INTELLIGENCE IN A CHANGING WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003000070001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 12, 1979
• Content Type: SPEECH

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Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Overseas Writers Club
Washington, D.C.
Thursday, 12 April 1979
INTELLIGENCE IN A CHANGING WORLD
I would like to talk about the important degree of change that is
taking place in the United States Intelligence Community today. Change
that is reaching into every element of intelligence activities. Change
which I believe is beneficial. Change, however, which comes not just
from conviction within but from the influence of three important external
factors. The first of these is the changing perception of the country
itself as to our role in international affairs. The second is the
burgeoning increase in technical intelligence collection capabilities
today. The third, closely related to you and your profession, is the
much greater interest and concern of the American public in intelligence
activities today than just a few years ago. Let me touch on each of
these factors for change and then take your questions.
First, the changing perception of America's role in the world.
I believe we are in a state of transition, a transition from a very
activist, interventionist outlook toward international affairs to one in
which we are recognizing more readily the limitations, the realities upon
our ability to influence events in other countries. This is not to
say that we are retrenching towards any degree of isolationism. In fact,
I believe as a nation we are gradually emerging from our post-Vietnam
aversion to any semblance of intervention on the international scene and
entering an era when our outlook toward the world and our role in it is
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more realistic and more reasonable. The circumstances today however are
such that we must gauge more carefully than ever before what our role in
the world can be and should be.
Take for instance the difficulty we have today in just deciding whom
we are for and whom we are against. Traditionally we have always been in
favor of those whom the Soviets were against. Some of our choices today
are not that simple. If you look just at 1978, there were a number of
instances in which there were two Communist countries fighting each other.
In some of those instances it was very clear that it was not wise for us
to be in favor of either one or the other, even though the Soviets were
supporting one of those parties.
Today it is not so clear that it is necessary for the United States
to take sides in every international altercation, even if the Soviets
are attempting to gain advantage from it. The consequences of a nation's
succumbing to Communist influence are not as irreverisble as we perhaps
once thought. Indonesia, Sudan, Egypt, Somalia all were under considerable
Communist influence at one time or another and have come back to be
independent. So today there is in our body politic a legitimate question
as to whether it is always necessary to come to the rescue of countries
being subjected to Communist pressure.
And even when we do decide that some struggling nation deserves our
support, there are problems today in giving it that did not exist just a
few years ago. One of these, again closely related to you and your work,
is the revolution in international communications. Any action that we
take on the international scene today is almost instantly transmitted
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around the globe; instantly analyzed; and instantly judged. Today that
international public judgment, be it approbation or criticism, does
influence events, and does inhibit the actions of major powers like the
United States and the Soviet Union, even though those countries who pass
judgment are very generally second or third level powers.
There are other difficulties today that we didn't face 10 or 20
years ago if we attempt to influence other countries through diplomacy or
through international organizations. In the past most free nations
took their cue on the international scene from us. Today in such fora as
the United Nations, each country usually uses its one vote independently
of what the major powers may desire and, in fact, frequently the major
powers find themselves on the minority side of those votes.
If then out of frustration with diplomacy we should decide in the
future to intervene militarily, we have to recall our lessons of Vietnam
and recognize that when the pendulum of offense and defense in military
weaponry tends, as it does today, toward the defense, even a minor
military power can give a major power a very difficult time.
What all this adds up to is not that we are impotent on the world
scene but that the leverage of our influence, while still considerable,
must be exercised much more subtly than ever before. We must be concerned
with long-term influences rather than just putting fingers in the dike.
We must be able to anticipate rather than just react to events. We must
be able to interpret the underlying courses which can be influenced and
driven over time. Now for us in the intelligence world this means that
we must vastly expand the scope of our endeavor.
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Thirty years ago our primary concern was to keep tabs on Soviet
military development. Today the threat to our national well-being
comes not just from actions of the Soviet Union, nor is it restricted to
purely military concerns. Thus the subject matter with which we in
intelligence must be intimately familiar, while it certainly continues to
have a high military content, has broadened to include politics, economics,
energy, population, terrorism, the health and psychiatry of international
leaders, narcotics and so on. There is hardly an academic discipline,
there is hardly an area of the world about which we do not need to be
intimately informed to keep our foreign policymakers well advised.
Hence, this is a demanding time for our intelligence organizations, a
time of fundamental change in the subject matter with which we deal.
