FULL TEXT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R002700160001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1977
• Content Type: TRANS

RADIO TV F &R ,1e GX01/08/07: CIA-RDP80BO15SWO02700160001-9
? 4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016 244-3540
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Good Morning America
WJLA TV
ABC Network
September 19, 1977 7:00 AM
SUBJECT Full Text: Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
DAVID HARTMAN: This is a Good Morning America special
program, the first extensive television visit inside the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Good morning. I'm David Hartman.
The forerunner of the CIA was the wartime, World War II
wartime, OSS, the Office of Strategic Services. And General William
Donovan, whose picture you're looking at now, ran it from this room
in this building; and we're in Washington, D.C.
General Donovan is considered to be the father, in a sense,
of the CIA. In fact, the OAS became the CIA exactly 30 years ago
yesterday. And as it grew, the CIA expanded its headquarters to
Langley, Virginia.
And Sandy Hill, during the past couple of weeks, and our
ABC film crews have spent many hours filming inside the headquarters
at Langley, Virginia. Some of what you are going to see in the next
couple of hours of our Good Morning America program special this
morning have never been seen before on television. And our guide
through all of this is the new Director, for the past six months, of
the Central Intelligence Agency, and he-is Admiral Stansfield Turner.
Admiral?
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Good morning, David.
HARTMAN: Good morning. Nice to have you with us this
morning.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you. Glad to be here.
OFFICES IN: NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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HARTMAN': "First of all, do you -- I'm going to quote
you. Quote: "I think we've got to be salesmen. I think we've
got a product to sell, and we've got to get out on the street and
selll it."
What's the product and why do you have to sell it?
ADMIRAL TURNER: The product is evaluated intelligence
about activities in foreign lands, and the need is to have our
policymakers in the government well informed so they make good
decisions.
But I also happen to believe that we have a lot of good
information that can be made available to the American public;
and the better informed our public is, the stronger our country
will be.
HARTMAN: Admiral, isn't part of it the fact that there
have been so many criticisms of abuses within the CIA, that in
order to improve your credibility and your strength as an intelli-
gence agency, you've got to go public to some degree?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. I believe that we can tell the
American public more about what we're doing and how we're doing
it, within the limits of necessary secrecy; and that in so doing,
we should be able to build a greater understanding in the public
of support for those things which we do which are so essential
to our country's welfare.
HARTMAN: Thank you, Admiral.
We're going to be talking more, through both our hours
this morning, with Admiral Turner....
HARTMAN: I'm here with the Director of the CIA, Admiral
Stansfield Turner. And right now Steve Bell has a report about
some of the excesses attributed to the CIA.
STEVE BELL: David, the Central Intelligence Agency was
a child of the cold war, created at a time when the Soviet Union
was seen as a clear and present threat to the United States and
other Western nations. Under the National Security Act of 1947,
!h' CIA was created to coordinate U.S. intelligence activities,'
specifically to correlate and evaluate intelligence and to advise
the National Security Council.
But there was a loophole in the act through which the
CIA moved into secret operations, dirty tricks, and finally full-
fledged military activity, a loophole that authorized the agency
to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence
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affecting the national security as the National Security Council
may from time to time direct
Armed with that loopholed and a desire by most members
of Congress not to know what was happening, the CIA undertook
operations over the years that have only recently become public
knowledge and brought the agency under critical public scrutiny.
Although it wasn't the first such operation, the Bay of
Pigs invasion in 1961 was the CIA's largest paramilitary endeavor
and its largest failure.
In Laos, the CIA financed a secret war with funds never
itemized to Congress that went on for years befor being publicly
acknowledged. And in Vietnam, there was the Phoenix program that
fought Viet Cong terror tactics with terror tactics.
Then there were the authorized assassination attempts,
the most widely publicized involving Cuba's Fidel Castro. And
there were the cases where CIA-supported activities appeared to
get out of hand, ending in unintended assassinations.
In Chile, for instance, Marxist President Salvado Allende
was killed in a coup that followed unrest and demonstrations fin-
anced, in part, at least, by the CIA.
A grand jury, incidentally, is considering indicting
former CIA Director Richard Helms for lying about CIA intervention
in Chile.
But the Central Intelligence Agency has taken some of
its worst lumps for activities right here in the United States,
where the law very specifically says, "The agency shall have no
police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security
functions."
In direct contravention of that law, we now know of
Operation Chaos, begun under White House pressure in 1967 to spy
on and compile lists of American dissenters; Operation Merrimack,
to infiltrate CIA agents into peace groups and black activist
organizations; also, the illegal opening of first class mail,
both by the CIA and the FBI. And, of course, there were the
secrets projects in drug testing that began in 1950 and lasted
until '73. What began as an attempt to understand so-called brain.
washing techniques used on American prisoners in Korea soon turned
to a search for mind-control weapons of our own: prisoners and
hospital patients used as guinea pigs, and prostitutes used to lure
unsuspecting subjects into drug-testing situations.
It was not until 1975 that Congress began to exercise
its oversight function. Senator Frank Church headed an investi-
gation by a select committee, and we asked Church how it all could
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could have happened-.
SENATOR FRANK CHURCH: Well, it happened for a variety
of reasons: the cold war fears; the notion that the CIA had carte
blanche, could do anything because it was engaged in an effort to
protect us against Communism; the failure of the Congress to exer-
cise proper oversight; the laxity, indeed the attitude of arrogance
that developed among Presidents who were willing to let the CIA
function in this manner; and the lack of an adequate law deline-
ating the authority of the CIA and limiting its activities within
our own country.
BELL: David, a look back at some of the reasons these
have been difficult days for the CIA.
HARTMAN: Thank you, Steve.
Admiral Turner, you have obviously inherited an agency
that's got a lot of problems, despite a lot of successes. But
you've got a lot of problems, a lot of criticism, abuses. What
are you doing about it?
ADMIRAL TURNER: We're using the mistakes -- many of which
have been exaggerated, David -- of the past as guide marks not to
let them happen again. And one of the great assurances that they
will not happen again, besides my and all the people in the CIA's
determination not to let them, is the new oversight procedures that
have been established by our government, oversight procedures in
the Congress and in the Executive Branch.
