DCI TALK TO SAN DIEGO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & KIWANIS CLUB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R002800340001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 8, 1978
• Content Type: SPEECH

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DCI TALK TO SAN DIEGO
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE f KIWANIS CLUB
TUESDAY, 8 August 1978
Thank you very much Dick, despite your gross exaggerations.
Bob, thank you for having me here from the Kiwanis side. It
is really a great treat for Pat and me to be back in San
Diego. I did four tours of sea duty based here and found it
such a wonderful place to live. Pat and I feel though, as
if we left our daughter, son-in-law, a mother, an uncle and
aunts, cousins, godsons, all here in San Diego so we are
very much at home with you whenever we have this kind of
opportunity to come back.
Because of that background I know how much San Diegans
are concerned and interested in matters of national security,
so I am delighted to have the chance to talk to you today about
American intelligence, because our intelligence capability
is indeed one of the cornerstones of our national security. It
is interesting I think to look back and realize that perhaps
as little as five or eight years ago, this talk probably would
not have taken place. In those days intelligence simply was
not discussed in public; it was almost totally secretive. And
yet, since then the events in Vietnam and Watergate have
virtually propelled intelligence activities into the headlines.
Allegations have followed upon allegations. Stories have been
written over and over again in the press. And what hasn't been
written in the press has been disclosed by former agents in their
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books. What has happened is that American. intelligence has
come to operate in a much more open way than ever before in
its history. Well you might ask, can you, in this kind of a
fishbowl continue to be effective. Can you cast away this
tradition and-past precedent of total secrecy and still do
the. job that needs to be done for our country?
What I would like to say to you today is that my opinion is
yes. Not in spite of this new openness but because of it. Being
open is being American and therefore, I believe we find great
strengths in being more open with you., the American public.
First, because I sincerely believe that no agency of our
government can remain effective over the long run unless it
has the support of the American. public. Now, intelligence over
the years has always had that support, but it has had it
largely on faith. Largely on an inherent recognition by the
American public that there were some things about which you
could not and should not talk. The result, however, was that
in 1975 and 1976, when we were cast into the press and under
intense public criticism there simply was no reservoir of
understanding, of support. There was no way for the American
public to balance past achievements of the intelligence
community with these alleged abuses. So, by being more open
today we-hope and expect that we are generating a sense of
support a sense of understanding and we are doing that in a
number. of ways. My being here with you today is part of that
commitment to openness. I and my deputy, Ambassador Frank
Carlucci speak on. the average perhaps to about six groups
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across our country every month. Secondly, we are being
more open with the American media when they make inquiries to
us. There are still many, many instances when all we say is
"no comment." But our needle is not stuck in that groove
anymore. Thirdly, we are publishing more in unclassified
form and making it available to the public and we think that
is making a contribution. But let me note to you at this
point that these are controlled disseminations, all three
of these steps--speeches, media responses and publications.
They are done by responsible authorities. We are not simply
opening the floodgates and telling every intelligence
professional that he can go out and say what he wants to say.
Clearly we must not talk about those things which cannot be
discussed in public without danger. to our country.
For instance, I mentioned our publications. What we do
today is when any element of the intelligence community produces
a classified study, we take a look at
and we say to ourselves
if we remove from that study those elements that really must
remain secret, will there be enough left to be of value to
the American public? Would what was left enhance the quality
of American debate on some important topic? If the answer
is yes, we publish it. We publish on a wide diversity of
topics: energy forecasts, international terrorism, international
economic statistics, Soviet military expenditures, Soviet
military strengths and recently an interesting one on the civil
defense program in the Soviet Union. I brought some of these
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with me and they will be available to those who are interested
at the door when we leave. Now I can assure you that with
this policy of openness the problem of protecting our true
secrets in this country is still a very substantial one. Yet,
I believe that greater openness is one way to ensure greater
secrecy. If that appears to you to be a contradiction, let
me explain it briefly.
By publishing more and putting it into the public domain
we are, in fact, constricting the amount of.classified information
that must be kept by the Government. One of the greatest
problems we have today in retaining secrets is that so much
that is not really secret is so labeled. People look at that
document, it says confidential, or secret, or top secret or
maybe destroy before reading and they don't really believe it.
And we do have a very serious problem of too many leaks of
things which must and should be kept secret.
Every reporter, today, it seems to me aspires to be a
Woodward or a Bernstein. Recently, for instance, one of the
presidents of a major university made the comment that just a
few years ago college graduates aspired to go into medicine.
Today, they think they can find their fame and fortune better
in journalism. The rewards, the satisfactions from criticizing
our society, from uncovering its faults and its warts, appear
to be greater today than from helping to build our society. Too
often today, every public servant is suspect, every renegade
so-called whistle blower is an automatic hero.
