SECRECY AND MORALITY IN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R002700280001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 30, 1977
• Content Type: SPEECH

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EDITED VERSION- did editing-and
ma e Agency istribution)
copies to: OST, GWT, LLE
RfiC 7977
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Secrecy and Mora:lit`in_Inte7.ligence
Vv~lien I came back to Washington. from my overseas assignment
nine months ago, I found myself confronted with what appeared
to be a beleaguered CIA. Beleaguered. by several years of
criticism, investigation, and adverse publicity. Yet, as I
grew to know the organization and the people I.realized how
very fortunate I was to come to it at. this particular time
in our nation's history. I felt it was a moment of opportunity.
opportunity first, because I doubt that anywhere e1.se in
the business world or in government will you find more dedicated,
more capable public servants than in the Central Intelligence
Agency ~.nd t}~~.e other associated intell.igfvnce organizations in
ot~r count;:y. They ha~re an admirable record. and, with this, I
am confident that we have the foundation on which to rebuild
public confidence which i.s much deserved.
The second way it is a moment of opportunity is because
today, out of the crucible of this period of investigation and.
inquiry we are forging a new model of: intelligence - an American
model of intelligence. The o1 d., traditional model of intelligence
remarkably unchanged aver centuries of history, is one where
intelligence organi.za.taons maintained. malimum secrecy and operated
wit} a minimum of supexvisory control. Nearly al"1 foreign
intelligence organizations continue to follow this pattern.
The new model wo are forging is singularly tailored to ~~}~e
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outlook, the attitudes, and tl~c starldards of our country.
On the one hand, it is-open, more open just like our society.
On the-other hand, there is more supervision, more control, much
like the checks and balances that characterize our entire
governmental process. Let me explain a few of the cardinal
features of this new J~merican model of intelligence.
First - Openness. Today we are attempting to share mare with
you, the public of the United States, than ever before. We
axe sharing first something about the process of intelligence,
how we go about doing our work. Now, clearly we cannot~shaxe
everything. Very often the reason information or how it was
obtained is useful is because it is unsuspected by our potential
adversaries. Publicity would vitiate its usefulness. 13ut at
the same time there is much about intelligence work that need
not be kept secret and which I think both the Intelligence
Community and the public would. benefit by discussing openly.
For example, contrary to populax belief, a very large
percentage of our effort is not involved in clandestine spying.
Most of our effort is concentrated on what would be termed
on an.y university campus, or in many major corporations, simply
as research. We have thousands of people whose task is to take
bits of information that have been collected - sometimes openly,
sometimes clandestinely - and, much lake working on a jigsaw
puzzle, piece them together to make them into a picture.
With this picture they can then pr.avide an evaluation or_ an
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estimate that wiJ.l help our. nation's decisionmakers better
understand warlci events, antica_pate problems, and make better
decisions on behalf of you and me. This is a very ordinary
but a very challenging task intellectually. It is no way spooky.
Today, in carrying out our new po]_icy of greater openness
we want to share more of the results of this kind of analysis.
Each.-time we complete a major intelligence study today, we look
it over carefully to see if it can be declassified. Whatever
its classification - Secret, Tap Secret, ar burn before reading -
we go through it and excise those portions which must reamir~
classified. These are clues which in the hands of our enemies
could jeopardize the way we acquired the information, or could
endanger the life of someone who has b.elped us. Once these
clues are removed, if there is enough substance left to be of
interest and of value to the American public, we publish the
study and make it available, usually through the Government.
Printing Office.
You may have heard that in Maxch the CIA issued a report-on
the world energy prospects for the next ZO years or so. In May,
a study was issued on the world steel outlook - available capacity,
prospects for the future. In July, an behalf of the Joint
Economic Committee of Congress, we issued one on the future
prospects of the Soviet economy - a rather startling change fxom
what had been predicted in the past. Also in July, we issued
a study on International Terrorism which has subsequently been
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made available through the Department of Commerce to businesses
operating overseas.
Now, not to exaggerate, the Intelligence Corrununity has,
of course, not been thrown open with all secrets revealed.
Anyone with a cursory understanding o:C the international system
appreciates that that would be very much to our disadvantage.
