ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER ADDRESS TO 28TH ANNUAL UNIVERSITY FOR PRESIDENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R002700450001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 6, 1978
• Content Type: SPEECH

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ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER
Address to
28th Annual University for Presidents
Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, California
Monday, 6 February 1978
Thank you. That is about the best introduction I've
ever had and I mean that. There was real thought put into
that and I appreciate it and I appreciate the opportunity to
be here with you. I've known YPOers for many years some of
whom were the strongest supporters of this organization.
Unfortunately, they have almost all turned 50 and aren't
here today. I wondered, however, when I received your
invitation why you were asking probably the only person in
the room who hasn't met a payroll in his whole life to come
and talk to a university for businessmen. However, I looked
in your catalogue and I find that tomorrow afternoon you're
going to hear from Professor Bronstein. He is going to talk
to you about semioptics. I never heard of that before, but
I find in here that it's something that seems to me needs
you and me to do a lot in common. It says, this is learning
to read between the lines. I think I may hire that chap
away from you, we need just that kind of a fellow.
Going back to Bobby's remarks about TIME and NEWSWEEK.
I hope that you use your semioptics on those articles and
read between the lines. There is a lot of criticism in
them, but I'm not asking you to avoid that. I'm suggesting
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that these articles are a very important mark in the course
of American intelligence. Very important because I believe
they signify a turning of the corner. For three years now
the American media has written about intelligence only in
terms of criticism--almost. But these articles are asking
a constructive question if you read between the lines. The
question is how do we have effective intelligence in a
democratic society? I believe that the opening of that
question--the turning from a critical to a constructive vein--
is an important turning point. I believe it symbolizes that
we are about to usher in a new era in American intelligence.
Now I can assure you that I do believe we have had effective
intelligence within our democratic standards while protecting
the rights of our citizens.
that's going
come without
to take change,
controversy and
I'm sure that in all of your
organizational
don't have any
But I would also assure you that
adaptation, and this doesn't
a certain amount of pique. Now
businesses when you make major
changes or major changes in procedures, you
problems at all in getting your employees to
accept those and to go right along with them. But in our
bureaucracy of the government there is sometimes resistance
to change. Resistance to the kinds of adaptation that we are
having to make today in the world of intelligence. If I might
have the effrontery to suggest, it's about like the change that
a well-established, successful family business makes when it
decides to go public.
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Take a family business that has been in business for
30 years and started out with a good product; it marketed it
well, it was very profitable. But after 30 years they really
had to adapt that product and they really had to diversify
product lines. Much the same is the case in American
intelligence today. We started out just 30 years last
September when for the first time this country organized a
peace time intelligence appratus. And back then it was really
like a family intelligence business. It had one product, the
product at the beginning was information about the Soviet Union;
primarily information about the military aspects of the Soviet
Union. Now, we were also interested in some of those Eastern
European satellites which were under the Soviet's wing. And,
we were of course, interested from time-to-time in other
countries in the world that the Soviets made forays out and
tried to establish a position in other countries. But
basically, our product line was determined by what the Soviets
were up to and where. Our product had one other characteristic.
When the Soviets did make a venture out into the third world
this country not only wanted intelligence information about
that activity of the Soviet Union, they called upon your
intelligence organizations to do something about it. We
called that political action, or the influencing of political
events in other countries. Remember, we were there in Iran
when the government changed from communist to that of the
Shah in 1953; similarly in Guatemala in 1954; as you're well
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aware over a period of time in 1960's in Cuba and very,
very successfully throughout the war in Vietnam; and
as recently as 1975 we were there, in an effort to change
the political scene in Angola until the Congress of the
United States decided otherwise.
But look back now at these 30 years and the changes
that have come over the environment in which the United
States lives. We are no longer interested in 8 or 10 or
12 countries in the world only. We have legitimate needs
for good intelligence information about almost everyone of
the 150-some countries around us. And listen to the names
of those countries that I have to recite when I brief the
top policy makers of our government from time to time:
Zimbabwe, Namibia, Benin, Somalia--countris that didn't exist
or we didn't know or think about a dozen years ago. Then there
are things like OPEC an acronym none of us would have paid any
attention to maybe 5 years ago. Our sphere of intelligence
interests, our product line has simply burgeoned, it has
expanded immensely. Not only geographically but topically.
Yes, we must still today put our primary emphasis on military
intelligence about the Soviet Union. But beyond that we have
to extend our horizons, we have to think very much in the
political and economic fields in these countries all around
the world. And there is one other difference in our approach
to the intelligence product today, and that is the attitude
of the country towards political actions, towards interferring
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in the events of other countries. As the Congress did
terminate that activity in Angola, so there is a lesser
inclination for this kind of activity today. I don't
mean to say we are renouncing political action, we must
have that capability but we must use it more judiciously.
