ADMIRAL TURNER'S REMARKS TO SUMMER ONLY EMPLOYEES AUDITORIUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R002800330001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 20, 1978
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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ADMIRAL TURNER'S REMARKS
TO
SUMMER ONLY' EMPLOYEES
AUDITORIUM
THURSDAY, 20 July 78
Good morning. I'm pleased to have you here, pleased to be
with you, pleased you are spending the summer with us and I know
making a contribution to our activities here. I hope that in the
process of it that you are getting a good feel for what you all
know a lot about already because your parents, or one of them
at least, are involved with us. We are pleased to have this
extension of our family spirit in the Agency here by having you
with us all summer. I'm going to spend, I hope, very little time
in talking and mainly answering your questions because I'd like
to address what's on your minds after your many years of association
with the Agency indirectly and now your direct association for these
weeks.
I: would like to emphasize that there are two basic functions
that we do out here. You're working in many different areas of
the Agency, some of you see the overall picture, some of you see
only the picture in your particular segment. The two things you do
in intelligence is collect data and then you interpret it. You
collect data by three different means as a nation. There's human
intelligence (the spies and agents). It is collected by signals
intelligence, getting the waves that go through the air, picking
them off and desiphering and understanding them. And by photo-
graphic intelligence. Those are the three basic methods. Now
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here, the DDSTT is involved in the two technical forms of
intelligence collection, signals intelligence and photo
intelligence. The DDO is the Agency's and the nation's
primary human intelligence activity. The NFAC on the other
side is the other half of the picture--all of the interpretations,
the analysis, the use of the data collected. As you know, of
course, I'm only talking here about these three Agency components.
Outside, in the Department of Defense and elsewhere, the
Department of State, we have other collection activities. The
National Security Agency is the basic signals collection agency
of the government is housed in the Department of Defense. It
ties in closely with our smaller signals intelligence activity,
the DDS&T. The Department of Defense runs most of the photographic
intelligence that ties in very closely with some very substantial
role the DDS&T plays there. The Department of Defense has human
intelligence activity also which is subordinate in supporting
that of the DDO here. So, over in Defense and State there are
corresponding organizations to NFAC. It is very critical that
we have those because we want to have competing analysis, competing
interpretations.
The real marvelous challenge of being in intelligence is how
to bring together all these pieces of data that are collected by
these different systems, organizations, and piece them into a
picture that makes some sense that can be interpreted by the
decision makers and be useful. But that is not easy and it's never
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soft intelligence, let me assure you that there's almost no
intelligence that is absolutely hard, absolutely conclusive.
Yet maybe you know they have a missile in that hole in that
place and that's a very firm, hard piece of intelligence. But
why they've got it there and what it will do and why they put
it there and how important it is is all very interpretative.
And it is useful to us to have the Defense Department studying
why that missile is in that hole; the State Department studying
what the purpose behind the whole missile program; and our
people in NFAC doing it also because there's a great danger that
anyone, no matter how smart he is, can get focused on three
pieces of the puzzle, three clues that came in from the collectors
and forget a portion, or discard an important one as not being
important when in fact history may prove that that was really the
important return. So we want competing analysis.
On the collection side, I am sure you can appreciate that
signals interpretation systems, the intercept systems,
photographic systems, human systems are expensive. The first two,
the technical ones are really expensive. The human systems are
risky, you get into trouble if you make a mistake. So you want
that part of intelligence, the collection part, well coordinated,
well brought together. Number one, it's expensive or risky and
therefore, you don't want to do more with it than you absolutely
need to. Secondly, because it's expensive, you don't want to have
too much, you don't want to overlap. Thirdly, because it's
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critical to the future and safety of our country that we get
good and right amount and kind of information, we want to make
sure that they are working as a team so that they fill each
other's gaps. You see what I mean, you don't want these people
to be doing this, these this, these this, and nobody doing
something else that's got to be done or something that falls
in between them. We need to be sure that what you can't get
from a photograph, you try to get from a signal or a human
agent. What doesn't a photograph tell you? It doesn't tell you
why they did what you've just taken a picture of. Right? It's
very hard to be sure you know why they moved this thing from here
to there; or why they built this thing this way instead of that
way. But when you've got the picture and you know something
about it, you go to a human agent and you say, now look we know
they're building a thing over here and it looks to me like it's a
nuclear weapons production plant, but I'm not sure whether that's
it, you get into the ministry of nuclear affairs in that country
and see what you can find for me. Then you turn the signals fellows
loose and you say, hey look we found this thing in a photograph over
here but it's got an antenna on the roof, they must be sending out
some kind of a signal, tell us what that is. Then you bring it
altogether. This is what I'm charged with doing, bringing this
together in my second capacity, not only as head of the Central
Intelligence Agency, but as Director of Central Intelligence.