Sources would evaporate, the advantage of knowing more about
your adversa.xy than he thinks you know would be lost, and a.
foreigner`s loyalty to us would assuredly be rewarded aaith
prison or death.
But there are real advantages to opening tzp within the
limits of necessary secrecy. Interestingly, I believe it is
going to make it easier to protect important secrets.
Winston Churchill once said, if everything is classified secret,
nothing is secret. Today too much information is classified.
There are also too many people running around who feel they
can take it unto themselves to decide what should be classified
and what should be released. They have released information
which has done irreparable dar~~age to our country.in terms of
damaged. national relationships; in terms of expensive, technical
intelligence systems compromised; in terms of lives dedicated to
America and what we stand for, lost. By our releasing as much
information as we can, we can help improve the quality of national
debate on important issues. And, in malting that contribution
we also derive a benefit. Greatea? public exposure of the
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intelligence product, generat:;c discussion and feedback to us
of attitudes toward what we are doing and good constructive
criticism of how~we arc doing it. This is important not only
because it decreases the likelihood of misunderstandings - and
much of the criticism of the past derived .from misunderstandings -
but-also, everyone of us in authority clearly recognizes that
the intelligence mechanism of the United States must be operated.
in ways that are compatible with the ethical and moral standards
of our country. The problem with that, however, is that. it is
not always easy to know with certainty what those standards are.
What the country would condone in intelligence operations or
other governmental activities 20 years ago, it may condenui today.
liow will the nation look 5, 10, or 20 years from now at v~That
we are doing today?
Unfortunately, we cannot launch a trial balloon. We can't
take some proposed activity anal test it out on 210 million or so
Americans and expect it to remain secret. Often we either do
something secretly., or we just don't d.o it at all. That places
a particular burden on all of us in-the Intelligence Community.
A burden to make difficult judgments as to what things we should
and what things we should not do. The American model that I'm
speaking of establishes controls to help us make these judgments.
Let me discuss three of those controls.
The first type of control is self-control, or self-regulation.
Far instance, today, and for some months, we have been attempting
to write a specific code of operational ethics for. the Intelligence
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Community. It hasn't been easy to i~a7,ite something that is
specific enough to g}_ve genuin.e guidance, yet not so specific
as to be tota:~Iy inhibiting and. prevent effectiveness. But the
process of attempting t:o wri_te such a code has been salutary
for us. It liar forced us to think mare about ethical issues.
It has forced us to grapple with the subtlties of these issues.
Just as in business, just as. in other .agencies of government,
ethical issues are seldom all black or all white. But in
examining the many shades of gray, tiae must ask ourselves exactly
what are the boundaries of our societal standards? To?what
lengths should iae ga to obtain information which would be
useful fox the decisionmakers of our country? The answers are
never clear cut. It would be easy for us to simply interpret
standards arbitrarily and stay right in the middle-of-the-road.
Never do anything that wou7.d embarrass the United States of
America were it disclosed. -- Never treat people of another
country differently than we would treat Americans, Be as open
and fair in our dealings with other countries as we believe
all peoples should be treated.
Uncluestionabl.y ~ this is how. we would hope we
could act. However., in many situat-ions they represent an
unrealistic ideal. We must always remember, that we are an
unusually blessed people, living in an unusually open society.
In an open society like ours an outsider can come in and without
great effort, using only open sources, attain a good grasp of what's
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going on, what our basic purposes arc, the directions we are going,
and what ~.ve are thinking. I-Ie comes; he reads; he looks;
he talks to people; he walks down the street; and he can
easily make an accurate appraisal of what the United States is about.
Unfortunately, as we all know, there are closed societies in
the world today. Closed societies where you can't go and walk dorm
the street and talk to the people. And, reading the newspapers
is not very informative because they only say what the government
puts in ;them. Yet, we have a genuine need to know whatYis going
on in those societies. I don't think you would want your government
to negotiate a new strategic arms limitation agreement with the
Soviet Union if I could not assure you t}~at we had some
chance of feeling the pulse of the Soviet Union's political,
economic, and military motives; if I di.dn'.t think there was a
goad chance of knowing whether or not they were abiding by the
terms of such an agreement.