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Let me again say to you, that when there is little trust
of public officials and when destroying is preferred by many
to building, we as a nation are in trouble. Let me assure
you, nonetheless, that I view the activities, the revelations
of Woodward and Berstein as an.important contribution to the
strength of our country. But we must never forget that when
they were finished, somebody had to step in and begin the job
of building back again. Yes, there has been too much secrecy
in the past and there is too much secrecy today in government,
but secrecy is not inherently good or bad, moral or immoral.
Secrecy is simply a condition of necessity. There are certain
things which governments, business, and private individuals
cannot or will not do unless there is some. modicum of assurance
of confidentiality. It is particularly true of course, with
governments; it is particularly true with the intelligence
activities of governments. Our country today has a legitimate
need to know what is going on in foreign lands, because more
today than perhaps ever before in our history what happends
abroad can have a direct bearing on you and on me and on our
country's welfare. Yet, many of these countries that have this
impact on us are not open societies like ours; not ones where
you can get a feel for what is going on by reading the newspapers--
you need intelligence. And yet, if we were to disclose our
sources of gaining that information for our nation's policymakers,
clearly those sources would dry up. Remember how in World War II
we broke the German and Japanese codes. Think how little good
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into the public. The problem, however, is how with some
need for secrecy such as this, can we give assurance to the
American public that the secrets are not being held for
purposes of covering up misdeeds or malfeasance.
I believe that out of the crucible of these last several
years of criticism of the American intelligence community, we
have been forging a new process of what I call surrogate
public oversight. By that I mean that when the public cannot
know everything that we can do, we can establish surrogates
for the public., who will know as much as is necessary for the
right check upon our activities. Who are those surrogates?
First, there is the President and Vice President of the United
States. Today they take a very keen and active interest in our
intelligence activities. I meet personally with the President
weekly and keep him fully posted of the things that we are
doing. He and the Vice President don't hesitate to give me
guidance and specific direction. Secondly, 2 1/2 years ago
we created something known as the Intelligence Oversight Board.
This board today consists of three distinguished Americans: former
Senatore Gore of Tennessee, former governor Scranton of
Pennsylvania, and a Washington attorney, Thomas Farmer.. These
three gentlemen are empowered to look into the legality and
the propriety of what we are doing in the world of intelligence.
If any member of the intelligence community--or for that matter
any private citizen wants to look into or believes he knows
there is something being done improperly or illegally by any
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this board. The board will investigate and then will report
only to the President of the United States what they believe
should be done about it.
I believe that these procedures today, for surrogate
oversight give the American public a greater assurance than
has ever been possible before, that we are conducting our
intelligence activities in conformance with the standards
the American public would want us to, and also in conformance
with the overall foreign policy of our country. And at the
same time I would suggest that these surrogate oversight
mechanisms provide to the so-called whistle-blowers a
wonderful opportunity if they are really interested in reform
rather than in simply praise or profit. Because, if the
whistle blower will go to one of these oversight mechanisms,
he can avoid disclosing classified information that could be
of grave harm to our country and only afterwards, if he
failed in that process, feel that he actually had to go public.
Now let me be totally candid with you. Clearly, there are
risks in oversight. First, there is the risk of leaks. The
more people who know any given secret, no matter who they are,
the more probability that there will be a leak. And beyond
that there is the risk of over-management. As people oversee,
they sometimes tend to want to get into increasing amout of
detail and, in fact, to direct or manage rather than oversee.
In intelligence as in anything else, too many cooks can spoil
the broth. I think that what we need is to establish a right
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balance between enough oversight to give assurance, but not
so much as to hobble our intelligence activities. Today we
are developing that balance, and I think the proportions
are correct. But, again, I would be candid with you, it
will probably be another two years before we have adjusted,
worked out the system of checks and balances and are certain
that we are really on solid footing.
Well you might ask me, is it all worth it? Is it worth
the risk to have this oversight? I think so, for two principal
reasons. First, it does give an assurance not only to the
American public, but to us within the intelligence community
that we are on the right track. Secondly, let me point out
that it is much easier to manage a large organization when
it is held very strictly accountable. Particularly in a
sensitive and secretive business like intelligence, it is easy
to get carried away with dedicated enthusiasm. It is easy
perhaps to take risks that perhaps aren't warranted. But
when you know that you are going to have to stand up and
defend those decisions in front of skeptics, in front of
people who are overseeing you, you feel now that you have a
different measure of what actions you can and you should take.
It helps, it really does help a manager to have an organization
that is held accountable. So what I am saying to you is that
in my view the risks of oversight and openness are more than
counterbalanced by the benefits. The benefits of greater
support from the American people; the benefits of greater
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the corpus of secrets; the benefits of greater assurance
against abuses; and the benefits of easier management
procedures.