We must use it under greater controls and I'll speak of
those a bit more later. But basically, our product today
is providing intelligence information--economic, political
and military to the top policymakers of our country in a
form that they can utilize and about a wide geographical
range of countries. Now this change requires different
attitudes, different skills, different kinds of people.
These adjustments can be made and they can be made without
difficulty but not necessarily without some noise and some pain.
Now, another reason that a family business will go
public is if it finds its production line is outmoded. It
simply needs new more sophisticated more expensive machinery
and to get the capital, it incorporates. Well, so too, the
production line of intelligence has changed today. At the
very beginning it was the historic, human agent that was
the keynote of intelligence. You remember Joshua sent two
spies into Jericho before he marched around with his trumpets
and the human agent has been the foundation of intelligence
ever since. But in the last 10 to 15 years there has come
a revolution in this production line because we now have
technical means of collecting intelligence that just boggle
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your imagination. The quantity of data that can be obtained
through these technical intelligence collectors is today
just going up not geometrically but at much greater rates.
Those of you here in the electronic industry know what I'm
talking about in terms of vastly increasing capacity in much
smaller size and at much less cost. Now interestingly the
advent of this technical revolution in intelligence collection
and collecting the data they need is in fact emphasizing the
importance of the traditional human intelligence collector.
And the reason for this is simply that generally speaking
when you get this technically collected data, it tells you
what happened yesterday or maybe today. When I give that
information to policymakers they look at me and say, Stan
why did they do that and what are they going to do tomorrow
if that is what they did yesterday? And that's the forte of
the human intelligence agent; finding intentions, finding
plans, finding the hopes of other people. So today, as
greater quantities of technical data become available we
must compliment that with a greater effort in the human
intelligence sphere as well. But what I have been saying to
you now still adds up to the fact that the production line
has changed, it has changed from a production line in which
we relied almost exclusively on one machine to where we
today must rely on a series of well-oiled, well-meshed
machines that tie together. Again, this is an adjustment,
it's a change, a change in the process, a change again in
the type of people, the type of organization that you need
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and it doesn't come too easily.
Also, when a family business goes public, when it
changes its product and its production line it may find that
its personnel policies have to be adjusted too. Because you
need new kinds of people, you need new skills to man these
new machines and produce these new products. And so too, we
have had to adjust our personnel policies away from a family
business-like atmosphere because of these new demands upon
us. This country has been blessed for 30 years with some of
the most dedicated capable intelligence specialists in the
world, one of whom, Ray Cline, you will hear from on Wednesday.
These people came in at the beginning, they came in at the
height of the Cold War and they have given tremendous service
to us. But as they have moved through the structure they
dominate the top of the organization and today we are facing
a problem of what you could call block obsolescence. We are
facing the day, very shortly, when large numbers of these
people will leave for reasons of retirement. Now that's
something that presents me a problem, which is unique. It
is different from one that anyone of you here might have, I
believe. In your corporations, your companies, if most of
your vice presidents or managers all happen to depart at the
same time, what do you do? You go out in the market and you
get some more. You renew. In my business where can I turn
to find a professional intelligence officer? A trained spy?
I can't do it, I have to raise them from within. I have to
raise them by a series of promotions, assignments, progressions.
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I must have a system so that when I have a key position to
be filled, one where we are going to take risks for this
country and where this country's reputation and success may
be at stake, I must have three or four choices: people who
have been groomed through this non-familiar personnel system
to be ready to take over when they are needed. But again,
this kind of a change in personnel management does not come
easily. And I can assure you that it was not easy for me on
the 1st of November last year to ask 212 of our loyal employees
to step aside to make room for this profession that we need.
But it simply had to be done if we were to ensure a strong
Central Intelligence Agency in 1985 and 1990 and so on.
Now a family business usually manages to stay out of
the public limelight, but when it goes public and has stockholders
and so on, it begins to have to make that adjustment also.