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My second job is to coordinate all the activities of the
entire Intelligence Community. And that primarily means in
this collection side, to ensure that we don't do too much, we
don't do too little, and whatever we do is in a teamwork,
coordinated fashion. As Director of Central Intelligence it is
also my job to see that these competing interpretative analytic
organizations, Defense, State, and CIA primarily, are at least
asking the right questions, and producing evaluations on the
right materials that are given to our decision makers. I'm
going downtown this afternoon for instance, and be chairman
of a committee with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, Dr. Brzezinski, Secretary of the Treasury, Head of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and a couple of others.
The whole purpose of the meeting is to look at them and say,
Gentlemen, what do you want, what do you need as the consumers
of intelligence which I should be producing for you. Am I
fulfilling the role of intelligence because we are only here
to support you people. You are the policy makers. That's an
important distinction that you should all be aware of while you
are here. That is, that in intelligence we stay as far away from
policy as we can.
people sometimes come to?me in public question periods and
say,. what do you think, should .we have ?a new SALT agreement. I
say, that's not my business. It's my business to ensure that
the people negotiating the SALT are aware of what the strengths of
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the Soviet Union are; are ware of if we make an agreement that
you won't have any more of these kinds of widgets. But I can
tell them that if the other side built those widgets, that I
can check that, or that there is a ten percent chance or seventy
percent chance or a ninety-nine percent chance that if they
cheat and build those widgets, that we in intelligence will be
able to-tell you, the policy makers. But you see if we in
intelligence say, I think that SALT Treaty would be terrible,
but this one would be good, then the people begin to wonder
whether, when we provide them intelligence about whether we
can verify this SALT Treaty or that one, that we are biased; that
we are interpreting the intelligence to suit our policy desires.
So, in spite of what you often read in the newspapers--the CIA
was in favor of this or against that or put out a position paper
on such and such--we try very scrupulously to stay out of the
policy business and to providing the most unbiased, most objective
information we can to help the policy makers to make those
decisions.
The greatest strength we have is our people and I would
like to say to you what you already know because of your long
association with Central Intelligence Agency, that we have as
fine a group of public servants in this organization as there
is anywhere in our government, and they'll stand up to any group
of people in any industry or business anywhere in the world.
They are capable, dedicated and very patriotic. That is why we
are pleased to have you with us.at this early stage. We hope
it will give you that appreciation and that has several benefits
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to us. One is as you go along with your education and your
life, you are going to become part of the important opinion
shapers in our country. And although you already understand
the Agency and its business fairly well, we want you to have
a better understanding of us because there is a great need in
our country today for people to understand and appreciate the
value of what we do, that this is critical to our country. Beyond
that, we're selfish because we hope that this additional insight
into the importance, the challenge, the great contribution of
our Agency will lead a lot of you to come back after you finish
high school, finish college, whatever you decide to do and come
work with us on a regular basis. Let me answer your questions if
I can. Who would like to lead off?
