satisfy
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07`1 #tA-l DP80B01500R000200270004-0
the aspirations of the Arab side. As a result, regional
volatility will remain at a high level and the danger
will persist that even a minor incident could result in
major military action. On the Israeli side, political
cleavages stemming from disagreements on issues such
as the necessity for negotiation and the retention of
settlements in occupied territories will sharply limit
the government's capacity for bold, decisive decision-
making on non-military subjects. The Arab world will
also continue to be rent by traditional enmities, to be
plagued by relentless Palestinian irredentism, and to
be split into economically handicapped frontline
states and oil producing donor states. Nevertheless,
regional tranquility probably cannot be maintained with-
out apparent momentum towards a negotiated peace includ-
ing achievement of some visible milestones in that
process.
Important potential sources of regional instability
include the continuance of politico-religious friction
in Lebanon, the overthrow of key national leaders --
such as Sadat, Asad, Husayn, the Shah or the Saudi royal
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80B01500R000200270004-0
 Approved For Release 2005/0 2' t Ik-DP80BO150OR000200270004-0
family --- or marked shifts in attitudes toward either or
both of the superpowers. if war resumes in the Middle
East an ever present and largely unpredictable
possibility -- Israel would have a decisive military
advantage over any combination of Arab forces and could
be expected to win the conflict within several weeks
time. Soviet reaction to the prospect of yet another
humiliating defeat of its Arab clients would likely in-
clude the rapid implementation of a massive resupply
effort, and possible introduction of token Soviet forces
in order to exert further political and psychological
leverage. Such actions by the USSR would substantially
increase the risks of US-Soviet confrontation in the
Middle East. In view of increasing dependency by both
the US and its allies on Middle Eastern oil, resumption
of fighting or even lesser crises could also again im-
peril Western economies via the cutoff or curtailment
of oil shipments.
Although US ability to influence events in the area has
exhibited a generally upward trend, maintenance of this
transitory and fragile capability is dependent upon
American success in bringing about real, rather than il-
lusory, progress toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, while avoiding confrontation with the USSR.
- 15 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
 Approved For Release 2005/0 4 - DP80B01500R000200270004-0
Although a breakthrough cannot be ex-
cluc.'led, there is little in the situation now to suggest
that the Korean peninsula five years from now will look
markedly different from the way it looks today. Efforts
by the Republic of Korea to strengthen its independent
military capabilities are likely to be met by equally
vigorous North Korean efforts to do the same; despite
obstacles that may be put in its way, the nuclear option
is likely to look increasingly attractive to the ROK..
9. Africa. Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa
will be areas of turmoil during the next several years.
There will be an increased risk of communist meddling
and an increasing likelihood of developments which will
threaten US interests and objectives in these areas.
In the Horn, there is a serious danger of hostilities
between Somalia, which will look to Moscow for support,
and Ethiopia, which may turn to the US. In southern
Africa, black-white confrontation is likely to increase.
Whether by force or by negotiation, Rhodesia and probably
Namibia will have black majority governments well before
1983. These governments are likely to be radical in na-
ture, and in Rhodesia, particularly if the blacks gain
power by force of arms, the government will probably be
- 17 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80B01500R000200270004-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07412 IA DP80B01500R000200270004-0
strongly anti-US. In South Africa, the prospect is for
increased strife over the government's apartheid policies,
and Pretoria, surrounded by basically hostile neighbors
and most likely confronted with increased international
opposition to its policies, will become even more iso-
lated. In such a situation, there clearly is a danger
that the South Africans might strike out against its
neighbors or that they might move to begin a campaign of
insurgency against South Africa.
10. Economics. The need for worldwide economic
intelligence will continue to increase. The past few
years of globally shared inflation, recession, supply
interruptions and material shortages have underscored the
high degree of economic interdependence among countries
and its pervasive impact on American interests. To be of
value to US policymakers, economic intelligence must
provide timely explanations of the meaning and implica-
tions of internal and external economic developments
in major free world and communist nations. It must also
provide an understanding of topical issues, such as the
maintenance of world monetary stability, the distribution
of income as between rich and poor countries, (the "North-
South dialogue") and other regional economic problems,
Approved For Release 2005/0~hZ- l c-kDP80B01500R000200270004-0
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80B01500R000200270004-0
the role of multinational corporations in trade, develop-
ment and technology transfer, and the problem of smooth-
ing the fluctuations of international commodity markets.