We have, for instance, two committees of the Congress dedi-
cated just to oversight of intelligence. We're very pleased with
this. We have in the Executive Branch the Intelligence Oversight
Board, three distinguished citizens who look for illegalities or
improprieties in our operations. And any citizen and any member
of the Central Intelligence Agency can write to this Oversight Board
and register a complaint or an alarm, if they find one. And in
addition, the President and the National Security Council are much
more involved in supervising our activities today than ever before.
I think the citizens' rights-are well protected.
HARTMAN: When you say that the President's more involved,
that the committees at the White House, and so forth, are more
involved, what does that -- who is responsible if something goes
wro.ag in the future? There is a criticism that there's been an
abuse in the field. Who do we look to?
ADMIRAL TURNER: You're...
HARTMAN: Who do we say, "He knew, and what did he know,
when did he know it?" and all that?
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ADMIRAL TURNER: You're looking right at him, David.
It's on my shoulders, and I take that responsibility for the proper
execution of our intelligence activities.
HARTMAN: But do you make the judgments?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Not in all..
HARTMAN: Or does the President?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Not in all. cases. We have different
rules according to the risk of the kinds of things that we are
doing. Some, for instance, we must get the President's personal
signature, and I must then go and notify up to eight committees
of the Congress that we're going to do something that has a par-
ticular risk to it.
So, it's a gradated thing, because some operations that
we do involve no risk at all. They're open; they're what we call
overt. Some are covert and require some form of risk.
BELL: Admiral, this is Steve Bell at the Washington
news studio.
In the past, hasn't it often been the President -- I mean
you're taking the buck, but hasn't it often been the President who
was behind what we now have come to consider CIA abuses?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, there certainly are accusations
that the CIA was driven into things it didn't want to do by other
members of the government. And all I can say is you're now looking
at the fellow where the buck goes to. I have to be the one who
stands up and says, "No," if it is an improper activity.
BELL: And yet, both you and President Carter have refused
totally to rule out covert opeations. How do you draw the line?
How do you assure the public that the line's going to be drawn at
the right point?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Because the cover operations, in particu-
lar, are the ones where we have to, by law, notify the Congress of
the United States as we're doing anything of that nature.
So, the public is protected here by the congressional
oversight of the Executive's activities.
HARTMAN: What does oversight mean, really? T_ mean that's
a word that we've heard a thousand times, but what ip it?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oversight means that these committees
of the Congress, one in the House and one-in the Senate, meet with
us regularly and interrogate us as to what we are doing. And I
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have an obligation to keep them informed of the nature of our
activities. And in'these certain cases, we're required by law
to inform them of special activities that we're undertaking.
We find them not a burden on us; we find them a help
for us, because we can turn to them and ask them questions as
to interpretation of law, interpretation of propriety. And that
gives us a strength, a foundation in congressional support, when
we've cleared our ideas and our operations with them.
BELL: Admiral, I wonder if I could draw a rather specific
current example. There's been a lot of controversy in this country
over alleged Korean CIA attempts to bribe and influence our U.S.
Congress. Now, the Korean CIA was very much a product of our CIA,
and one wonders, when we talk about the continuance of covert oper-
ations, if we're talking about the continuance of the kind of things
in other countries that the Koreans are accused of doing here.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Covert operations, technically, is an
effort to influence events in other countries, and to do so without
attribution to the United States. We have very, very little of that
kind of activity authorized today, and anything that ever is author-
ized does go through this very strict clearance procedure, which I
believe gives the public and gives this country adequate safe-
guards.
BELL: There's another particular incident that has just
come into the papers this morning, namely, that a group of Pales-,
tinian supporters in the U.S. has taken out ads in The New York
Times which use raw CIA data gained from the Freedom of Information
Act. The accusation is made that Moshe Dayan specifically ordered
the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty in the 1967 Middle East war.
Can you give us any enlightenment on that?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I certainly can, and I'm glad, Steve,
that you emphasized the word "raw" intelligence data.
We are required, under the Freedom of Information Act,
to produce to those who ask for it intelligence documents which
can be unclassified. In those which we released, there were
several which indicated a possibility that the Israeli Government
knew about the U.S.S. Liberty before the attack. Also, we released
an evaluated overall document which said very clearly that it was
our considered opinion that the Israeli government had no such
Knowledge at that time. -
HARTMAN: Admiral, could you differentiate for me the
difference between -- if there is one -- between a covert operation
and what we have come to know as dirty tricks: assassination
attempts, buying governments, affecting elections, etcetera? What's
covert?
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thing.
ADMIRAL TURNER: In my lexicon, those are about the same
HARTMAN: And those are not ruled out for the future, then.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I believe that we must retain a covert
action capability for this country. We are exercising it, as I
said, very little today, and we have a specific prohibition against
planning or carrying out an assassination. And we are developing
right now with the Congress new rules that will specifically say
what we can and cannot do.
But, Steve -- but, David, there are occasions -- let's
say some terriorist,group in the future gains acquisition. to a
nuclear weapon. This country would be poorly served if we didn't
have an ability to do something. about that kind of a situation.
BELL: But what control do you have, sir, to be sure
that you know everything that the operative out in the field is
doing? Especially when he goes under in a covert situation.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's a matter of how well all of us
at the top of the CIA manage it. You have to have confidence in
the people you appoint, you have to check on them, you have to use
your instincts to determine where you think anything could go
wrong; and then you have to start all over again and check on your
people, go out in the field, as I did just last week, visiting some
of our overseas activities, and use every opportunity you can to
find out for sure what's going on.
But beyond that, let me emphasize that I don't think it'
a matter of cat-and-mouse. I'm confident that the people in the
CIA are doing their very best today to carry out the instructions
which the President and the Congress issue through me.
HARTMAN: Admiral, thank you. We are going to be able
to talk more in this hour and in our other hour about a variety of
subjects. It's a pleasure to have you with us this morning. We
hope we've shed some light on what you guys do in this business of
intelligence.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you, David.