The problem is not limited to the military. Today we are
in a. economically interdependent world. What happens to the
economies of the Soviet Union or the tTnited States has ripple
effects around the world. Yet, even }iez~e, closed societies of_
the communist bloc are not very informative. 'the pocketbooks of
each one of us here is~exposed to dangers of the
economically unsound actions of other countries. We must }lave
some intelligence capability for anticipating those events, for
getting a feel for the way foreign economies are moving, But
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t}ii.s too is not easy. Nor is it clear cut how much of that
information? is of real value. Nor aro the lengths to whic}z we
should go in acc{uiring that information well-defined. So, we
must look to controls beyond the self--control which I have described.
The second type of control over the Intelligence Community is
in the form of laws and formal regulations. Congress has Massed
a number of laws that affect intelligence aperati.ons, like, far
example, the law on wiretapping. This spring the Administration
went to the Congress with a revision to this wiretapping law
in an effort to bettex protect the right to privacy of American
citizens and at the same time enable the government to obtain
information that may be crucial to it.
The President himself may issue ~.rery specific regulations.
For example, there is a written regulation today prohibiting the
Intelligence Community from counselling, planning, or carrying out
an assassination.
Tn the next session of Congress, our recent work with
Congressional leaders will culminate in a series of charters being
issued for intelligence agencies. A11 of the intelligence operatic-zs
in the CTA, the Defense Department, and elsewhere in the gove.rnmen~,
will have a specific charter which will govern their operations.
The third form of Control under the American model of
intelligence is called Oversight. Earlier I mentioned the
impossibility of attempting full public oversight by launching
trial balloons for every secret operation. W1i~ilet~re'really would
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like to have full public oversight, it simply is not practical.
The substitute that has been evolving i.s a surrogate proce4s
of public oversight.
One of the surrogates for the American people is the
President of the United States. Another is the Vice President.
.Both these elected officials take a very keen interest in
the intelligence pxocess and operations. I see them both
regularly and they are fully aware of intelligence activities.
Another surrogate is a committee called the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence which has been in existence for
just over a year-and-a-half. This committee is in many
respects a sounding board for us. We go to them with our
prab]_ems and they feedback to us witYi what they feel the
American people want. It is also a check on us. They
hear things, they read things, they callus up, and ask us
to come over and tell them what is happening and why it is
happening. Through the budget process, I keep them informed
of the full range of our activities. It is a very valuable
line of communication between the intelligence agencies and.
the people of the United States.
I am vexy pleased that in August the House of
Representatives elected to establish a corresponding committee.
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I look forward to having the same point of contact, the same
sounding board in the lower chamber, as we now have in the Senate.
The Intelligence Oversight Board is still another oversight
surrogate. TlYis board i.s comprised of three distinguished citizens:
former governor Scranton, former Senator Gor?~, and Tom I+armer of
~~ashington, D. C., appointed by the President for the sole task
of overseeing the legality and propriety of :what the Intelligence
C.ammunity is doing. You, any of my employees, anyone who wants,
may write to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and say that fellow
Turner is doing something wrong. If. they think there ,s any
illegality in intelligence operations or that something is being
done improperly, they can go directly to this::Board. The Board then
makes its own i_r~vest:i.gation; they ma.y call me in and ask me what
is going an; but they do it independently and report only t~
the President of the United States. He then decides if sorr-e
action should be taken.
Another form of control is over what is called covert action.
Covert action is not gathering or analyzing intelligence, it is
taking actions intended to influence opinions or events in other
countries tvitrz.out those actions being attributed to the United States..
The CIA has been charged by the President over many years as the
-only agency in the government that will conduct covert action
and continues to be rec{uired to retain that capability. It is
outside the normal a.mbi.t of intelligence activities and, as you
can imagine involves a high element of risk. This is where the
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CIA has received the most adverse publicity. In the past, in
Viet Nam far example, there was a good deal of covert acti.vit~~
being carried out. Today, covert activity i_s first, on a very,
very, low scale; anal second., before any covert effort is undertaken,
it must be cleared by the National Security Council, the
President must then indicate his approval by signature, and I
must then notify eight committees of Congress.
There are some who say that all of this oversight may be
overkill. Let me be candid with you. There ar.e risks in this
process. There is the risk of timidity. The more oversight
over an intelligence operation the less willing individuals
axe to take the risks that operation may entail. Maybe too fe~ca
risks will be taken for the long term good of our country.
