SIGNAL CONVENTION REPORT ISSUE

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CIA-RDP80B01554R003000190001-2
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August 1, 1979
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. Volume 33, Number 10 Approved For Release 20 /08/ 1 : IA- P 0B01554R003000190001-2 JOURNAL OF THE ARMED FORCES COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS ASSOCIATION One Skyline Place, 5205 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, Va. 22041, (703) 820-5028 EDITOR Judith H. Shreve MANAGING EDITOR Carolyn N. Frazier ASSOCIATE EDITORS Kathleen T. Mason Diane C. Dowling EDITORIAL ADVISORS Charles DeYore Norman D. Jorstad 4ilatter Duka Harry M. Raven Col. Robert A. Foyle, Nonnie Robertson USMC (Rel.) R. H. Rosequist Donald M. Jansky Robert Steele tiYQndell A. Johnson MEMBERSHIP SERVICES Beulah F. Houck, Director Beverly A. Detwiler FfanCES 1. Dickinson ADVER~fISING HEADQUARTERS Joyce Selby & Associates 12005 Chesterton Drive Upper Marlboro, Md. 20879 (301) 243-7158 MILITARY LIAISON Arm~t Col. rry ;lfillner, USA Navy RAdm. Milton J. Schultz, 1r., USN Air Force Lt. Cal. Raymond Lee, USAF Marine Corps Col. Arthur A. Bergman, USMC Coast Guard Cmdr. Leonard V. Dorrian, USCG Defense Communications Agency ilince Yoionoski Circulation of this issue: 17,000 copies. Authors are entirely responsible for opin- ions expressed in articles appearing in AF CEA publications, and these opinions are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Armed Forces Communica- tions and Clectronics Association. SIGNAL (ISSN-0037-4938) is published monthly except for-the combined issues in May/June and November/December by the Armed Forces Communications .and Elec- tronics Association at One Skyline Place, 5205 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, Ya. ?2041. Second Blass postage paid at Falls Church, Va., and at additional mailing of- tices. Subscription rate to non-members of AF- CEA, 1 year (10 issues) $14.50. To foreign post offices, $17.50. Single copies, 52.50 each. Membership dues for regular and al- lied members of AFCEA, $10.00 per year, $5.00 of which is for a subscription to SIG- NAL. All rights reserved. Copyright 1979 A Message from the President of the United States Keynote Luncheon Address Senator John W. Warner (R-VA) Referring to 1979 as the ' `year of the electron," Sen. Warner gives an overview of the communications industry as the keystone of U.S. national defense. Sustaining Members' Luncheon Address Dr. Walter B. LaBerge The Under Secretary of the Army focuses on the importance of the development of a clear sense of priorities in light of the substantial changes in leadership of the military services and the electronics community. Banquet Address Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN Various trends in the U.S. necessitate an inevitable response by the intelligence community. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency discusses the fundamental changes which chazacterize the state of intelligence today. dndustrial Luncheon Address William F. Bolger Postmasteriieneral Bolger discusses electronic communications and its impact.on the Postal Service. He views electronic message transfer as essential in keeping the Postal Service operating in an efficient manner. Convention Panel Discussions: Tactical C3 Architecture 1985-1995 The BDM Corporation The panel participants examine the developing technology that will support the tactical C' of U.S. and military forces in the 1985-95 decade. Trends in Protected Communications Harris Corporation The speakers give views on different approaches to protected communications, including DOD programs, military weapon systems, satellite communication systems and technology. A Battlefield Automation~Communications Network The United States Army The panel presents the framework for battlefield communications, covering integrated management; electronics standazdization; military computer family; automatic switching and control; INTACS and the AC2MP. Tactical P?S/NAV for the 1991 Air/I,aad Battle&eld Tezas Instruments, Inc. This panel discussion focuses on the evolution of positioning and navigation functions for combined armed forces in the 1990s. AFCEA Convention Exhibitor Listing Convention Photos 10, 12, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 32, 33, 34, 35, 43, 45, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, y8, 60,152,154,155,157,158, 159, 160,161,162,163. or in part prohibited except by permission of Federal Signals 9 AFCEA Sustaining and Group the publisher. The publisher assumes nn re- _ _ _ _ by Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association. Copyright is not claimed in the portions of this work written by government employees within the scope of their employment. Reproduction in whole scripts or art. When sending change of ad- AFCEAIV of the Month 168 AFCEA Chapter Urganizatiion 174 dress, please ~t~tq~,~i~~n~,6he FQ~'e 2QU~28#Q'~e~lA-RDP80B01591RIR00310~(i11v~ttisers 176 dress, and allo ~d e`k3~~or e)'dery o Tiisl' ?.,.... Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B.Q'4v54R003000190001-2 banquet Address ~y Admiral Stansfield Turner, US(V (het.) Director, Central Intelligence Agency EiERE is so LirrLE that is done today, especially in technical fields like communications and electron- ics, that is not related to world affairs in one way or another. As members and friends of this association, I know you appreciate how important ii is that we have good information upon which to conduct foreign pol- icy. The work which you do permits us not only to transmit that information to its ultimate user, but in -. many cases permits us to collect it in the first place. As world events, progress in science and consumer de- minds push you against the frontiers of knowledge and require to adapt to inevitable changes, so too in in- telligence are these same forces at work. If there is one word that characterizes the state of intelligence more than any other, it is change. In- - telligence activities are undergoing a period of impor- t~nt and fundamental change. Change which, while of- ten not comfortable, I .believe is beneficial. This change is not coming about because we bureaucrats have thought up some new ideas; it is coming about as a necessary and inevitable response to three trends in events gong on around us. The first of those is a changed perception by the United States of its role in world affairs. The second is an increasing sophisti- cation in the techniques for gathering information. And the third is a greater interest and concern by the American public in the intelligence activities of our na- tion. Let me describe these three trends and the im- pact that they have on intelligence, First, I believe in the United States' perception of its role in the -world is changing. We are in a state of tran- sition in public attitudes toward foreign affairs, moving from an activist, interventionist outlook to one which recognizes more the restraints and th.e limits on our ability to influence events in other countries. This is by no means to say that we are becoming isolationist. Quite the contrary, I believe we are gradually emerg- ing from our post-Vietnam aversion to almost any form of international intervention and entering an era where our view of the world is much more reasoned and balanced. Clearly, the United States must contin- ue to play a major role in the world. Yet the circum- stances today are such that we must gauge much more carefully what that role can be and what it should be. For instance, look at the difficulty that we have today in simgly~d_ecidingg~~whpp,,,,vv,~~,,e,, are ~~yt~~ w are against ~~N',~Y~{n~~ib~f1'F~~~~ti't3il~li~l~ ...the challenge is not only to absorb and utilize the vast new quantities of technically collected information, but also to pull together all of our efforts ... so that they can be or- chestrated to compliment each other, to help us acquire what our policy makers need at minimum cost and minimum risk." Approved Soviet Union. But today it is not that simple. Looking back to the last ear or so, there have been at least two BOZ~Q@~1~1p~tting two communist nations against each other with the Soviets backing one of them. In neither case was the other country an ideal candidate for our support. Moreover, it is not nearly so clear today that it is necessary for the United States to take sides in every international issue even if the Soviets are pressing. for an advantage. The consequences of a nation succumb- ing to communist influence are not always as irrevers- ible perhaps as we once thought. Indonesia, Egypt, Somalia, and the Sudan all came under substantial communist influence, and have returned to independ- ence. Even when we decide that some struggling nation deserves our support, there are problems in providing that support which simply did not exist a few years ago. One of these stems from the revolution in inter- national communications. Today, any international ac- tion is almost instantly communicated around the globe, instantly analyzed; and instantly judged. That judgment-often approbation or criticism---though of- ten coming from second or third level powers, influ- ences events and inhibits even major powers. In the past, free nations often took their diplomatic cues from the United States. Today in fora like the United Nations, every small nation uses its one vote independently and the major powers frequently fend themselves