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December 9, 2016
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July 25, 2001
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February 6, 1978
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Approved For,,$elease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554 02700460001-6 Admiral Turner's Speech at Stanford University - Monday evening - 6 February 1978 Thank you very much Brian - How are we coming through in the back? Alright? I appreciate the opportunity to be with you tonight because it is always stimulating and fun to be back on a college campus. I haven't had any tomatoes yet! Seriously. You have to be fast with your foot work when you make a remark like that! Seriously, it is very important to us in the Intelligence Community and in your government today, to keep wide and open avenues to the academic community. After all, so much of what we do is really academic-type research and need influence from the academic community. We need understanding; we need support. We get it in abundance and we're very greatful for it. Buy beyond that the life blood over the long run of the intelligence of our country depends on continuing infusions of bright, young college graduates into the intelligence profession. We don't need many, but we need some of the highest quality that this country can produce. And over the long run it's going to be critical to our future. Because I think today, perhaps more than any time since this country in 1947, first established a peace time centralized intelligence organization, the importance of the product of that organization is of great, great value to our c untr G heater than 30 years aggo when we first went in ~pproved For 2elease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700460001-6 Approved For aelease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554it002700460001-6 business. Why? Let me just say that in the three areas in which we do our intelligence work - military intelligence, political, and economic - there are greater demands on us today than ever before. Take the military for instance. The military equation today is vastly different than it was in 1947. We were then by far the dominant military power in the world. There was no one that could touch us. But look what's happened since then. The Soviet Union, not being able to compete with us effectively in the political and economic spheres, has chosen to compete in the one area where they really could - the military. Today, we are in a position of being much closer to military parity than ever before. There are of course, vast quantitative and qualitative differences between our military forces and their's. So we are in a situation where neither country could contemplate war with the other without assuming there would be tremendous risks. Now in this kind of a situation intelligence becomes a much greater asset in the military sphere simply because if you know what the enemy can do and perhaps something about what he intends to do you can use your own military capabilities to much greater advantage. Now an enemy or an opponent doesn't normally tell you these things. But over time he gives away clues here and there and it is our job in the intelligence world to try to piece those clues together and get some feeling for his capabilities and his intentions in the military sphere. As we do this, we hope that we are able to give to our policymakers, to the people e pt~ied For Release 001/08/07: CIA-RDP80 015548002700460001-6, who s e programs tor our governmen , a greater ability -3- Approved For Elease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554$WO2700460001-6 to do that job well for you and for me. We hope for instance that we give insight to our negotiators in SALT. We hope that we give ideas to our military leaders that may shape our military forces so that they will best be able to deter war. After all, when you are in a situation of near military parity, it is both risky and destabilizing if your intelligence allows the other side to gain an advantage on you. Because if that advantage gets too big the risks become very high. Similarly in the political field. Thirty years ago we were the dominant political power and many, many of the smaller nations simply followed our lead. I don't have to talk today about how different that is; how many of the smaller nations of the world simply refuse to take the lead, of course, from either the Soviet Union or the United States. I say that with approbation too, there is no reason they should. But what that means for us, is that if we're going to play the leadership role in the world that has been cast upon us, if we're going to do the best we can to help keep the world free and peaceful, we must understand the moves, the cultures, the attitudes, the aspirations of so many of these countries and learn to work with them in a spirit of partnership. That's a different world than the totally independent, one-way attitude that we could take some thirty years ago. Similarly in the economic sphere. Let me touch only lightly by saying that 30 years ago we were independent economically. Today, we are interdependent. It is almost Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700460001-6 Approved For please 2001/08/07-: tIA-RDP80B01554 002700460001-6 trite simply to refer to OPEC and the cost of oil to point our our economic interdependence because it goes in much wider spheres. And again, if we do not have good intelligence information we are going to lose our shirts in the economic arena of international economics today. What happends when the Soviet Union, the European economic community, Japan, take independent economic actions about which we are not forewarned could be devastating to our economy here, to your pocketbook and to mine. And so, we must again in the intelligence world of our country keep abreast in this area much more than ever before. In addition to these increasing needs for good intelligence today we have still another requirement that is upon us. It's upon us because of the past three years of very strong public criticism of some of the past of intelligence in this country. I'm very happy that today I see us beginning to turn the corner on that criticism. I'm beginning to sense that the country is taking a very healthy, constructive approach to intelligence. I'm beginning to ask the question how do we have adequate intelligence for our country within the democratic standards that we want and without abuses of the American rights? I believe that we are working in that direction and that we are going to be able in the next few years to change the intelligence operations for this country which will meet these growing needs in the conomic, political and military spheres. And we'll do so within the confines of our democratic standards and while protecting the rights of our citizens. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700460001-6 Approved For RgJease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554QQ02700460001-6 Let me then talk about four changes that we are making in the ways we go about conducting intelligence today as illustrative of how we're going to both meet the needs and meet the standards of democracy. To begin with we are shifting the product of intelligence. The product 30 years ago was one - one product. It was military intelligence about the Soviet Union. We were probably interested also in six or seven countries in Eastern Europe that border on the Soviet Union and we were interested from time to time when the Soviets made a foray out in the Third World and try to establish a position in some other countries. But basically the product of the United States Intelligence Community was determined by where and what the Soviet Union was up to. There was also one other characteristic of the intelligence product in those days. When the Soviets made a foray out into the rest of the world this country called upon the Central Intelligence Agency not only to provide good information about what was going on but to try to influence the events themselves. You recall we were there in Iran in 1953. We were there in Guatemala in 1954. We were, perhaps unfortunately, there in Cuba in 1961 and afterwards. We were there constructively throughout the VietNam conflict and we were there as recently as 1975 in Angola attempting to change the political complexion of that situation until the Congress said that that was not what this country wanted and called a halt to it. But look at how the world has changed over this 30-year period. Look at how Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700460001-6 -6- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554W2700460001-6 United States interests have expanded. Today we don't need intelligence on just the Soviet Union -- six or eight or ten other countries. Today we have legitimate needs to know what's going on in most of the 150 some countries of the world. When I brief your country's policymakers, I'm as likely to be talking about places like Zimbabwe or Namibia or Somalia or Benin as they are countries that we've all known throughout our lives. I am likely to be talking about OPEC and the organizations that we hardly knew existed 5 or 6 years ago. So today the intelligence product in our country must first cover a much broader geographical area, and secondly, a much wider range of topics not just military intelligence on the Soviet Union. There is one other change today and that is that our attitude toward political action, toward interferring in the internal events of other countries is quite different than it was in the past. As reflected, as I mentioned, in the action of the Congress over Angola in 1975. I would not say, however, that we can or we should eschew the possibility of taking political action when it is in the best interest of our country. But I will say that is is clear that the country wants to use that device more judiciously than in the past and under much greater control. I'll talk about those in just a moment. In sum though on this first point, the product of the United States Intelligence Community today is good intelligence information about the economic, political and military developments in a wide range of countries around the world Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700460001-6 Approved For F lease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554 . 02700460001-6 and much less on political action than it was in the past. Now the second change in what we are doing today is in what I would call the production line. The production line of intelligence is changing remarkably. You know that over the centuries the plain old human intelligence agent - the spy-has been the basic bread and butter way of collecting intelligence information. You know Joshua sent two spies into Jericho before he marches around with his trumpets. And since then the spy has been an essential ingredient of intelligence ever since. In the last decade or decade and a half, however, there has been a revolution on how we collect intelligence data. Today we have advanced technical systems for collecting information that just boggle one's imagination and the quantity of data that can be collected today is multiplying more than geometrically. This vast increase in data changes the way we go about intelligence in many, many facets. But ironically, it also happends to make the use of the human intelligence agent more important than before. You see, when we have a vast quantity of technical data and we begin to pass this to the policy makers of our country, what do they do? They turn to me and they say, "That's nice, that tells us what happened yesterday or maybe today, but what we really want to know is why that happened and what they're going to do tomorrow?" Well that, of course, is the forte of the human intelligence agent. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700460001-6 Approved For Rlease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554QO02700460001-6 And so today as more data comes in through these technical systems it must be complemented by the traditioned human intelligence operator. But is is a different production line. It is one in which we must now have a complementary between the technical and human; it must be like a well-oiled, well-meshed machine. Still a third area in which we are changing remarkably is in the question of openness. Normally, traditionally, intelligence is operated in maximum secrecy. Yet, I believe in our country today we can no longer do that. Now it is difficult to make an adjustment from maximum secrecy to a much greater degree of openness because there is a great deal about intelligence that if made public simply vitiates having the intelligence whatsoever. But our Intelligence Community today, in this country, has no option but to operate in a greater degree of openness. There are inherent disadvantages in this, particularly if you take into account the way the KGB operates against us. But there are also substantial advantages to us in. greater openness. For instance, in the last three years of intense criticism that I mentioned earlier the Intelligence Community did not receive much understanding and support from the American public; even when it was, as frequently was the case, falsely accused because it had not taken the time and made the effort to generate that understanding and support in the past. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700460001-6 Approved For R Jease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554QD02700460001-6 Even though in countless ways it had earned such support. Now, we cannot, even today, in a policy of greater openness start discussing all the things about intelligence and we particularly cannot discuss the ways in which we get intelligence because as soon as you do they really dry up; the countermeasures will be taken to cut them off. But we can and are doing is to look at each study or each estimate that we produce from the intelligence derived, the research that I referred to earlier, and when we finish a study or an estimate today we look at it and we say, "It says here on the cover Top Secret, or secret, or destroy before reading," whatever it may be. And we ask ourselves, if we take out of that the information which really must be held tightly will there still be enough of value to the American public if we publish it. And if the answer is yes we do publish it. And over the past year we averaged 2 studies a week that we've made available to the public. And we think this is providing a service and giving the public a return on its investment and we hope at the same time, generating some sense of renewed confidence in what we are doing. For instance, we published a study last summer on the Soviet economy. We said that prospects for it are perhaps more bleak today than anytime since the death of Stalin. And that has real implications for all of us. It has implications for stability in the world. It has implications for the ability of the Soviets to earn the foreign exchange Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700460001-6 Approved For FIease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554RD02700460001-6 to come and buy technology and manufactured goods in our country. And we publish studies on the world steel outlook and international terrorism, on the world energy prospects and so on. And we hope that in the process of doing this we are not only providing you, the public, a service but that we are also providing ourselves a service in terms of helping to keep those secrets which need to be kept, because one of our problems in keeping secrets is when too much information is classified no one respects the classification. And that is the case today and so we're hoping to reduce that amount of classified information to a minimum. Let me say in all seriousness that there is a lack of respect for classified information in our country today. I'm very concerned for our society when individuals like Ellsberg or the recent man Snepp who wrote a book on the CIA. When people like that feel that they can take it upon themselves as individuals to decide what should be and what should not be classified information in our society, they have established a principle by which, in logical extension, everyone of you here-everyone of the 215 million Americans in this country- have the right to go out and decide what the government should keep private and what it should not. And that I submit to you would be nothing less than choas. I suggest that we have moved into the post-Watergate period today far enough to understand that it is time for this country to return the where the public places a modicum of confidence in its eleCtcApp d A A1JO> I17 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700460001-6 Approved For F lease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554EW02700460001-6 Let me emphasize that I'm not asking you to take us on face alone. Because also out of this crucible of three years of criticism has come another very important change to the American Intelligence Community. And this is a new process of oversight. I've emphasized that we must keep some secrets and therefore we cannot truly have full public oversight of the intelligence process in the United States. But what we are creating in its stead is a surrogate public oversight. The surrogate for you the public are the President, the Vice President, the National Security Council, a body that has been constituted called the Intelligence Oversight Board, and two committees of the Congress. One in each chamber dedicated exclusively to overseeing the intelligence process. I can assure you that we report much more vigorously and much more forthrightly today than every before on our activities to these surrogate oversight bodies. Out of this there are risks and out of this there are strengths. There are strengths in our keeping closer in touch with the American public through the oversight process, through reporting to the Committees of the Congress. There are strengths in having others look at the difficult risky decisions that we must take from time to time and see them from different perspectives. There are also dangers - dangers that we will end up with intelligence by timidity; failure to want to take risks under this situation of oversight and there are risks of too many leaks as a result of proliferating the number of people who