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QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
SUMMER ONLY EMPLOYEES
Q: (Inaudible)
A: Do I ever have any problems with my conscience on things
I do and authorize? No, I wrestle with my conscience in
many decisions. I simply will not do something that I
don't think is proper, certainly not anything that I
think is illegal. I don't want to go to jail anymore
than anybody else That is the problem because we all are
honest, and we're not trying to break the law. Problems
come with tough decisions---and is the value to the country
of obtaining this information worth the risk. This Agency
has been criticized over the years, particularly in the
last few, for having done things that weren't worth the
risk. Let me tell you that I 'sincerely believe there have
been few if any people here who make decisions and take
risks that were ceitici:zed afterwards who didn't do it
after searching their conscience and doing it in what they
thought was in the best interests of their country. You
have to always remember' that what was acceptable ten years
ago is often criticized today. My recollection, when the
Bay of Pigs came along, there wasn't any outcry in this
country that that was an immoral and improper thing to do,
we were all unhappy that we botched it--not because we did
it. Today, we are unhappy because we did it. Now maybe
our hindsight is better and so: on. But I'm saying that people
here who decided on some of that were in conformance with the
attitudes of the country. Were trying today to stay in more
conformance with the attitudes of the country but we can't
predict what they are going to say about us ten years from
now. But I sleep easily at night because I do wrestle with
my conscience when I have to make a decision and when I make
it, I feel that I've made it on the best grounds that I can.
As. a human being, I'll make mistakes but I know I'm doing it
with. sincerity, I know I'm doing it with the best I have in
me,,that's all I can do.
Q: (Inaudible)
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A: The honest answer to your question is n cannot
guarantee that to anybody--you can't hear the question
in the back. It was with all the oversight that we do in
covert operations can we guarantee that it'll never leak.
The answer has to be no. The question is really though,
can we do covert operations with reasonable probability of
success without leaks, without compromise with the people
involved, so that we with honesty, with integrity, ask
people to do these things and risk their lives or reputations.
I don't know the answer to that to be very honest with you
and I don't think I could answer that forthrightly for another
year or two because we are still working out that relationship.
You read in the papers the last week that the President met
with the Congressional leadership. There's no question of
leaks, not only in the Congress but in the Executive Branch.
One of the things we suggested is that there be fewer committees
in the Congress who are privy to the covert action in-
formation because it is a danger. Not because the Congress
is leaking but because--according to what was labeled in
the newspaper one day as Turner's Law--and that is that the
possibility of a leak is geometrically proportional to the
number of people who know the secrets, regardless of who
they are. It's just almost a mathematical law. So we want
to reduce the number of people on the Hill, but preserve
enough that there is good oversight. And I'll say to you in
great sincerity that there should be this oversight for
covert action. Because if we made mistakes in the past,
which is part of intelligence we thought we knew what was
needed, we thought we :knew what was right, we were wrestling
with our conscience and doing it to the best of our ability,
but maybe we didn't have the proper picture and people who
are open to the electorate do. So I think there should be
oversight, but we hope to get it down to a smaller number
but adequate for them to be totally effective.
Q: (Inaudible)
A: It's better to have no intelligence agency than one that is
crippled. We cannot have an agency that is crippled, we
absolutely cannot. The world'is not an open society. The
United States is the most open society the world has ever
known. What happens in other parts of the world today, more
than ever before, effects everybody in the world and us in
particular in this country. And therefore, we cannot afford
to have our fate determined by people who are in closed socie-
ties whose actions taken in a closed, secretive manner, are
going to determine our sa.fety,our economic wellbeing and our
political future. So we've got to have this and I don't have
any doubts about our ability as a country to maintain a
capable, non-crippled intelligence capabilities. If the
Congress passes a law that would cripple us, the President
of the United States would veto it in five minutes. And the
attitude on Capitol Hill in the last 6 to 8 months has really
remarkably changed. I have no concern about the Congress
passing the charter for us that would cripple us. It
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wouldn't get through the Congress if it would. I really
have that confidence so I think as I said to the previous
question, it will be a year or two before it all settles
out and I can really come to you and say, I'm confident
we're running without undue problems; I'm confident we're
going to get there, but we're not there yet. It will take
some time. It's a new process.
Q: (Inaudible)
A: Have we come any closer in our recent efforts for greater
openness and so on to define the role of secret intelligence
in American society? That's a marvelous question and a very
appropriate one. This Sunday in Aspen, Colorado, there will
be a conference at the Aspen Institute on this question of
how you have secrecy in an open -emocratic society. We
generated this by asking them if they would do this. We
think a national debate on this issue is very much needed.
Yes, I think we're making a?lot of progress in that direction.