When you. sit around a conference; table with otl~ier members of d
committee, it is easy to say, no, that's too risky, let's not do it.
Tt is much more difficult to stand alone in a group and say yes,
for the long .term needs of the country, we require that information,
we should take that risk.
The second risk is that there may be a security leak.
A.s you proliferate the number of people with access to information
about intelligence operations .in order to conduct the aversi_ght
process, you run the risk of somebody saying something that
he should not.
In. conclusion, you should. know that I feel very confident
that today we are beginning to find the balance between the risks
of too much oversight on the one hand and necessary control on
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the other. There is every good. prospect. that a relatively
stable balance can be estabJ_ished over these next 2 or 3 years
as we shake down this process and as we mature into this new
Amexican model. of intelligence. I believe we wi1.1 develop
ways of maintaining that necessary level of secrecy while at
the same time conducting intelligence operations only in
ways that will strengthen our open and. tree society.
Thank you very much. I would be happy to entertain
your questions.
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ADDRESS BY ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NORTH SHORE UNITARIAN CHURCH
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
13 NOVEMBER 1977
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I'm really very pleased to be back here on the North Shore
of Chicago-land. I'm sure that all of you who live here appreciate
the privileges you have. I look back on the privilege I had of
being raised here; it has meant a lot to me ever since. I've
lived in a lot of other places across this country and around the
world, but I've never seen anywhere that I thought was better for
raising a family or putting down roots.
Speaking of roots, my professional roots when I left here
were with the United States Navy until dust nine months ago when
the President of the United States uprooted me and decided that I
should become the nation's number one spook. When I came back
to Washington from my overseas assignment nine months ago to
undertake this new work, I found myself confronted with what
appeared to be a beleaguered CIA, beleaguered by several years
of criticism, investigation, adverse publicity. Yet as T began to
know the organization, T came to feel very fortunate to come to
it at this particular time in our nation's history. I felt it
was a moment of opportunity, opportunity first because I have
gotten to know the people there. T can say to you with. great
confidence that I doubt-that anywhere else in the business world or
in government will you find more dedicated, more capable public
servants than in the Central Intelligence Agency and the other
associated intelligence organizations in our country. They have
an admirable record, and with this T am confident that we have the
foundation on which to rebuild public confidence which is much
deserved.
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The second way it is a moment of opportunity is because I
believe that today, out of the crucible of this period of inves-
tigations and inquiry, we are forging a new model of intelligence,
uniquely an American model of intelligence. The old, the
traditional model of intelligence is one where the intelligence
organizations maintained maximum secrecy and operated with a
minimum of supervisory control. The new model that we are forging
is uniquely tailored to the outlooks, the attitudes, and the
standards of our country: On the one hand it is open, more open
just like our society. On the other hand there is more supervision,
more control, just like the checks and balances that characterize
our entire governmental process. IVow let me explain to you, if I
may, a few of the cardinal features of this new American model of
intelligence.
First - openness. We are today attempting to share more with
you--the public of the United States--than perhaps ever before in
the history of our intelligence operations. We are sharing some-?
thing about the process of intelligence, how we go about doing
our business. Now, clearly there are areas here we simply cannot
share or they wauld evaporate and go away, But on the other hand
there are lots of things about what we do that we would like people
to know more about. To know more, for instance, about the fact
that a very large percentage of our effort is not in spying. It's
not in doing clandestine things. Tt`s in doing what would be termed
on any university campus, or in many major corporations, simply
research. We have thousands of people whose task it is to take
bits of information that we collect, sometimes openly, sometimes
clandestinely, and piece them together to make them fit into a
picture puzzle, to provide an evaluation, an estimate that will help
the decisionmakers of our country come to better decisions on behalf
of you and of me. This is a very ordinary but a very intellectually
challenging assignment. It is not spooky.
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Today, in our policy of greater openness, we are trying to
share more with you the results of this kind of analysis, this
kind of estimating. Every time we do a major intelligence study
today, we look back at it and see the label on the cover where i?
may say secret, tcp secret, or burn before reading. Whatever it
may be, we go through it and we excise those portions which must
remain classified to protect our national interests. Then we
say to ourselves, is there enough left, is there enough substance
here to be of interest and of value and importance to the American
public. If there is, we publish it and make it available. You
may have heard in March we issued a report on the world energy
prospects for the next 10 years. In May we issued one on the world
steel outlook, whether it is over-capacity, whether it is under-
capacity. In July, on behalf of the Joint Economic Committee of
Congress, we issued one on the future prospects of the Soviet
economy, a rather startling change on what had been predicted in
the past.