There are several other exciting developments in American
intelligence today that I would like to mention briefly. One
of these is changes in the way we go about collecting
intelligence information. Basically, there are two ways
to get intelligence data. One is the traditional human agent,
the spy. The other is the more modern technique of using
sophisticated technical procedures to gain information--
usually be means of photographs or by means of intercepting
signals that are going through the air. There has been
almost a revolution in this technical side of intelligence
collection in the last several decades. Because we are the
most sophisticated technological nation in the world, this
gives us one of our great advantages in the field of
intelligence today. We in fact, are able with these
technical means to collect a wealth of data, almost so
much that we may be surfeited. And yet, what a photograph
will tell you, for instance, is generally what happened
yesterday. And what you often want to know is why did it
happen yesterday and what is going to happen tomorrow. That
is the forte of the traditional human intelligence agent:
seeking our people's intentions, people's plans, people's
ideas for the future. So what we are trying to do today is
find the right mix between the old human agent and the new
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an exciting challenge, particularly when you have a large and
diverse bureaucracy that you must bring about a sense of true
team work in.
Secondly, there is also a marked change in the focus of
our intelligence efforts overall. If you look back 30 years
to when this country first organized a central intelligence
activity, our principal focus in those days was the Soviet
military effort. That was viewed as the primary threat to
our country and, therefore, all of our intelligence organizations
focused primarily on that. Look at how the world has changed
since then. Today our country has important, legitimate
interests in most of the 150--some nations in the world. Yet,
our intercourse with most of those nations is much more economic
and political than it is military. And so, we have had to
expand our focus, being able to not only cover matters of military
import, but economic and political as well. Look what that does
to the number of skills we must have in our storehouse. Today
we must be able to deal with grain forecasts, energy forecasts,
medical predictions on leaders of the rest of the world,
political movements, economic data and so on. Its an expanding
challenge and one that really does stimulate us. Let me not
overstate the case, because keeping our finger on the Soviet
military threat still remains our number one priority--and it must.
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What I am saying is that we have had to enhance our overall
interests and our overall capabilities beyond just that.
Thus, what I am really saying to you, is that today our
intelligence community has got to learn to operate in a new
environment a much more open environment and at the same time
it must also expand the types of information which it is
collecting and evaluating for the benefit of our national
decision makers. In short, this is an exciting, an important,
even an historic moment in American intelligence. What I
believe we are doing is evolving a new model--a distinctly,
uniquely, American model of intelligence. A model that truly
reflects American values and what at the same time permits us
to be effective in accomplishing the intelligence tasks set
before us. I believe we are the best intelligence service in
the world today. I assure you I am doing everything I can to
keep us on top. Thank you.
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QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
DCI TALK TO SAN DIEGO
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE F KIWANIS CLUB
Tuesday, 8 August 1978
Q: In the past the intelligence community has been somewhat
frangmented with different organizations going different
directions. There have been reports it is being more
concentrated under your control, what is the status?
A: Last January the president signed a new executive order
which did strengthen my role as the Director of Central
Intelligence, the coordinator of all of our nations
intelligence activities, as opposed to my other job as
head of the CIA. He strengthened my authority over the
budgets of the intelligence community and over what we
call tasking. Telling people what to collect with these
various technical and human means. But he was very careful
to ensure that there was no strengthening in my authority
over what we call the analytic or the interpretive part,
because no intelligence data is ever so conclusive that you
know exactly what it tells you. You want different
interpretations, you want conflicting views to come forward
and there are still independent analytic interpretative
agencies inside the Defense Department, the State Department,
the Department of Energy, the Treasury and the CIA. So,
we have tried to find a balance of more centralized control
to be sure that one man is responsible for these risky,
expensive collection efforts and yet diversity of inter-
pretation and analysis. In the six months we have been
working under this new order, it is going splendidly from
my point of view and I believe from everyone's.
Q: I had read several sources, which state Soviet Russia has
anywhere from 500 to 700 KGB agents roaming our United States.
Is that a true facr or not?
A: There are a lot of Soviet KGB agents in the United States. I
can't confirm that number of 500-700 that you have suggested,
but they are very considerable. The Soviet Union is very
strong, very active in this human intelligence field that I
have described to you and there are agents scattered throughout
all of their official activities: their embassy, their
United Nations delegation and so on, trade delegations and
what not, in the United States is very substantial. I think
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we are their match in the human intelligence field because
we are smart, not because we have such a huge effort as
they do. I think we are better than they, as I mentioned,
in the sophisticated technical techniques. Finally, I would
say that I always believe that you can do this interpretive
function far better in a free society like ours than you
can in an autocratic society like theirs. If my analysts
come up with the conclusion that the President is doing
something wrong, I can afford to send that to him, I'm
not sure that Mr. Andrepov in the KGB would stick his
neck out that far.