Looking quickly to a second element of change, the technological
revolution which affects how we collect intelligence, let me start by
pointing out there are three ways of gaining information about other
countries, in a very general sense at least. By photographs from satel-
lites and airplanes, by intercepting signals such as those that could be
passing through this room right now, either from military activities or
communications systems, and by the traditional human agent, the spy.
In our business the first two, photographic and signals intelligence,
are what we call technical intelligence as opposed to the human means.
Our capabilities in the technical area, thanks to the great sophistication
of our industries, are burgeoning. Interestingly though, rather than
denigrating the value of the traditional spy, technical capabilities have
increased his importance. Broadly speaking, technical intelligence
tells you something that happened sometime in the past. But that often
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raises more questions than it answers. Why did it happen? What is going
to happen next? Uncovering the concerns of other nations, the pressures
which influence their decisions and their intentions is exactly the forte
of the human intelligence activity. And it is indispensable that we have
that capability if we are going to anticipate the future trends as I have
been suggesting.
The real challenge in intelligence collection then is to be able to
put all of our efforts together, the photographic, the signals, and the
human, orchestrating them so that they complement each other and so that
we can learn what we need to learn in the least expensive and the least
risky manner. What questions a photograph cannot answer you try to solve
with signals or human activity. For instance, the plans which may be
hinted at in a conversation you try to confirm with a photograph, or if
you have a photograph of some new factory in a foreigh country and you
wonder whether it is making nuclear weapons, you specifically target a
human agent to try to find that information.
All this may sound very logical, very simple to you. But because
our technical capabilities are growing rapidly and because intelligence
in our country is a large bureaucracy spread over a number of different
departments and agencies each with its own priorities and concerns, we
can no longer do business in the traditional manner. It has taken some
fundamental restructuring to accommodate these changes.
The Director of Central Intelligence has been authorized to coordi-
nate the national intelligence activities of our country ever since the
passage of the National Security Act of 1947. However, until recently
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he had inadequate authority to do so. Just over a year ago, President
Carter signed a new Executive Order which strengthened the authority of
the Director over budgets and over the collection activities of all
national intelligence organizations. The change is still evolving
today. It is going well but is making a substantial difference in the
management of intelligence.
Finally, let me hit the third topic which is driving change. That
is the increased public attention since the investigations of 1974 to
1976. These investigations brought to American intelligence more public
attention than ever in the history of mankind has been brought to bear on
a major intelligence activity. The impact of all this added visibility
has been substantial, and in some respects it has been traumatic. The
right kind of visibility can be beneficial both to us and to the public.
By the right kind of visibility, I mean the public's access to information
which permits you to understand at least generically what we are doing
and why we are doing it, and which confirms that the proper controls
established over the intelligence apparatus are in fact effective. To
achieve this we are trying today to be more open about the things we do.
We are passing more of what we do directly to you in the form of
unclassified analyses which we distribute to the public. We are answering
questions more. We are speaking more in public as I am with you this
morning and we are participating more in symposia and academic conferences.
I know that the Intelligence Community of our country is doing an honorable
and a vital job for our country and for the free world. It is doing it
well and I personally want you to know as much about it as possible. And
parenthetically I would mention, because you are an Overseas Writers
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organization, that I believe this trend towards greater openness, greater
visibility in intelligence is not unique in our country but it is a
process that is taking hold in other free democratic societies.
Let me add though that some of the visibility that we receive is
definitely unwanted. Unwanted because it benefits neither Americans,
nor friends, nor allies. Here, of course, I am talking primarily about
unauthorized disclosures of properly classified information. Our need
for some level of secrecy appears to run contradictory to your imperative
to keep the American public informed. But let me suggest that we do meet
on some common ground despite this contradiction. To begin with I am
emphasizing our need for secrecy primarily because of our need to protect
our sources. I hardly need to elaborate on that topic in front of a
profession who has had members go to jail to protect their sources. Let
me add though that we also need to protect some information that does not
reveal sources. This is primarily information which, if it is held
uniquely by our decisionmakers, will be of special value to our country.
Again, however, this is not something unknown to you because it is
nothing more than an exclusive. You have spent a lot of your efforts and
time in protecting your own exclusives. So we do have common ground. We
can understand each others motives and purposes.
On our side we are trying more to understand your imperative of
informing the public by our effort to be more open and more responsive.