HARTMAN: If you've just joined us, we're devoting all.
of our Good Morning America program, two hours of it, this morning
to a special look at the CIA on the 30th anniversary, 30th birthday
of that agency. Sandy Hill and our ABC film crews, during the past
month, have spent a great deal of time with the CIA. Our films
have been screened for security, but the CIA has exercised no edi-.
.torial control.
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Admiral Stansfield Turner, the Director of the CIA, is
here with me, and will be through both our hours this morning. And
we'll be talking with you in just a little while again, Admiral.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you, David.
JACK ANDERSON: ...there is absolutely no trace of the
work that's been done in any of the offices. Typewriter ribbons
have to be taken out and locked in a safe. Desks must be com-
pletely cleared and all papers locked away, Even the day's scrap
paper is collected in special burn baskets and transferred to top
secret garbage bags so it can be completely destroyed.
Well, nothing is actually burned. The containers are
labeled that way as a psychological reminder that all trash must
be destroyed. If anything is left out in the open overnight, it's
considered a serious violation of security, which could result in
dismissal or a leave of absence without pay.
At the end of the day, the bags of trash are collected
and taken to a special chute which leads to a machine that reduces
the paper to pulp.
It's important to mention here that the CIA is not allowed
to destroy any records or documents. What you're seeing here is the
wastepaper from a normal days' work. But this is one government
agency that can't be accused of being wasteful. All this pulp is
put to good use as landfill.
As you may have suspected, thorough background checks are
done on every applicant, whether you're applying for a job in the
cafeteria or for a high-level position as an analyst. Everything
is checked: birth records, education, employment, where you lived
the past 15 years. Personal references are checked; neighbors and
police are questioned. And, of course, all federal agencies are
contacted to make sure you haven't been involved in any illegal or
anti-American activities.
Now, if you're wondering who wants to work for the CIA,
in 1976 the agency received 30,000 employment inquiries; only 1100
people were hired, 700 of them clerks.
HARTMAN: Thank you, Jack.
A lot of people get their ideas about the CIA from what
happens in the movies, and Rona Barrett tells us about that this
morning.
RONA BARRETT: Good morning, David. Good morning, Admiral
Turner. And good morning, America.
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Spying is as old as history itself. As long as there
have been people and nations, there have been spies; and Hollywood,
the dream factory, has conjured up more than its fair share of
espionage illusions. For the most part, Hollywood has portrayed
spying as a glamorous response to a world easily divided into two
categories: us against them.
As early as 1917, when spying provided America's Sweet-
heart, Mary Pickford, with a mission in "The Little American,"
audiences have flocked to spy movies. More often than not, the
films were long on fabrication and short on realism. But the
appeal of spy movies was not their handle on reality; it was their
emphasis on suspense, tension, and heroics. Movies like Alfred
Hitchcock's superb "The 39 Steps," about Nazi infiltration into
English society, captured this magical combination perfectly. And
when World War II broke out, Hollywood responded with an avalanche
of spy films, from Jack Benny and Carole Lombard in funny [unin-
telligible] "To Be Or Not To Be," about the Nazi invasion of Poland,
to "Watch on the Rhine," in which Betty Davis let Americans know
all about the threat of Nazism from within.
In 1948 the OSS, the Office of Strategic Services, became
the CIA, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the menace to the
Free World changed from Nazis to Communists.
In the '60s the name most associated with cold war spying
was an Englishman, James Bond, who burst on the unsuspecting American
movie-mad public with "Dr. No" in '62. Bond combined a fantasy with
gadgetry and made the CIA secret service agent a hero to audiences
greedy for escapism.
It wasn't until '65 that another view of espionage was
presented to the American public. John LeCarre's biting novel,
"The Spy Who Came in from the Cold," was made into a movie, with
Richard Burton, which turned the tables on Bond and showed spying
as a grim profession tinged with shabbiness, a sort of last-ditch
outpost for losers.
Reality reared its head in the '70s, as the CIA involve-
ment in Vietnam and Chile came under increasing attack, and the
innocence of moviegoers willing to accept a black-and-white con-
cept of us-against-them was permanently lost.
Also in the '70s, it became unclear just who was us and
who was them. Movies like Warren Beatty's "The Parallax View,"
which dealt with assassinations, proposed a paranoiac world in
which a CIA-type organization murdered people at will. "Three
Days of the Condor," with Robert Redford, was even more explicit.
It called the CIA by its name and showed the agency to be a blood-
thirsty organization willing to terminate its agents with the
alacrity of the KGB.
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With films being the most potent propaganda tool we have
in our society today, Admiral Turner, how accurate a portrait of
the CIA has Hollywood painted?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Rona, Hollywood does a great job of
turning intelligence into entertainment, but I don't think I could
use the films you've been talking about as training films for our
agents.
HARTMAN: You mean you don't drive an Aston-Martin, Admiral?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I don't drive an Aston-Martin.
HARTMAN: [Laughter] With oil shooting out the back?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Not at all.
Actually, what Hollywood exaggerates about intelligence
is the amount of derring-do, the amount of sex that's involved in
it; when, in fact, the vast majority of to people in the Central
Intelligence Agency have nothing to do with that type of activity.
One of our most important activities is simply research,
is analyzing and assessing the information that is obtained, some-
times by derring-do spies, sometimes by reading newspapers and
other perfectly open sources of information.
HARTMAN: Thank you, Admiral.
We're going to be taking a look at the U-2 photographs
which have just been declassified. They alerted President Kennedy
to the Cuban missile crisis back in the '60s.
HARTMAN: The public has never been able to see before
how CIA uses photographic information. Here's an exclusive look
at how we found out, through photographic interpretation, about
the Russians and their missiles in Cuba back in the '60s.
SANDY HILL: It may surprise you to know that the 2rA
was in space four years before John Glenn was launcher!--into orbit.
The U-2 started flying missions in 1956. Since overhead reconnais-
sance is one important way that the CIA gathrs information, the
agency designed a way to take photograph: from as high as 70,000
feet.
Now, these space designed by the CIA for those
reconnaissance missions mere later redesigned for our astronauts.
And in 1962, well, =.t was this camera, carried in a U-2 plane on
a mission over Cuba, that gave us the first pictures alerting us
to the Cuban missile crisis.
