DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE 1976 - 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01500R000200280029-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: January 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE
1976 -1981
Introduction
1. Perspectives for Intelligence, looking five years into the future, are issued
annually by the Director of Central Intelligence to provide general guidance for
all elements of the Intelligence Community. In particular, these statements of
perspectives are designed to stimulate early action and planning on programs
requiring long developmental lead times prior to their execution-such as com-
plex technical systems, language training, the augmentation of skills, etc. These
Perspectives for 1976-1981 are intended to influence Fiscal Year 1976 decisions
whose effects will be felt or results fully manifest only after several years. Near
term guidance for Fiscal Year 1976 is provided in the Objectives the Director has
submitted to the President, which included both Substantive Objectives (further
articulated in the Key Intelligence Questions-KIQs) and Resource Management
Objectives. The Director's Annual Report to the President on the work of the Intel-
ligence Community will include comments on steps taken during FY 1976 to meet
future requirements as outlined in these Perspectives.
2. The Perspectives open with a general overview of the international politi-
cal, economic and security environment anticipated during the coming five years
(Part I). This is followed by a broad statement of the needs the Intelligence
Community will be expected to meet during that period (Part II ). More specific
guidance is given with respect to activities which should be initiated, or on which
planning should commence, in order to meet those needs (Part III). Finally,
guidance is provided for implementation of "Perspectives" against major national
intelligence problems (Part IV).
3. The Perspectives focus on major national intelligence problems. They
recognize three important additional categories of problems, but these require-
ments are not extensively addressed;
a. Continuing national responsibilities of a lower priority which must
somehow be satisfied with limited resources;
b. The requirements of civilian and military components of the United
States Government for departmental or tactical intelligence support which
often parallel national needs and also necessitate continuing attention and
resources;
c. Unanticipated situations or crises capable of posing major political,
economic or security problems for the United States. Since it may not be
possible to meet the demands of such unanticipated problems by a realloca-
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6. Eastern Europe. While Eastern Europe will continue to be under Soviet
control, economic uncertainties and recurrent pressures for some loosening of ties
with Moscow will complicate the picture. Poor in natural resources, the region
is faced with a slowdown in economic growth rates which could have reper-
cussions at the political level. The five-year period could see an explosion within
some East European country against Soviet dominance, but Moscow would
quickly reestablish its hegemony, by force if necessary, whatever the price in
terms of other policies. Less spectacularly, individual regimes may find them-
selves able gradually to expand some areas of autonomy, primarily in domestic
policy, while adhering to Soviet guidance in foreign policy and security matters.
The passing of Tito could open a period of difficulty and contest over the suc-
cession and over the external orientation of Yugoslavia, a period that could be
risky should the Soviets try to intervene, either to prevent a westward drift or
to pull the country eastward.
7. The Middle East. This region seems bound to continue to be both volatile
and dangerous. Even if significant progress is made over the next five years in
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, considerable distrust will persist, providing
a favorable atmosphere for those Arab elements rejecting a final settlement. A
breakdown in the negotiation process is likely to lead to another round of war.
As a further source of instability, the policies of important states are strongly
dependent on individual leaders-such as Sadat, the Shah, Hussein, and Asad-
whose departure could lead to major shifts in national behavior.
The US interests which are threatened by these possibilities are not likely
to decline substantially over the period. Arab oil will not become less important
to the US economy and will remain vital to. our major partners. Meanwhile, the
accumulation of oil revenues will magnify the potential for international mone-
tary distortions. While there are important trends which favor an increase in US
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9. New Powers and Blocs. OPEC's disruption of the non-Communist world's
energy situation is likely to inspire further attempts at cooperative efforts by small
nations to control other important raw materials, such as bauxite and phosphates.
Although most of these attempts will fail, efforts to form various types of pro-
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domestic and international issues with which they are concerned; (2) the pres-
entation of these issues in a context which accounts for all significant factors
that impinge upon them; and (3) the assessment of the intentions and likely
courses of actions of these leaders as well as the capabilities of their countries.
In addition, the Intelligence Community is faced with the requirement to:
(1) more effectively identify that which is significant from the large volumes
of raw information, and to put it in manageable form; and (2) devise techniques
for rapidly and accurately communicating to consumers the essential elements of
foreign situations and the reliability of these assessments.
2. The USSR. The USSR will remain our major intelligence target. Intel-
ligence will be expected to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities,
economic activity, and efforts to acquire advanced scientific and technological
skills to improve military and economic capabilities. It will be expected also
to supply reliable assessments of Soviet political dynamics and intentions. While
a small percentage of data for these assessments will become available through
open exchange and access, the Soviets will try to keep much more of this infor-
mation secret, and extraordinary efforts will be required to obtain and under-
stand it. One specific priority task will be accurate and demonstrable monitoring
of arms limitation agreements made with the Soviet Union. In the military
field otherwise, special attention will be focused on Soviet research and develop-
ment applicable to weapons and supporting systems which could substantially
affect the balance of power. These will include antisubmarine warfare, ballistic
missiles, satellites, and advanced technology systems. The greater political unity
of non-nuclear forces and perhaps an increasing disposition for their use, at
least by some of the Soviet client states, will put a greater burden on intelligence
to maintain a current baseline of information on such forces. It will also mean
maintaining capabilities for tactical intelligence coverage of potential crisis areas
and for rapid crisis augmentation of such coverage.
Intelligence will need to keep a running estimate of Soviet calculations of
their overall foreign policy balance sheet, and to anticipate shifts in area or
emphasis as well as in the general line. Particularly important elements in this
larger estimate will be Soviet-US, Sino-Soviet and Sino-Soviet-US relationships,
followed by Soviet leverage and intentions in Western Europe and the Middle
East. Anticipating the relative smoothness or turmoil of phases of Soviet succes-
sion politics, and the implications of this and any new leadership policy consensus
will be an important intelligence task, as will the identification of significant
reform tendencies or trouble areas in the Soviet economy.
3. China. China will continue to be an important intelligence target. The
closed nature of Chinese society will make it difficult to assess any turmoil
within the country, its leadership perceptions of threats to China's security, or
threats China might pose abroad. The latter will become particularly important
as Chinese strategic power grows and comes to include capabilities against the
United States itself. It will also apply to Chinese political activities and intentions
in view of China's influence in the Far East and its ties with and aspirations in
the developing countries.
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5. Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe will be a constant collection and assess-
ment target, in order to assess stability in an area where breakdowns in internal
order or major divergences from Moscow could have profound political reper-
cussions. An increasing need to tailor US policy to the specifics of each East
European country will call for improved intelligence. During the five-year period,
the most important intelligence target probably will be Yugoslavia, where a
shift in international alignment actually is a possibility. Rumania's growing
propensity to develop independent economic and political linkages to the West
and China looms as another possibility.
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7. Other Priorities. Intelligence will increasingly be expected to warn of,
and explain, new situations posing problems to American interests. For an ex-
ample, intelligence will be expected to identify the causes of social change, tur-
bulence, and political terrorism in developing countries, so that the componei t
elements of these problems can be isolated, negotiated about, or countered with
appropriate mechanisms. This may require intensified efforts on our part to
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