PUBLIC AFFAIRS OF THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003000020001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 16, 1979
• Content Type: SPEECH

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL
OF THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION
16 March 1979
We are in a state today of considerable change, a profound change
in the way we go about our intelligence activities. More profound than
I think the public, and many of the people inside the government,
appreciate. And I think there are three factors driving this change.
One is the change in the perception of the United States' role in the
world that our country sees for itself. Second is the much greater
interest and attention of the public to intelligence matters ever since
the many investigations and revelations and so on. Third, and very
relevant to you, is the increasing opportunity that technology is giving
us in how we go about collecting intelligence information. Let me just
touch on these very quickly so I do not take up too much of our time.
Clearly, we are in a state of transition as I see it from a rather
activist, interventionist approach to foreign affairs to one of greater
recognition of the restraints, the limits on what we can accomplish and
want to accomplish. I am not suggesting isolationism or withdrawal from
the world scene. Clearly we cannot do that. But I do think that if we
look at the facts, there are limits today that did not exist before on
what we can do.
Take for instance twenty years ago, if the Russians were opposed
to somebody, we were in favor of them. Today look at some of the cases
we have had in just the last year. A year ago right now there was a
war in Ethiopia and the people the Russians were against were a Marxist
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dictatorship that was the aggressor in that war; tough choice to be for.
At the end of last year there was a war in Cambodia. The people the
Russians were against were Pol Pot, the most repressive regime on the
globe since Hitler; tough to be for. I mean, who are the white hats and
who are the black hats today; it is not as easy to discern.
And we have looked around the world and we have not only realized
that communism is not monolithic, but that maybe the perception of the
'50s, that once you stood behind the Iron Curtain you were done for, is
not quite so certain today. Indonesia was under Soviet influence,
Sudan, Egypt, Somalia, they have all come back to some degree or other.
What I am saying is I am not sure the American public feels the need to
intervene as much as it did in years past.
And if we attempt to intervene with political pressure, there are
inhibitions today that did not exist before. Again, some measure,
thanks to you, in sophistication of communications of the world.
Anything we do in the way of political maneuvering in the world is
almost instantly displayed before all the countries and we are either
criticized or receive approbation. And that visibility, that approbation
or criticism, does inhibit us and inhibits the Soviets and it inhibits
others as to what you can do. I cannot explain why it is inhibiting,
but international world opinion does have inhibiting effect to some
extent.
If we try to intervene militarily around the world, you can
appreciate better than most groups I'm sure, that today the dynamics
of the military equation. is putting, I think, more emphasis on the
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defense, more capability on the defense, as we learned to our sorrow to
some extent in Vietnam. You don't have to be a major military power to
cause a major military power a lot of problems if they try to exercise
the military option against you. So I think there are lots of inhibiting
factors even though I see a trend in this country towards shaking off
the revulsion, the great, great reluctance that came out of Vietnam to
consider intervening in any part of the world.
What does that mean for us in intelligence in words? It means that
the country is less inclined to putting fingers in the dike. I think
more inclined to looking at the long term trends and influencing matters
over the longer trends. It means we have got to understand what is
going on beneath the surface around the world and to be able to anticipate
rather than just react. And that means more emphasis on political,
economic, cultural, energy, production, terrorism, narcotics, all these
kinds of intelligence rather than quite as much emphasis on the miilitary
which we cannot neglect because that military problem has not gone away,
it has not gone away in the Soviet dimension, it has not gone away in
the number of wars we have to watch all around the world. There are
more wars going on today than I can remember. It does not go away
because we have arms control agreements that have to be monitored. We
have to have good military intelligence. But we have had to spread
ourselves into many more disciplines, many more countries and to a
deeper, longer range outlook on the world so we can interpret what is
going to happen and try to shape it in a gentle manner today for tomorrow
rather than waiting until we have got a crisis on our hands and some of
these more inhibiting factors come into play.
