ADMIRAL STANSFELD TURNER U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 28, 1977
• Content Type: SPEECH

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Turner
Attached are the two copies you requested
of your address at the Naval Academy.
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(/ 1 Date 7 Oct 77
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5.75 I EDITION5'OUS
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
TO:
O/DCI/Mary
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
Attached are three copies of the DCI's
address at the Naval Academy. He - k
expressed an interest in'having two, so
two attached are for him and one is for
your files.
P.S. If you need
more, we have them aren
FROM :
IOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
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Admiral Stansfield Turner
September 28, 1977
U.S. Naval Academy
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ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Admiral McKee, members of
the Brigade of Midshipmen, ladies and gentlemen.
I happen to have been a great admirer of James Forrestal.
I happen to be personally indebted to him for something he did on
my behalf. I am very honored to be able to speak in this series
named for him.
Beyond that, beyond my friendship for your Superintendent
and his persuasiveness, I am here also tonight because I feel
obliged to be here. When I was in your shores, we used to have
4ednesday night lectures for First Class Midshipmen, and I, as you
tonight, used to go voluntarily and with enthusiasm.
[Laughter]
But as I look back, all of those involuntary trips to
'hen-Mahan Hall paid off for me because of one lecture. This was
3 l cture by a professor from Harvard University named William Y.
t'.lliott He spoke to us one Wednesday night in the fall of 1945
about a trip he'd just made to the Soviet Union, just after World
War II. The only facts I remember of what he told us was that
they delayed him, contrived a way to delay him at the border of
the Soviet Union for six or seven hours while they searched his
baggage, every corner of it.
Now, 32 years later, that's an irrelevant fact to remember
and it was not, of course, the facts of Professor Elliott's lecture
-hat impressed me. It was the clear reasoning behind it. It was
the fact that here was a man who posed questions, didn't just ex-
press opinions, and then explored the various hypotheses and alter-
natives which could supply the most logical, persuasive answers to
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I- hose questions .
I sat where you're sitting, and I was frankly dissatisfied
intellectually. I was learning a lot of facts here at the Naval
lcaderly: entropy, differential equations, lots of other thrilling
things. But my sense of inquisitiveness, my wanting to know why,
why I was studying this and why it was important, was not being
at is lied
I left Mahan Hall that night with a crystal-dear objec-
tive in mind. I wanted to become a Rhodes Scholar and go to Oxford
University, only because William Y. Elliott had been introduced as
a Rhodes Scholar, and I wanted to emulate his method of thinking.
That lecture and my subsequent education at Oxford left
a permanent mark on me for which I am very grateful. And hence I
am here tonight out of a sense of obligation to this lecture series,
in its previous title, and to Professor Elliott.
Now, I'm not going to tell you that I think 4000 of you
should apply to go to Oxford. That hardly would be sensible or
feasible. But what I would like to suggest to you is that the
kind of thinning -vhich William Y. Elliott epitomized to me is the
bind which I believe, by thinking problems through in depth, ex-
pioring all the possible alternatives, will make your lives more
rich, more successrul, and more productive.
If I could describe what I'm talking about, it's an enthu-
siasm which this professor reflected for probing very deeply, for
weighing all the possible answers carefully and sucessively until
you come up with that which is most likely, most persuasive, most
reasonable.
So I would suggest tonight that the most value you will
get out of your education here and any subsequent education, be
it formal academic or just acquisition of knowledge by osmosis,
the greatest value will not be the facts that you learn or the
subjects that you study, it will be the habits of thinking and
reasoning which you acquire, and the willingness and determination
which you develop then to probe beneath the surface of things.
Let me illustrate what I'm talking about more concretely
by giving you an example that came from my educational experience
at Oxford.
Can you still hear me in the back?
One day I was meeting with my philosophy tutor, one-on-one;
and he looked at me and he said, "Turner, do you tell the truth?"
I said, "Yes, of course."
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He said, "Do you always tell the truth?"
T said, "Yes, sir."
He said, "Imagine yourself standing on a street corner,
and a man comes running by at full speed, turns the corner and
goes down that way, shouting to you as he goes by, 'They're trying
to kill me. They're trying to kill me.' And about 30 seconds
later another man comes by, as you stand there wondering what this
is all about, and he has a gun in his hand. And he runs up to you
and he says, 'Which way did he go?'"
My professor looked at me and he said, "Turner, do you
the truth?"
Well, the point of this simile is that you must under-
stand why you tell. the truth. I think we tell the truth because
it is essential to the fabric of our society. You simply cannot
have an organized society if you can't trust the majority of the
things the other people say.
But does that mean you tell the truth to a murderer? That
is, if this man with a gun was not a policeman. Does it mean you
tell the truth under every circumstance. People like murderers are
trying to tear down the fabric of our society, not to build it up.
Perhaps -- perhaps they deserve a lie.
Now, it may be heresy, here in the halls of the Naval
Academy, where you have a code of conduct, where you are dedicated,
as we all are in the Navy, to being honorable and truthful, to sug-
gest that on some occasions you might want to lie. But I would
also suggest to you that I have two Naval Academy classmates who
will go down in the annals of this educational institution as two
of our greatest heroes because they lied. They lied for 7 1/2
years as they were tortured as prisoners of war in North Vietnam.
So I suggest to you don't wait until you're on that street
corner, don't wait until you are a prisoner of war to understand
why you tell the truth or why you do a lot of other things. Think
it out in advance.
Now, I appreciate that I'm asking you to take a very
introspective view of life, to sit back and calmly see what's
going on around you and analyze it, and you're very busy, the
demands on your time are great. You've got to get by that test
tomorrow in order to be here the day after tomorrow.