Now, I will not overdo this. I dan't want to let you think
we are letting all the secrets out of the bag--I'm sure you wouldn't
want us to. If we let out too much, we will lose our sources of
information--they would dry up. If we let out too much we would
deprive those decisionmakers of important advantages in having
inside information on which to base their decisions. But there are,
I believe, real advantages to us in opening up within the limits of
necessary secrecy, Interestingly, I believe it is going to make
it easier to protect our important secrets. 4tinston Churchill once
said if everything is classified secret, nothing is secret. We
have too much classified information today. But we also have too
many people running around who feel they can take it onto themselves
to decide what should be classified and what should be released.
They have released information which has done great damage to our
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country, So I hope that by narrowing the purpose of classified
information, by releasing as much as we possibly can without
harming our national interests, we will protect and respect that
which remains classified much more.
Sharing with the public has other advantages. I hope that
it has the advantage of giving us a better informed electorate.
What is more important to the foundation of democracy in this
country? If we, by our releasing information for which you
the taxpayers have paid, can contribute to improving the quality
of national debate on important issues, T hope we will be providing
all of you a service. And in providing that servide we derive
a benefit, we derive the benefit of staying in closer touch
with the American public. This is important to us, important
because we don't want misunderstandings. Much of the criticism
of the past was misunderstandings and we don't want those to occur
again. But also, everyone of us in authority in the intelligence
world of our country today clearly recognizes that we must operate
our intelligence mechanism in ways that are acceptable to the
ethical and moral standards of our country.
So, put youself in our shoes. It's not easy to devise
what those standards are, what we are expected to live up to, because
what the country would accept in intelligence operations or other
governmental activities twenty years-ago perhaps it may not accept
today. What was condoned then may be condemned today. We have
some difficulty finding just what those standards are today and
predicting how they will look in retrospect five, ten and twenty
years from now. We have particular difficulty in our business
because we cannot go launch trial balloons. We can't take some
proposed secret operation and test it out on a million or so
Americans and expect it to remain secret. We either do it in a
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secret way or we just don't do it at all, That places on all of
us in the Intelligence Community a particular burden, the burden
to make difficult judgments as to what things we should and
what things we should not do.
Naw the new American model that I'm speaking of establishes
controls for haw these judgments are made. Let me discuss three
of those types of cantrols.
First I would say is self-control, or self-regulation. Far
,instance, today and for some months we have been attempting to
write a specific code of ethics for the Intelligence Community.
It hasn't been easy. It hasn't been easy to write something
that is specific enough to give genuine guidance to our people,
yet not so specific as to be totally inhibiting and prevent
effectiveness. But the process of attempting to write a code
of ethics has been salutary for us, it has forced us to think
more about the ethical issues, it has forced us to wrestle with
these issues to recognize that, just as in business, just as in
other walks of government, the ethical issues are seldom all black
or all white. But we ask ourselves what standards we should set
as to the lengths we will go to obtain information for the decision-
makers of our country. We aren't really facing black and white,
clear-cut easy decisions. It would be easy for us to simply
establish a standard that says, don't ever do anything that would
embarrass the United States of America were it disclosed, Or a
standard that says, don't ever treat people of another country
differently than you would treat Americans, or a standard that says,
treat other countries as openly and as fairly as we believe in our
society that people in other countries should be treated.
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But we have to remember that we are blessed because we ]ive
in an open society. In an open society an outsider can come in
and he can get a good fee], a good grasp of what's going on, what
our basic purposes are, the directions we are going, and what the
thinking of the people is. He comes; he reads; he looks; he talks
to the people; he walks dawn the street; and he makes a good
appraisal of what the United States is watching.
Unfortunately, as we-well know, there are closed societies
in the world today, closed societies where you don't go and walk
down the street and talk to the people,_and read newspapers which
are not very informative. Yet, we have genuine need of knowing
what's going on in many of those closed societies. Would you want
us today, your government, to be out there negotiating a new strategic
arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union, if I could not assure
you that I thought we had some chance of feeling the pulse of the
Soviet Union's political; economic and military intentions, some
chance of understanding whether they are adhering to the terms we
will establish-with them at the next SALT agreement?