And I can assure you that when an intelligence business goes
public it is a wrending, difficult experience because so
much of what we must do can only be done in secrecy if it is
to be achieved at all. And yet, the time has come when the
intelligence community of this country simply must be more
open. There are risks in this, there are dangers in it
particularly when you look at how the KGB operates against
us. But there are also strengths. If you look back again
at those three years of intense criticism of intelligence,
you have to recognize that there was a lack of support and
understanding in the American public because the intelligence
community was not only sometimes correctly but often falsely
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accused. But it had never built up understanding and support
in the American public and hence it had no supporters or
defenders when the bad days came. Let me say again that we
are in the risk taking business and as I sat here and had
lunch with you today and drew my fortune out of the cookie--I
don't know who planted these, I guess you get suspicious
when you're in my business--the one I drew was, "if the
profits are great, the risks are great." Now that is really
more applicable to you perhaps, but it is very applicable to
my profession because we are in the risk taking business, and
you don't get good profits, you don't get good intelligence
unless you take some risks and when you take risks there are
going to be times when you make mistakes. Now that's when
your going to need understanding and support of the American
public as well of course of the times when you are falsely
accused of making mistakes.
So we are trying today to be more open with you, to tell
you more about what we are doing. Now let me assure you
that there is no way we can tell you everything that we do
and particularly we cannot tell you too much about how we
acquire our information because as we do, it will be easier
for others to take countermeasures and defeat our future
efforts to collect that information. But what we have been
doing, is we have been looking at what we collect and then
what we have analyzed from that and the conclusions we have
drawn and we've asked ourselves can we take out of these
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analyses, these estimates, things that we cannot afford to
put in the public domain and still have enough left that
will be of value to the American public, and if that's the
case, we will publish it. Perhaps you read of some of
these. We put out an average of two unclassified estimates
or studies a week in the past year and we hope they have
been of value to the public and I particularly hope they
have been of value to American business.
For instance, last July we put out a study on the
future prospects for the Soviet economy. We came to the
conclusion that the outlook for that economy is bleaker
today than at any time since the death of Stalin. Why?
Well, because in our view that Soviets have managed to
continue increasing productivity by a simple formula of
primary reliance or increased infusions of labor and capital,
but they are coming to a dead end. Their demography is such
that in the 1980s the birthrate will only sustain a half a
percent a year growth in the labor force in the Soviet
Union, compared with a percent and a half today. And on the
capital side they are having to reach further and further
into the wastelands of Siberia to get their natural resources
and, of course, as all of you well know, the costs of investment
in modern sophisticated machinery are going up as well. Now
the Soviets recognize this and in their five-year plan they
acknowledge that they will not be able to increase the
inputs of labor and of capital and yet they somehow predict
they are going to continue to increase productivity. We
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don't think it's in the cards, we don't think they can
make the changes in their economic system, their stifling
economic bureaucracy, that will allow that kind of increase.
And what impact does that have on you? And on me? Well,
for one thing it means the thirst the Soviets have for
American technology and American manufactured goods may not
be quenchable. They may not be able to earn and obtain the
foreign exchange that is necessary, or if they do they may
have to do it on credit, and that faces you and the government
with difficult choices.
We have done Other studies we've published that would be
of interest to you on the international steel outlook, on
international terrorism--the fact that the increase from 1975
to 1977 in the number of international terrorists incidents
that affect U.S. persons and corporations is from 20 to 40%,
(I'm sorry, my numbers are wrong. It used to be 2 out of
5 and now it's 3 out of 5 instances of international terrorism
that affect American interests). A discouraging but factual
situation. We are going on with other studies like this.
We hope they will on the one hand help inform the American
public and on the other help to improve the quality of
debate in our country over these cardinal issues. But again,
let me stress that adjusting the intelligence organization of
our country is not an easy process.
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Finally, when a family business goes public it also
begins to subject itself to new forms of oversight, like
a board of directors. Well, my board of directors is the
President, the Vice President, the National Security Council,
something called the Intelligence Oversight Board established
by the President, and two committees of Congress, expressly
designed to oversee the intelligence process. And today we
are reporting to and being much more forthright with these
oversight bodies. There are risks here too, of course, but
there are also strengths. There are strengths in sharing
the responsibility for the risks we take. There are
strengths in not becoming too separated from American public
opinion, staying in touch with the Congress and understanding
what the American public wants from its intelligence community.
There are strengths in having someone with a different outlook
pass judgment on the risks that we do take. But of course,
there are dangers. There are dangers that this could lead to
intelligence by timidity, unwillingness to take risks when you
have to discuss those with other people. And there are risks
of leaks, leaks of security information which could endanger
the intelligence process. But I think we are going to work out
a common balance here that will allow us to proceed with this
oversight and with the openness I have just described without
leading to intelligence by timidity or undue danger of
security leaks. It is not going to be easy, but it is necessary
and I'm sure that we can do it.
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One of the steps to move us into doing it was mentioned
by Bobby and that's a new Executive Order which the President
signed two weeks ago tomorrow which tries to take these
evolutionary changes that I have been describing and put
them into express orders. And very briefly, there are
three aspects to this Executive Order: The first is to try
to ensure that the intelligence process of our country is
closely related to the needs and desires of its policymakers.