But I assure you that when you leave here in a year or two
or three, it's going to be the same. Because when you're a junior
officer, the demands on your time are very heavy. When you're con-
ning a ship at sea, there's a right way to do it and a wrong way
to do it, and nobody wants you sitting up there philosophizing.
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And when you're fling an airplane, there are laws of aerodynamics,
and you'd better d) it the right way or you'll end up in the drink.
And when you're reactor officer on a submarine and all the signals
read scram, you don't sit there and ask why. Yours not to reason
why; yours to do as your told or get a bad fitness report.
[Laughter]
But seriously, nonetheless, I urge you to set out and to
set a goal for yourself not to lose the bubble, not to fail to keep
asking yourself why you are where you are and why you are doing
whatever you're doing.
When does this class, the first class make their choice of
service: submarines and aviation and so on?
MAN: [Inaudible]
ADMIRAL TURNER: Six weeks from now you first classmen will
be deciding wh-,re you go inside the Navy, right? How many of you
are likely to apply for aviation?
Now, all those of you who raised your hands, have you
really thought through why you want to be a naval aviator? Have
you ready thought through not only -- not only that it means more
money, not only that it's good training at Pensacola, have you
thought about what you're going to do for the Navy in five years,
ten years?
[Laughter]
Have you thought about what aviation will be like in ten
or fifteen years, when you become squadron commanders?
Well, if you want to think about the future of naval avi-
a=ion, why don't we look at the past. And the last example we have
of aviation in combat was Vietnam. And I recollect that one of the
major aviation challenges in Vietnam was to knock down the Thanh Hoa
railway bridge in North Vietnam. And lots of you who are going to
be aviators have studied that, and you know that we sent over 600
individual aircraft sorties against that bridge and lost dozens of
airplanes and pilots in doing it, and we didn't knock it down.
And then all of a sudden, towards the end of the war --
and I'm talking Air Force and Navy here -- towards the end of the
war we sent in a few airplanes. They didn't get in close, where
they were subject to surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft fire;
they stood off there with a new weapon called a smart bomb. And
they lobbed it in, filled with semiconductors and minicomputers.
Ir found its way to the target. It was smart enough to know where
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it was, and that was it. We did it in, nothing flat.
Now, have you thought, if you're going into aviation,
what that means to you in the future? Where are you going to be
in this process? What's the role of aviation going to be? Are
you -just going to -- are you going to drive a hotrod fast plane
in fast over the target? Are you going to stand off and lob these
smart missiles in? Or are you going to ship back on the ship and
control remotely piloted vehicles that'll do the job for you?
What kind of a pilot do you think you're going to be to meet the
needs of the Navy in the 1990s?
Now, much the same will be for those of you whom I'm sure
will be applying for destroyers. You want to look back at history
too, but for destroyers I would turn to a very major chapter in the
history of the surface Navy, way back in the spring of 1.945, the
Bathe of Okinawa. And what was there? What was introduced there?
Tne kamikaze. And the kamikaze wreaked havoc with our destroyers
and our amphibious forces.
And we forgot about the kamikaze for almost 20 years, until
1967, when the Egyptians, from a land base, launched a kamikaze at
an Israeli destroyer called the Eilat, and they sank it. And we
suddenly remembered that cruise missiles are kamikazes with mini-
conductors and minicomputers and semiconductors instead of a man.
And the other difference is they're better and they're more numer-
0uS .
Now, if you were planning to go into destroyers, are you
thinking about what that means in terms of the kind of preparation
you're going to have to make to defeat that threat?
The antiaircraft guns at Okinawa weren't too successful.
I don't know whether you think the guns and missiles today will take
care of it, or whether you think you're going to have to become an
expert in the ,?-rorld of electronic wizardry to defeat this kind of
a technical, sophisticated system by being technical and sophisti-
cated. But I'd suggest you ought to think about that and understand
what it's going to mean to be a destroyer officer in the 1990s.
Now, of course there are those, like Admiral McKee, who
will tell you that that all means everything will go below the sur-
face. And I'm sure there are lots of you here who will apply to
be submarine officers.
Now, what is that going to mean? Submarines, traditionally,
are loners. They go out, single ships on patrols, sink a lot of
ships or submarines, come home, replenish, go out and do it again.
But what are going to be the needs for submarines in the 1980s and
'90s?
The objective of a navy is to -- or, one of the objectives
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is to get the army and air force across the sea, if necesary.
Another is to get economic flow coming into this country in raw
materials and going out in terms of manufactured goods. Another
is to protect the naval projection of power forces, carriers or
amphibious forces.
Now, how are the submarines going to do this in their
traditional lone-wolf, stealthy operation?
First of all, a submarine can't do much at all about a
guided missile coming in from an airplane. Secondly, I don't
think a single submarine will be that effective in any sphere
against opposition to a carrier task force, let's say.
So it looks to me life if you're going into submarines
you're going to have to start thinking about a different kind of
game -- teamwork. And if you have teamwork you have to communicate,
and if you have to communicate you don't have the same stealth you
did in the past. It's different.
Maybe I'm wrong in the way it's going to go, but I don't
think it will be like the submarine operations of history. And I
wonder if you're thinking about that.
And some of you will undoubtedly make the choice of the
United States Marine Corps.
Any nod y?
Semper fidelis.
Well, a Marine is an amphibian, and the essence of amphi-
bious warfare is to concentrate a lot of force in a small. area over
a short period of time to make that dangerous transition from water
to land. The thing that used to bother us were big-gun emplacements
in turrets and revetments ashore, which we had to take out with air-
craft and big naval guns.
But if we look into the near term, let alone the 1990s,
the enemy doesn't need revetments and turrets. Today you can have
two soldiers with a hand-held missile, and you can sit under the
foliage and wreak havoc if an amphibious force comes too close to
the. shore.