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Quickly, the second factor of more public attention and interest in
us derivative from the investigations. It is tough on an organization,
or a group of organizations, that have to have secrecy and have had a
great tradition of it. And it is startling, it is unnerving to the
professionals in the intelligence field to find themselves in the public
display so much. We are there in part because we want to be however.
It is a hard policy to sort of persuade the people to follow in the
intelligence world. But there is, out of the investigations, in my
opinion, not a lack of appreciation in this country for the need for
intelligence, but a lingering suspicion that we may be doing more than
intelligence; that is, we may be invading the privacy of the American
public. I can assure you we are not, but we have got to dispel that if
we are going to continue to have the confidence, the support of the
American public.
So we are trying to be more open. We are pleased to have you here
today. We are publishing more. We are sharing more with the public
when we can. But it is not an easy transition. On top of that, we have
all too much unwanted publicity and I am sure in your profession you
appreciate so well the damage that is done to us by these disclosures
of very sensitive information. And it particularly hurts, of course,
the intelligence field as to our ability to continue to collect informa-
tion from our sources when cases get compromised by these disclosures.
So, it is a difficult period for us as we try to recoup from the sense
of criticism from the new environment of greater visibility that is not
a natural and common environment for intelligence.
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Thirdly, what you are doing in Aerospace Industries in helping us
to get more photographic and signals intelligence capabilities is just
surpassing imagination. The burgeoning capabilities to collect data
through signals intercept and photographic means--we call it technical
intelligence as opposed to the human intelligence spying operation--is
really just superb. It has brought about a revolution in the intelli-
gence process.
Let me emphasize quickly that it has not done away with the human
intelligence. That generally speaking the technical tells you what
happened some time in the past and then the decision maker wants to know
what is going to happen tomorrow, or why did they build that or do that.
And that is, of course, the forte of the human agent. So we have to
play them together in a complementary team. The more you get from the
technical systems, the more questions you have posed to you which can
best be answered by the human.
So there is not a emphasis on one or the other. But there is a
great need today to be sure we can orchestrate these, that we do not go
off and use a human spy at great risk and cost when you can get it by
satellite. But, of course, there is a quality that what you get by a
satellite photograph that is different than a quality of what you get
from signals intercept or what you get from a human agent. So you have
to play those qualities, each one feeding to the other. Maybe you get a
picture of a building that looks strange. You target your signals
intelligence on it because it has an antenna that you know is in a
certain band. And then you get a human agent to say, we know that place
is emmanating this characteristic, we think that puts it in this kind of
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business. Get in there and penetrate that part of the government and
find out what that is about. You play that all together. That is not
easy. It is new.
The people in the human intelligence business has been an intel-
ligence community to themselves, the photographic people and the signals
intelligence people. As you know, they are spread all over the government.
Nominally I am the boss--nominally. The President strengthened my
authority, gave me budgetary and what we call tasking authority over all
the agencies, tasking what you go out and collect, how you orchestrate
them. I am not there yet and, as you can imagine, in this big bureaucracy
change does not come easy. I am not sure it does in your corporation.
But it certainly does not in the government. So, we are going through
change. We are going through change in what we want to do because what
does the country need. How do we adjust to being in the fishbowl more
and how do we get out of it to some extent where we do not need and want
the publicity? And how do we really take advantage of the kinds of
things that your corporation and others have made available to us in a
complementary way and one that is not going to drive the country bankrupt?
But one which also is not going to let things sort of drop between the
cracks because the photo people think the SIGINT people have got it and
so on.
It is a real challenge. It is a lot of fun. We are making progress
and we are in a hell of a lot better state than the newspapers tell you.
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QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
Q: The news media would have us believe that the Intelligence Community,
despite the Iranian student protest , the Intelligence
Community was caught flatfooted in not knowing that the Shah was on
shaky ground. ?