I'm not the one to decide what we need to do in intelligence,
I'm not a consumer, I'm a producer of intelligence, so this
Executive Order sets up a committee of which I'm the chairman
but of which the members are the Secretary of State, Secretary
of Defense, Treasury, the National Security Advisor to the
President. They gave me my marching orders, my priorities, my
instructions and this should keep American intelligence pointed
in the most useful direction possible. The second aspect of
the President's new order is to give me added authority to
coordinate the intelligence effort. I really have two jobs,
I'm the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, but I
am also the Director of Central Intelligence, which is
coordinating the intelligence functions of not only the CIA,
but the Defense Department, the State Department, the Treasury
and so on. This new order, through the budgeting authorities
of several others, gives me more opportunity to ensure that
we are not only effective but efficient and economical. And
finally, the Executive Order has a section that is devoted
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entirely to protecting the rights of American citizens and
establishing the ground rules under which we can operate in
our intelligence efforts whenever there is an impossible
impingement on American rights. Here, the Attorney General
has been brought into the process much more than ever before
in terms of overseeing and checking and having a system of
check and balances.
The last step in this new era of American intelligence,
the last step in shaping the way we are going to do what has
to be done to obtain the right information for our country,
will be charters enacted by the Congress. Drawing on these
procedures which we have established and which I have described
to you, drawing on the President's Executive Order and now
codifying those portions that the Congress feels should not
be left to the Executive Branch but should be put into
expressed law. That process is just starting and we will be
working in the months ahead with the Congress to establish
those rules and guidelines.
In closing, I would say that I'm very confident that
out of this process now, out of this rehaping of the American
intelligence community, we are going to continue to be the
number one intelligence organization in the world. And I
can also assure you that I personally will be doing everything
I can in the years ahead to ensure that it's just that way
for you.
Thank you
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Q&A
28th Annual University for Presidents
Q: What is the Central Intelligence Agency's role with
the Canadian Intelligence with respect to the Russian
satellite that came down?
A: With respect to the Canadian intelligence we have a
very warm and close liaison relationship as we do
with a number of other allied countries of course.
For instance, in the year I've been in office I've
had calls here in Washington from the top people
in the Canadian intelligence services and we have
ensured that the teamwork that goes between us has
continued smoothly. And the case of the Russian
satellite that came down in Canada, it's just a
very typical instance of that. We in our intelligence
business were the first to detect this problem. We
have been watching this type of Soviet satellite for
over 10 years. In this case, we saw that it was an
aberration, that it changed its pattern up in the
skies. At that point we notified the Canadians and
others and gave our best predictions of where it
could come down and then as soon as it defintely did
come down over Canada there was tremendous cooperation
and coordination in the locating and retrieval of it.
This is typical of one of the areas of intelligence
that we must give continuing attention to and that's
our relationships with our allies. Intelligence
requirements are so great today that we must draw on
every asset we can get and therefore, we try to bring
in the allied intelligence services to the extent we
properly can so that we benefit by what they have and
in turn we give them as much as we can reasonably give
to them who in turn make their efforts more productive.
We are very pleased with our relationships sir with
your intelligence community.
Q: Admiral Turner, I always felt that a democracy was at a
distinct disadvantage in competing with the communist
world countries. Don't you believe that further
openness in our intelligence agencies will only cause
further deterioration in our competition?
A: No I do not, for a couple of reasons. One, there is
clearly no point in defending ourselves if we undermine
ourselves from within. One of the great protections
of our country is being as open as we possibly can.
I'm talking to you about being open in areas where I
sincerely believe we can do that without jeopardizing
what must be kept secret. In addition, let me suggest
to you that one of the reasons we are number one; one
of the reasons we are going to remain number one is,
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there is collecting information and there is analyzing
and interpreting it. Now when you come to analyzing
it you may well find that the conclusions you draw from
the facts at hand are at variance with what the
policymakers want to know. It is my unfortunate duty
to ensure that if the facts lead to conclusions which
are contrary to the policy the President and the
Secretary of State are following that I get up there
and tell them that. But I don't worry about losing
my head, if that's the case. But if I were my
counterpart, Mr. Anderpov, I'm not sure I would be so
happy about it. So I can say to you, I believe that
in a free democratic, open society where we can
interpret the intelligence signs, good or bad, we have
a tremendous advantage over an authoritarian, closed
society.
...Inaudible...