So, you Marines had better do some thinking too. It may
not be easy...
[Laughter and applause]
I net a thinking Marine one day.
[Laughter and applause]
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And let's look at the bigger picture. Are you giving
any Thought to why we want a navy in the 1990s? Are we talking
shout the possibility of another prolonged war in Europe and
another Battle of the Atlantic like 1917 and 1.942? Or are we
talking about another Vietnam and seven or eight years of air
bombardment from the sea to the shore?
Now, when I was here the answer to that question was
given to us by all the senior authorities by quoting Alfred Thayer
`".ahan. The purpose of navies was to control the seas, because
cabal said it at the end of the 19th Century, and he was Neptune's
prophet, it was certainly true.
In point of fact, about the time Mahan was writing this,
his concept of control of the seas, which was a total control, an
exclusion of the enemy from the surface of the sea, was becoming
totally obsolescent, by the advent of the submarine and the air-
craft. But 50 years after that we were still being told that con-
trol of the seas was the byword, and there wasn't much questioning
of it.
Now I challenge you tonight, I ask you what shibboleths
are we, your seniors in the Navy, telling you today? Are you
asking yourselves, "Are those old fogeys looking backward or for-
ward"? Are you asking yourselves, "Where should the Navy really
be going in the future"?
Now, I'm not suggesting there's not a good explanation
f.)r why we need a navy or for why we need aircraft, submarines,
destroyers, and even Marines in it. What I'm suggesting is that
the excitement, the challenge of military life is the constant
change which we find around us, the change because of the dif-
f-~ring world environment and the change because of the rapid pace
of t:ochnology today. And the kind of navy we'll have in the 1990s
will be dependent upon how well. you think that through and anti-
cipate what kind of a navy we should have, rather than letting
events force change in the Navy.
And if that sounds like it's pretty ethereal and you're
n,-)t going to be that involved in it, let me suggest that your
ability to think through the kinds of problems I've been raising
with you will have a very direct bearing on you. Becasue the role
that you set out to play in the Navy, whether you join the sub-
marines or the destroyers or the aviation or the Marines, may well
not he the role you end up playing. Events may force you to adapt,
t) be flexible, to change.
Look at myself. Eight months ago I was the military com-
mander of the forces of NATO in Southern Europe. Overnight, I was
ticked into a basically civilian assignment as the Director of
Central Intelligence.
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Now, I have no specific training for this, and it's far
too late to go take any kind of a course in intelligence. All. I
can do is rely on the experience I have had in destroyers, in the
Pentagon, in other Navy assignments, in learning how to ask the
right questions and how to demand the right alternatives so that
I can make, hopefully, correct choices. The subject matter is
new, the environment is civilian rather than military, but the
same process of probing and asking questions applies just as much
in my present civilian job as it did as a commander of military
forces in the field.
Let me tell you about the first challenge I had when I
became Director of Central Intelligence. One of my superiors
came to me and said, "Turner, I've got a tough assignment for
you.
"All right, sir."
He said, "I want to know whether there are any good golf
c purses in heaven."
So I said to my staff, "Where do we go to find out about
rite?ligence on heaven?"
And first we went to the satellite people because we
thought they might be close to the problem. Then we went to the
signals intelligence people because we thought surely somebody would
b-- communicating with the golf course. And finally we went to the
soy people because we thought surely they could find out who was in
touch with the golf pro.
But then, because I have been stressing to you tonight the
use of alternatives, I appointed Team A and Team B to study this
problem. And after a couple of weeks, Team A came back, and I said,
"What's your answer?"
And they said, "We're very confident of our answer. There's
an 87% probability that there are at least two good golf courses in
heaven."
I said, "Great. That's fine. I know my superiors will be
pleased with that.
"Team B?"
Team B said, "We agree wholeheartedly with Team A, but...."
And I said, "But?"
"But, Admiral, we have to tell you one other thing. Your
first tee-off time is next Tuesday at 10 o'clock."
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[Laughter]
Well, now, from the strength of your response to that
supposed joke...
[Laughter and applause]
...I'm not sure whether you're in the same trouble as West
Point or not.
[Laughter and applause]
Well, intelligence hasn't become -- hasn't become so esoteric
that we can really probe to heaven. But much like the military, it
is a rapidly changing environment today. And some of these changes
will affect you directly as you go out into the operating forces of
the Navy or the Marine Corps. Whether you're flying an airplane,
conning a ship, driving a submarine, or barking at Marines, you're
~,,oing to be dependent on good intelligence. And there are three ways
that we try to collect intelligence for you:
We try to intercept signals in the air. We try to take
h,)tographs. And we try to send spies into the enemy camp. And let
rat-? illustrate the kind of probing and analytic thinking you have to
(,o in order to employ these collection of intelligence assets so as
to serve you, the operating people in the field.
Signals intelligence is a very important field and it's
becoming increasingly potential. There's great opportunity today,
lecause more and more signals are put on the air, communication sig-
r_als, radar signals, beacons, all sorts of things.
For instance, if you make a telephone call in Washington,
D.C. today, from one side of Washington to the other, there's a high
probability that your call will go via a satellite 20,000 miles in
the sky and back down again to go five miles across the city. That
40,005-mile trip provides lots of opportunities for interception.
And so on.
But at the same time, the wizardry of semiconductors and
^iinico:nputers that I mentioned before gives everyone an opportunity
to encode, encipher, deceive, put up deception in these signals so
they will be unintelligible to somebody else.
[Cassette turned]
And yet we're talking today about spending billions of
dollars to build new signals intelligence collection systems that
won't be available for four or five, seven years. And today we've
rant to make a decision: Will that be worthwhile in five or seven
years? Will it still be productive enough?