Let me explain our openness policy just very briefly. I feel
that no public institution in our country can survive without
the support of the American public. The American public
supported this agency from 1947 to about 1975 on faith. They
knew we were needed and they said do what you have to do
because we know you're good guys and you're doing it right.
Then that was questioned in the press for a couple of years.
We have made some mistakes. The public doesn't quite accept
us on that same blind faith any more. If we are going to
survive over the next decade or two, I think we have to have
enough public support that we will be preserved as a public
institution. Therefore, we have to have enough openness to
generate enough understanding, to generate public support for
intelligence, or a Central Intelligence Agency. But opening
up does not mean opening up the doors to everything we do
and how we do it, particularly not to that collection side of
the house, because if you compromise how you get your
information, you'll never get it again. On the evaluation
side of the house we can afford to give out more to the
public and it benefits the public. We released yesterday a
study on civil defense in the Soviet Union, a topic that
has been so distorted in the press over the last 3 or 4 years.
We hope that our paper will put it in perspective. We'll
take a position on one side or the other and lay out the
facts of what actually is being done and what it means.
That kind of thing we can be more open on and we can help with
more. But those Agees, Frank Snepps, John Stockwells, those
people--they're not part of an openness policy, they're part
of a traitorous policy. They are disclosing things that
should not be disclosed and that's not what we are talking
about here. But I think we are as a nation finding our way
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into a better balance of secrecy and openness in our
intelligence activities. You might have noticed in this
morning's paper that the citadel of intelligence secrecy
in the United Kingdom where they have the Official Secrets
Act (which makes it against the law to do almost anything
in terms of disclosing information) yesterday proposed an
amendment to the Official Secrets Act, is a new example
of greater openness also.
(Inaudible)
A: The relationship between the FBI and the CIA is primarily
what we call counterintelligence, which is to understand
and counter the efforts of other countries to collect
intelligence about our country. That means in some cases,
for instance, surveilling individuals. I mean if a spy
comes to our country, you want to watch him because you
know he is a spy, you want to see what he is doing and
whom he's contacting and where is he getting information.
The FBI is the only one authorized to do that in the
United States to protect the rights of the American
citizen because they are a law enforcement agency and they
have very tight controls and so on. We don't get involved
in counterintelligence activities in this country. But
overseas we are in a much better position to watch that kind
of thing, because the FBI is a domestic agency and we are
basically a foreign intelligence agency. So we have
responsibilities at CIA for counterintelligenee overseas.
So if the spy is in a foreign country today it is our
responsibility. If he comes on an airplane to the United
States tomorrow he shifts to the FBI. We've got to get real
teamwork here, we've got to have real close teamwork or
we'll drop the ball between us here. All these arguments--
is he really a spy, or is he really something else, or some-
times these fellows defect and they say well, one us will
say he's not really a defector he's still working for them,
and the other agency will say no, he really isn't--what
he's giving us is good information. So we have to work
very carefully together to be sure we're a team, and I'm
happy to say to you that although there were times in the
past some years ago when there wasn't good teamwork, I see
no evidence of that today. We are working together very
well, very cooperatively.
Q: (.Inaudible)
A: Mort Halperin recommends we do away with human intelligence
and rely only on these two technical means of intelligence
collection--is that practical? No, absolutely not. I
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alluded to it a minute ago. When you get information
from these technical systems--and I'm oversimplifying
here a bit--but generally speaking, it tells you what
happened yesterday or today. It doesn't tell you why
it happened or what's going to happen tomorrow, or
what people are thinking and planning which may be of
great importance to you. That's where the human
intelligence agent has his forte. He is the one who
tries to penetrate into people's thinking, into people's
planning, into people's ideas, intentions, and add that
dimension to this other information. I can assure you
that it has got to be a trilogy of signals photographic,
and human intelligence to bring it altogether. In
addition, you are never happy when you have good intelligence
from only one source. You lack corroboration. Even pictures
can be misleading: camoflage, perception, misinterpretation
of the pictures. You are best off when you get basically
corroborative material from two or three different means
of collecting intelligence. You are much less likely either
to be deluding yourself or having to exclude. So I would
fight to the end for the human intelligence agent.
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