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This camera, which fits into the belly of a U-2 aircraft
flying at 70,000 feet, can identify an object as small as the hood
of a car. It fires in seven different positions, carries two rolls
of film, each one mile long, and can photograph and area 300 miles
wide from Washington to Phoenix.
pretation.
Then the film is developed and sent to photographic inter-
MAN: Now, interpretation means that we scan the photo-
graphy for items of interest. On the items of interest, we then
do a detailed interpretation.
Now, the item of interest may be military, economic, or
may be something that relates to disaster relief.
This machine is very similar to the college microscopes
that you used.
HILL: Okay, now, what exactly is this that I'm looking
MAN: Sandy, you're actually looking at a duplicate posi-
tive taken from the film on the overflight of Cuba by that U-2.
What we have down here is a picture of the airfield at Santa Clara.
What it shows is some of the intensive buildup accomplished by the
Soviets just prior to the end of September.
HILL: How did you find that now, by scanning this?
MAN: Yes, we did. We actually moved across the film at
a very slow pace, using that joy stick. If you move a little bit
to the left, you should be traveling across the airfield.
HILL: Oh, yes.
MAN: Now you should be passing over MIG-21s and some
older Soviet fighters. Go a little bit further and now head to
your left, and you should come across a long row of the MIG-r21s.
HILL: Well, here they are, but how did you know that
these were actually Russian missiles.?
MAN: Well, based on the very finite mensuration of the
objects themselves, and, additionally, based on Moscow May Lay
parade photographs of their medium-range ballistic missiles, we
drew the direct correlation that these were in fact those same
missiles with only canvas over them.
MAN: Additionally, we saw some propellant vehicles
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associated with those missiles, and, additionally, we saw a large
number of tents...
HILL: Oh, yes.
MAN: ...other Soviet type of vehicles down there.
HILL: Uh-huh. You could identify that they were Soviet
vehicles from this -- from this shot.
HILL: And again, based on experience of having seen
them in Russia and...
MAN: Definitely.
HILL: Mensuration. What is mensuration?
MAN: Mensuration is a process that we go through here
to verify whether or not an item on the imagery is in fact what
we think it is.
MAN: It's a very detailed measuring from one end point
to another end point of the particular item.
In this case, the length of that object put it into the
category that it could have been a Soviet missile. Based on pre-
vious experience, having looked at Soviett missiles in the Moscow
parade, we knew what the length of a Soviet missile was. The canvas
stretched over the missile did create some minor problems in identi-
fying it as a missile. But the general length, shape, orientation,
and associated vehicles pretty much confirmed the fact that it was
a Soviet medium-range ballistic missile, and not a piece of farm
equipment or a non-military object.
HILL: Well, once you found these, then what happened?
What did you do with this information?
MAN: Well, once we'd identified exactly what the items
of equipment were down at the airfield, we then passed the infor-
mation, through the chain of command, up through the Central Intelli-
gen"e Agency and on to the President.
PRESIDENT JOHN KENNEDY: We will not prematurely or unneces-
sarily risk the course of worldwide nuclear war, in which even the
fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth. But neither will we
shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.
Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and
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of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted
to me by the Constitution, as endorsed by the resolution of the
Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken
immediately:
I have directed the continued and increased close sur-
veillance of Cuba and its military buildup.
HARTMAN: Those photographs, by the way, taken by the
U-2s back in the '60s were declassified so that we could show them
this morning.
Admiral Turner, we're all familiar with these photographs
being taken from airplanes. To what extent have satellites replaced
photographs, intelligence that you get from airplanes?
ADMIRAL TURNER: We use all sorts of photographic intelli-
gence today, and I think that the films you've just shown show one
of the great things about the CIA over its 30 years of history.
We have technical people out there who have invented the
U-2, who have invented that type of camera that was used; and that
and many other such scientific developments have been of great
value to our country today, David.
HARTMAN: But back to my question about satellites. To
what extent have satellites given you a greater capability?
ADMIRAL TURNER: We have what we call in the trade national
technical means for verifying the SALT agreements, and. photographic
devices such as the ones you've just seen are part of that. And
again, this is a critical contribution of your intelligence community
today. Because when you're dealing in a negotiation like strategic
arms limitations, SALT, with a country like the Soviet Union, where
everything is-so very secret, if you don't have your own national
technical means, you're not going to be able to trust that agreement.
And therefore we feel we're making an important contribution to peace.
Thank you, Admiral.
HARTMAN: Welcome to a Good Morning America special pro-
gram, "Inside the U.S.A." [sic].
Good morning, again. I'm David Hartman.
Sandy Hill is with us today on film. For the past month,
she has been filming several reports about the CIA at the head-
quarters there in Langley, Virginia.
It's important that you understand: We have abided by
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security restrictions, but the CIA has had not editorial control
at all over the two hours that we're showing you about the agency
this morning.
And with us through both hours is the Director of the
Centeral Intelligence Agency, Admiral Stansfield Turner.
Good morning, Admiral.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Good morning, David.
HARTMAN: Nice to have you with us.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you.
HARTMAN: We know that you are showing us just a small
portion of what -- of the activities of the CIA. Even though it's
more than has been seen in the past, we're only seeing the tip of
the iceberg, and we understand that. But this is a departure from
the past.
What opposition have you had, and from whom, to your
sitting here this morning on national television, going public
with some of the operations of the CIA?
ADMIRAL TURNER: There's always resistance to change,
David, but I am persuaded that we must today create what we call
a new, American model of intelligence. Traditionally, the model
for intelligence has been one of maximum secrecy. But I do not
believe that in our society today we can afford to have that.
First, the Congress, the public must benefit by the fine
information that we produce and can make available in unclassified
form.
For instance, I happen to have with me some...
right?
HARTMAN: Just happen to have it here this morning, Admiral,
ADMIRAL TURNER: Just happen to -- some of the 77 unclassi-
fied publications that we've issued this year already, which is con-
siderably more than in any other previous year: Soviet Economic
Problems, Nuclear Energy, International Terrorism, Major Oil and.
Gas Fields of the Free World.
HARTMAN: Are there people who jump on you for this,
though? Are there people saying, "You shouldn't go on television
this morning? Why are you letting that stuff out?"