And the problem is not limited to military things. Today we
are in a world of growing economic interdependence. What happens
in the economy of the Soviet Union or the United States has ripple
effects across the world horizons. Yet, even here closed societies
of the Communist B]oc are not very informative about their economic
undertakings. And each one of us here, in this roam, is exposed to
dangers to our economy, to our. pocketbooks, to our taxes, as a result
of actions of these other countries that are unexpected and unanticipated.
So again I believe we must have some intelligence capabilities far
anticipating those events, for getting a feel for the directions they
are going in their ecanorrRy. But this is not easy., it's not clear-cut
as to how much of that information is of real value, to what extremes,
to what limits we should go in obtaining it. So we have arrived at more
controls than the self-control I have just described.
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The second type of control is law and regulation. Congress
has passed a number of laws that affect intelligence operations.
There is, for instance, a law on wiretapping of United States
citizens' communications. On the one hand, this spring the
Administration went to the Congress with their revision to the
wiretapping law in an effort to find an even better balance in
protecting the rights of privacy of American citizens. On the
other hand, leaving open some opportunity for the government to
obtain information that may be critical to it. When needed the
President issues very specific regulations. For instance, there
is one in writing today which governs all of us in the Intelligence
Community. It says, thou shall not plan or commit assassinations.
For the next session of Congress we have worked with the Congressional
leaders on a program that will lead to what we will call charters for
intelligence. Ali of our intelligence operations in the CIA, in the
Defense Department, elsewhere in the government will have a specific
charter which will lay out certain do's and don't's that will
govern these operations.
And then we have the third form of control under the American
model of intelligence which I call oversight. Back at the beginning
I mentioned the difficulty we have with really giving good public
oversight and watching trial balloons about secret operations. that
has been evolving as a substitute for full public oversight, the kind
that pervades our political process and which we would like to have
but simply cannot from a practical standpoint, is what I call a
surrogate process of public oversight. Qne of the surrogates is the
President of the United States and another is the Vice President.
They have, since January 20th, taken a very keen interest in our
intelligence process and operations.. Another surrogate is a committee
called the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which has been in
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existence for just a year and a half. Senator Adlai Stevenson of
our state is a member of that committee and I particularly enjoy
working with him. Just yesterday morning he called me with a
particular suggestion of real value to me. This committee is
a sounding board for us. We ga to them with our problems and
get feedback as to what they feel the American people want.
It's a check on us. They inquire, they hear things, they read
things, they ca11 us up and say come over and tell us what's
happening and why this is going on. It's a very valuable line
of communication between the intelligence world and the United
States representatives of the people on Capitol Hi11. I'm very
pleased that in August the House of Representatives elected to
establish a corresponding oversight committee. I'm equally pleased
that your own Representative, Robert McClory, is a member of
that. I particularly enjoy working with him as well. We look
forward to having that same point of contact, the same sounding
board in the lower chamber.
Sti]1 another oversight surrogate-.that we have is something
called the Intelligence Oversight Board, This consists of three
distinguished citizens; ex-Governor Scranton, ex-Senator Gore and
Mr. Tom Farmer of Washington, D.C. They are appointed by the
President for the sole task of looking into the legality and propriety
of the way we are operating the Intelligence Community. You, any of
my employees, anyone who wants to, may write to .the Intelligence
Oversight Board and say that fellow Turner is really messing things
up, They don't have to go through me if they work for me, they can
go right to this Board if they think there's any illegality, anything
being done improperly. The Board them makes its awn investigation,
they call me in the. ask me what in the world is going on, but they
do it independently and report only to the President of the United
States, and he decides if some action should be taken ds d result,
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Another form of control is exercised over what we call
covert action. Let me describe very briefly what I mean by this
terminology. Covert action is not really intelligence. It is
actions taken intended to influence opinions or events in foreign
countries without anybody knowing whose point of view it is. This
is where CIA has gotten into the most adverse publicity, because it
happens that the CIA has been charged by the President over many
years as the only agency in the government that will conduct covert
action. It's outside the intelligence business, and there are not
that many cases. It's on a very, very low scale today. But today as
contrasted with the past, covert action, an effort to influence events
elsewhere in the world, that is going to be undertaken must be cleared
by the National Security Council. The President must place his
signature indicating that he wants this done, and I must then go and
notify the appropriate committees of the Congress. This is oversight.