together on the minority side of such votes. If in frustration we decide to use military influence, we must remember the lessons of Vietnam. When the pendulum of offense and defense in military weaponry tends toward the defense, as I believe ii does today, even a minor military power can cause a major military power considerable difficulty. Now what all this adds up to is not that we are impo- tent on the international scene but that our leverage of influence, while still considerable, must be exercised much more subtlety if it is to be effective. We must be more concerned with long term influences rather than just "putting a finger in the dike." And, if we want to be able to anticipate rather than simply react to events, we must be able to recognize and interpret the under- lying theme and forces which we can influence over time. For the intelligence world this means vastly ex- panding the scope of our endeavors. Thirty years ago our primary concern was to keep track of Soviet military activity. Today, we recognize that the threat to our national well-being does not come alone from the Soviets or from military events alone. We must be equally interested in politics and economics, in food resources and population growth and energy reserves, international terrorism and in narcotics to name just a few. There is hardly an aca- demic discipline, hardly an area of the world which we can afford not to be well informed. in if we are to keep policy makers informed. This is a more. demanding time perhaps than ever before for intelligence and. it is a time in which there must be a vast expansion of the subject matter with which intelligence must deal. The second trend bringing change on us is the. tech- nological revolution in how we collect information-a. revolution which I hardly need to detail for this au- dience. Thanks to the great sophistication of American industry, our national capabilities in the technical area today, in overhead photography and signal intercept, are simply burgeoning. Interestingly though, rather than denigrating the role and the importance of the hu- For Release 2001/08/01 : CIA-RDP80B0~94fl~9!?~9 ~~1 ~$is has accented it. The more ir{formaiion technical systems give us, the more ques- about the unauthorized i o ure of ro erl classi- ~tions it r r p p y a~vhich e~o~~~~t~~a~ ~OA1K/tad/04terF.~,~RDF~061~f1ft9A~~~ti1rQ Q~ ,these disclosures have . g y to us something that happened in th d li d ' past prompts the policy maker to ask -why it happened and what will happen next. Understanding the con- cerns, the forces that bring about decisions, the in- tentions of other people and other nations, is the forte of the human intelligence agent. Thus today, the challenge is not only to absorb and utilize the vast new quantifies of technically collected information, but also to pull together all of our efforts in these three fields-photographic, signals and hu- man--so that they can be orchestrated to compliment each other, to help us acquire what our policy makers need at minimum cost and minimum risk. This sounds logical and simple to the bystander. But as you well know, because technical capabilities have expanded so and because intelligence in our country is a large bureaucracy spread over many different gov- ernment agencies and departments (each with its own concerns and priorities) we can no longer do business in traditional ways. It has taken some fundamental re- structuring to accommodate these changes. T'he Director of Central Intelligence has been autho- rized to coordinate all national intelligence agencies since 1947 when the National Security Act was passed. [Jnfortunately, until recently he never had the authority to actually do it. A year and a quarter ago, President Carter signed a new Executive Order which gives -fo the Director of Central Intelligence authority over the budgets of all of the national intelligence or- ganizations and authority to direct the way in which they collect information. This strengthening of my au- ihority is still new and the processes are still evolving, but it is having a very substantial effect on the whole intelligence community. The third trend driving change is the increased pub- lic attention to intelligence activities ever since the in- vestigations of 1974 to 1976. Those investigations brought .io American intelligence more public attention than has ever before been brought to bear on a major intelligence organization. The impact of this has been substantial and, within the intelligence community, it has been traumatic. The right kind of visibility can be beneficial both to us and to the American public. By the right kind of visibility what I mean is visibility that gives the public access to information about the