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And much the same goes in the photo world. Our capability
take photos is increasing every day, but so too is a potential
:-enemy's capability to thwart that.
It's the old game of offense and defense, and billions of
ioliars are in the balance.
Perhaps the only field of collecting intelligence that
-snit up for grabs is the human field, the spies. They've been
'Mere since the beginning of history, and I think they'll go on for
3 long time.
But we do have a problem because our country is more con-
ous today than ever before of the ethics and the morals of the
way our government operates. And, therefore, when we go into a
eying operation, we have to weigh the risks more against the
:)n ential benefits.
And doing these trade-offs within these individual systems
_s very difficult, and doing the trade-offs between the three of
the,: is even more difficult and requires a more penetrating analysis
and comparison.
Signals intelligence can tell you a little bit about tomor-
row because maybe you're lucky enough to be listening to the signal
)r the communication at just the right moment when somebody's
~e'Iing something about what they're going to do. It's not easy.
'hotos can only tell you about today. Spies can overcome some of
the disadvantages of the coincidence you need in signals intelli-
.,ence, between listening and what's being said as to what you want
-o know, because you can direct your spy and tell him to go get
what you want and don't bring home the extraneous material. But
lie may come back to you and say, "I really didn't have access to
what you wanted, so here's a bunch of extraneous material."
So there are very complex choices to be made, and behind
them all. we must also ask ourselves what kind of intelligence will
our country need in the 1980s and 1990s? Will the Soviets still
be the big deal? Or, with a more interdependent world today than
every before, will we want to concentrate on many other countries?
Will military intelligence still dominate the intelligence scene,
,or are we more interested in energy and oil embargoes and popu-
ation growth and grain and other economic or political factors?
What will be the pressures on the United States? What will be the
.nterests of the United States in a decade or two?
We can't complacently assume that today's objectives for
,collecting intelligence will. be the same as tomorrow's. And if we
In not think those through, we will be unable to attack the trade-
.offs I've been mentioning or the establishment of the right objec-
1:2ves
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So I'd like to say, in closing, if you're going to parti-
cipate in the establishment of the right objectives for our country,
for our Navy, if you're going to participate in the trade-offs that
have to be made in all of the kinds of systems we have in the mili-
tary and the intelligence fields, take Professor Elliott's advice.
As I interpret that, it was: Be flexible. Be inquisitive. Concen-
trace on your ability to see the woods for the trees. Discern the
alternatives and reject the superficial. And remember the words of
Henry Ford: "The hardest thing in life is thinking. That's why so
ft-w people do it."
Give it a try. It'll be worthwhile and fun.
Thank you.
[Applause]
MAN: There are four microphones for anyone who wants to
ask Admiral Turner any questions. They're located right there
where the ushers are. And Admiral Turner will answer your questions.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't know if Admiral Turner will answer
your questions, but he'll sure try.
MAN: Sir, you mentioned the question of whether or not we
would be ready to fulfil l the needs of the Navy in 1990. In view of
our rather qustionable escapades in Vietnam in the last few years,
do you feel that right now the Navy is meeting the demands that are
being made on it, in the means of -- well, basically, are we equal
to our enemies? Can the Navy survive. Or between now and 1990 do
we play catch-up?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, I think -- the question -- can you
hear the question in the back, or not? Okay.
It's my strong belief that, yes, we can meet the demands
upon us today. I, as your Superintendent, have come back recently
from the Mediterranean, where there's perhaps the most difficult
combat potential situation for a navy: a small sea, lots of land
around from which the enemy can launch air attacks as well as
attack us from the sea.
It's my conviction that if we use the forces we have to
best advantage, if we think through how we can fight them, how we
can take the advantage of every opportunity we have, we can prevail.
But I certainly would not say it's going to be easy, and I would
not be complacent about it in any degree.
But we have the superior navy today, and I believe that
we are rapidly evolving the kind of tactics we need to meet these
difficult situations.
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I'm -- I'm optimistic.
MAN: Midshipman Barth, sir.
I don't want to put you in a position that you can't
answer, sir. But...
MAN: I mean -- well, whatever.
Recently the Israelis indicated that they would be amenable
to including the Palestinians in the Middle Eastern peace talks.
Can you tell us if our intelligence community was able to predict
this change of position, and what sort of effects this has on our
intelligence picture for the future of the Middle East area?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Did we predict the Israelis' willingness
to have the PLO represented in the peace talks, and what does this
mean for our future of intelligence?
We did not make a specific, concrete prediction on that.
We have, rather, tried to lay out for our policymakers the alter-
natives that were available to the Israelis, to the Arabs in each
of these situations and the factors which were pushing them in one
direction or pushing them in the other. That's my preferred way of
helping our policymakers.
If I can make a prediction out of that too, that's great.
But no policymaker wants a simple intelligence officer to come
along and say, "Boss, this is the way it's going to happen." He
wants to know, "It may happen this way because these things are
pressing the Israelis. It may happen that way because these things
are pressing them in a different direction." And he can then make
his own judgment on it, though I would likely say to him, "I favor
this," or, "I favor that."
People usually criticize intelligence for not making
express predictions, for not anticipating things that happen. We
all like to do that, we all aim to try to be ahead of the game.
But I don't feel that's the major value in what we produce. You've
got to alert people over a long period of time to possibilities and
give them some sense of weighing them against each other.
MAN: Sir, how do you interpret the CIA's rights to make
political assassinations?
MAN: Could you repeat that?
MAN: Sir...
ADMIRAL TURNER: I got assassinations, but what else?
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13
MAN: How do you interpret the CIA's rights to to commit
political assassinations?
ADMIRAL TURNER: The CIA has no right to conduct any
assassinations or to plan any assassinations, and that is pro-
scribed by presidential directive. And we will not do it, have
no puns or thoughts about it.
