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December 9, 2016
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July 16, 2001
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September 19, 1977
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RADIO TV F &R ,1e GX01/08/07: CIA-RDP80BO15SWO02700160001-9 ? 4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016 244-3540 PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF Good Morning America WJLA TV ABC Network September 19, 1977 7:00 AM SUBJECT Full Text: Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. DAVID HARTMAN: This is a Good Morning America special program, the first extensive television visit inside the Central Intelligence Agency. Good morning. I'm David Hartman. The forerunner of the CIA was the wartime, World War II wartime, OSS, the Office of Strategic Services. And General William Donovan, whose picture you're looking at now, ran it from this room in this building; and we're in Washington, D.C. General Donovan is considered to be the father, in a sense, of the CIA. In fact, the OAS became the CIA exactly 30 years ago yesterday. And as it grew, the CIA expanded its headquarters to Langley, Virginia. And Sandy Hill, during the past couple of weeks, and our ABC film crews have spent many hours filming inside the headquarters at Langley, Virginia. Some of what you are going to see in the next couple of hours of our Good Morning America program special this morning have never been seen before on television. And our guide through all of this is the new Director, for the past six months, of the Central Intelligence Agency, and he-is Admiral Stansfield Turner. Admiral? ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Good morning, David. HARTMAN: Good morning. Nice to have you with us this morning. ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you. Glad to be here. OFFICES IN: NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES Material supplied by~`pprovec~gF'or egease ~~'~'(``~t exhibited. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP801301554R0'02700160001-9 HARTMAN': "First of all, do you -- I'm going to quote you. Quote: "I think we've got to be salesmen. I think we've got a product to sell, and we've got to get out on the street and selll it." What's the product and why do you have to sell it? ADMIRAL TURNER: The product is evaluated intelligence about activities in foreign lands, and the need is to have our policymakers in the government well informed so they make good decisions. But I also happen to believe that we have a lot of good information that can be made available to the American public; and the better informed our public is, the stronger our country will be. HARTMAN: Admiral, isn't part of it the fact that there have been so many criticisms of abuses within the CIA, that in order to improve your credibility and your strength as an intelli- gence agency, you've got to go public to some degree? ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. I believe that we can tell the American public more about what we're doing and how we're doing it, within the limits of necessary secrecy; and that in so doing, we should be able to build a greater understanding in the public of support for those things which we do which are so essential to our country's welfare. HARTMAN: Thank you, Admiral. We're going to be talking more, through both our hours this morning, with Admiral Turner.... HARTMAN: I'm here with the Director of the CIA, Admiral Stansfield Turner. And right now Steve Bell has a report about some of the excesses attributed to the CIA. STEVE BELL: David, the Central Intelligence Agency was a child of the cold war, created at a time when the Soviet Union was seen as a clear and present threat to the United States and other Western nations. Under the National Security Act of 1947, !h' CIA was created to coordinate U.S. intelligence activities,' specifically to correlate and evaluate intelligence and to advise the National Security Council. But there was a loophole in the act through which the CIA moved into secret operations, dirty tricks, and finally full- fledged military activity, a loophole that authorized the agency to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 Approved FoVWelease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B015' 002700160001-9 affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct Armed with that loopholed and a desire by most members of Congress not to know what was happening, the CIA undertook operations over the years that have only recently become public knowledge and brought the agency under critical public scrutiny. Although it wasn't the first such operation, the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 was the CIA's largest paramilitary endeavor and its largest failure. In Laos, the CIA financed a secret war with funds never itemized to Congress that went on for years befor being publicly acknowledged. And in Vietnam, there was the Phoenix program that fought Viet Cong terror tactics with terror tactics. Then there were the authorized assassination attempts, the most widely publicized involving Cuba's Fidel Castro. And there were the cases where CIA-supported activities appeared to get out of hand, ending in unintended assassinations. In Chile, for instance, Marxist President Salvado Allende was killed in a coup that followed unrest and demonstrations fin- anced, in part, at least, by the CIA. A grand jury, incidentally, is considering indicting former CIA Director Richard Helms for lying about CIA intervention in Chile. But the Central Intelligence Agency has taken some of its worst lumps for activities right here in the United States, where the law very specifically says, "The agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions." In direct contravention of that law, we now know of Operation Chaos, begun under White House pressure in 1967 to spy on and compile lists of American dissenters; Operation Merrimack, to infiltrate CIA agents into peace groups and black activist organizations; also, the illegal opening of first class mail, both by the CIA and the FBI. And, of course, there were the secrets projects in drug testing that began in 1950 and lasted until '73. What began as an attempt to understand so-called brain. washing techniques used on American prisoners in Korea soon turned to a search for mind-control weapons of our own: prisoners and hospital patients used as guinea pigs, and prostitutes used to lure unsuspecting subjects into drug-testing situations. It was not until 1975 that Congress began to exercise its oversight function. Senator Frank Church headed an investi- gation by a select committee, and we asked Church how it all could Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 could have happened-. SENATOR FRANK CHURCH: Well, it happened for a variety of reasons: the cold war fears; the notion that the CIA had carte blanche, could do anything because it was engaged in an effort to protect us against Communism; the failure of the Congress to exer- cise proper oversight; the laxity, indeed the attitude of arrogance that developed among Presidents who were willing to let the CIA function in this manner; and the lack of an adequate law deline- ating the authority of the CIA and limiting its activities within our own country. BELL: David, a look back at some of the reasons these have been difficult days for the CIA. HARTMAN: Thank you, Steve. Admiral Turner, you have obviously inherited an agency that's got a lot of problems, despite a lot of successes. But you've got a lot of problems, a lot of criticism, abuses. What are you doing about it? ADMIRAL TURNER: We're using the mistakes -- many of which have been exaggerated, David -- of the past as guide marks not to let them happen again. And one of the great assurances that they will not happen again, besides my and all