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, of course there are some people who
feel that we may give away our secrets. But my policy is a twofold
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policy on secrecy.
By making more of this information unclasified, there is
less classified information that must be protected, and therefore
we can protect it better. We will respect it more. When it says
"Secret," we know it's secret; it's not unclassified, as is this.
But secondly, I'm running a very hard policy on tightening
up our security over those things which must be kept secret, par-
ticularly how we get our intelligence and particularly the very sen-
sitive intelligence we obtain. And we're doing a lot in that area
also.
So, it's two-pronged policy. We don't believe intelli-
gence can be totally open. You've got to have some secrets, but I
want to minimize those.
HARTMAN: Thank you, Admiral. We'll talk to you in just
a little while.
BELL: Finally, most of the CIA's operations have long
been cloaked in secrecy, and so have the buildings where those
activities have been planned, monitored and analyzed. As part of
our special CIA anniversary program, our cameras took a look behind
the scenes at CIA Headquarters in Langley. Here's what they saw.
The grounds of the Central Intelligence Agency could
easily be mistaken for a college campus, and the resemblance carries
over even when you enter the main building. The books in the CIA
library, for instance, are the same ones you'd find in any good
college library, books on law, economics, politics; also, telephone
books, hundreds of phone books that list just about every phone
number in the world; and newspapers from almost every major country.
In this auditorium, six months ago, it is here that
Admiral Turner was sworn in as the 12th Director of the CIA.
[Clip of swearing-in
of Admiral Turner]
BELL: The Map Room. When President Carter wanted a map
showing exactly where that American helicopter was shot down over
North Korea last July, this is where it was made. The experts in
this department were able to pinpoint the exact spot, which showed
that our helicopter accidentally had flown just over the border and
beyond the DMZ.
Maps made here are all requested for a specific purpose,
since information is needed and no appropriate map exists.
Not surprisingly, the CIA is known for making some of the
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finest maps in the world, many of them, surprisingly, available to
the general public, through the Government Printing Office.
But Operations is the real nerve center for the CIA.
This portion of Opeations looks like the newsroom of any metro-
politan newspaper. It even has the same teletype machines that
transmit news reports from all over the world. In fact, it func-
tions to complement the CIA's classified cable system. For security
reasons, we could not photograph the communications room itself,
where classified cables pour in by the hundreds from all over the
world. A staff is on hand 24 hours a day to review every report
that comes in and to determine if and when other officials should
be notified of fast-breaking developments. -
You'll recall that when most of America is sleeping, the
rest of the world is going into action. And the Operations staff
functions to stay on top of every development and to make sure the
President has available the most up-to-date information on any
event or crisis that could affect our national security.
That's the news, David, with a little closer look at the
tip of that CIA iceberg.
Thank you, Steve, and we' 11 have more about the CIA in
just three minutes from now.
HARTMAN: Most people don't associate the CIA with human-
itarian activities, but Sandy Hill right now has a film report that
says otherwise.
HILL: We've seen a camera designed by the CIA for over-
head reconnaissance and how photographic interpretation was used
to alert President Kennedy of the Cuban missile crisis. But
national security is really just one aspect of photographic inter-
pretation. It's also used for peaceful, non-military purposes.
And Lynn is one of the CIA's photographic interpreters. And when
parts of Guatemala were devastated by earthquakes in February of
1976, she used her expertise to determine just where help was needed.
Good morning, Lynn.
LYNN: Good morning.
HILL: I'm looking forward to seeing just how the CIA was
involved in all this. How did it come about, to begin with?
LYNN: Shortly after the earthquake hit Guatemala, Guate-
mala asked aid from the United States. The agency who handles that
is the Agency for International Development. One question they
needed to know in particular was how extensive was the damage; they
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needed an overall picture.
Because of that, the Administrator of A.I.D. requested a
U-2 flight. This was done with the permission of the Guatemalan
government and at their request; and the Agency was called on to
interpret, analyze the film, because they have the expertise in
that area.
HILL: And what did those pictures show, basically?
LYNN: One was the amount of damage to towns outside
of the main urban areas, and also the transportation routes to
those areas.
LYNN: This board here showed one of the many landslides.
There were just hundreds and thousands of landslides throughout
Guatemala that blocked roads, dammed streams, etcetera.
HILL: You said that this one buried an entire village,
this landslide here, right?
HILL: How do you know there's a village buried under
LYNN: That was based on maps we were using. In order
to record the damage, we used preexisting maps. The map of this
area showed a village of about 15 buildings in this area. You can
see on the photo there's only one building left standing.
HILL: [Inaudible]
LYNN: And it was the first time we could get in for
clear coverage.
LYNN: And on this one we could see the entire area and
how much damage there was.
HILL: And this was from that second flight.
LYNN: Yes. This was the same landslide that you s x on
the first mission. You see the lake has increased grearly; it's
about five times the area it was on the first mission.
HILL: And how it poses a potential hazard here.
LYNN: Yes. If this increases, it could break this dam..
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and cause flooding downstream.
This shows a bridge that's completely destroyed along the
main route between Guatemala City and the port on the East Coast.
You can see cars backed up here now. They're waiting to cross this
temporary bridge being built downstream.
Something that was of interest to geologists, both in
this country and in Guatemala, was that they could -- you could
actually see the earthquake and see the fissures and cracks.
HILL: It's remarkable information, but what happened as
a result of this? What happened?
LYNN: It was useful, both to the government of Gua-
temala, because they could determine where the damage was, where
to send supplies, and also for this country, because they knew
how much aid to send and, again, where to send it; for instance,
where to send -- set up their mobile hospitals, for instance.
They could get that information based on this imagery?
HILL: How unique is this? How often is the CIA in-
volved in a project such as this one in Guatemala?
LYNN: Well, they have been in previous cases; their
expertise has been called upon for such cases, and may again in
the future. But it would have to be a country that had a disaster,
had requested aid, and also be willing to be photographed, to help
out in the disaster assessment.
HILL: Thank you very much.
LYNN: Okay. Thank you.