[Applause]
MAN: Sir, you said that it is all right to possibly not
tell the truth when it defends somebody or in some interest. Well,
where do you draw the line in, say,,bugging somebody's telephone,
or something like that? Would you tell that as a breach of civil
rights, or is that agreeable when the situation calls upon it, sir?
ADMIRAL TURNER: We in the intelligence community do not
break the laws of the United States of America. And the procedures
under which any telephones are bugged or any communications are
intercepted inside this country are laid out by law. And those
laws are a compromise effected by the Congress and the President to
protect, on the one hand, the rights and liberties of our citizens,
and, on the other hand, the safety and security of our country.
And it is my job, as the head of the intelligence community,
to insure that we comply with those laws precisely, minutely, and
absolutely. And I am utterly confident we are.
MAN: Sir, Midshipman Saxon, Fourth Class.
There are indications that former CIA Director William
Colby will be indicted for alleged crimes he committed while
Director of the CIA. My question is: Do you believe he should
be tried in open courtroom, with the possible implications of
what may come out in a trial of a former CIA Director of the United
States.
ADMIRAL TURNER: It's actually Director Helms who's being
considered, who's been...
[Applause]
ADMIRAL TURNER: Sorry. Sorry, I didn't mean to embarrass
you, but...
[Laughter]
ADMIRAL TURNER: This is a very difficult and delicate
point. There's no question that if Mr. Helms comes up for a public
trial, we, the CIA, will have to release information the release of
which will be damaging to the national security interest. And,
therefore, a decision must be made by the Attorney General of the
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14
United States as to whether the overall national interest will be
furthered by prosecuting this case, if that is the recommendation
of the grand jury -- and that has not come out and I don't know
whether that is the recommendation -- or whether it would be better
to waive the trial in order to preserve the secrets.
Now, I will not give you my opinion on that, because I'm
involved in it, and I'm involved in it to this extent: that I feel
a responsibility to advise the Attorney General and the appropriate
authorities of this government of what I estimate the damage will
h~, from the release of this information. But I am not in a posi-
t-On to weigh that outdistances the good that will be done by pro-
secuting if that were called for. That's someone else's bailiwick,
so:nehody else's decision.
I have made my views known on what information would have
to be released and how damaging it would be. Others have to make
the decision.
MAN: Does the CIA have any intelligence concerning the
Navy-Duke game this weekend?
[Laughter and applause]
ADMIRAL TURNER: I guess you do have a sense of humor.
[Laughter and applause]
ADMIRAL TURNER: Now, as for that bug I put in the Duke
locker room.. .
[Laughter]
MAN: Sir, in light of the many instances that have come
to light recently...
ADMIRAL TURNER: Its very hard to hear that microphone.
Could you speak a little closer?
MAN: Sir, in light of the many instances that have come
to light in the newspapers about CIA activities which are of question-
able intelligence or legality, how would you determine the effective-
ness of this, as a public information point of view, and how would
you -- do you think it should be reported in newspapers, some of the
tkings that might be detrimental to the intelligence community?
ADMIRAL TURNER: The question is: Should there be reporting
in the newspapers of some of the past questionable activities of the
CIA?
To begin with, the freedom of the press is one of the rock
brdstones of our country and must be preserved. There's no question
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15
that there are times when the press, in my view, goes to excesses
i i this . But I would be the last one in any way to suggest that
anything should be suppressed from them. They must take the respon-
s_bi?ity and make their own judgments on what they publish and what
they feel they should withhold.
Now, the latest series of exposures about the CIA, from a
public relations point of view, I expressly took to the public, to
the Congress, because we uncovered documents indicating errors had
been made 12 to 24 years to go, but the documents had been asked
for four or five -- no, two or three years ago and had not been
produced, through no one's fault; an error but an oversight. I
don't believe it was deliberate. When I found them, it seemed to
me the only honorable, the only true thing to do was to put them
not. And I felt that it was better to do that than to have them
ieak out through what's known as the Freedom-of-Information-Act
process, in which we'd have to have given them out over time anyway,
and have a more sensational situation.
I went out, disclosed them, testified before the Congress,
and we've taken our licks. But I do urge you to put in perspective
that these were things done some years ago, and I assure they're
not being done today.
MAN: Sir, what do you interpret as the Council on Foreign
Re?at ions' role in the American intelligence community and the Navy
in years to come, sir?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well., I'm going to lecture at the Council
on Foreign Relations in 10 days, and it's a very fine organization
that helps to promote dialogue and debate within our country on
foreign policy issues. But there is no official connection in any
way between the intelligence community of our country and the
Council on Foreign Relations, which is a totally private body. But
I know that we do and will. benefit by the studies they do, the maga-
zine they publish, and interchange with some of their scholars.
MAN: Midshipman Kromal, sir.
In light of the, granted far long ago, Liberty and the
Pueblo and recent Soviet satellite blindings alleged in the news-
papers, has our intelligence-gathering capability been compromised
or in any way restricted as to what it used to be, and have we
acquired new means of acquiring intelligence which we haven't heard
about yet which are making up for any losses we incurred because of
these?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Every one of those types of incidents,
where we lose important equipment, as we did with the Pueblo, where
we lose important information, as we did with two young men on the
West Coast who conducted espionage against a major industrial cor-
poration that does business with the intelligence community just
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700190001-6
1.6
recently, sets back our ability to collect intelligence, and costs
you and me, as taxpayers, lots of money. That kind of information
that gets into other people's hands makes it easier to do what I
described here as taking countermeasures against our signals intel-
ligence, taking countermeasures against our photography, and, of
course, even compromising our spies if that kind of detailed infor-
:iation gets out.