general way in which we go about our business and why we are doing it, and which confirms that the controls which are established over intelligence are being exercised as they were in- tended. To achieve this kind of right visibility, the in- telligence community is trying to be more open. We are passing more of the information which we gain and produce to you through the unclassified publication of our studies. Taking the analyses that we produce, we remove from it that which must be kepi secret either to protect sources or to preserve for policy makers some unique advantage, and if what remains continues to have adequate substance and we feel The American public would benefit from it, we publish it in unclassi- fied form. 1n addition, we are answering questions more. We speak in public more as I am with you today. We par- ticipate more in academic symposia and conferences. I know .that the intelligence community is doing an hon- orable and a vital job for our country and is doing it well. I personally want you to know as much about it as possible. Still, some of the visibility is unwanted Unwa t d n emora ze an intelligence service that has traditi on- ally, and of necessity, operated largely in secrecy. Far more important is the destructive effect that such dis- closures can have on our ability to do what we are mandated to do by the President and the Congress. First, no foreign country or individual will entrust lives or sensitive information to us if they do not be- lieve we can keep them secret. Secondly, it is impos- sible to carry out the quest for information in a society like that of the Soviet Union if what we do and how we do it becomes public information. In short, these im- proper revelations damage our country's long term ability to know what is going on in the many closed societies around us. Because we are such an open so- ciety, we often overlook the disadvantage to which we can be placed if we are not well informed about what goes on in closed societies. For instance, actions like those of the Soviet Uriion in 1972 in dramatically en- tering the international wheat market cost Americans a lot in our pocketbooks. Other surreptitious and un- suspected moves can cost us in many other ways. On balance, this increased visibility is a net plus. We do need the understanding and the support of the American public and we do need to avoid any possible abuses. Yet, at the same time, we.must recognize that with visibility there are also minuses. There are inhibi- tions on the actions we can take and limits on the risks that we will take. The issue today before our country is If you currently earn between ~~~'?~o?~o?o we'rre got ?better jab for you ... I~loVl/! Several new contract awards have created numerous, immediate, long term career opportunities for degreed, technical professionals. W l e are on y interested in top caliber, creative individuals with proven records of success in engineering, management 8 consulting. Locations are nationwide. Opportunities include technical/management consulting, project management, RBD, test and systems evaluation. Major Contract areas include Communications, Satellites. Weapons, Intelligence, Computer, Energy and Aerospace systems. All positions require U.S. CITIZENSHIP, MINIMUM OF A BS degree (MS/Ph.D. preferred), and a minimum of one year experience in one or more of the specific areas listed below. ? Minicomputers ? Radar Systems ? Microprocessors ? Communication Systems ? Software development ? EW/SIGINT/FLINT ? Signal processing ~ Microwave Systems ? Digital systems ? Electromagnetics ? Command & Control ? Fire Control Systems If you want to join one of the fastest growing firms in the country, call Robert Beach. Vice President, collect at (301) 762.1100 or. if you prefer, send your detailed resume, in confidence. We'll make you an offer you can't refuse. WALLACH ... Your career connection e because it beA~dis~o~~@ala>~Od>668'ti~hd~lA- and allies. a of course, I am talking primarily 1010 Rockville Pike Box 6016 Rockville, Maryland 20852 (3011762-1100 For more than 30 years-confidential"informotion? individucl:sotution for you from:ourwide range Our experienced specialists can also find an" -has been-entrusted'ta GRETAG coding;-~: Tdepiterrzs ? Radio ~ Data.? T.xt? Tdsx ? Mesimia- GRETACODER? 101~~--``~ GRETACODER?'515' . GRFTACODER? 1 OS -~ ~ GRETACODtER? 601:-~ GRETACODER? 201.`x::"': GRETACODER? 805; GRETACODiR? 505=f~~=~-.6R6TACODER? 905-'4 Choose security and find out~about our , , wide GRETACODER range for protecting:-~'~~ v, gu~ii~ug iiuuiiiiaiwt~ es~enua- Lo toretgn poltey. ~I.