HARTMAN: Admiral Turner, releasing that kind of infor-
mation, which even until now we haven't heard, should help -- kind
of help your image just a little bit?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I hope so, because we do do a
great many things that are of value to the country over and above
the James Bond type of spying that gets a rather exaggerated play.
You might recall, David, that in these pamphlets I men-
tioned awhile ago, the topics of them -- Terrorism, Internationa-1
'!'nrrorism, International Narcotics Flow, The World Steel Market --
these are areas where I think the Central. Intelligence Agency today
is providing a real service to our country.
In a number of instances in recent years, we have un-
covered information about international terrorist activities that-
have led directly to the thwarting of terrorist activities.
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19
HARTMAN: Specifically? Where, Admiral? Can. you give me
one example?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I'm...
HARTMAN: You can't.
ADMIRAL TURNER: ...reluctant to do that, simply because
it might lead to a disclosure of how we penetrate these terrorist
organizations and get information about their plans.
Similarly, in the narcotics. Now, we deal strictly outside
of the United States. There are law-enforcement agencies to handle
narcotics in this country. But outside the United States, we watch
the flow, as we see the narcotics moving from the poppy fields,
through the various processing centers, and shipments and inputs to
areas where they can come into the United States. And here again,
we've helped the Drug Enforcement Agency put its finger on this very
serious problem for our country.
HARTMAN: And what you've just said, you're guaranteeing,
you're assuring me that the CIA is not involved in drug trafficking
or in watching it here in the United States, right?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Absolutely not. We are involved in for-
eign intelligence collection, not in the United States.
HARTMAN: We've been talking, Admiral, about intelligence
that you perform. Obviously, the Russians are doing the same thing.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.
HARTMAN: How would you compare the Soviet intelligence
capability compared to ours?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't think there's any question that
.ours is superior. Theirs is perhaps a larger, more intensive effort,
because they are a very secretive society, a very suspicious society.
But, number one, we have the technological edge on them, because...
HARTMAN: In what way? When you say technological, what
does that mean? Because that's all Greek to me.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I see. I just mean that we have been
able to apply advanced technology to techniques of collecting .
intelligence, like the U-2 and its fine cameras, where we're ahead
of them.
But secondly, and most importantly, really, as I said
earlier, analysis, assessement of the information you collect is
critical. And I don't believe that in a society as controlled, as
antithetical to free thought, you can do as good analysis as we can.
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If you did an analysis in the Soviet Union where you came
out in opposition to what the regime was thinking or doing, you might
lose your job.
BELL: Admiral...
ADMIRAL TURNER: We encourage that in this country.
BELL: Admiral,...
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, Steve.
BELL: ...Steve Bell. The Soviet Union, of course, has
been very active when it comes to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Speci-
fically, so many electronic beams reported that sometimes there was
possible danger to American health..
What is the situation now with Soviet electronic intelli-
gence at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow?
ADMIRAL TURNER: The Soviets are trying in every way to
collect information from our embassy in Moscow. We do not believe
that the radiation effort there is injurious to health at this time,
however.
HARTMAN: Admiral, the KGB. You know, maybe this is movie
stuff, maybe not, and perhaps you can tell us. I mean you're the man
who knows.
ADMIRAL TURNER: ...hope so.
HARTMAN: How many agents, let's say, to start off -- how
many agents does the KGB have in the United States?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I would estimate there are hundreds
of agents in the United States, and it's growing. Their activity
has not slackened in recent years, despite detente.
HARTMAN: Would it make any sense -- in the minute we
have left to go out and try to find them and get them out of the
country?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, we have a responsibility in both
he FBI and the CIA for what's known as counterintelligence, coun-
tering other countries' intelligence efforts against us. The CIA
does this overseas, the FBI inside the United States. Obviously,
we've got to have close teamwork here.
ADMIRAL TURNER: If an agent comes from the KGB and we've
been watching him from the CIA in some foreign country, comes to
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Washington, we do a'football handoff to the FBI. And we try to find
those who are doing things illegal and improper in our country. But
we have an open society, and there's a lot that you can collect of
intelligence in this country without doing anything improper or
illegal; and there's nothing we can do about that. Reading some of
our technical magazines, you get a great deal of information about
our military capabilities, for instance.
HARTMAN: Admiral, we just ran out of time for now, but
we'll talk with you later in the hour.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you.
HARTMAN: What you just saw was a CIA computer mapping
the location of where an American helicopter went down in North
or South Korea. Obviously, it was very important for President
Carter to know exactly where that helicopter went down. And we
found out, through the CIA computer, that it went down in North
Korea.
In our special two hours on the CIA today, I'm being
joined by the Director of the Agency, Admiral Stansfield Turner,
who is joining me here in Washington.
Nice having you with us.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you, David.
HARTMAN: And we'll be talking with the Admiral. in just
a little while.
HARTMAN: We asked Erma Bombeck to comment on the CIA
this morning; and, as usual, her comments are astute and compre-
hensive and knowledgeable.
ERMA BOMBECK: This morning I'm proud to join the Good
Morning America report on the 30th anniversary of the CIA. And
you're probably saying, "What does she know about the CIA?"
Plenty.
If you're among the working class, I don't think there's
a family that has not been touched by the CIA, especially when
they merged a few years back to become that prestigious CIA-.FL.
[Laughter]
BOMBECK: Which boosted their membership to more than
14 million. I mean this organization works tirelessly to champion
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the cause of silled and nonskilled labor.
MAN: Cut. No, Erma. That's wrong. Try it again.
BOMBECK: What- do you mean, that's wrong? What? What?
Did I blow a line or something?
This morning I'm proud to join the Good Morning America's
report on the 30th anniversary of the CIA. Now, I personally am
proud to hold membership in an organization that cares for my
safety. I mean I know when I'm out there on that road at night,
alone...
[Laughter]
BOMBECK: ...and I get a flat, you know, I feel very
secure in knowing that I have my CIA card with me.
[Laughter]
BOMBECK: ..and within minutes there's a tow truck
there to bail me out. They also plan my vacation, they
free road maps, and with that little Magic Marker they tell eme...
MAN: Cut.
BOMBECK: What do you mean, cut?