I am very, very concerned today about the leak of secrets
vit'-rin our government, within our country. And it is a most in-
?urious matter, not only for intelligence, but for the Navy and the
Array and the Air Force and for all of us. And we must, each of us
who are in the government, encourage higher standards of security.
And I'm doing that in two directions today.
On the one hand, I'm trying to downgrade and declassify
more intelligence information, so that it will. help the public,
on the one hand, but so it will reduce the amount of classified
information and give us a greater sense of respect for what re-
1.ai_ns
And secondly, I'm trying to tighten the controls over
the very sensitive information, and have much tighter regulation
c.f it. It's very essential to us.
MAN: Sir, has the Team A/Team B analysis, combined with
the pass record of underestimation of Soviet military programs,
prompted any change in the CIA's methodology for determining what
their military programs are, sir?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Some. The Team A/Team B experiment ended
up in a disaster because it went public and classified information
got out and the debate got into the public forum. We are redoing
that same study right now. And instead of a Team A/Team B, I have
engaged a team of eight outside consultants to come in at different
periods in the course of the study and review the work. And I've
deliberately selected on that team people of the quality of Team A,
people of the outlook of Team B, and others, so that we have a
thorough mix of opinions. And if there is a strong opinion that
we're underestimating, at least it will first be known to me before
the es-imate is finally approved; and, secondly, if it's a reason-
able opinion, I will see to it it's expressed in the document. We
will get the minority views there and make sure that the decision-
maker understands that there is a difference of opinion.
MAN: Newspaper reports indicated that the Russian MIG-25
that landed in Japan had vacuum-tube avionics. Does the CIA con-
sider his defection a hoax, along with the avionics; or do they
consider it a first-line Russian aircraft and that is their state
of technology, sir?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I have no evidence that it's a hoax or
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17
-hat they tried to pull the wool over our eyes with this at all.
And the equipment, including the electronics in the aircraft, in
ny personal opinion, fits the kind of technology we expect the
aov ets to have. But I wouldn't underestimate that. It isn't
j?w,iys as sophisticated as ours, but the end product, done often
with greater quantities, with more brute force, is frequently not
ar off from what we do in a much more sophisticated way.
MAN: Sir, do you feel, as Director of the Central In-
:e?'igence Agency, that unification of the intelligence services
should be a primary objective?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, that's a loaded question, maybe.
The President in early August announced a step of what we call
reorganization, some centralization, consolidation of the intel-
igence apparatus of our country, which gave me more authority
over the budgets and the operations of our intelligence community,
regardless of whether they're housed in the Depatment of Defense,
the CIA, the Department -- I'm sorry. Primarily in the Department
of Defense and the CIA.
I believe that there are two considerations about the
ronso?idation, the centralization of authority in the intelli-
;ence wor?d. We do two things in intelligence. We analyze and
(one up with estimates or predictions, and we collect information
Chat you have to have to do those analyses.
In the collection field, as I stressed tonight, it's very
~.xpensive, and you don't want to have unnecessary duplication.
."end, therefore, central control is very desirable. It's also
desirable because you want to make sure that with these different
systems you're not underlapping, you're not failing to collect
something of importance because one fellow didn't think of it and
another fellow didn't think it either.
But on the side of estimating or analyzing, you want to
have overlap and duplication -- as the question down here a minute
ago, your question, You want to be sure that divergent opinions
come forward, because no intelligence officer is omnisicent, and
you want to be sure that you've got the State Department working
primarily on political intelligence, the CIA working on political,
economic and military, and the Department of Defense working on
military and some economic, and you have that kind of overlap and
interchange. It keeps the analysts stimulated, it keeps the policy-
makers from getting only one view, when that seldom is correct or
seldom that clear that it's the right view.
So, we want some duplication in analysis, we want minimum
duplication and maximum control in collection.
MAN: One final question in the back.
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?8
MAN: Midshipman Chavez, sir.
Sir, we're all aware of the Soviet -- the tension between
the Soviets and the Chinese now. Are our intelligence resources
good enough to predict and possibly prevent a nuclear exchange
between these two countries that would certainly have an effect on
the "nited States?
ADMIRAL TURNER: [Laughter] Yes, it would.
[Laughter)
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think I'd be honest with you and say
i you're talking about predicting it some days or weeks in advance,
no. I hope we might, but I wouldn't give you a high confidence in
that, because a nuclear war doesn't take a lot of visible, detec-
table type of preparation.
Now, you assume that there would probably be some buildup
in tension, and you would be alert to this and thinking aobut it.
Bit pushing those buttons from relatively fixed forces, inter-
continental ballistic missiles, doesn't have the requirement for
a lot of warning signs that you would get for a normal conventional
war.
So that's one of the more difficult tasks that you could
give us. We hope we could meet it, but I wouldn't want to give you
a high-probability guaranty.
[Applause]
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/22 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
28 September 1977
28 September 1977
I. Obliged to talk
As you - came Weds - voluntarily $ w/enthusiasm
All involuntary trips paid off by one lecture
Wm. Y. Elliott
Russia - one fact - baggage
Fact not worth remembering -
Lecture was worth remembering not because
of any facts presented
Example of clear reasoning - Not just
statements of opinion - Posed questions,
examined hypotheses & alternatives to
uncover what he thought was most nearly
correct answer
I dissatisfied -
Lots of facts - differential equations, entropy,
steam tables
But not much inquisitiveness
Whys
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/?2 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
II. Left Mahan Hall - crystal clear
Determination become Rhodes Scholar because
Wm. Y. Elliott had been introduced as Rhodes
Scholar and I aspired to his kind of thinking.
That lecture and subsequent education Oxford left
permanent mark on me - Grateful - obliged & honored.