A: Yes. , but let me
put it this way. We surely kept the policy makers posted that there
were problems in Iran, the Shah was not riding smooth. We saw
people that did not feel happy because they were not part of the
political process. We saw people who were not happy because they
were not getting enough out of the economic improvements. We saw
people who were unhappy because their religion was being tampered
with by and so on. What we did not see was that
these numerous forms of discontent were going to coalesce under the
rubrick of a 78 year old cleric who was out of the country and had
been out for 14 years. And suddenly, not the 4, 5, 6, 7 forms of
discontent but one, right up to October I, at least, worked on the
assumption that this was basically--I am off the record--a police
state with a strong SAVAK, strong military, a strong boss and that
when the time came, he was not going to let it get out of his
control. There were repressive measures available.
a few things happened. One, they coalesced to where it was going to
be a much bigger problem to repress. And two, I do not think the
Shah was much more alert to it than we were in that sense that it
was really going to bubble over. And by the time he appreciated
that, he made the choice it was going to be too bloody to use his
powers and he stepped aside instead. Now let me not try
to pretend that I think we did the best job possible. I would liked
to have been able to predict this in September or August that there
was going to be explosion in November and that would lead to the
Shah's demise in January. But I do not want to lead you astray in
thinking that I am going to be able to do that the next time it
happens someplace else. I would like to, we will try harder.. Those
are tough. Those are tough to predict. But I want to do for the
country and the way you should measure up is not whether we make
each little individual event things I have been criticized for in
the last few years--I did not predict Begin's election. Who predicted
Jimmy Carter's election? And you had a lot more data. We did not
predict this thing in Iran, but if I am not providing this long term
sense to the policy makers, you know there are problems in this area
of the world But much as I would like to
predict every assassination, every coup, every turn of government in
the world and I will try better, I am not guaranteeing we will ever
make it.
Q: Admiral, there has been considerable comment in the general press
about the lost and friendly faces (inaudible)
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I want to be candid with you. That is
a very sensitive subject . Off the record let me say that the more
we talk about our sensitive intelligence collection operations in
public form, the more difficult, the more costly become ways to
replace those that get overtaken or lost. I think that should be
obvious to you. So I really am trying to low-key this one. It is
important to the country we have all the intelligence collection
capabilities needed, particularly with the SALT treaty looming on
the horizon. And to the extent we loose anything one place we have
got to try to replace it some other way, either through a better
technical device you fellows can invent for us, or in different
locations around the world. The cost of doing these is just goin
to get exorbitant if we keep telling the world we are
that because of one event or another.
Q: (Inaudible)
A: No, I do not have any perception of when the Iranian situation will
stabilize. I am afraid the situation will polarize--polarizing
first between the secular leadership, Bazargan; the religious
leadership, Khomeini; and the great danger that the leftist of the
Sheriks and of others, that the Sheriks, terrorists, paramilitary
groups being the most prominent Marxist oriented people. There is
great confusion between the secular and religious leaderships of the
country, they may step into the breach. They are, I think, consciously
discouraging the revival of the Iranian army, which if it were
brought back into cohesiveness and did work for the secular government,
it might be able to get some semblance of order. The army has sort
of disappeared off the radar scope right now. It is hard for me to
predict whether there is any hope that it could be brought back.
Q: Do you have any indication what the security of the
missiles and so on? Are they still secret or have they managed to
breach those secrets?
A: Well I can say this, I do not have any evidence they have been breached.
But we have not had access to them, that is the Americans, for some
time now. One hope is that there is a group of
people called and they are really high priced technicians,
they are in uniform. I guess they would be sort of like
people who get technical training. I guess
they do not have a military authority, they are just there to
operate and maintain the equipment so they get a better education
They have been a very unusual group. They have
been Khomeini from the beginning. And they
have taken control of the air bases where these equipment are and
they excluded us, they are not pro-American by any means. But we
also think they are pro-Iranians and they like their equipment and
they are proud of it and they think it belongs, and it does belong
to Iran. And I guess our hope is that out of the sense of nationalism,
they are not letting this stuff escape and go away. They are not
Marxists, so there is something of hope here but no guarantee that
it has not (inaudible).