This morning I'm proud to join the Good Morning America's
report on the 30th anniversary of the CIA. For years they have been
the watchdogs over our food and drugs.
[Laughter]
BOMBECK: They were the first ones who told us that if
our cans were bent out of shape, it was dangerous to buy 'em.
[Laughter]
BOMBECK: They pushed for legislation on fair packaging
and labeling...
BOMBECK: This morning I'm proud to join the Good Morning
America's report on the 30th anniversary of the CIA. I'm not your
militant feminist or anything, I mean I don't mind dancing backwards
or having the buttons on the wrong side of my sweater. But I per-
sonally think"the CIA should be passed. I mean...
[Laughter]
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23
BOMBECK: Yes. They've only got three more states to
MAN: Cut.
BOMBECK: If it's still morning, I'm -- I'm proud to join
the Good Morning America's report on the CIA. I first saw the CIA
when they played USC.
[Laughter]
BOMBECK: They had both just joined the NFL, or was it the
On second thought, the CIA might have been playing, maybe,
[Laughter and applause]
HARTMAN: Thank you, Erma.
We're going to meet some of the women who actually do work
at the CIA and ask them why they're there and how they feel about
their jobs.
HARTMAN: Not long ago, if you asked a member of the CIA
where he worked, he couldn't tell you. Obviously, the CIA has
become a lot more open.
Sandy Hill has talked with some of the people who work
John Blake has been with the CIA for 30 years. He is the
Acting Deputy Director of Intelligence. He's the number two man at
the Agency. Mary Ellen has been a secretary with the CIA for 18
years. Pat is an executive officer; she's a high-level intelligence
analyst who's been with the agency for 15 years. And Brian became
a CIA member just four months ago; he is an associate watch officer.
And Sandy asked the same questions of these four people.
HILL:- Has working with the CIA created any problems for
you, with your husband, in terms of being able to discuss certain
subjects and...
WOMAN: No, not really. Certainly, I would not go home
at night and say, "Gee, what a wonderful clandestine report I got
today." I mean it's not the sort of thing one talks about over
dinner.
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JOHN BLAKE: I can remember, many a time, going out on
social occasions; and, you know, you're standing there, having a
drink before dinner, or you're sitting down after dinner. And
this man is saying what he recently accomplished, and another
individual is saying what he made this trip to Western Europe for.
And someone looks at you, and you feel like the village idiot.
So you start to talk about religion or sports, or something.
HILL-: What was it like 18 years ago, when you first
joined this agency?
WOMAN: Well, when I first came, you were not -- you
were told you worked for the government. You couldn't say you
worked for CIA. And, of course, when you'd say -- someone would
say, "Where do you work?"
And I'd say, "For the government,"
"Oh, you work for CIA."
[Laughter]
WOMAN: It's always like that. You know, it's like an
open secret in Washington.
HILL: What are your thoughts about the image of the CIA,
the perception that outsiders have about it?
BLAKE: In my own travels, at times, I do, you know, ask
the gentleman who's driving the cab or ask the young lady in the
airplane who's serving the dinner, you know, what they may think
of this or that, if I happen to have a newspaper in my hand. I
get some very rewarding replies.
BLAKE: Such as, "We think you people are absolutely
essential to the survival of the country." Such as, "We think you
know what you're doing." Such as, "We couldn't do without you."
they?
HILL: But not all of the responses are positive, are
BLAKE: Oh, in honesty, I couldn't say they'-?e all
r?si-
tive, no.
HILL: So, what do they say-,,n the other side?
BLAKE: "My p rv-d* ~ss gracious, how did you ever get
involved in that?'_
.:1LL: And how do you respond?
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BLAKE: Oh, a variety of ways, depending what "that" is in
that question: "How did you ever get involved in what?" Sometimes
you can answer the question. Sometimes you say, "Frankly, I don't
know." And sometimes you change the subject.
I think it's wise for us to try to develop a favorable
constituency. To the degree that we have public opinion on our
side, to degree that we can do a better job.
Now, here we have a real problem. How can we communicate
with the public those things which, by law, we are directed to hold
secret. But I suspect I feel the same way about this organization
as you feel about your network. You would like to have it best
thought of as possible by the public.
HILL: When you read or hear stories about the CIA and
some of the things that they allegedly have been involved in, what
do you -- how do you react?
WOMAN: Probably just like you do. You know, I find much
of it despicable, some of it simply stupid. But it -- you know,
two points: If your grandfather were a horse thief, would you
expect to have been responsible, you know, 20-30 years later for
what he may have done? To the people in my generation in the agency,
it's reprehensible, you can learn a lesson of things not to do, but
it is largely irrelevant; it just doesn't mean a great deal. to me.
Second, in most of the cases that I know anything about,
[unintelligible] little things the Agency just whipped off and did
on its own. People do not run around doing all this kind of skull-
duggery.
I find it, I guess, maybe sad that we're sort of expected
to answer for the sins of the fathers.
HILL: There've also been more recent reports of CIA
involvement, in the '70s.
WOMAN: One of the things I have learned is that so many
of these stories, when you look at them and it looks like: "Oh,
boy, new headlines, new story, new revelation," it is the same old
stuff in a new guise. It comes out over and over again. And I
think so often the story -- there will be, indeed, a grain of truth,
and it gets-distorted and blown out of all proportion. And then,
six days later, by the time the Agency people get to troop thro>;h
all the paperwork and find out what the real story is, where'r, the
denial? It's on page 62 in the want ads.
BRIAN: You know, mistakes were made, given. Okay, let's you know, there's no argument there. Nasty mistakes were made. But
the important thing here, I think, is that we have to learn from
these mistakes.
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I think the dangerous thing here is that people tend
to become cynical, and that is the real problem, as I see it.
That's the most dangerous thing, for people to just become cynical
and just to assume that all government is bad.
In my experience here -- I've just been here four months,
but I've come in contact with a lot of people who are very capable,
very intelligent people, who are dedicated, career professionals
who really want to do a good job. And that's the way I feel, too.
WOMAN: If people did what they have been accused of
doing, knowing full well the consequences that were going to come
out of that, then that is something that I can't accept. I don't
think that anyone in the CIA would have done that. I mean this is
not an immoral organization, by any means.