Now there are some people that say that all of this oversight
may be overkill. Let me be candid with you--there are risks in ti~is
process. There is the risk of timidity. There is the risk that as
you conduct more and more oversight over this intelligence operation,
you will take less and less risks, maybe too few risks for the long-term
benefit of our country. It is easy when you sit around the table with
a member of a committee and say, gee, that's too much risk, let`s
not do that. It is more difficult to stand up and be counted, to say,
yes, the long-term needs of the country require that you obtain that
information. We take that risk.
There is a second risk and that's of security leaks. As you
proliferate the number of people who have access to information about
our intelligence in order to conduct the oversight process, we run
the risk of somebody inadvertently saying something that he shouldn`t
say.
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I believe it will be two or three years before we settle
the balance between these risks of timidity and security leaks
and the proper amount'of oversight.
In conclusion, I want you to know that I feel very confident
today that we will find a satisfactory balance in these next
two or three years as we shake down this process, as we mature to
this new American model of intelligence. I believe we will and
have developed ways of maintaining that necessary level of secrecy,
while at the same time conducting your intelligence operations only
in ways that will strengthen our open and free society.
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 Glad to be t~_ap~~?V~~i FI~c~-~eaSs~it~00e1/11/2~Yb~l- a~r~~~~~~4~v~17n~8 ner~ /3~.n- ~~-
I appreciate having been raised here.
Since laving Chicagoland--lived in lots interesting places
Raise family--roots
Ny professional roots Navy upturned 9 months ago
Interveneing months exciting
9 months ago came to a beleagered organization in CIA
Investigated--attacked
Fortunate--came at moment opportunity--2 reasons
1. Have in CIA and other intelligence agencies-- one finest groups
of dedicated public servants--record admirable--foundation--
rebuild confidence.
2 . Moment when out of the past investigations is ,~emr,~-_r.,g? ng_
Entirely new model of intelligence--American---
41d model--maximum secrecy, agencies and minimum supervision
New model uniquely sculpted to characteristics of our country
one hand --more open like our society
other hand--less independent, mare supervised like the
checks and balances in our governmental system--
Let me explain cardinal features
1. Upeness--
sharing more--precess clearly cannot tell all
Like Know-- large ?o not spying --simply research.
Sharing more of analysis
check each study --unclassify?
Studies -- Soviet economy
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 2
ov ~aue~~'a~eS~~'/~'~1~2 : CIA-RDP80B015~R002700280001-6
lose sources
lose advantages
~~~
i
Are advantages Gt~
1. Protect secrets ~.
2. Share with public
3 , is eep in torch with public
Important --reco-nine must operate intelligence mechani_~vrays
acceptant ethical ~ moral standards society
1. Difficult - changing
2. Cannot test on publ,~
.QQ~~'~"'u''?
Difficult judgements `-~controYs-- 3 types
lst type control must be self control -- regulation derives from
~nygjl.igeae e .
Derives efforts to write code ethics -- not easy
cry enough to be guidance but not tie in knots
Process doing it important-- makes wrestle with issues
recognize not black and white
C~t ~//joss - .
No standard--what info
~- to what den ttis
~tx ld-fie t-~a~c-ag-metes-m--ev~~~e 1 sLQ~1.i sin:
Easy ' on--E_ar__ins Feet 've .~i~-o
close societies
openly is curbed ability
2nd form controls in addition self
regulations
S ~-~r"6w
scrutiny --specific
wiretaps -- U5 citizens
Assassination
Explicit written guidance--nett session Gong:~ess --charters
3rd Co trols Ov rsight -- -~N~~~'~`~~
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President
Congress Ste-,renson and 1~~~c Clory
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~"`~ ~..
Timidity
Zeaks
2 - 3 years balance
Out this confident have evolved ways to maintain secrecy
while still conducting intellig nce operations in ways
will only strengthen our open society.
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 26 October 1577
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St. John's Forum
Washington, D. C.