the people in the CIA's determination not to let them, is the new oversight procedures that have been established by our government, oversight procedures in the Congress and in the Executive Branch. We have, for instance, two committees of the Congress dedi- cated just to oversight of intelligence. We're very pleased with this. We have in the Executive Branch the Intelligence Oversight Board, three distinguished citizens who look for illegalities or improprieties in our operations. And any citizen and any member of the Central Intelligence Agency can write to this Oversight Board and register a complaint or an alarm, if they find one. And in addition, the President and the National Security Council are much more involved in supervising our activities today than ever before. I think the citizens' rights-are well protected. HARTMAN: When you say that the President's more involved, that the committees at the White House, and so forth, are more involved, what does that -- who is responsible if something goes wro.ag in the future? There is a criticism that there's been an abuse in the field. Who do we look to? ADMIRAL TURNER: You're... HARTMAN: Who do we say, "He knew, and what did he know, when did he know it?" and all that? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 Approved Fol Rlease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO15 002700160001-9 5 ADMIRAL TURNER: You're looking right at him, David. It's on my shoulders, and I take that responsibility for the proper execution of our intelligence activities. HARTMAN: But do you make the judgments? ADMIRAL TURNER: Not in all.. HARTMAN: Or does the President? ADMIRAL TURNER: Not in all. cases. We have different rules according to the risk of the kinds of things that we are doing. Some, for instance, we must get the President's personal signature, and I must then go and notify up to eight committees of the Congress that we're going to do something that has a par- ticular risk to it. So, it's a gradated thing, because some operations that we do involve no risk at all. They're open; they're what we call overt. Some are covert and require some form of risk. BELL: Admiral, this is Steve Bell at the Washington news studio. In the past, hasn't it often been the President -- I mean you're taking the buck, but hasn't it often been the President who was behind what we now have come to consider CIA abuses? ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, there certainly are accusations that the CIA was driven into things it didn't want to do by other members of the government. And all I can say is you're now looking at the fellow where the buck goes to. I have to be the one who stands up and says, "No," if it is an improper activity. BELL: And yet, both you and President Carter have refused totally to rule out covert opeations. How do you draw the line? How do you assure the public that the line's going to be drawn at the right point? ADMIRAL TURNER: Because the cover operations, in particu- lar, are the ones where we have to, by law, notify the Congress of the United States as we're doing anything of that nature. So, the public is protected here by the congressional oversight of the Executive's activities. HARTMAN: What does oversight mean, really? T_ mean that's a word that we've heard a thousand times, but what ip it? ADMIRAL TURNER: Oversight means that these committees of the Congress, one in the House and one-in the Senate, meet with us regularly and interrogate us as to what we are doing. And I Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B0155402700160001-9 have an obligation to keep them informed of the nature of our activities. And in'these certain cases, we're required by law to inform them of special activities that we're undertaking. We find them not a burden on us; we find them a help for us, because we can turn to them and ask them questions as to interpretation of law, interpretation of propriety. And that gives us a strength, a foundation in congressional support, when we've cleared our ideas and our operations with them. BELL: Admiral, I wonder if I could draw a rather specific current example. There's been a lot of controversy in this country over alleged Korean CIA attempts to bribe and influence our U.S. Congress. Now, the Korean CIA was very much a product of our CIA, and one wonders, when we talk about the continuance of covert oper- ations, if we're talking about the continuance of the kind of things in other countries that the Koreans are accused of doing here. ADMIRAL TURNER: Covert operations, technically, is an effort to influence events in other countries, and to do so without attribution to the United States. We have very, very little of that kind of activity authorized today, and anything that ever is author- ized does go through this very strict clearance procedure, which I believe gives the public and gives this country adequate safe- guards. BELL: There's another particular incident that has just come into the papers this morning, namely, that a group of Pales-, tinian supporters in the U.S. has taken out ads in The New York Times which use raw CIA data gained from the Freedom of Information Act. The accusation is made that Moshe Dayan specifically ordered the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty in the 1967 Middle East war. Can you give us any enlightenment on that? ADMIRAL TURNER: I certainly can, and I'm glad, Steve, that you emphasized the word "raw" intelligence data. We are required, under the Freedom of Information Act, to produce to those who ask for it intelligence documents which can be unclassified. In those which we released, there were several which indicated a possibility that the Israeli Government knew about the U.S.S. Liberty before the attack. Also, we released an evaluated overall document which said very clearly that it was our considered opinion that the Israeli government had no such Knowledge at that time. - HARTMAN: Admiral, could you differentiate for me the difference between -- if there is one -- between a covert operation and what we have come to know as dirty tricks: assassination attempts, buying governments, affecting elections, etcetera? What's covert? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 Approved For FFef'ease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554QX02700160001-9 7 thing. ADMIRAL TURNER: In my lexicon, those are about the same HARTMAN: And those are not ruled out for the future, then. ADMIRAL TURNER: I believe that we must retain a covert action capability for this country. We are exercising it, as I said, very little today, and we have a specific prohibition against planning or carrying out an assassination. And we are developing right now with the Congress new rules that will specifically say what we can and cannot do. But, Steve -- but, David, there are occasions -- let's say some terriorist,group in the future gains acquisition. to a nuclear weapon. This country would be poorly served if we didn't have an ability to do something. about that kind of a situation. BELL: But what control do you have, sir, to be sure that you know everything that the operative out in the field is doing? Especially when he goes under in a covert situation. ADMIRAL TURNER: That's a matter of how well all of us at the top of the CIA manage it. You have to have confidence in the people you appoint, you have to check on them, you have to use your instincts to determine where you think anything could go wrong; and then you have to start all over again and check on your people, go out in the field, as I did just last week, visiting some of our overseas activities, and use every opportunity you can to find out for sure what's going on. But beyond that, let me emphasize that I don't think it' a matter of cat-and-mouse. I'm confident that the people in the CIA are doing their very best today to carry out the instructions which the President and the Congress issue through me. HARTMAN: Admiral, thank you. We are going to be able to talk more in this hour and in our other hour about a variety of subjects. It's a pleasure to have you with us this morning. We hope we've shed some light on what you guys do in this business of intelligence. ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you, David. HARTMAN: If you've just joined us, we're devoting all. of our Good Morning America program, two hours of it, this morning to a special look at the CIA on the 30th anniversary, 30th birthday of that agency. Sandy Hill and our ABC film crews, during the past month, have spent a great deal of time with the CIA. Our films have been screened for security, but the CIA has exercised no edi-. .torial control. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 Approved Far Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554 002700160001-9 Admiral Stansfield Turner, the Director of the CIA, is here with me, and will be through both our hours this morning. And we'll be talking with you in just a little while again, Admiral. ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you, David. JACK ANDERSON: ...there is absolutely no trace of the work that's been done in any of the offices. Typewriter ribbons have to be taken out and locked in a safe. Desks must be com- pletely cleared and all papers locked away, Even the day's scrap paper is collected in special burn baskets and transferred to top secret garbage bags so it can be completely destroyed. Well, nothing is actually burned. The containers are labeled that way as a psychological reminder that all trash must be destroyed. If anything is left out in the open overnight, it's considered a serious violation of security, which could result in dismissal or a leave of absence without pay. At the end of the day, the bags of trash are collected and taken to a special chute which leads to a machine that reduces the paper to pulp. It's important to mention here that the CIA is not allowed to destroy any records or documents. What you're seeing here is the wastepaper from a normal days' work. But this is one government agency that can't be accused of being wasteful. All this pulp is put to good use as landfill. As you may have suspected, thorough background checks are done on every applicant, whether you're applying for a job in the cafeteria or for a high-level position as an analyst. Everything is checked: birth records, education, employment, where you lived the past 15 years. Personal references are checked; neighbors and police are questioned. And, of course, all federal agencies are contacted to make sure you haven't been involved in any illegal or anti-American activities. Now, if you're wondering who wants to work for the CIA, in 1976 the agency received 30,000 employment inquiries; only 1100 people were hired, 700 of them clerks. HARTMAN: Thank you, Jack. A lot of people get their ideas about the CIA from what happens in the movies, and Rona Barrett tells us about that this morning. RONA BARRETT: Good morning, David. Good morning, Admiral Turner. And good morning, America. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 Approved For (ease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO155 02700160001-9 Spying is as old as history itself. As long as there have been people and nations, there have been spies; and Hollywood, the dream factory, has conjured up more than its fair share of espionage illusions. For the most part, Hollywood has portrayed spying as a glamorous response to a world easily divided into two categories: us against them. As early as 1917, when spying provided America's Sweet- heart, Mary Pickford, with a mission in "The Little American," audiences have flocked to spy movies. More often than not, the films were long on fabrication and short on realism. But the appeal of spy movies was not their handle on reality; it was their emphasis on suspense, tension, and heroics. Movies like Alfred Hitchcock's superb "The 39 Steps," about Nazi infiltration into English society, captured this magical combination perfectly. And when World War II broke out, Hollywood responded with an avalanche of spy films, from Jack Benny and Carole Lombard in funny [unin- telligible] "To Be Or Not To Be," about the Nazi invasion of Poland, to "Watch on the Rhine," in which Betty Davis let Americans know all about the threat of Nazism from within. In 1948 the OSS, the Office of Strategic Services, became the CIA, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the menace to the Free World changed from Nazis to Communists. In the '60s the name most associated with cold war spying was an Englishman, James Bond, who burst on the unsuspecting American movie-mad public with "Dr. No" in '62. Bond combined a fantasy with gadgetry and made the CIA secret service agent a hero to audiences greedy for escapism. It wasn't until '65 that another view of espionage was presented to the American public. John LeCarre's biting novel, "The Spy Who Came in from the Cold," was made into a movie, with Richard Burton, which turned the tables on Bond and showed spying as a grim profession tinged with shabbiness, a sort of last-ditch outpost for losers. Reality reared its head in the '70s, as the CIA involve- ment in Vietnam and Chile came under increasing attack, and the innocence of moviegoers willing to accept a black-and-white con- cept of us-against-them was permanently lost. Also in the '70s, it became unclear just who was us and who was them. Movies like Warren Beatty's "The Parallax View," which dealt with assassinations, proposed a paranoiac world in which a CIA-type organization murdered people at will. "Three Days of the Condor," with Robert Redford, was even more explicit. It called the CIA by its name and showed the agency to be a blood- thirsty organization willing to terminate its agents with the alacrity of the KGB. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-.RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 With films being the most potent propaganda tool we have in our society today, Admiral Turner, how accurate a portrait of the CIA has Hollywood painted? ADMIRAL TURNER: Rona, Hollywood does a great job of turning intelligence into entertainment, but I don't think I could use the films you've been talking about as training films for our agents. HARTMAN: You mean you don't drive an Aston-Martin, Admiral? ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I don't drive an Aston-Martin. HARTMAN: [Laughter] With oil shooting out the back? ADMIRAL TURNER: Not at all. Actually, what Hollywood exaggerates about intelligence is the amount of derring-do, the amount of sex that's involved in it; when, in fact, the vast majority of to people in the Central Intelligence Agency have nothing to do with that type of activity. One of our most important activities is simply research, is analyzing and assessing the information that is obtained, some- times by derring-do spies, sometimes by reading newspapers and other perfectly open sources of information. HARTMAN: Thank you, Admiral. We're going to be taking a look at the U-2 photographs which have just been declassified. They alerted President Kennedy to the Cuban missile crisis back in the '60s. HARTMAN: The public has never been able to see before how CIA uses photographic information. Here's an exclusive look at how we found out, through photographic interpretation, about the Russians and their missiles in Cuba back in the '60s. SANDY HILL: It may surprise you to know that the 2rA was in space four years before John Glenn was launcher!--into orbit. The U-2 started flying missions in 1956. Since overhead reconnais- sance is one important way that the CIA gathrs information, the agency designed a way to take photograph: from as high as 70,000 feet. Now, these space designed by the CIA for those reconnaissance missions mere later redesigned for our astronauts. And in 1962, well, =.t was this camera, carried in a U-2 plane on a mission over Cuba, that gave us the first pictures alerting us to the Cuban missile crisis. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 Approved For lease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B0155 02700160001-9 This camera, which fits into the belly of a U-2 aircraft flying at 70,000 feet, can identify an object as small as the hood of a car. It fires in seven different positions, carries two rolls of film, each one mile long, and can photograph and area 300 miles wide from Washington to Phoenix. pretation. Then the film is developed and sent to photographic inter- MAN: Now, interpretation means that we scan the photo- graphy for items of interest. On the items of interest, we then do a detailed interpretation. Now, the item of interest may be military, economic, or may be something that relates to disaster relief. This machine is very similar to the college microscopes that you used. HILL: Okay, now, what exactly is this that I'm looking MAN: Sandy, you're actually looking at a duplicate posi- tive taken from the film on the overflight of Cuba by that U-2. What we have down here is a picture of the airfield at Santa Clara. What it shows is some of the intensive buildup accomplished by the Soviets just prior to the end of September. HILL: How did you find that now, by scanning this? MAN: Yes, we did. We actually moved across the film at a very slow pace, using that joy stick. If you move a little bit to the left, you should be traveling across the airfield. HILL: Oh, yes. MAN: Now you should be passing over MIG-21s and some older Soviet fighters. Go a little bit further and now head to your left, and you should come across a long row of the MIG-r21s. HILL: Well, here they are, but how did you know that these were actually Russian missiles.? MAN: Well, based on the very finite mensuration of the objects themselves, and, additionally, based on Moscow May Lay parade photographs of their medium-range ballistic missiles, we drew the direct correlation that these were in fact those same missiles with only canvas over them. MAN: Additionally, we saw some propellant vehicles Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 associated with those missiles, and, additionally, we saw a large number of tents... HILL: Oh, yes. MAN: ...other Soviet type of vehicles down there. HILL: Uh-huh. You could identify that they were Soviet vehicles from this -- from this shot. HILL: And again, based on experience of having seen them in Russia and... MAN: Definitely. HILL: Mensuration. What is mensuration? MAN: Mensuration is a process that we go through here to verify whether or not an item on the imagery is in fact what we think it is. MAN: It's a very detailed measuring from one end point to another end point of the particular item. In this case, the length of that object put it into the category that it could have been a Soviet missile. Based on pre- vious experience, having looked at Soviett missiles in the Moscow parade, we knew what the length of a Soviet missile was. The canvas stretched over the missile did create some minor problems in identi- fying it as a missile. But the general length, shape, orientation, and associated vehicles pretty much confirmed the fact that it was a Soviet medium-range ballistic missile, and not a piece of farm equipment or a non-military object. HILL: Well, once you found these, then what happened? What did you do with this information? MAN: Well, once we'd identified exactly what the items of equipment were down at the airfield, we then passed the infor- mation, through the chain of command, up through the Central Intelli- gen"e Agency and on to the President. PRESIDENT JOHN KENNEDY: We will not prematurely or unneces- sarily risk the course of worldwide nuclear war, in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth. But neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced. Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 Approved For ease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B015549,&02700160001-9 13 of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution, as endorsed by the resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately: I have directed the continued and increased close sur- veillance of Cuba and its military buildup. HARTMAN: Those photographs, by the way, taken by the U-2s back in the '60s were declassified so that we could show them this morning. Admiral Turner, we're all familiar with these photographs being taken from airplanes. To what extent have satellites replaced photographs, intelligence that you get from airplanes? ADMIRAL TURNER: We use all sorts of photographic intelli- gence today, and I think that the films you've just shown show one of the great things about the CIA over its 30 years of history. We have technical people out there who have invented the U-2, who have invented that type of camera that was used; and that and many other such scientific developments have been of great value to our country today, David. HARTMAN: But back to my question about satellites. To what extent have satellites given you a greater capability? ADMIRAL TURNER: We have what we call in the trade national technical means for verifying the SALT agreements, and. photographic devices such as the ones you've just seen are part of that. And again, this is a critical contribution of your intelligence community today. Because when you're dealing in a negotiation like strategic arms limitations, SALT, with a country like the Soviet Union, where everything is-so very secret, if you don't have your own national technical means, you're not going to be able to trust that agreement. And therefore we feel we're making an important contribution to peace. Thank you, Admiral. HARTMAN: Welcome to a Good Morning America special pro- gram, "Inside the U.S.A." [sic]. Good morning, again. I'm David Hartman. Sandy Hill is with us today on film. For the past month, she has been filming several reports about the CIA at the head- quarters there in Langley, Virginia. It's important that you understand: We have abided by .Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 Approved For IM 0* Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 security restrictions, but the CIA has had not editorial control at all over the two hours that we're showing you about the agency this morning. And with us through both hours is the Director of the Centeral Intelligence Agency, Admiral Stansfield Turner. Good morning, Admiral. ADMIRAL TURNER: Good morning, David. HARTMAN: Nice to have you with us. ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you. HARTMAN: We know that you are showing us just a small portion of what -- of the activities of the CIA. Even though it's more than has been seen in the past, we're only seeing the tip of the iceberg, and we understand that. But this is a departure from the past. What opposition have you had, and from whom, to your sitting here this morning on national television, going public with some of the operations of the CIA? ADMIRAL TURNER: There's always resistance to change, David, but I am persuaded that we must today create what we call a new, American model of intelligence. Traditionally, the model for intelligence has been one of maximum secrecy. But I do not believe that in our society today we can afford to have that. First, the Congress, the public must benefit by the fine information that we produce and can make available in unclassified form. For instance, I happen to have with me some... right? HARTMAN: Just happen to have it here this morning, Admiral, ADMIRAL TURNER: Just happen to -- some of the 77 unclassi- fied publications that we've issued this year already, which is con- siderably more than in any other previous year: Soviet Economic Problems, Nuclear Energy, International Terrorism, Major Oil and. Gas Fields of the Free World. HARTMAN: Are there people who jump on you for this, though? Are there people saying, "You shouldn't go on television this morning? Why are you letting that stuff out?" ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, of course there are some people who feel that we may give away our secrets. But my policy is a twofold Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554SN2700160001-9 policy on secrecy. By making more of this information unclasified, there is less classified information that must be protected, and therefore we can protect it better. We will respect it more. When it says "Secret," we know it's secret; it's not unclassified, as is this. But secondly, I'm running a very hard policy on tightening up our security over those things which must be kept secret, par- ticularly how we get our intelligence and particularly the very sen- sitive intelligence we obtain. And we're doing a lot in that area also. So, it's two-pronged policy. We don't believe intelli- gence can be totally open. You've got to have some secrets, but I want to minimize those. HARTMAN: Thank you, Admiral. We'll talk to you in just a little while. BELL: Finally, most of the CIA's operations have long been cloaked in secrecy, and so have the buildings where those activities have been planned, monitored and analyzed. As part of our special CIA anniversary program, our cameras took a look behind the scenes at CIA Headquarters in Langley. Here's what they saw. The grounds of the Central Intelligence Agency could easily be mistaken for a college campus, and the resemblance carries over even when you enter the main building. The books in the CIA library, for instance, are the same ones you'd find in any good college library, books on law, economics, politics; also, telephone books, hundreds of phone books that list just about every phone number in the world; and newspapers from almost every major country. In this auditorium, six months ago, it is here that Admiral Turner was sworn in as the 12th Director of the CIA. [Clip of swearing-in of Admiral Turner] BELL: The Map Room. When President Carter wanted a map showing exactly where that American helicopter was shot down over North Korea last July, this is where it was made. The experts in this department were able to pinpoint the exact spot, which showed that our helicopter accidentally had flown just over the border and beyond the DMZ. Maps made here are all requested for a specific purpose, since information is needed and no appropriate map exists. Not surprisingly, the CIA is known for making some of the Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 wool Aft Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 finest maps in the world, many of them, surprisingly, available to the general public, through the Government Printing Office. But Operations is the real nerve center for the CIA. This portion of Opeations looks like the newsroom of any metro- politan newspaper. It even has the same teletype machines that transmit news reports from all over the world. In fact, it func- tions to complement the CIA's classified cable system. For security reasons, we could not photograph the communications room itself, where classified cables pour in by the hundreds from all over the world. A staff is on hand 24 hours a day to review every report that comes in and to determine if and when other officials should be notified of fast-breaking developments. - You'll recall that when most of America is sleeping, the rest of the world is going into action. And the Operations staff functions to stay on top of every development and to make sure the President has available the most up-to-date information on any event or crisis that could affect our national security. That's the news, David, with a little closer look at the tip of that CIA iceberg. Thank you, Steve, and we' 11 have more about the CIA in just three minutes from now. HARTMAN: Most people don't associate the CIA with human- itarian activities, but Sandy Hill right now has a film report that says otherwise. HILL: We've seen a camera designed by the CIA for over- head reconnaissance and how photographic interpretation was used to alert President Kennedy of the Cuban missile crisis. But national security is really just one aspect of photographic inter- pretation. It's also used for peaceful, non-military purposes. And Lynn is one of the CIA's photographic interpreters. And when parts of Guatemala were devastated by earthquakes in February of 1976, she used her expertise to determine just where help was needed. Good morning, Lynn. LYNN: Good morning. HILL: I'm looking forward to seeing just how the CIA was involved in all this. How did it come about, to begin with? LYNN: Shortly after the earthquake hit Guatemala, Guate- mala asked aid from the United States. The agency who handles that is the Agency for International Development. One question they needed to know in particular was how extensive was the damage; they Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 Approved For Fase 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554W2700160001-9 needed an overall picture. Because of that, the Administrator of A.I.D. requested a U-2 flight. This was done with the permission of the Guatemalan government and at their request; and the Agency was called on to interpret, analyze the film, because they have the expertise in that area. HILL: And what did those pictures show, basically? LYNN: One was the amount of damage to towns outside of the main urban areas, and also the transportation routes to those areas. LYNN: This board here showed one of the many landslides. There were just hundreds and thousands of landslides throughout Guatemala that blocked roads, dammed streams, etcetera. HILL: You said that this one buried an entire village, this landslide here, right? HILL: How do you know there's a village buried under LYNN: That was based on maps we were using. In order to record the damage, we used preexisting maps. The map of this area showed a village of about 15 buildings in this area. You can see on the photo there's only one building left standing. HILL: [Inaudible] LYNN: And it was the first time we could get in for clear coverage. LYNN: And on this one we could see the entire area and how much damage there was. HILL: And this was from that second flight. LYNN: Yes. This was the same landslide that you s x on the first mission. You see the lake has increased grearly; it's about five times the area it was on the first mission. HILL: And how it poses a potential hazard here. LYNN: Yes. If this increases, it could break this dam.. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9. Approved F elease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 and cause flooding downstream. This shows a bridge that's completely destroyed along the main route between Guatemala City and the port on the East Coast. You can see cars backed up here now. They're waiting to cross this temporary bridge being built downstream. Something that was of interest to geologists, both in this country and in Guatemala, was that they could -- you could actually see the earthquake and see the fissures and cracks. HILL: It's remarkable information, but what happened as a result of this? What happened? LYNN: It was useful, both to the government of Gua- temala, because they could determine where the damage was, where to send supplies, and also for this country, because they knew how much aid to send and, again, where to send it; for instance, where to send -- set up their mobile hospitals, for instance. They could get that information based on this imagery? HILL: How unique is this? How often is the CIA in- volved in a project such as this one in Guatemala? LYNN: Well, they have been in previous cases; their expertise has been called upon for such cases, and may again in the future. But it would have to be a country that had a disaster, had requested aid, and also be willing to be photographed, to help out in the disaster assessment. HILL: Thank you very much. LYNN: Okay. Thank you. HARTMAN: Admiral Turner, releasing that kind of infor- mation, which even until now we haven't heard, should help -- kind of help your image just a little bit? ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I hope so, because we do do a great many things that are of value to the country over and above the James Bond type of spying that gets a rather exaggerated play. You might recall, David, that in these pamphlets I men- tioned awhile ago, the topics of them -- Terrorism, Internationa-1 '!'nrrorism, International Narcotics Flow, The World Steel Market -- these are areas where I think the Central. Intelligence Agency today is providing a real service to our country. In a number of instances in recent years, we have un- covered information about international terrorist activities that- have led directly to the thwarting of terrorist activities. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 Approved For Fease 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80B01554402700160001-9 19 HARTMAN: Specifically? Where, Admiral? Can. you give me one example? ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I'm... HARTMAN: You can't. ADMIRAL TURNER: ...reluctant to do that, simply because it might lead to a disclosure of how we penetrate these terrorist organizations and get information about their plans. Similarly, in the narcotics. Now, we deal strictly outside of the United States. There are law-enforcement agencies to handle narcotics in this country. But outside the United States, we watch the flow, as we see the narcotics moving from the poppy fields, through the various processing centers, and shipments and inputs to areas where they can come into the United States. And here again, we've helped the Drug Enforcement Agency put its finger on this very serious problem for our country. HARTMAN: And what you've just said, you're guaranteeing, you're assuring me that the CIA is not involved in drug trafficking or in watching it here in the United States, right? ADMIRAL TURNER: Absolutely not. We are involved in for- eign intelligence collection, not in the United States. HARTMAN: We've been talking, Admiral, about intelligence that you perform. Obviously, the Russians are doing the same thing. ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. HARTMAN: How would you compare the Soviet intelligence capability compared to ours? ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't think there's any question that .ours is superior. Theirs is perhaps a larger, more intensive effort, because they are a very secretive society, a very suspicious society. But, number one, we have the technological edge on them, because... HARTMAN: In what way? When you say technological, what does that mean? Because that's all Greek to me. ADMIRAL TURNER: I see. I just mean that we have been able to apply advanced technology to techniques of collecting . intelligence, like the U-2 and its fine cameras, where we're ahead of them. But secondly, and most importantly, really, as I said earlier, analysis, assessement of the information you collect is critical. And I don't believe that in a society as controlled, as antithetical to free thought, you can do as good analysis as we can. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554602700160001-9 If you did an analysis in the Soviet Union where you came out in opposition to what the regime was thinking or doing, you might lose your job. BELL: Admiral... ADMIRAL TURNER: We encourage that in this country. BELL: Admiral,... ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, Steve. BELL: ...Steve Bell. The Soviet Union, of course, has been very active when it comes to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Speci- fically, so many electronic beams reported that sometimes there was possible danger to American health.. What is the situation now with Soviet electronic intelli- gence at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow? ADMIRAL TURNER: The Soviets are trying in every way to collect information from our embassy in Moscow. We do not believe that the radiation effort there is injurious to health at this time, however. HARTMAN: Admiral, the KGB. You know, maybe this is movie stuff, maybe not, and perhaps you can tell us. I mean you're the man who knows. ADMIRAL TURNER: ...hope so. HARTMAN: How many agents, let's say, to start off -- how many agents does the KGB have in the United States? ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I would estimate there are hundreds of agents in the United States, and it's growing. Their activity has not slackened in recent years, despite detente. HARTMAN: Would it make any sense -- in the minute we have left to go out and try to find them and get them out of the country? ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, we have a responsibility in both he FBI and the CIA for what's known as counterintelligence, coun- tering other countries' intelligence efforts against us. The CIA does this overseas, the FBI inside the United States. Obviously, we've got to have close teamwork here. ADMIRAL TURNER: If an agent comes from the KGB and we've been watching him from the CIA in some foreign country, comes to Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 Approved For ease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP8013015541 02700160001-9 Washington, we do a'football handoff to the FBI. And we try to find those who are doing things illegal and improper in our country. But we have an open society, and there's a lot that you can collect of intelligence in this country without doing anything improper or illegal; and there's nothing we can do about that. Reading some of our technical magazines, you get a great deal of information about our military capabilities, for instance. HARTMAN: Admiral, we just ran out of time for now, but we'll talk with you later in the hour. ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you. HARTMAN: What you just saw was a CIA computer mapping the location of where an American helicopter went down in North or South Korea. Obviously, it was very important for President Carter to know exactly where that helicopter went down. And we found out, through the CIA computer, that it went down in North Korea. In our special two hours on the CIA today, I'm being joined by the Director of the Agency, Admiral Stansfield Turner, who is joining me here in Washington. Nice having you with us. ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you, David. HARTMAN: And we'll be talking with the Admiral. in just a little while. HARTMAN: We asked Erma Bombeck to comment on the CIA this morning; and, as usual, her comments are astute and compre- hensive and knowledgeable. ERMA BOMBECK: This morning I'm proud to join the Good Morning America report on the 30th anniversary of the CIA. And you're probably saying, "What does she know about the CIA?" Plenty. If you're among the working class, I don't think there's a family that has not been touched by the CIA, especially when they merged a few years back to become that prestigious CIA-.FL. [Laughter] BOMBECK: Which boosted their membership to more than 14 million. I mean this organization works tirelessly to champion Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 Approved For elease 2001/08/07 : CIA-kbP80B01554R002700160001-9 the cause of silled and nonskilled labor. MAN: Cut. No, Erma. That's wrong. Try it again. BOMBECK: What- do you mean, that's wrong? What? What? Did I blow a line or something? This morning I'm proud to join the Good Morning America's report on the 30th anniversary of the CIA. Now, I personally am proud to hold membership in an organization