HILL: What would you do, Brian, if someone asked you to
do something that you considered to be morally improper?
BRIAN: You know, I can't foresee that happening, ever,
in the job I am in now. But if that ever did happen, I don't think
I'd really hesitate to go back to driving a truck.
HILL: How would you react? What would you do?
WOMAN: If I felt it was morally wrong?
HILL: Uh-huh.
WOMAN: I would refuse.
HILL: Do you feel as if there would ever be an oppor-
tunity for that kind of a situation to evolve in your role here?
WOMAN: No, I can't see that at all.
WOMAN: Nobody ever asked me to do anything like that.
HILL: And if they did?
WOMAN: I'd do two things. I'd yell for the Admiral,
and I'm punch him in the nose.
[Laughter]
HILL: What do you think would happen if the CIA simply
did not exist?
BRIAN: That's -- people who suggest that notion, I
think, are -- have not thought out what they're saying. Every
state worthy of its name has to have intelligence operations and
counterintellience operations. That has to be. We don't live in
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a Sunday School world.
WOMAN: In all honesty, you know, if there weren't an
agency, you would go back to what we had before the war; and what
you had was everybody in town running his own little intelligence
shop, falling all over each other, and very happily missing Pearl
Harbor.
BLAKE: This is a day and an age where we live with
nuclear weapons, which in a very few minutes of time can cross
oceans and do damage the likes of which you and I can't sit here
and describe. How else can this country protect itself unless
it knows what the intents and the capabilities of any potential
or actual enemy may be? It's a day entirely different from the
day that I was first born to; and the threats are different and
the problems are different.
HARTMAN: That was John Blake, the Deputy Director of
the CIA. And when we come back I'll be talking to the number one
man, Stansfield Turner.
HARTMAN: What you just saw was Harry Truman swearing
in the first CIA Director. I'm sitting with Admiral Stansfield
Turner, the current and new Director of the CIA.
Admiral, some of the past covert activities of the CIA
have been buying public officials, fixing elections, overthrowing
governments, assassination attempts. Are these going to continue?
ADMIRAL TURNER: To begin with, David, I don't accept all
your premises. We've been accused of some of those, some of those
may have been donne, but they are not going to continue.
Assassinations, for instance, are particularly ruled out
by a presidential order to me. And any member of our organization
can be fired for even planning or thinking about one in concrete
terms.
But, no. We have a covert action capability. It's very
closely regulated, including a requirement for a precise presi-
dential determination and the notification of eight committees of
Congress if we're ever going to play in that game.
BELL: Admiral, Steve Bell in the news studio. I'd like
to ask a couple of specifics that relate to items in the news, and
see if that will help us define your concept of covert activity.
Number one, did we bug the Panama negotiations? Have
the Panamanians discovered it and, in return, tried to blackmail
us?
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ADMIRAL TURNER: Steve, just one hour after I leave you
with this program, I'm going up to Capitol Hill to testify to the
Senate Committee on Intelligence about everything we know of our
activities in intelligence_ with respect to Panama. Clearly, it
would be improper and imprudent for me to discuss that in public
before going before the Senate for that purpose.
BELL: Now, one of your predecessors, former Director
William Colby, denied any knowledge of such bugging, but said,
frankly, he would not disapprove of eavesdropping in such cases,
that it's very much to our advantage.
What's your response to that?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think the various techniques of intel-
ligence that are used by different intelligence agencies all around
the world vary from country to country, from time to time, from
objective to objective. But clearly, if we are to discuss in public
the details of how the United States conducts its intelligence, it
makes it much easier for other people to deny us that opportunity.
That, in turn, would cost the American public a great deal in wasted
effort and in loss of opportunity.
So, I really can't get into that kind of specifics.
HARTMAN: Can you really -- we're in a free society. Can
you really do the intelligence job that you have to do, and have
this openness and go public?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, I really think we can. As I men-
tioned to you earlier this morning, David, we're trying to build
what we call an American model of intelligence, which, on the one
hand, shares all- that we can with the public and gives the public
the benefit of the considerable money they're spending on intelli-
gence.
And still you can maintain your...
ADMIRAL TURNER: But on the other hand, we haven't relaxed
for one bit. In fact, I have issued some'very Draconian rules in
recent months about tightening security. There's just too much that
has leaked out; and we're going to stop that where it's proper to
hold it secret, but we're not going to hold things secret that really
deserve it.
BELL: Admiral, without violating any confidences, I'm
wondering if you can tell us if you have, since you've assumed that
office, stopped anything that was planned or proposed because it
violated your moral concept of the Agency?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I'm pleased to say, Steve, that that has
not really been necessary. In my first six months in office, I've
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29
conducted a very thorough inquiry into how all of the clandestine
activities are conducted, and.I have found nothing that required
any major overhaul.
Clearly, taking guidance from the President, I have
adjusted some things here and there, but I have not found that
there was anything reprehensible going on or anything that needed
any great change.
HARTMAN: Admiral Turner, thank you. And it's been a
pleasure having you with us this morning for both hours. Good
luck to you. I don't have to tell you you've got a touch job.
But for our welfare, we hope you do it well.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you for helping us celebrate
this 30th anniversary of American intelligence in the CIA. We're
pleased to have been on the show, and it's a part of our hope of
making our intelligence operation more visible to the American
public, so they can share with us and support us.
HARTMAN: Thank you, Admiral.
HARTMAN: This morning we've seen some of the everyday
operations of the CIA and met some of the people who work in the
agency. But there are CIA members whose names and faces cannot
be revealed. Their work is so sensitive that their identities
can never be known,. not even after death.
It's perhaps hard for some of us to understand the
importance of this anonymity, but Richard Welch, the CIA agent
who died last year in Greece was killed shortly after his name
was revealed in.a magazine article.
The CIA honors its members who have died serving their
country very simply: with a start. At the CIA Headquarters in
Langley, Virginia, there are 35 stars; 17 represent people who
have never been identified.
Admiral Turner, thank you for being with us today.
ADMIRAL TUNRNER: Thank you, David.
HARTMAN: It's a pleasure.
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