need to know that Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700460001-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554002700460001-6 delicate information. But I believe that we will in time strike a proper balance between the risks on the one hand and the right and the desiribility in the American public knowing more about what we are doing on the other, and at least having the assurance that what they cannot know themselves there are officials of both the Executive and Legislative Branches who do and who are exercising that oversight. Two weeks ago tomorrow the President took these trends in American intelligence that I've been describing to you and he put them into a new Executive Order which will reshape American intelligence for years to come. That Executive Order has three characteristics. The first is that it establishes an organ by which I will receive my guidance, priorities, for what we do in intelligence, because I'm not the one to set those, I'm not the consumer of the intelligence, I'm the producer. I will now receive from this group of the Secretary State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Treasury, National Security Council Advisor to the President, a set of goals a set of priorities against which to work. That will be very, very helpful. Secondly, as Brian has indicated, the President in the Executive Order has strengthened some of my authorities to bring together the large and diffuse intelligence apparatus of our country and to be sure that it is well coordinated and that it is efficient and it is not overly expensive. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700460001-6 Approved For Wease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554QO02700460001-6 But at the same time ensuring that within it, on the research on the analytic side, there is ample room for dissenting differing opinions to reach the top policy makers. And finally, the last part in the President's order establishes through the Attorney General a series of very important checks and balances on how intelligence is conducted whenever it may impinge in any way on the rights of the American citizens. I believe that the new procedures we are following, the new orders of the President and legislation which is going to follow in the Congress will, between them, do two things: They will continue to let us have an intelligence capability in this country that is second to none as it is today, and they will do so in a way that will protect the rights of the citizens and ensure that we are doing what needs to be done for the protection and defense of our country and nothing else. I can assure you I'm dedicated to those goals. Thank you. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700460001-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554 DO2700460001-6 Questions & Answers - Stanford University Speech - 6 Feb. 1978 I have a question on the use of CIA money, or the money that's directed to any of the bodies of the government structure, to domestic political organizations whose sole purpose seems to be to influence votes and policies. That's a general question, and in particular I would like to know whether you have any information about an organization called the U.S. Labor Party which was a leftist organization which was so thouroughly infiltrated that it ceased to exist as a leftist organization--and now flourishes with several offices around the world as something called the New Solidarity International Trust Service. My question is, are they using CIA money? A: Let me unequivocally state that the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research none of them... the FBI is another thing, I'll get to that. A segment of the FBI has intelligence purposes, the rest of it is law enforcement. The intelligence portion of the FBI, the intelligence portions of the other organizations that I've mentioned, had no business in and do nothing in the way of domestic intelligence or information collection. That is not our business. Law enforcement is the province of the FBI in its duly constituted mode and it does look into the activities of American citizens under it's proper judicial arrangements. But we do not provide money to the Americal Labor Party or whatever the organization was you stated. We do not have any business spying on the American citizens and the regulations I've been describing to you and some of the new ones that have just been instituted are to prohibit that and to enforce very stringent rules when in the course of collecting foreign intelligence information we inadvertently come across some information about Americans. There are very tight rules on that and generally speaking we have to get out of the act when an American comes on to the scene when we're doing foreign intelligence. Sometimes that can be very inhibiting. For instance, we do a great deal today about anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics and when you're working on a narcotic issue and you're in the middle of a foreign narcotic ring and an American appears, who is also involved in it, we have to get out of the act. It's very tough because we're loosing a very good opportunity. But it's one of those prices we're paying in order not to do the kind of thing that you're suggesting. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700460001-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-F?DP80B01554R002700460001-6 Q: Time quotes you as saying that we're producing--as to the CIA--and it was known in the past that President Nixon had a very poor attitude as to the CIA's productivity in information and other activities. When you say we're producing, do you mean just in intelligence gathering or are you talking about covert activities also? A: Alright, let's be sure we understand our terms. Covert action, political action, that I talked about a little bit as the influencing of events is not really an intelligence function. It has always been given to the Central Intelligence Agency by the government as the only one to do this kind of thing. But that function has become almost miniscule in terms of our budget and in terms of the number of people assigned to it. It is much more today a residual capability of potential for use under the strict controls that have been established. But we are producing good intelligence. We are producing the best intelligence in the world. I would not say we are complacent, that we don't have areas in which we can improve. We are working on that. But we are producing very valuable intelligence and President Carter has repeatedly say that one of the best surprises to him upon becoming President of the United States was the high quality of the intelligence product that he had received. (Turned tape over) A: ..........The first question was if the CIA was testifying on interfering in Chile and the second is are we today involved in destabilizing the government of Jamaica. The answer to the first question is - I've... I haven't criticized my predecessors, I haven't investigated in great detail what was done and what was reported to have been done. But as to the Government of Jamaica today, the answer is absolutely no. We have never, in the past or at the present, tried to interfere with or destablize the government of Mr. Manley. Q: (inaudible)... A; If I comment and say whether it was justified or not it would be an implication that something was down there, and I'm not willing to do that. Because I just (someone from the audience says "something was done and that's a fact") Sure that's fact but what you think was done and what that, lady thinks was done and what I think was done are all three different things and until we can get on the same premise we can't have a decent discussion! Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700460001-6 Approved For Wease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R602700460001-6 Would you please comment in some detail on the types of covert intervention activities for which the CIA is involved in abroad which you as the Director of CIA are specifically permitted and those which you are not... (inaudible). A: How many of you would want me to answer a question that said would I give you the details of all our present covert action? No, I will not answer that question because as I said to you we must maintain some secrets. But what I will tell you is that there have been several covert actions approved during my time in office. But each one of them have gone through the following process: They have gone through the National Security Council (Secretary State, Secretary of Defense and so on), they've debated it, they've discussed it, made a recommendation to the President, the President has signed and said that this is in the best interest of the United States Government and it is then my responsibility to take that information to the Committees of the Congress-- 8 Committees of the Congress--and notify them what we're going to do. Now I suggest to you that's a pretty good check that this isn't some wild scheme. Finally, let me say to you that if I could tell you what we're doing in the way of covert action today, and you could all publish it in a book, you wouldn't make any money. It's not that exciting. Q: ....(inaudible) A: There is nothing that I or the Intelligence Community will do that will violate the laws of the United States of America governing the rights of its citizens and any other person in the United States who are under its jurisdiction. But if you ask me at the same time to comply with all the laws of all the totalitarian and inhumane states in the world, I will not try to do that also. Q: Your predecessor on the platform--Senator Joe Biden of Delaware--who serves on the Senate Committee on Intelligence --said that between 40 and 60 serious breeches of national security, ranging from outright murder to major espionage comparable to the Rosenberg case, have gone unprosecuted because open trials would jeopardize national intelligence sources. Do you confirm or deny that? A: Neither! Senator Biden is on one of my oversight committees so I can't contradict him I guess. No seriously, I don't know where he got his counts 40 to 60 but I will say to you that there do come some difficult decisions, in order in the ]4OFMO A f RR ''as lrtO&140/07?1 r4WP86B6T' 4Rb?2 iff(fi someone Approved For elease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B015W002700460001-6 who is accused of having committed a crime. You clearly must make available all relevant information to that accusation. And sometimes the cost of doing that in terms of what we must disclose would cost maybe some people their lives around the world. It is exorbitant to being able to prosecute. Each time we have to make that decision, not to adduce the necessary classified information, it is a very difficult one and reaches a very high level for decision. But it does at times have to be made. Whether there was 40 or 60 of them I'm not certain of that detail. Q: When you were discussing Jack Welford you seemed to articulate a form of argument which goes as follows: This man did something which, if everybody took it upon himself to act for the same principles in the same way, would be disastrous and wrong so what he did was wrong. And it is only right if everybody could act the same way for the same principles. I wondered if in view of that, you're willing to call right American efforts to influence the complexion of political situations in other countries? If you're willing to say that somebody in the KGB coming up with a plan for influencing political affairs in other countries like the United States, is OK if they take it to 8 committees of the politbureau and all the various quadrants that they have is it okay for them to go around influencing political situations outside the democratic process? A: I don't say that it is OK. I think the question is whether it is alright if the KGB conducts covert actions against us if they cleared it with 8 committees politbureau. It's a view of some extension of my logic which was not entirely clear to me! I say that the KGB doesn't act by any ground rules and we must live with that reality in life today. But that does by no means justify our following the laws and the rules, or lack thereof really, of the KGB. We'll do things in accordance with our laws; our executive orders and our sets of morality. Q: ...