1000, Sunday, 6 November 1977
North Shore Unitarian Church
Chicago, Ill.
1900-2100, Sunday, 13 November 1977
SECRECY AND MORALITY IN INTELLIGENCE
- looking at/explaining past Intel activities
- not exercise in burying/praising past
- value of looking at past: makes you want to find
ways to ensure mistakes/impressions of mistakes
don't reoccur. All we must do rest on a solid
foundation of the ethical/moral values of our nation.
B. Ethics
- Would like to write a formal code of ethics for the IC.
Not an effort to restrict action, instead to try to help.
We all have own personal code, but organizations must
have standards too. Unexpressed, they can only be assumed.
It really isn't fair to our employees to expect them t:o
live up to standards which have not been made explicit.
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- 2 -
- Problems:
1. Values hard to pin down; interpretations of
national ethics change with time and circumstance.
2. Difficult to test acceptability of secret operations
through public opinion. Consequently, must attempt
to judge what the nation wants today and will
continue to approve tomorrow.
- In doing so, whether or not a formal code of ethics can
be written, the reassessment of our operations and their
measurement against today's expressed ethics is__wflrthwhile
because:
a. it sensitizes the whole IC to the issues, and
b. it encourages public understanding of the
real problems involved in trying to run
an intelligence organization in accordance
with the Marquis of Queensbury.rules.
We do have some guidelines however - for instance on the
1. Domestic side that is, activities involving U.S.
citizens, in U.S.A., have easiest time.
- Most are closely controlled by law, e. g.,
new wiretap legislation. I'm sure you feel
as I do - don't want to go to jail any more
than any other citizen.
- In other cases we are regulated by Presidential order:
Assassinations.
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Finally, have our own regulations:
a. Media
Today - no paid contractual relationships
with accredited American media are permitted.
We don't use them as agents. However, do
respect journalists as citizens. They have
right to assist the government by passing
on observations/information if they so
desire. Nothing improper. Injurious
freedom? press sharing -
b. Clergy/missionaries
No secret, paid or unpaid, contractual
relationships are permitted. None exist.
c. Academia
Do_have paid relationships - e.g., engage
professors to write or do research for us.
Afraid, however, the popular but unreasonable
view in some areas of academe that any
relationship between the academic and Intel
communities is improper. This has led
to unhealthy reduction in the amount of
contact.
I hope to expand those relationships. Harvard
guidelines, dialogue with Harvard/Amherst~
speaking on campuses.
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phone calls, or Korean payments to
U.S. Coligressmen, but uncomfortable
about the basis for their outrage
for fear CIA engages in equivalent
practices in the Soviet Union and
Korea, are confused.
- Clandestine gathering of information is
a tool used sparingly. There is always
a necessity far ascertaining that this
information is not available through
overt or less risky sources. I assure
you, however, that with all the wonderful
new technical means we have today
clandestine spying is still a vital
arrow in our quiver of intelligence
gathering techniques.
- To what lengths, however, should
we go in pursuing information? To what
limits should pragmatism override idealism?
On whose judgment should we depend?
Recall - operate largely in secret,
public scrutiny cannot be our
guide; we must find a surrogate process
of public oversight. That has been one
major result of past several years
of scrutiny and criticism
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err'
- Oversight
(1) Personal interest of President/VP
(2) Senate Select Committee
- relations with IC are close and excellent
(3) New House ~;ommittee
- benefits of 1 committee in House
and I in Senate
(4) Legal requirement for approval for
covert operations
(5) IOB
- Risk in all of this:
(1) Timidity - least common denominator
(2) Security leaks
But I believe in balance - next few yeaxs critical
C. Limits on Public Oversight - More sharing - more in touch -
within limits of secrecy
Both - process of intelligence - how to do it - And - Product -
Energy - Soviet Economy
Even within limits - Benefits - most important relates to fact
values are hard to pin down; changing - hence must sta in touch
with society, not only through Congress, elected. executive branch
but also own contact with public.
- Where does this all lead?
? New American model of intelligence
-British model - Secrecy
-American model - balance openess vs secrecy
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Out this balance - 2 things
(1) Greater input from public to
standards expect IC
(2) Greater input from IC to public
contributing to a more informed
debate on major issues
This kind of dialogue is the essence of the democratic
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