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Q: Going back to , there has been some comment that
the activation of the women in Iran is sort of parallel to what
happened in Chile, the women were instrumental in bringing down the
government.
A: Well, it is syptomatic of the number of sectors of the Iranian society
that are not happy to go to a full Islamic concept that Khomeini--the
bankers do not like the idea of having banks with no interest rates.
The lawyers, the judiciary do not like the idea of the Islamic
courts to decide things outside the normal legal process because
The women, many of them do not
want to go back to the veil. Lot of others, particularly women, are
concerned that their educational opportunities will change under
this concept of the Islamic republic. I do not, at this moment, see
the women any more than any other group as being one that would
likely topple things. But I do see some indication that those
groups, be they women or lawyers or bankers or whatever, who are
reluctant to see the thing go as Islamic as it may. From looking
around for support against the religious trend, we may end up with
the Shariks as the only cohesive force which will eject. You see,
Bazargan can only fight Khomeini to some limited degree both because
of a lack of power and because he is on his team. So if you really
want to fight Khomeini at this point as a non-Marxist, you may end
up with a Marxist in order to find a coalescing factor. That is a
real big one.
Q: (Inaudible)
a much smaller population. It has not been
as perturbed yet by great infusions of money and a chance to build a
whole new society. There has, of course, been education for women
liberation of women in the working force and so
on. Saudi Arabia not nearly as much disturbance of the
traditional religious The difference in the
other direction is that there is large expatriate population in
Saudi Arabia's working force. A potential disturbing problem they
did not have except for representatives of your companies and ours
the government in Iran is not the same way.
Moslem sect largely rather than Sheha is less inclined to tamper
with governmental processes and less structured than Shehas are.
a big role. It was a
communications network around Iran and not that it was exactly
against the Shah but coalescing process.
Tighter control by a, not a single individual like the Shah as much
as a family, a fairly sizable family, that has its pluses and
minuses, less decisive; but on the other hand, more in touch with
the country. The King, you know, I had the privilege of calling on
the King last March. I had to get in a C130 and fly out, a really
exciting adventure, and land in the desert, no airstrip, and get
into a Cadillac and drive out across no road and come to the tents
where the King was out there to be able to commune with the
and have them call on him. And you would enjoy this sight as you
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came upon this tent city and right behind the King s tent what was
there but a huge antenna to transmit to his satellite. And you go
in the tent and saw it covered with Persian rugs and around on the
wall are neatly spaced air conditioners. I mean, really,
But he does get out and he keeps in touch with
the people. There are other things going for us there but, clearly,
the basic seeds are very similar and we have got to hope (inaudible)
Q: how you do coordinate and effectively put forth
your position and your problems in reports to the President or the
government and how that works? I realize it is a big long subject,
but how effectively do you think you are in influencing government
or the President in taking action or developing policy?
A: Let me say that I have been very grateful in the two years that I
have been here in not having any problem getting through to President
Carter and having tremendous receptivity from Vance and Brown and
Brzezinski. They have a tremendous interest in what we are doing.
A phone call interrupted me in the middle of a breakfast this
morning. Vance had read a memo I sent him and wanted an amplification.
Now there has never been a time when there has not been difficulty
whether decision makers will accept and understand and interpret
intelligence I am not the I to say whether they do
it right or wrong because that is the policy But, I
have felt a tremendous need as a result of these changes that I
mentioned, and particularly the shift to more emphasis on political
and economic kinds of intelligence. careful that
what I think that is to intelligence by consensus
is not the way we do it in the future. You are doing military
things. You are looking for facts. Have they got a thousand mile
range in that airplane or two thousand mile range? And we have
developed in this country--I can say this as an ex-military man--a
feeling that more interested in the capabilities than
the intentions. And, therefore, we want to know what the range is
and we end up compromising between DIA and CIA and the State Depart-
ment, the Army, the Navy and so on. And if we compromise and make
it fifteen hundred miles, why, it is probably pretty good because
everybody exaggerates his position anyway cause he knew he was going
to come to consensus. But you cannot come to consensus on are they
going to attack on Monday or Friday. That is their intentions and
Wednesday is the one wrong answer. And you cannot compromise on is
the Shah going to survive or is he not going to survive. What
you've got to do is explicate to the people, what are the pressures
against the Shah, what are the things he has got going for him. We
thought what was going for him was a little more than he had. But
as long as we explicate that to people, we are providing a service.