(inaudible) A: The question is what is the state of morale after all this investigation of the analytical side of our house in particular? What are we doing to enhance it's capability? I would say that relatively speaking the analytic side of the house as opposed to that which collects intelligence clandestinely, has faced better in wake of all the criticisms. But no one in the Central Intelligence Agency or the other Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700460001-6 Approved For W ease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554QD02700460001-6 agencies of our intelligence community can really feel the same sense of pride that we had 10 or 15 years ago because of all this criticism. It doesn't mean that the criticism wasn't justified or shouldn't have taken place but we are going through a period where we're rebuilding the morale on both sides--the collection and the analysis sides of the house. I'm trying to put new vigor into the analysis side in particular. I'm doing so, as I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks, by bringing in as much confusion from the outside such as stimulus and ideas and imagination as we can; and particuarly from the academic community. I'm establishing a roster of academicians and others who will be consultants and advisors to ensure that our analysis is not one-sided, to ensure that we're bringing out the pros and cons of these issues. And it is this kind of stimulus I think will bring the morale of that part of the Agency back up to where it deserves to be. Q: ...(inaudible) A: How do I feel about the multi-disciplinary approach to problem solving? Generally speaking, I'm all for it if you can get the people who really understand it. We have and, before my time, they created several interdisciplinary groups within the Central Intelligence Agency's analytic organizations to try to take advantage of these new techniques. Again, it is why we must have interchange with college campuses to take advantage of all the latest analytic techniques that are available. Q: As an American who has come from abroad, I'll tell you that from experience there is no facet of American life or no institution in America which has created more of a sense of embarassment or animosity among people in foreign countries than the CIA. In my view in many cases, that by comparison Richard Nixon was like George Washington. Owing to that and owing to your statements earlier, do you plan to make an effort to change that reputation of the CIA? Do you honestly feel that is is feasible that such a change in reputation is possible? And if not, what does that say for the prospects for the CIA? A: The question is can we ever overcome the international suspicion, hatred, animosity toward the Central Intelligence Agency. I certainly hope so. I think it would be catastrophic to our country if we couldn't. Nct that the CIA as such is that critical but a good intelligence operation is. If we have to change the name, we have to change the name, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700460001-6 -6- Approved For Ra1ease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554RW2700460001-6 but that isn't going to change anything. We've got to have an intelligence activity and I sincerely believe that when in this country we do stop flagellating ourselves and do start taking a constructive approach on how to conduct intelligence; I think that will lessen it somewhat. I would suggest to you that while you have been much criticism of the CIA overseas, I also see great respect for it in other areas overseas. Because it is respected for it's effectiveness, it's respected for its professionalism and I think we'll make the balance of that respect outweight the last bit of suspicion and mistrust over time. Q: ..... I'm not at Stanford. In 1939 I graduated from Harvard. I have my doctor's degree. Mr. Director, I ended up in intelligence. I have spent 32 years of my life abroad working for American intelligence; 21 years for the FBI. I like Stanford University, I have no intentions whatever of Santa Anna and saying, "Aw, these punks...". But, I have a lifetime behind me of what I think are accomplishments and I conclude tonight, because many of you are here present to hear the head of the CIA attempt to answer a group of very difficult questions which in the first place he can't answer--he was in the Navy. ... (inaudible) ... Why are we dismantling the clandestine service? A: We are not dismantling the clandestine service. You've all read that I've asked 820 people to leave the Agency over a 2-year period and let me assure you that all of that is coming out of the Headquarters overhead. In fact it is the unnecessary number of people who are administering the people who are out in the field doing the work. I sincerely believe that the clandestine service, the human intelligence portion of our Intelligence Community will be stronger as a result of this paring down to fighting trim. Mr. Turner, I think your going to talk about new rights of intelligence... .Yet, the only major study intervention abroad for the last 3 decades that you criticized is the one in Cuban and I think that's a failure. .... (inaudible) A: Would we terminate our working alliance with the regimes in South Africa and Iran? We will follow the dictates of the policies of the United States of America. As long as the country maintains relations with those countries, we will maintain intelligence liaison with those countries. We will not in any way - in any way - do things to assist them in their internal security measures in their country, or in any way make agreements which will permit them to do intelligence work inside our country. We simply exchange Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700460001-6 -7- Approved For F ease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO15544QO2700460001-6 information with those intelligence services about what happens in third areas of the world. Q: ....