Let me suggest on your side that I would not think of asking you to be
less perservering or to cover up or to ignore our faults. But I would
question whether sometimes members of the media today are not overly
eager to resurrect old, well-worn stories about the Central Intelligence
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Agency and then play them as though they just happened yesterday, until
you get to the penultimate paragraph when it says 1953. I would also
question whether some of the media always apply the same standards of
truth and confirmation to leaks of intelligence information as they do to
other stories. Let me suggest to you that in my experience, a large
percentage of those who offer these leaks are people who have selfish,
not altruistic motives, people who are out to use the American media and
through them the American public.
Finally, let me also suggest that there are times when the media
should recognize that it might not be in the interest of the free world
to publish something, especially security information which you may
receive. For instance, the names of our agents. I do not accept the
excuse which is often made that you must publish it because if you do
not, Joe or Bill or Mary will; or, because if you have come into posses-
sion of it the KGB certainly must also have it. Yet while I make these
somewhat critical comments let me end by acknowledging how difficult the
choices are that you have to make in these areas. I recognize that
fully. They are difficult judgment calls, each one unique to itself. I
only suggest some balance here is very necessary to our welfare.
Let me though add that the net impact of all this visibility I have
been mentioning is, in my view, a net plus for the United States and for
its Intelligence Community. We must have public support. We must avoid
the abuses of the past. And yet there are definite minuses to this
visibility too. There are inhibitions on the actions that we could take,
on the risks that we will take. The issue before our country today is
really: how much assurance does this nation need against invasions of
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privacy and against the possible taking of foreign policy steps that
would be considered unethical; and how do we balance these desires for
privacy and propriety with a resulting reduction in our intelligence
capabilities and covert action potential.
Congress is expected to give expression to this question of balance
in the enactment of legislation called Charters for the Intelligence
Community. Such legislation would set out our authorities as well as the
parameters within which we are permitted to work. It is my sincere hope
that such legislation will be passed by this Congress--written with
care, with sensitivity to problems like those I have been discussing with
you, it can help to resolve some of these difficulties. Overreaction
either by tying the Intelligence Community's hands or by not imposing any
restrictions whatsoever would be a mistake--on the one hand inviting a
repetition of abuses, on the other hand emasculating necessary intelligence
capabilities.
After all these comments, plus and minus, let me end with an assurance
that in my view the intelligence arm of the United States Government
today is strong and capable. It is undergoing substantial change. That
is never an easy or a placid process in a large bureaucracy. Out of this
present metamorphasis is emerging an Intelligence Community in which the
legal rights of our citizens and the constraints and the controls on
intelligence activities are going to be balanced with a need to garner
necessary information for the conduct of foreign policy. This is not an
easy transition. We are not there yet but we are moving rapidly and
surely in the right direction. When we reach our goal we will have
constructed a new model of intelligence, a uniquely American model of
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intelligence reflecting the laws and the ideals of our country, and one
which I believe will be a precursor to similar changes in countries all
over the free world. Thank you very much, let me have your questions.
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Q's & A's -- Admiral Turner -- Overseas Writers Club -- 12 April 1979
Admiral Turner, I'm going to ask you a question about what you
call the traditional human agent, the spy. While we were having
lunch the Prime Minister of South Africa claimed that the
United States has engaged in a massive spying operation against
his country `several American diplomats hal(been asked to
leave the country. Can you tell us -- has the United States
been engaged in massive spying in South Africa and to what end?
Admiral Turner:
No. Next question. No, I can't tell you. It's a basic policy
that we do not comment on intelligence operations, whether we
were doing them or whether we were not doing them. Because
you know the technique of pushing us into the corner on that
one very easily.
vflw*tA
Jerry ud--n-, Westinghouse Broadcasting:
How much less are American spies feared than they used to be
because of whatever moral or governmental restraints are upon
them and in what ways does that hurt the United States' interests?
I certainly -see no degree of let-up of counterintelligence
activities on the part of the KGB, who are very, very active
in that field. Let me suggest that the majority of these restraints
upon us have to do with protecting the rights of Or privacy
of our citizenry. Now that sometimes, of course is, or largely
as far as o role is concerned iw overseas. l)Where it has
inhibited usto the country's detriment most are in things
like narcotics, where if we get some information and then an
American intrudes on the scene, then we're precluded from
continuing to^pursue that type of information and the country
in a sense loses. But that's a trade-off we have to make
as a nation, as I sort of suggested.