So I am trying to shift the orientation of analysis to this kind of
explication of pros and cons more than I am saying, what is the
prediction, what actually, I mean, You give them
something to chew on. The decision maker then integrates with his
own intelligence and his own judgment. Then I think he has got
have not got there yet, but that is what
we are trying to do.
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Q: (Inaudible)
A: Yes, surprised to the extent that that movement of relatively small
military force is very difficult to project. Not surprised to the
extent that we knew, in fact, both countries are trying to undermine
the other with the South being more competent at it. So, again,
this specific outbreak, which actually the specific outbreak on 5
November, no, I did not predict that would happen there. It is not
easy, even now, to detect exactly what is going on because these are
not big tank arms that are moving around But
clearly, we have been apprehensive for some time as to how much this
continued division of equipment and training by the Soviets contributed
to South Yemen and the impact on either North Yemen or
Q: (Inaudible)
A: Not a great deal. The problem on my commenting on SALT is that my
job is not to tell you whether they are or viable, but
to tell the policy makers can I tell you what is happening. We call
it monitoring. It seems like a fine line Can I
detect what they are doing with respect to each of the 60 some
provisions of the treaty. And in some I will tell the policy makers
I'll be right on boss, you know, one missile and we will have it in
two weeks. Others I'll say, I'll let you know how far a cruise
missile will fly, it is tough as you would know very well. And so
my confidence level is "x" rather than 100. It is up to the policy
makers to decide can the country benefit by a treaty in which the
confidence level of being able to check on this is "x" as opposed to
100. What is the net plus or minus for the country. If I get
involved in saying yes, that is a good treaty and I can verify it,
then I am likely to color my degree of confidence in checking on it,
you see what I mean. I have to stay as impartial as I can by
saying, these are the hard facts, and I will give those to the
Senate, obviously give them to the President all the time and they
include them in the course of negotiations so they know what they
are getting into. I am afraid that I will have to keep my monitoring
confidences limited to the Senate who will have to make the judgment
for the country.
Q: Admiral, could you comment on the various Africas--South Africa,
Angola, Southwest Africa significant
political change may result?
A: That is a tough one. We are also sort of disappointed and discouraged
over the last four or five months they have just continued
to have lost their sense of direction. Angola, let's take the
countries quickly. A hugh (tape turned) ........ suppressed and now
increasing problems with South Africans working against the Swapo
guerrillas that go down into Namibia or So they are in
real problems and the more they are attacked by , the
more they are attacked by South Africa, the more they claim they
have to have a to build them up. So I don't see,
myself, a lot of hope for the prospects of a big change in the
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attitudes or policy of the Angolans. In Libya, it is just hanging
right on the cliff as to whether the U.N. will get in there and do
something to hold elections and to form an indigenous government
that would have some ability to control the countryside. There is a
real danger it could go the wrong way, but we will just have to
continue with some very weak government in there. I do
not know if it will get that far or whether the South Africans will
feel they have to hang on work right now, it is
very touchy. The Rhodesian situation--a few people think the
elections on the 17th of April might solve the problem there. I
only hope that it will as if Smith really does step down. He is
saying now that he is not sure he is going to. An unfortunate
prospect or continued guerrilla warfare
.It is very difficult to see how that can be resolved easily and a
great danger that if the guerrillas find things not going their way
that that could be the sand in the face in Zambia, Mozambique
respectively, that they will turn more and more
Soviets for material support, training support and even
in Ethiopia. The latter would be a very dangerous
and limit how far the South Africans might
So I think it is a very uncertain, dangerous prospect
Q: (Inaudible)
A. You are well aware of how critical some of those are to us. I don't
think I see South Africa itself in great internal danger at this
point. I think certainly the long term plan and why the Soviets are
taking such an active interest down there, they want to be on that
side and it is going to be pushing South Africa but I think that
would come after they especially in Rhodesia
and Mozambique and so on to put the pressure on them. In the
meantime, we are very concerned about the situation in Zaire.