(inaudible)..... A: I'm not either denying or confirming it because I don't know that and I know that we're not doing that today. I only know for this period.. Q: Admiral Turner, I can understand your not wanting to discuss covert activities which are presently ongoing but I wonder if you could discuss the criteria to which you submit proposed covert activities before you submit them to the oversight committee and second, whether you can give an example of covert activities that you may have proposed to the oversight committee that they have rejected. A: I'll do my best to answer that as fortnightly as I can. I do not propose covert activities to the National Security Council. I feel it is my responsibility to have available covert action plans if they are likely to be of use to our country. When I go to the National Security Council meetings and I think it is possible that there will be a need of covert action, I will have a plan in my pocket. And if the discussion in the Council is such that there seems to be illicited from the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and the others a requirement for covert action, I will take the plan out of my pocket and volunteer it. Sometimes they will accept it sometimes they won't. I'm not in the business of pushing covert action because I'm not a policymaker of the government. I'm there to provide objective intelligence information and when necessary to suggest or to offer what covert actions we have the capability of undertaking. There have been covert actions turned down, there have been covert actions approved. I'm not at liberty to discuss specific ones at this time. But let me suggest, because of the unease of my position on wanting to maintain a covert action potential in this country, an example: What if a terrorist group obtained a nuclear weapon and was threating us or other parts of the world. I think you and the American public would find me remiss if we didn't have an ability to get intelligence about what was going on; some ability to do something about a terrible situation like that. Q: Do you plan any more massive firings of CIA people and, also, you said that it was just Headquarters overhead, did you fire anyone overseas anywhere? A: First, I don't have anymore plans such as that. What I did was remove 820 positions--eliminated 820 jobs. But the people in those jobs weren't necessarily the ones to leave the Agency. We had a screening process for who was asked to leave. Some of the people we asked toApproveed rrWeI eoWs%rMift/07B'dA-15 a2 049CM-8.nd -8- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554QA02700460001-6 replace them. But the 820 positions in the Headquarters in Langley will not be replaced. There will be nobody in those jobs by the end of two years. Q: ...(inaudible)... A: There sure are. How do I know what is going on in the covert action field? Are there mechanisms to ensure that I'm informed? I can only say to you that I'm violating a law and I'm violating the Executive Order of the President if I don't keep those people up above informed of what's going on. I assure you that I don't want to go to jail anymore than anyone else and I don't want to disobey the orders of the President anymore than anybody else. And, therefore, I'm keeping myself informed and ensuring it. The only assurance I can give of that is that in scouting these 820 positions I've removed, earlier in my time in the Agency, I found 5 instances of people who were not conforming with the rules; the way they were doing their jobs or weren't keeping their superiors fully informed. And those five people don't work for us anymore. ....(inaudible)... A: The gentlemen has indicated that I said that we're doing more in economics and less in military, that we're facing a major threat with Japan in the economic sphere and am I then trying to do things against Japan that we might be doing against the Soviet Union because of their military threat. Let me make a couple of points. One, is that military intelligence on the Soviet Union has still got to be our number one issue but we've got to extend ourselves much further into this economic sphere. I did not really single out Japan. I said if the Soviet Union, the European economic community, Japan any of the major economic powers of the world take actions without our knowing it we're going to be in trouble. The Japanese, the European Economic Community generally keep them. We have no intentions no designs to take any kind of covert action against the economic position of Japan. Q: Mr. Turner, would you mind sharing with us the opinion you mentioned having concerning the events of Santigo early 1970. A: I don't think I mentioned having any opinion on that. Let me say this. It is clear in some instances the Central Intelligence Agency did things that it should not have done. It is also clear that in some instances it did things that were quite authorized, quite acceptable to the American public at that time, and which in retrospect and the change of time our attitudes are culture our standards have changed in this country and indeed you could look back and be Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700460001-6 -9- Approved For lease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554WO2700460001-6 critical. I'm not trying to white-wash everything that's done and say it's all good. But I'm also not willing to stand here and say that I'm spending a great deal of my time in exhuming the past and trying to wear a hairshirt. I'm here to see to it that we have the best intelligence service this country can have into the future. To the extent I need to dig into the past to ensure that the abuses don't recur I will and am doing that. But I'm concentrating much more on the future and on building our intelligence on the sound types of foundations that I have described tonight. And I'm very greatful that this hall would be filled with people like yourselves who are concerned, as I am concerned, to ensure that we do have a continuing ability to obtain that information that is essential to our country. Thank you so much. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700460001-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700460001-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002700460001-6