Berson: UPI
Admiral, I'd like to ask you a SALT-related question. We are
told repeatedly that the Administration will not send forward
a SALT treaty that cannot be verified.But yesterday, for example,
we had some quite convincing statements to people who, like
yourself, are retired military officers, ?e-saying that the SALT treaty
as they see it now, is not verifiable. Can you tell us anything
now that would convince us that with the loss of the Iranian:.posts, the
SALT treaty would give you the necessary:.confidence that any
cheating by the Soviets would be picked up?
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Admiral Turner:
Let me try to make my role in SALT verification expressly clear.
We divide this into two terms; monitoring and verifying.
Monitoring is the act of telling what the Soviets are doing
with relation to each of the provisions of the treaty that limit
strategic force activities. For each monitoring activity,
I will be able to go to the Senate and say I have this
level of confidence that any change in these parameters will
be detected. Whether that is adequate to verify the treaty
is a decision for policymakers. Because you have to weigh with
that does that change that Turner has monitored really violate
the treaty? Every provision is not as express as to say 1320
missiles of this type. Beyond that, the policymaker must also
say, "in view of the fact APPL, Turner hasn't got 101% assurance
on any of these things, are the 1 ks to our country worth it?~D
,ice the benefit~l of having these w rth whatever degree of
possibility there is from the monitoring evaluation that it
could be circumscribed, or circumvented, or whatever the right
word is -- cheat. If I get into saying my opinion of these
factors of interpretation of the treaty and cost benefits to
the country of the risks and benefits of having this treaty
as opposed to having none) then the objectivity of my position
on how well we can monitor will be questioned. People will
say, "Ao, .Ie's saying the monitoring is 95% sure because
he's taken the position the treaty is verifiable." I don't
want that to happen because I should be the impartial SOB
who is able to stand up and say, "with these instruments of
intelligence collection and these techniques of analysis,
Senator I can do'this for you on checking on provision 17B
of the treaty." So I won't answer your question, nor will I
answer it for the Senate of the United States. But I will
give the Senate and of course I.am giving the Executive Branch
regularly, every detail of what our capability will be to
monitor, to observe, to check on each provision of the treaty.
And there are so many of these, that even if you asked this
broad question, I Ts the treaty verifiable?" you really are
asking a very meaningless question*. ~ w'"S'ou have to finally
get to with those who are qualified to pass judgment on
verifiability, is what provisions of the treaty are so weakly
verifiable in their view that it should not be passed.
Can I just try again, since you couldn't answer that question. On
a more specific basis, can you say, did the loss of the Iranian
posts lower your level of confidence in our ability to verify?
Yes.
ILO,,,,,, ,frd.)) (,(f. I
Can you say how much?
Admiral Turner:
No. Because even if I were willing and able to share that with
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you, which I can't, because it's highly classified, you just
can't answer that in any kind of a very simple way. You've
got to take a provision of the treaty and you've got to say,
versus this, what does it do? Then you've got to-
"---explain -what the alternatives are to using those methods
of collection. And that just gets above our heads in this
unclassified forum.
Nick Daniloff: UP .
Admiral Turner, I have a two-part question for you. The
WASHINGTON STAR today in a front-page story reports that the
Intelligence Community has discovered 1,000 new strategic
Soviet missiles which we weren't aware of. In other words,
the Soviets have about 3500 strategic missiles instead of 2500.
Now I'd like you to comment on the veracity of that report.
The second question is this. Some of your criti have charged
that you've placed too much emphasis in techna' intelligence --
satellites, signals and so forth, to the detriment of the human
spy. You did comment on that in your opening remarks. I would
like you to give us some appreciation of what role you feel the
human spy has today in intelligence collection.
Well, I tried to mention that in my remarks. The human intelligence
input is a fundamental part of the three-pronged process. And
it primarily lets you understand what people are thinking,
doing, planning, what their intentions are. It is the most
risky, not the most costly, of the tech ue,p~~~~ f collecting
intelligence. Therefore, it is my view~if`don't downplay
it ~2/ou don't ever use it when you can do it -- that's an
olerstatement -- but you try not to use the human when you can
do it by technical means. But the quality of what you get
from each of these techniques is different. A photograph
tells you certain things. Clearly, you wouldn't want to run
your reporting just on photographs. You've got to talk to people.