Not advocating all 4000 or so of you rush out apply
for Oxford
Would like suggest Wm. Y. Elliott approach to analyzing
problems will make your life more rich, successful,
productive.
If I could describe it, I suggest it's an enthusiasm
for seeking all the alternative answers to problems;
weighing them carefully, & then selecting most likely,
most persuasive, most reasonable
Do suggest greatest value in your education, here
& later, whether formal or osmosis, will not be
facts you acquire, but habits of thinking &
reasoning you acquire which you establish,
particularly your willingness & determination
to probe beneath surface F, ask why?
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 Approved For Release 2001 /11 /22 : IA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
III. Let illustrate - particular experience at Oxford
Phil tutor -
Tell truth always?
Point of similie - must understand why tell truth -
Because essential to fabric of society -
But murderers tearing down that fabric may
deserve a lie
Heresy - USNA - Code Conduct
Prisoners of War don't tell truth if can help it
Again because, their torturers.-are not
promoting the society but destroying it
Don't wait until on street corner or prisoner - ask why?
I appreciate even though daily demands of your
routine & here not conducive this kind reflection
& introspection. You have to pass that test
tomorrow. Also suggest it will be same when J.O.
When conning ship there will be a right &
wrong way to do it. Fly a/c, or scram sub -
reactors - no whys or wherefores-- Yours not
reason why
Urge - despite pressures not to lose bubble -
know why you are where you are & why you are
doing what you are doing.
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 Approved For Release' 2001/11/224 CIA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
IV. E.G. on approach to career selection
Aviation (Pause 15 sec - ask why?)
What's future?
Thanh Hoa Bridge; - hundred a/c F pilots lost -
no damage
Then smart bomb -
Lesson - RPV's
DD's -
Vulnerability
Okinawa 32 years ago - Kamikaze wrecked havoc
Elath sunk 1967
Cruise missiles are kamikazes - only smarter
Lucky if have as much anti-kamikaze capability
today as 1945.
With this increasing vulnerability whither
the DD?
How going to use subs -
Go alone - loner - Purpose of Navy is to protect
deployment of Army forces & supplies by sea $
naval projection power forces.
What part of job can subs do? -
Can help w/enemy subs - how about a/c, ships?
Teamwork, comm, conformance formation
anthical
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 Approved For Release, 2001/11/22 : FIA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
Amphibs
jr. How about future of Navy itself?
Another long war in Europe? Battle N. Atlantic
Another V.N. projection of air power?
When I was Midshipman - we were told it was "Control
of Seas" - that the Navy was to do - Mahan said it
at end 19th Century & so it was true.
But no one defined what - "Control of Sea"
meant 50 years later.
In fact, about time Mahan wrote that term,
the use he intended of it became obsolete as
advent of sub and a/c made control of seas
impossible - in his and classic British sense
Yet 50 years later it was the byword here
no one questioned it.
What shibboleths are we telling you today? Is
our model based on yesterday? Have you detected
whether we're looking ahead or back? Are you asking?
Not suggesting don't need Navy - exciting, challenging
nature of military life is that it is one of fast change
especially today - tech pace is geometrical
Kind Navy depend you - think thru - or accept past
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/22-:IA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
VI. Suggest - not only Navy change around you - your
role may change - may have to adapt
Never know where will end up? Part Navy start out
in may evolve in quite different form. Best laid
career plans may not work out -
Look at ST in CIA -
No specific training
Certainly can't take time to get any
About all I can rely on is experience in
asking those difficult questions about why?
& sizing up the alternative answers.
The subject matter is new; the environment
is civilian rather than military; but the
same process of probing #1 asking questions
applies.
Let me tell you my first challenge - Golf
in Heaven -
Intelligence not become so esoteric that we
can probe Heaven - but just as with military,
whole field of intelligence changing rapidly.
Some the changes will affect you directly
and whether you can do your job as aviators,
DD, subs, Marines
Three ways collect intell. - SIGINT, Photo, Spies
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 Approved For Release'2001/11/22: CIA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
1. Balance of effort in collecting?
Each own characteristics & values
But $ short -
SIGINT
More signals
More coding
Imagery
Capability expanding
So - enemy's capability to
destroy platforms
Traditional offense - defense -
HUMINT - If technology uncertainties
Historic.
How indecent HUMINT get?
How much will I lie?
Spying not nice -
But necessary = closed societies
What's value of the take - ?
(be inquisitive)
2. Trade-offs difficult within each
3 spheres -
Between them
Photos - today -
SIGINT - tomorrow - chance
HUMINT - tomorrow - steer -
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 Approved For Release' 2001/11/2 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
3. Beyond these matters of technique what
intell. will US need? - in 1990's
Soviets still big deal?
Other nations in interdependent world
Military? or economic/political - ?
What pressures on US? What interests?
Can't complacently assume today's
objectives will be tomorrow's.
VII. Advice - As Wm. Y. Elliott left one message with me;
the message I hope you will take away
tonight is
Stay flexible - Be inquisitive
Don't believe most predictions on what
best career patterns are, on where
opportunities in Navy lie, on whether
P.G. education is important.
just concentrate on developing ability
to see woods for trees, to discern
alternatives, to see behind superficial
reasons, & you will be in demand.
Henry Ford: "Hardest work is thinking - that's
why so few do it."
Recommend you try it - it's also fun.
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 Approved For Release'2001/11/22 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
28 September 19771
28 September 1977
I. Obliged to talk
As you - came Weds - voluntarily w/enthusiasm
All involuntary trips paid off by one lecture
Wm. Y. Elliott
Russia - one fact - baggage
Fact not worth remembering -
Lecture was worth remembering not because
of any facts presented
Example of clear reasoning - Not just
statements of opinion - Posed questions,
examined hypotheses & alternatives to
uncover what he thought was most nearly
correct answer
I dissatisfied -
Lots of facts - differential equations, entropy,
steam tables
But not much inquisitiveness
Whys
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/P : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
II. Left Mahan Hall - crystal clear
Determination become Rhodes Scholar because
Wm. Y. Elliott had been introduced as Rhodes
Scholar and I aspired to his kind of thinking.