25X1
situation continues to pose complex problems, particularly
whether or not the OPEC cartel will be willing to pro-
vide enough oil to meet the rising demands of consuming
countries, and at what price, if, indeed, viability of
the cartel itself is not once again called into question.
12. New Powers and Blocs. OPEC's disruption of` the
non-Communist world's energy situation is likely to in-
spire further attempts at cooperative efforts by small
nations to control other important raw materials, such
as bauxite and phosphates. Although most of these at-
tempts will fail, efforts to form various types of pro-
ducer's associations by these developing countries already
have had some political effects within many industrial
consuming states as well as on international economic;
and political relationships. Whatever agreements are
negotiated between producing and consuming countries
concerning the supply and price factors for raw ma-
terials, the political and economic effects for the
- 19 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80B01500R000200270004-0
 Approved For Release 2005/O BIk-4F DP80BO150OR000200270004-0
international system -- including the connections of
the Communist states to that system -- could be signifi-
cant. Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Zaire are becom-
ing regional powers and are playing more substantial
roles in international forums. Aside from these, sev-
eral nations whose ties to the US have traditionally
been close will display greater independence. This will
be particularly prevalent in the economic field but may
also affect certain US strategic interests.
13. The Developing Countries will present other
major problems to US policymakers. The nature and
severity of these problems will hinge in part on for-
eign, especially developing world, perceptions of America's
ability -- and willingness -- to succor its friends,
to protect its interests and those of its allies, and,
generally, to play an active role in areas beyond its
borders. The developing countries will be especially
concerned with US willingness to support transformations,
in their favor, in the international economic and politi-
cal system.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
25X1
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA- DP80BO150OR000200270004-0
If the developing countries do not consider that the US
and other rich industrial states are sufficiently forth-
coming in closing the gaps between the developed and less-
developed worlds, they will seek outlets for their frus-
tration in assaults on the existing international sys-
tem. The domination by the developing countries of cer-
tain international forums will result in increased con-
frontation and could eventually incapacitate these forums
as useful international organizations for the industrial
states. Also, some sufficiently angry developing coun-
tries may resort to covert actions in attempts to black-
mail selected industrial states through terrorism -- of
a conventional or nuclear variety -- or through covertly
sponsored "liberation armies."
14. Social change will cause turbulence and pos-
sibly create power vacuums in a number of areas stemming
from increased expectations and a perception of the grow-
ing rather than narrowing economic gaps between developing
countries (and classes within developing countries) and
the more developed industrial world. Areas particularly
susceptible to this process will be the Persian Gulf, cer-
tain other Arab states such as Morocco, India, and in
Latin America, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and possibly
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 fjI f,1DP80B01500R000200270004-0
even Brazil. Internally this turbulence may be temporarily
stilled by some authoritarian governments, particularly
those benefiting from increased oil revenues, but they
will have difficulties in maintaining themselves over the
longer term. Such turbulence will also exist within ad-
vanced nations, as economic, racial, ideological, or re-
gional minorities turn to violence and terrorism to press
their claims against more and more delicately tuned and
interdependent societies.
15. The acceleration of events will be characteris-
tic of the years ahead. This will come from improved com-
munications and transportation, sharply reducing the time
available to reflect on, negotiate, and resolve interna-
tional problems. It will also raise many local events to
international prominence and inflate national or politi-
cal pride, posing further handicaps to successful nego-
tiations. There will be a resulting tendency toward
breakdowns of overloaded institutions, shorter attention
spans for individual situations, and a need for simul-
taneous perception and management of a multiplicity of
international relationships. Such change will occur
most conspicuously in the fields of science and tech-
nology, but the pace there will have substantial effects
on the pace of sociological, industrial, and institutional
Approved For Release 2005/OS' i TA RDP80B01500R000200270004-0
'ji
 Approved For Release 2005IO j pj -11DP80BO150OR000200270004-0
change, with resultant political and economic impacts.
Identification and accurate assessments of such changes
and their effects will be needed on an increasingly
rapid basis.
16. Interdependence will be an increasingly important
characteristic of the world of the future. Intelligence
problems will also be increasingly interdependent, re-
quiring more complex models for analysis to give full
weight to the number of disciplines involved. For ex-
ample, intelligence on the USSR's ability to acquire and
absorb Western technology will require a sophisticated
interweaving of political, economic, military and psy-
chological analyses.
Interdependence also will reflect greater national
dependence on other nations, particularly in the economic
sphere. The following key variables will be important
to analyze as indicators of future trends: economic
growth, population, energy, raw materials and food.
Approved For Release 2005/0~11P-~&'RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0
Next 9 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200270004-0