Clearly, we're in exactly the same business. And we can't
get along without talking with people. You can listen to
people talk, but you like to be able to ask the questions.
You wouldn't bey happy just to sit and .listen^to,,the
'you could not interrogate people and get
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your particular quistions answered, you wouldn't be very happy.
And we're in exactly the same business. We're trying to piece
together the elusive details of information which, one by one,
put a picture puzzle into place. And we need all three of these.
And there has not been in recent years, and certainly not in
my two years here, any degradation of that capability, or any
less emphasis on it. But I was asked that question on Capitol
Hill a few days ago at the end of a hearing. My response was,
"Sirs, I have now been here for two hours and 15 minutes, two
hours and 10 minutes of which you interrogated me about our
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technical systems. And that is what gives a misperception that
we're more interested in the technical. Why, because the technical
costs a lot of money. Becaus7-1_~:\`the technical, when you make
a decision today, you've got to live with it for 10 years,
probably. And it happens we're in a phase in intelligence when
the technical decisions have got to be made. You know, you go
in lulls and peaks. And we're in a peak right now.
,You buy all your airplanes one year and all your
submarine the next, and that kind of thing, and it's the same
way with us. So it does get a lot more attention. But it's
not because we're neglecting the other. It doesn't require
ac miirh Ai crrncci nrt and rlahn+o
How a out the first part of the question, Admiral? abvmrtr-'~...
Admiral Turner:
No comment. You don't comment on
facts.
Don Oberdoffer: ?D$
operations or
Admiral Turner, was the decline and ultimate fall of the Shah
of Iran last fall an intelligence failure and, specifically,
what about the charge that was reported in the article that
was reprinted in Sunday's POST that you kept postponing the
issuance of a new intelligence estimate on Iran because the
White House didn't want to hear the news that that estimate would
have conveyed?
Let me take the last part first because it's the easiest. That's
absolutely untrue. I did reject an intelligence estimate on
Iran and ha##. ' reworked because it was not a balanced piece
of work and because it was far too optimistic as to the possibility
of the Shah remaining in power. Now I'm not upset that somebody
brought me that kind of an estimate. I want different, divergent
views to come forward on these estimates. They've got to because
none of us has perfect insight. But when this came forward,
there were several views in it. I thought it was overbalanced
towards the side of optimism as to the Shah's endurance. I sent
it back to be reworked in August. By the time it was reworked
and came bac to me again, it was clear the situation in Iran
was so fluid to publish an estimate, which is a long-term
look at things, was not a profitable thing to do, so we never
did publish it.despite the fact that it's been played back and
quoted as having been a National Intelligence Estimate which
it was notes
first part of your question, I don't think it was an intelligence
failure in Iran. But I will say, I'd like to do better. I'd
like to do better in any of these cases. The most difficult
part about intelligence, the most difficult part about political
newspaper reporting is to predict changes of government, coups,
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 Bern' Kalb:
Admiral, I have a two-part question if I can get in two. What's
your estimate, do you think sir, where Idi Amin might take
refuge.
Admiral Turner:
His family's in Iraq. w khether he'll go to join
Bernie Kalb:
A question on China if I may. How do you explain the turning
on of the screws once again after a rather brief experiment
in what might be called a liberalized attitude on the part of
Admiral Turner:
Well, that was a major shift in their approach to the expression
of dissent and I suppose with an experiment like that they're
adjusting the sails,--trimming them to find out what is the right
amount of dissent that will suit th it urposes. I wouldn't
be surprised when anybody changes that much that he has
to do some adjustment to suit his particular purposes.
Edward P. Morgan:
Admiral Turner. You indicated, or at least I inferred from your
remarks, that despite the classic collision course, so to speak,
between intelligence and the media4,Afthe situation net was pretty
much of a plus. What about Congress? Congress over the recent
years has been showing an eloquent independence of the. Executive
Branch in terms of cooperation and so forth. What about the
realism, the fairness, the insight of Congress in passing laws
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assassinations, plots, major political upheavals. We all would
like to be more prescient In this case, I think
it was a very difficult one. Why? We all saw the discontent.
We saw it in political areas. We saw it in economic areas.