That lecture and subsequent education Oxford left
permanent mark on me - Grateful - obliged & honored.
Not advocating all 4000 or so of you rush out apply
for Oxford
Would like suggest WVm. Y. Elliott approach to analyzing
problems will make your life more rich, successful,
productive.
If I could describe it, I suggest it's an enthusiasm
for seeking all the alternative answers to problems;
weighing them carefully, & then selecting most likely,
most persuasive, most reasonable
Do suggest greatest value in your education, here
FT later, whether formal or osmosis, will not be
facts you acquire, but habits of thinking F,
reasoning you acquire which you establish,
particularly your willingness F; determination
to probe beneath surface F, ask why?
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/22 -IA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
III. Let illustrate - particular experience at Oxford
Phil tutor -
Tell truth always?
Point of similie - must understand why tell truth
Because essential to fabric of society -
But murderers tearing down that fabric may
deserve a lie
Heresy - USNA - Code Conduct
Prisoners of War don't tell truth if can help it
Again because. their torturers-are not
promoting the society but destroying it
Don't wait until on street corner or prisoner - ask why?
I appreciate even though daily demands of your
routine u here not conducive this kind reflection
& introspection. You have to pass that test
tomorrow. Also suggest it will be same when J.O.
When conning ship there will be a right &
wrong way to do it. Fly a/c, or scram sub -
reactors - no whys or wherefores-- Yours not
reason why
Urge - despite pressures not to lose bubble -
know why you are where you are & why you are
doing what you are doing.
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/22 4 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
IV. E.G. on approach to career selection
Aviation (Pause 15 sec - ask why?)
What's future?
Thanh Hoa Bridge; - hundred a/c & pilots lost -
no damage
Then smart bomb -
Lesson - RPV's
DD's -
Vulnerability
Okinawa 32 years
Elath sunk 1967
- Kamikaze wrecked havoc
Cruise missiles are kamikazes - only smarter
Lucky if have as much anti-kamikaze capability
today as 1945.
With this increasing vulnerability whither
the DD?
How going to use subs -
Go alone - loner - Purpose of Navy is to protect
deployment of Army forces & supplies by sea &
naval projection power forces.
What part of job can subs do? -
Can help w/enemy subs - how about a/c, ships?
Teamwork, comm, conformance formation
anthical
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/22 : QIA-RDP80BO1554R002700190001-6
Amphibs
V. How about future of Navy itself?
Another long war in Europe? Battle N. Atlantic
Another V.N. projection of air power?
When I was Midshipman - we were told it was "Control
of Seas" - that the Navy was to do - Mahan said it
at end 19th Century & so it was true.
But no one defined what - "Control of Sea"
meant 50 years later.
In fact, about time Mahan wrote that term,
the use he intended of it became obsolete as
advent of sub and a/c made control of seas
impossible - in his and classic British sense
Yet 50 years later it was the byword here
& no one questioned it.
What shibboleths are we telling you today? Is
our model based on yesterday? Have you detected
whether we're looking ahead or back? Are you asking?
Not suggesting don't need Navy - exciting, challenging
nature of military life is that it is one of fast change
especially today - tech pace is geometrical
hind Nabs' depend you - think thru - or accept past
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/22 CIA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
VI. Suggest - not only Navy change around you - your
role may change - may have to adapt
Never know where will end up? Part Navy start out
in may evolve in quite different form. Best laid
career plans may not work out -
Look at ST in CIA -
No specific training
Certainly can't take time to get any
About all I can rely on is experience in
asking those difficult questions about why?
sizing up the alternative answers.
The subject matter is new; the environment
is civilian rather than military; but the
same process of probing E1 asking questions
applies.
Let me tell you my first challenge - Golf
in Heaven -
Intelligence not become so esoteric that we
can probe Heaven - but just as with military,
whole Meld of intelligence changing rapidly.
Some the changes will affect you directly
and whether you can do your job as aviators,
DD, subs, Marines
Three ways collect intell. - SIGINT, Photo, Spies
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/222-- CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700190001-6
1. Balance of effort in collecting?
Each own characteristics & values
But $ short -
SIGINT
More signals
More coding
Imagery
Capability expanding
So - enemy's capability to
destroy platforms-
Traditional offense - defense -
HUMINT - If technology uncertainties
Historic.
How indecent HUNIiNT get?
How much will I lie?
Spying not nice -
But necessary = closed societies
What's value of the take - ?
(be inquisitive)
2. Trade-offs difficult within each
3 spheres -
Between them
Photos - today -
SIGINT - tomorrow - chance
HUMINT - tomorrow - steer -
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/22 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700190001-6
8-
3. Beyond these matters of technique what
intell. will US need? - in 1990's
Soviets still big deal?
Other nations in interdependent world
Military? or economic/political - ?
What pressures on US? What interests?
Can't complacently assume today's
objectives will be tomorrow's.
VII. Advice - As Wm. Y. Elliott left one message with me;
the message I hope you will take away
tonight is
Stay flexible - Be inquisitive
Don't believe most predictions on what
best career patterns are, on where
opportunities in Navy lie, on whether
P.G. education is important.
Just concentrate on developing ability
to see woods for trees, to discern
alternatives, to see behind superficial
reasons, E, you will be in demand.
Henry Ford: "Hardest work is thinking - that's
why so few do it."
Recommend you try it - it's also fun.
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