A: No, it's a problem, it's a real problem but it's not
quite attributable to our policy of openness. It's
attributable to our policy of leaks. I don't think
I'm telling anything to you today, or in releasing
these studies on the Soviet economy, or steel in the
world outlook and so on, has caused any concern in
our liaison arrangements. But when they pick up a
newspaper and find that so-and-so was on our payroll
yesterday or they read that the way we got our
information about such-and-such a world event five
years ago was to do this or to do that, that makes
them very nervous. And somehow we must strengthen
our security over the vital information particularly
as I said, over how we collect that information. And
interestingly a part of that process in my opinion is
being more open. Today we have a plethora of classified
information in our government, and Winston Churchill
once said when everything is secret, nothing is secret.
And so, I am trying by releasing more information to
reduce the corpus of classified information within
the government and thereby increasing respect for that
which remains classified. When you have too much, people
simply do not treat it seriously and so, we have got to,
within the limits of our society and its standards and
its laws, tighten up on what we leak, not on what we
deliberately release.
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Q: Admiral Turner could you explain the proposed submarine
cable that is to be possibly buried in the upper part
of Michigan as far as the importance of it?
A: I'd be happy to take a little swing at it, but this is
not actually an intelligence problem it's an operational
military problem and I don't want to get out of my
bailiwick too far. Basically, one of our principal
forms of strategic nuclear deterrencs, preventing
intercontinental nuclear warfare, are our polaris
Posieden submarines on patrol in the oceans of the
world. Their virtue, of course, as you recognize is
that they are difficult to detect and target, so
they give us an assurance that we have a capability
there that can not be destroyed by what is known as
an enemy first attack. One of the things you
obviously must do, however, even in the event of
an enemy first attack, is to be able to communicate
with those submarines. There are lots of ways to
do that and one that is being considered is to bully
these cables in the ground over sizeable distances
because they would be less amendable to being knocked
out in a first strike attack and they would be able
to assure or give us greater assurance of continued
communication with those important submarines. That
is the purpose behind that.
Q: Some of us had a briefing at the CIA in September of
1977 through YPO. George Bush had his expert on China
explain to us what they found, or what they assessed
on the leadership in China, the power struggle. We
were all very impressed with that type of information
but it didn't get very much publicity. I wonder if
you could comment for this group as to how you see
the leadership in China right now?
A: Yes, we've got an interesting shift with the revival
of Teng Hsiao-p'ing in China; an interesting attempt
to reverse a lot of the policies that went on under
Mao; an attempt to put much more emphasis on rational
economic programs to recoup some of the lost distance
in both economics and education that had taken place
previously. There is today, however, not a settlement
of who is going to lead China. There is still a
rivalry. We still see signs of it recurring from
time-to-time. We think a lot is going to depend on
how they resolve these internal rivalries in that
organization. But, overall I would say the signs
have been encouraging since this change in leadership
and we are hopeful that they will resolve their internal
differences and continue on the constructive course they
have embarked on.
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Inaudible
A: The question is, what do I think of the resolution of the
case of my predecessor, Dick Helms, what would I do in
those circumstances, and is there a way out of that
problem?
The answer is yes there is a way out of that problem
and it really comes from this oversight process I
described briefly to you. If I were confronted with
a situation today where a committee of Congress asked
me to testify on the kinds of things they asked Dick
Helms about, I would have the opportunity to say to
them: Sirs, that is a matter under the province of the
intelligence committees of the Congress, one in the
House and one in the Senate, and I have briefed them
on that situation, and I believe it would be best if
you worked with them in obtaining that information.
I'm very free in talking to any committee of Congress
about the substance of intelligence--what we think about
China, what we think about the balance of power in Europe--
but when it comes to describing now how we go about
our intelligence, it's very sensitive material. I am
able to focus that in these two committees which did
not exist in those days with Dick Helms and confine
my most inner revelations to these two small bodies
of Congress-people. That gives me a great deal of
protection against the situation in which he was placed.
Basically, I would also say about the Helms situation
that on the one hand I am very pleased that we did not
have to go through the trauma of a public trial because
it would have forced us to bring forth much more
classified information in the process of the trial. We
would have been jeopardizing this liaison we are talking
about here in particular. But secondly, let me also
assure you that although Mr. Helms was not brought to
trial it was a very firm reminder to all of us in
government that none of us stands above the law.
Q: Inaudible
A: No, I can't for a couple of reasons. One is that the
CIA and the intelligence business in general in our
country stay out of law enforcement; stay out of
collecting information about American citizens. We
have in the course of the years had incidental information
about Park as a Korean. All that information as it
related to the Congress in any way was turned over to
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the appropriate law enforcement authorities. On top
of that, since there is possible legal action pending
here, it would be injudicious for me to enter into a
discussion of any other facts in the case.
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