We saw it in religious areas, cultural areas. But we didn't
see that a 78-year-old exiled cleric would be the force that
would coalesce all of these areas of discontent to where they
got out of control. Nor did any of us anticipate that when
the chips were down the Shah with a strong police power, would
not be able to exercise that power to control this dissidence.
We, me personally, overestimated the possibility, the probability,
that the Shah would step in at the right moment and get the
dissidents back under his control. I guess he missed that too.
He missed the critical point. And I'm happy to have any of you
who predicted it better than we did stand up and tell me so
because I didn't read your columns.
them or not, I don't know, but Mrs. Amin is in Iraq.
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- and'attempting, its role indicates to a degree, to control
the Intelligence Community?
Admiral Turner:
There are one or two areas where I would frankly like some help
from the Congress. Some years ago they passed an act called
the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which requires that if we're to do
a covert action, we must notify up to seven committees of the
Congress. That's a lot of people to know that something is covert.
And I don't make any aspersions on the ability of the Congress
to keep things secret. There's a basic law that the possibility
of a leak is geometrically proportional to,the number of people
who know it. And we'd like to get that 1'istbility reduced,
preferably to the Intelligence Committees who could then ensure
that it was disseminated as absolutely necessary to other
committees who had actions that might be affected by it. The
law of the Congress in Freedom of Information is a good law.
It's one that I support. But 116 man-years, some of which are
dedicated to supplying . requestt. of the Polish Embassy, is
not a good use of your and my money as taxpayers. when, after
those 116 man-years, we can produce very little that isn't
properly qualified. We've not ever lost a challenge in the
courts On our fairness in keeping only that which is necessary
out of the public domain. It isn't worth it. We cannot afford
to turn over to the public information which discloses our
sources, our liaison with foreign countries, and so on. And
that kind of material should be exempted so *at we don't have
to do a tremendous screening process. I don't know how you file
in your home officesbut we in our business, because we must
protect our sources, 40 file in separate compartments; And when
you get a request where somebody just comes in and
toft , I'm
trying to think of one that came in just the other day. All
the film footage that we may have about Vietnam going back to
1940. Now that's the actual extent of the request, that's how
closely defined it is. Imagine the man-hours that we will have
to take to get out a projectori..go through all that ors
if were documents, to go through each of these different
compartments. -Rowwwoseyou have to look at it, even though you
know the odds are extremely high that you can't release it.
It's wasteful, and i-t gives a perception to our sources that
they may get exposed. We've not exposed any through the Freedom
of Information Act. I want to have the Freedom of Information
Act applicable to us but on the kinds of activities that affect
our people. I want people to be able to write in and say, "have
you got something on me?" if they want to. But not this broad,
shotgun approach that impinges on our sources. Finall we
have an Es iona ~~~~,,A~~, t~,,,*~ s country that requires for
prosecution, that~"t`he` inMv'ual wilingly, wantonly gave
the information to a foreign power. Yet we have Mr. Agee
running around writing books, publishing pamphlets in Washington,
disclosing the names of our CIA officers around the globe,
putting their lives at risk, ruining their usefulness to us,
spoiling their professional careers, and we can't adequately
handle that. ou're in the Department of Agriculture and you
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disclose something about grain futures, you can go to jail.
If you disclose the name of a case officer in the United States
Central Intelligence Agency and you don't do it to a foreign
power but to one of you ladies and gentlemen, there's no way
we can prosecute you.
Admiral, your former colleague, General Graham, said yesterday
the sale of the satellite manual to the Russians jeopardizes
the activity of the K-ll satellite. I just wonder whether you
agree with t
,
~
4 of the manual when you look at certain
rr)ft Ate -P
`-
i i ents', the Paisley case and other things, how much are you
concerned about Soviet moles in your organization?
Admiral Turner:
To answer your first question, I don't agree with General Graham
at all. To answer your second question, I do not have any
evidence that there is a mole in the Central Intelligence Agency
but I will never stand other than vigilant to look for one.
You cannot be complacent in that department. There's nothing
in the Pai case that's come -fto my attention that leads me
to believe at he was associated with a mole or that there was
anything but a suicide involved.
Admiral, SALT verification has, of course, always been a difficult
problem even before the loss of the Iranian facilities and the
KH-11 satellite. I'm wondering, can we make up for that loss
of capability even within the lifetime of a SALT treaty? And
I ask that in having the background of General Graham's statement
yesterday in which he said, "don't let them tell you that the
stations in Turkey will do, that's fraudulent. Don't let them
tell you they can do it by aircraft, that's a fraud. Don't let
them tell you they can build and deploy new satellites in time,
that's also a fraud."