that cares for my safety. I mean I know when I'm out there on that road at night, alone... [Laughter] BOMBECK: ...and I get a flat, you know, I feel very secure in knowing that I have my CIA card with me. [Laughter] BOMBECK: ..and within minutes there's a tow truck there to bail me out. They also plan my vacation, they free road maps, and with that little Magic Marker they tell eme... MAN: Cut. BOMBECK: What do you mean, cut? This morning I'm proud to join the Good Morning America's report on the 30th anniversary of the CIA. For years they have been the watchdogs over our food and drugs. [Laughter] BOMBECK: They were the first ones who told us that if our cans were bent out of shape, it was dangerous to buy 'em. [Laughter] BOMBECK: They pushed for legislation on fair packaging and labeling... BOMBECK: This morning I'm proud to join the Good Morning America's report on the 30th anniversary of the CIA. I'm not your militant feminist or anything, I mean I don't mind dancing backwards or having the buttons on the wrong side of my sweater. But I per- sonally think"the CIA should be passed. I mean... [Laughter] Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 ratify... Approved Fo*elease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B015R002700160001-9 23 BOMBECK: Yes. They've only got three more states to MAN: Cut. BOMBECK: If it's still morning, I'm -- I'm proud to join the Good Morning America's report on the CIA. I first saw the CIA when they played USC. [Laughter] BOMBECK: They had both just joined the NFL, or was it the On second thought, the CIA might have been playing, maybe, [Laughter and applause] HARTMAN: Thank you, Erma. We're going to meet some of the women who actually do work at the CIA and ask them why they're there and how they feel about their jobs. HARTMAN: Not long ago, if you asked a member of the CIA where he worked, he couldn't tell you. Obviously, the CIA has become a lot more open. Sandy Hill has talked with some of the people who work John Blake has been with the CIA for 30 years. He is the Acting Deputy Director of Intelligence. He's the number two man at the Agency. Mary Ellen has been a secretary with the CIA for 18 years. Pat is an executive officer; she's a high-level intelligence analyst who's been with the agency for 15 years. And Brian became a CIA member just four months ago; he is an associate watch officer. And Sandy asked the same questions of these four people. HILL:- Has working with the CIA created any problems for you, with your husband, in terms of being able to discuss certain subjects and... WOMAN: No, not really. Certainly, I would not go home at night and say, "Gee, what a wonderful clandestine report I got today." I mean it's not the sort of thing one talks about over dinner. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 Aft A% Approved ForRelease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 JOHN BLAKE: I can remember, many a time, going out on social occasions; and, you know, you're standing there, having a drink before dinner, or you're sitting down after dinner. And this man is saying what he recently accomplished, and another individual is saying what he made this trip to Western Europe for. And someone looks at you, and you feel like the village idiot. So you start to talk about religion or sports, or something. HILL-: What was it like 18 years ago, when you first joined this agency? WOMAN: Well, when I first came, you were not -- you were told you worked for the government. You couldn't say you worked for CIA. And, of course, when you'd say -- someone would say, "Where do you work?" And I'd say, "For the government," "Oh, you work for CIA." [Laughter] WOMAN: It's always like that. You know, it's like an open secret in Washington. HILL: What are your thoughts about the image of the CIA, the perception that outsiders have about it? BLAKE: In my own travels, at times, I do, you know, ask the gentleman who's driving the cab or ask the young lady in the airplane who's serving the dinner, you know, what they may think of this or that, if I happen to have a newspaper in my hand. I get some very rewarding replies. BLAKE: Such as, "We think you people are absolutely essential to the survival of the country." Such as, "We think you know what you're doing." Such as, "We couldn't do without you." they? HILL: But not all of the responses are positive, are BLAKE: Oh, in honesty, I couldn't say they'-?e all r?si- tive, no. HILL: So, what do they say-,,n the other side? BLAKE: "My p rv-d* ~ss gracious, how did you ever get involved in that?'_ .:1LL: And how do you respond? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 Approved For Fase 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554W2700.160001-9 BLAKE: Oh, a variety of ways, depending what "that" is in that question: "How did you ever get involved in what?" Sometimes you can answer the question. Sometimes you say, "Frankly, I don't know." And sometimes you change the subject. I think it's wise for us to try to develop a favorable constituency. To the degree that we have public opinion on our side, to degree that we can do a better job. Now, here we have a real problem. How can we communicate with the public those things which, by law, we are directed to hold secret. But I suspect I feel the same way about this organization as you feel about your network. You would like to have it best thought of as possible by the public. HILL: When you read or hear stories about the CIA and some of the things that they allegedly have been involved in, what do you -- how do you react? WOMAN: Probably just like you do. You know, I find much of it despicable, some of it simply stupid. But it -- you know, two points: If your grandfather were a horse thief, would you expect to have been responsible, you know, 20-30 years later for what he may have done? To the people in my generation in the agency, it's reprehensible, you can learn a lesson of things not to do, but it is largely irrelevant; it just doesn't mean a great deal. to me. Second, in most of the cases that I know anything about, [unintelligible] little things the Agency just whipped off and did on its own. People do not run around doing all this kind of skull- duggery. I find it, I guess, maybe sad that we're sort of expected to answer for the sins of the fathers. HILL: There've also been more recent reports of CIA involvement, in the '70s. WOMAN: One of the things I have learned is that so many of these stories, when you look at them and it looks like: "Oh, boy, new headlines, new story, new revelation," it is the same old stuff in a new guise. It comes out over and over again. And I think so often the story -- there will be, indeed, a grain of truth, and it gets-distorted and blown out of all proportion. And then, six days later, by the time the Agency people get to troop thro>;h all the paperwork and find out what the real story is, where'r, the denial? It's on page 62 in the want ads. BRIAN: You know, mistakes were made, given. Okay, let's you know, there's no argument there. Nasty mistakes were made. But the important thing here, I think, is that we have to learn from these mistakes. . Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 I think the dangerous thing here is that people tend to become cynical, and that is the real problem, as I see it. That's the most dangerous thing, for people to just become cynical and just to assume that all government is bad. In my experience here -- I've just been here four months, but I've come in contact with a lot of people who are very capable, very intelligent people, who are dedicated, career professionals who really want to do a good job. And that's the way I feel, too. WOMAN: If people did what they have been accused of doing, knowing full well the consequences that were going to come out of that, then that is something that I can't accept. I don't think that anyone in the CIA would have done that. I mean this is not an immoral organization, by any means. HILL: What would you do, Brian, if someone asked you to do something that you considered to be morally improper? BRIAN: You know, I can't foresee that happening, ever, in the job I am in now. But if that ever did happen, I don't think I'd really hesitate to go back to driving a truck. HILL: How would you react? What would you do? WOMAN: If I felt it was morally wrong? HILL: Uh-huh. WOMAN: I would refuse. HILL: Do you feel as if there would ever be an oppor- tunity for that kind of a situation to evolve in your role here? WOMAN: No, I can't see that at all. WOMAN: Nobody ever asked me to do anything like that. HILL: And if they did? WOMAN: I'd do two things. I'd yell for the Admiral, and I'm punch him in the nose. [Laughter] HILL: What do you think would happen if the CIA simply did not exist? BRIAN: That's -- people who suggest that notion, I think, are -- have not thought out what they're saying. Every state worthy of its name has to have intelligence operations and counterintellience operations. That has to be. We don't live in Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9 Approved For Rase 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554W2700160001-9 a Sunday School world. WOMAN: In all honesty, you know, if there weren't an agency, you would go back to what we had before the war; and what you had was everybody in town running his own little intelligence shop, falling all over each other, and very happily missing Pearl Harbor. BLAKE: This is a day and an age where we live with nuclear weapons, which in a very few minutes of time can cross oceans and do damage the likes of which you and I can't sit here and describe. How else can this country protect itself unless it knows what the intents and the capabilities of any potential or actual enemy may be? It's a day entirely different from the day that I was first born to; and the threats are different and the problems are different. HARTMAN: That was John Blake, the Deputy Director of the CIA. And when we come back I'll be talking to the number one man, Stansfield Turner. HARTMAN: What you just saw was Harry Truman swearing in the first CIA Director. I'm sitting with Admiral Stansfield Turner, the current and new Director of the CIA. Admiral, some of the past covert activities of the CIA have been buying public officials, fixing elections, overthrowing governments, assassination attempts. Are these going to continue? ADMIRAL TURNER: To begin with, David, I don't accept all your premises. We've been accused of some of those, some of those may have been donne, but they are not going to continue. Assassinations, for instance, are particularly ruled out by a presidential order to me. And any member of our organization can be fired for even planning or thinking about one in concrete terms. But, no. We have a covert action capability. It's very closely regulated, including a requirement for a precise presi- dential determination and the notification of eight committees of Congress if we're ever going to play in that game. BELL: Admiral, Steve Bell in the news studio. I'd like to ask a couple of specifics that relate to items in the news, and see if that will help us define your concept of covert activity. Number one, did we bug the Panama negotiations? Have the Panamanians discovered it and, in return, tried to blackmail us? .Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 Approved Far elease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 ADMIRAL TURNER: Steve, just one hour after I leave you with this program, I'm going up to Capitol Hill to testify to the Senate Committee on Intelligence about everything we know of our activities in intelligence_ with respect to Panama. Clearly, it would be improper and imprudent for me to discuss that in public before going before the Senate for that purpose. BELL: Now, one of your predecessors, former Director William Colby, denied any knowledge of such bugging, but said, frankly, he would not disapprove of eavesdropping in such cases, that it's very much to our advantage. What's your response to that? ADMIRAL TURNER: I think the various techniques of intel- ligence that are used by different intelligence agencies all around the world vary from country to country, from time to time, from objective to objective. But clearly, if we are to discuss in public the details of how the United States conducts its intelligence, it makes it much easier for other people to deny us that opportunity. That, in turn, would cost the American public a great deal in wasted effort and in loss of opportunity. So, I really can't get into that kind of specifics. HARTMAN: Can you really -- we're in a free society. Can you really do the intelligence job that you have to do, and have this openness and go public? ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, I really think we can. As I men- tioned to you earlier this morning, David, we're trying to build what we call an American model of intelligence, which, on the one hand, shares all- that we can with the public and gives the public the benefit of the considerable money they're spending on intelli- gence. And still you can maintain your... ADMIRAL TURNER: But on the other hand, we haven't relaxed for one bit. In fact, I have issued some'very Draconian rules in recent months about tightening security. There's just too much that has leaked out; and we're going to stop that where it's proper to hold it secret, but we're not going to hold things secret that really deserve it. BELL: Admiral, without violating any confidences, I'm wondering if you can tell us if you have, since you've assumed that office, stopped anything that was planned or proposed because it violated your moral concept of the Agency? ADMIRAL TURNER: I'm pleased to say, Steve, that that has not really been necessary. In my first six months in office, I've Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9 Approved For F ase 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554W27001.60001-9 29 conducted a very thorough inquiry into how all of the clandestine activities are conducted, and.I have found nothing that required any major overhaul. Clearly, taking guidance from the President, I have adjusted some things here and there, but I have not found that there was anything reprehensible going on or anything that needed any great change. HARTMAN: Admiral Turner, thank you. And it's been a pleasure having you with us this morning for both hours. Good luck to you. I don't have to tell you you've got a touch job. But for our welfare, we hope you do it well. ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you for helping us celebrate this 30th anniversary of American intelligence in the CIA. We're pleased to have been on the show, and it's a part of our hope of making our intelligence operation more visible to the American public, so they can share with us and support us. HARTMAN: Thank you, Admiral. HARTMAN: This morning we've seen some of the everyday operations of the CIA and met some of the people who work in the agency. But there are CIA members whose names and faces cannot be revealed. Their work is so sensitive that their identities can never be known,. not even after death. It's perhaps hard for some of us to understand the importance of this anonymity, but Richard Welch, the CIA agent who died last year in Greece was killed shortly after his name was revealed in.a magazine article. The CIA honors its members who have died serving their country very simply: with a start. At the CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, there are 35 stars; 17 represent people who have never been identified. Admiral Turner, thank you for being with us today. ADMIRAL TUNRNER: Thank you, David. HARTMAN: It's a pleasure. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700160001-9