one or two crises there. They are trying to keep the
cobalt running, I guess that copper is important but not as critical
as the cobalt. But is not solving the basic internal
problems of the country either discipline of his military or
themselves or the serious economic problem. So I think
we can expect continued difficulties in that area.
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 tir- ~-
15 March 1979
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Public Affairs Council
of the Aerospace Industries Association
1100, Friday, 16 March 1979
Community in state profound change
Not appreciate
1. Customers different needs - U.S. sees role in world different
2. Public interest greater
3. Technological systems
I, Customers
Transition - activist - recognition limits/restraints
1. Visibility - criticism - 1 vote/country
2. More difficult to decide who to support where/when, e.g., Ogaden, Cambodia
Black vs Whites
No irretrievable losses to communism?
Interpret world scene - mil - pol - econ - culture
3. Tools intervention less military - Defense dynamic
Pol.- econ limits too
Must understand
Not mean - opt out - not care - intervene
Longer range view
Less finger in dike
Impact Intell two-fold
Collection
1. More countries/topics - food, population, bal trade, nuc prolif
`raw material, production
Pol/Econ - Some tech - Much HUMINT
Non espionage
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Military
More interdisciplinary
Analysis - More disciplines
More area specialists - Training
Compromise - Not bad
Mil - facts - consensus
New style
Tech systems - Timely
Sov build-up - More local
Decisive - avoid least
E.O. - Coordinate - Not control DIA, INR
Pdl - Econ - essence - not prediction
Differing views - Views not comments
II. Increased Public Attention to Intelligence
Investigationseroded confidence, support
Generated suspicions of invasions of privacy
Enough true (tho much exaggerated) - corrective action necessary
Action very, thorough.
Oversight procedures: Pres, IOB, Congress - including press
Impact
Much greater visibility - some wanted - much unwanted
3 Impacts on Community
1. Uncomfortable
Secrecy - necessity and habit; e.g. case officer's stock
in trade is assurance of confidentiality
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2. Accountability - New - Techniques Unfamiliar
Have adapted beautifully - but painful
Super budget presentations - FY '78 vs '80
3. Lessen valuable capabilities
A. Especially to C.A. - 2 aspects
1) Leaks
a) Controversial policy issues - Exec Branch - Hughes-Ryan?
b) Domestic political issues - Congress - 8 committees
Loss of flexibility due detailed guidance/control - won't work
that way
Spillover inhibition to intell collection
B. To intell collections
Risks of leaks - clearances
Reverse need for disclosure and hold closeness
Lesser confidence - agents and allies
Net impact of visibility:
Plus - Must have public support - Must avoid abuses
Charters and practice of next 2-3 years will establish balance
How much does nation desire assurance against invasions
of privacy. and foreign policy moves considered unethical
at expense of intell/covert action capabilities
III. Burgeoning Technical Capabilities
New dimension of intell - referred to earlier - arms control - but
want expand because magnificent opportunities if utilized well
unique problems - sorting - processing
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003000020001-0
 Approved Foolease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO154003000020001-0
Coordination of 3 elements - PHOTINT - SIGINT - HUMINT
- Each intell community on own
Collect - Interpret - Produce
- Especially need integrate HUMINT
Conclusion
- Changing customer needs
- Changing domestic climate
Changing character and cost of tools of intel collection
Each places special demands - requires adjust
Adjusting well, but must be careful
Easy to hobble.intel capability
Your contribution in area of technology often permits us to make those adjustments
without loss in capability.
Aerospace Industries playing even greater role in intel for future.
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003000020001-0
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003000020001-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003000020001-0