Q: With all these various intelligence agencies in different
parts of the government, are we going to ensure that they
will pool their information, that they will share it so
everybody can benefit by it.
A: Yes. I tried to simplify my previous answer. Another
authority that the President gave me in January was to ensure
exactly what you are talking about. It is written in the
Executive Order that I have authority to ensure the dissemination
of information. That is not as simple as it seems because
if it is very secretive (and just by knowing this information
you know how we got it, and therefore, you can compromise
our source) you have to be discreet about how widely you
distribute it. We are working very diligently to ensure that
the dissemination authority I have been given is exercised so
that it gets to the right people, but not too many people so
we have leaks.
This is one of the most skillful and stateman-like presentations
I have heard in a long time. Does that mean you are going to
run for President?
A: Well, I am sure you can appreciate from the introductory remarks,
that the fact I was a classmate of the President of the United
States had nothing to do with my success in getting this job,
I have done it strictly on merit. In all seriousness let me
assure you that I have watched our fine President and I can
tell you that that is the most backbreaking, the most demanding
job that any man can ask for in our country, and I don't
know why people ask for it, but it really is amazing to see
a man like President Carter who has to cover such a span of
knowledge, such a span of activities in his every day decisions
and conversations. It really is a remarkable ability that
anyone who fills that job has to rise to.
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Q: (Inaudible)
A: The Soviet civil defense effort is quite extensive. We
believe today that they can put into shelters the majority
of their leadership and 10 to 20% of the urban population.
In order, however, to protect a more substantial portion of
their population they would have to go to evacuation of
their major cities. This would take a number of days to
accomplish. When they had done that, they could reduce
the population fatalities considerably. The implications
for us are certainly: number one, that they are interested
in ensuring they do build every part of a total warmaking
capability; and secondly, that before they could use civil
defense to really assist them in a potential war situation,
they would have to give us a clear signal by commencing
this evacuation on a very mass scale.
Q: How accurate is Jane's Fighting Ships?
A: They do a very credible job.
Q: (Inaudible)
A: What is the status of the relationship between Soviet Union
and Communist China? Every indication we have is that the
rift between them is very strong, very deep, on both
idealogical and practical grounds. Each seems to be genuinely
concerned of a military threat from the other. I see no signs
at this time of any steps toward reconcilation.
Q: Admiral Turner to follow up on the gentleman's question
on Soviet defense. Why is it the Soviet Union has a four-star
general in charge of civil defense and their budget exceeds
ours by almost five to one, and we have as our director of
civil defense the former campaign manager of President Carter.
A: I alluded to that a minute ago, let me expand. The Soviet
philosophy on military force is basically different than ours.
The Soviets feel the way to deter war is to have a total war
fighting capability: To be able to sit down and say to
yourself, if a war came could I go through every step that
might take place if we had a nuclear war. I'm not advocating
one or the other, I think I am just saying that those are
the two different approaches to it which lead to this
difference in rank and money and emphasis.
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Would you discuss the current oversight by the
Congressional committees and the relationship CIA has
with Congress now?
A: I am certainly glad you asked that question because I
totally overlooked and omitted it, although it was
supposed to be in my text. There are three basic oversight
bodies that I wanted to mention to you. The leadership of
the Executive Branch, the President and Vice President; the
Intelligence Oversight Board which is subordinate to the
Executive branch, it is part of it; and then on the
Congressional side, two committees. One has been in business
two years, one just a year now. One in the House of
Representatives, one in the Senate. I am finding the oversight
committees, very fine and very helpful. On the other hand,
they give me advice and I find that very useful. On the
other hand, however, they are scrupulous in ensuring that
any time they suspect something may be done improperly, they
call me up interrogate me, my people, ask for reports and
really do investigate very thoroughly. I find them constructive
in their tone, but nonetheless, a very vigorous in their
oversight procedures. It is with respect to them, however,
that I was alluding to the fact that it would probably be
several years before we settle out on just what this
relationship is going to be. How much of our sources
and methods of intelligence must I disclose to them in
order to give them the ability to do the oversight job
that they are supposed to do. It is a narrow line, it is
a difficult one, it has been working well. I am optimistic
that it is going to come out well, but I told you it would
be some time before I can guarantee that to you. Their next
step, which has been under public debate with hearings in
the Senate for the last four months, is to write what they
call charters for the intelligence community: to rewrite
the basic law concerning intelligence and very specifically
to lay out what the rules are under which I am to operate
in the future. The nature of that law is going to be very
important to us. We are working with them; I am sure it
is going to come out well; it is going to take time to do it.
I really am grateful for your intense interest and your
excellent questions. It has been fun to be with you and it is
always great to be backii this wonderful city.
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