Admiral Turner:
Ed, the damage that has been done to our country already by
the improper revelations on this SALT question is s.rer.. us.
It is a-very difficult and will be cx-very difficul you in
the media in the months ahead as the SALT debate continues.
We must absolutely keep the details of monitoring and verification
out of the media. I must make every effort to do that. It will
unravel like a ball of string if we don't. Because there's no
single panacea to verifying, monitoring any particular rovision
of the treaty. It always comes as a conglomoration oseveral
of the kinds of techniques we have been discussing. So if I
answer your question* it leads me then to discuss four more kinds
of intelligence activities which haven't been discussed in the
media lately, and we just lay out for everybody, particularly
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.of course for the'oviets, all of our intelligence techniques
to verify SALT and if we do that, I'll guarantee you we won't
be able to verify it over the long run. There is no intelligence
collection technique that does not have a counter. And when
you disclose its capabilities in detail, as we are doing
progressively, you invite, eventually, the creation of the
counter. And that not only spoils our collection capability,
it costs you and me billions of dollars in our pockets.
Let me go back and try to follow up on the answer you gave to
Don Oberdorfer's question. You said that the Agency and you,
in fact, had overestimated the possibility that the Shah could
or would step in to put down the rebellion there with all the
police authority available to him. And, what I was wondering
was, first of all, why do you think the Shah did not step in
at the time you expected him to. Was it because he psychologically
wasn't up to doing that or was it for other reasons and, number
two, did we, did you, ever urge him to step in at that time?
And maybe number three, when was that time?
Admiral Turner:
Number one: It's my guess that the Shah, as we, if you don't mind
as you, did not perceive himself being on the scene, being an
Iranian) how serious the situation had become and therefore
he judged by the time he faced up to that decision that it was
too late. I could be totally wrong. I don't know, but that's
my appreciation of him. Why, because it really was a truly
revolutionary situation.n retrospect, there was
no group we could have gone and penetrated and spied on and
found out what their plans were. There wasn't a t at organized
and imposed a revolution on Iran. It was a spontaneous upheaval
throughout the country that did coalesce around the Islamic
label. I'm not privileged to discuss with you the State
Department's role in this with the advice to the Shah.
Was there advice tha-t would have gone through any other channel
than the State Department?
Admiral Turner:
I don't know. The State Department can use all kinds of channels
I'm in the covert action business which is giving advice if
properly authorized. So, yes, there are other channels that
could have been used but I'm not commenting on whether any of
them were used in this case.
8
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Admiral, do you believe that Saudi Arabia is susceptible to the
same type of upheaval that occurred in Iran? If not, do you
believe that the Saudi policy might be neutralized, that the
anti-Communist aspect of Saudi policy might be neutralized
by the fact that there are a number of left-wing states in
the neighborhood now?
Well, Saudi Arabia clearly is subject to some of the same
pressures that Iran was but it is quite a different state and
in quite a different stage of development. You can judge for
yourself whether you think it is anywhere close to the Iranian
model. It is a country of 4 million people as opposed to 38-some
million in Iran. It is less Westernized, less industrialized,
the economy internally has heated up less. There's more Saudi
money in investment overseas as opposed to procurement and
construction in the country. It is not a one-man rule, it is
a family rule. And they have not strayed as fr from Islamic
tenets as they had to the perception of the Ay~iatolla's ( 2}-
in Iran. So in those respects it is somewhat behind, you might
say, the situation in Iran. On the other hand, one would have
to point out that there are large numbers of expatriate workers
in Saudi Arabia, a condition which while it existed in modest
numbers in Iran, it isinnot to the 50% or thereabouts that exists
in Saudi Arabia today. o they have other problems such as that
which they must consider. And they do have their intimate
relationship with the leadership of the Arab world, in one
sense) their relationship with the PLO and its numerous
ele e ~ eluding a fairly extensive Palestinian population
in Via`` ,,_1 0 it has other dangers which did not exist in Iran.
The plusses and minuses in all of these lead me to believe that
Saudi Arabia is not in a dangerous situation today as Iran was
last year or last fall.
I
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