~h1S is not an easy transition. We are not (here yet but, we are moving swiftly and surely in the right direction. When we reach our goal, we will have constructed a new model of intelligence, a uniquely American mod- el, tailored to the laws and the standards of nnr sn_ ~sRET~1~C SECLIR/TY 5~i7'EMS".:=t:~~- ~ ~ ciety. As we proceed towards this goal, in this period _r.----'-~ - -- ,.' computerinfornnation ~` ' ~.._ be with you today. Comte ahd sea us at H+e MED! sro~z?~49~ hHr-R P80B01554R003000'h9fl001F-2- - "...out of this present metamorphosis is emerg- ing an intelligence commu- nity in which the legal rights of our citizens and the con- trols and the restrictions on intelligence activities will be balanced with the necessi- ty of gaining information essential to foreign policy." how much assurance does.the nation need against in- vasions of its privacy or against the possible taking of foreign policy actions that could be considered unethi- cal? How do we balance these desires for privacy and. propriety with the resulting reduction in our in- teIligence and covert action capabilities? Congress is expected to give expression to this ques- tion of balance by enacting legislation called charters for the intelligence community. These charters would. set forth. our authorities to undertake specific in- telligence activities, the boundaries within which we must operate, and the oversight mechanisms for checking on those activities. It is my sincere hope the Congress will pass these charters during this session of the Congress. Written with care and with sensitivity to the kinds of problems I have been discussing with you, charters could help to resolve same of these funda- mental difficulties.. Overreaction, either by tying the intelligence community's hands or by giving it unre- stricted freedom, would. be a mistake--on one hand, emasculating our necessary intelligence capabilities and on the other, inviting abuses. After all these comments, let me assure you that, in my view, our intelligence arm is strong and capable. It is undergoing substantial change and that is never an easy or a placid process in a large bureaucracy. But, out of this present. metamorphosis is emerging an in- telligence community in which the legal rights of our citizens and the controls and the restrictions on in- telligence activities will he halancert wart, r},n .,a..~~~:.., 40 . SIGNAL, AUGUST, L979 Approved For Releas~01/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R0030~0001-2 19 June 1 Ji`9 Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner Director of Central Intelligence Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association SheratonaCarlton House, Washington, D.C. Wednesday, 20 June 1979 THE STATE OF INTELLIGENCE There is so little that is done today /especially in_technical fields like communications and electronics that is not related to world affairs in one way or another.( As members and friends of this association, I know you appreciate how important it is that we have good information upon which to conduct foreign policy. The work which you do permits us not only to transmit that information to its ultimate user, but in many cases permits us to collect it in the first place. Hs world event ~rogress in scienc and onsumer push you against the frontiers of knowledge and require to adapt to inevitable changes, so too in intelligence are these same forces at work. If there is one word that characterizes the state of intelligence more than any other, it is change. Intelligence activities are undergoing a period of important and fundamental change. Change which, while often not comfortable, I believe is beneficial. This change is not coming about because we bureaucrats have thought up some new ideas; it is coming about as a necessary and inevitable response to three trends in events going on around us. The first of _1 those is a~C anged perception b the United States of its role in Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003000190001-2 Approved For Release~1/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R00300~0001-2 world affairs. The second is an increasing sophistication in the ~...~ --?~.' tec~rrigues for gathering. inform~..i. And the third is a greater eres an? conc~r~. mere an pu ic~ the intelligence activities of our nation. Let me describe these three trends and the impact that they have on intelligence. First, I believe t e United States? perception of its role in the world is changing. We are in a state of transition in public. attitudes toward foreign affairs, moving from an activist, interven- tionist outlook/to one which recognizes the limits on our ability/ta influence events in they countries /we are not becoming isolationists Quite the contrary,~I believe we are gradually emerging from our post-Vietnam aversion~o almost any form of international intervention and entering an era where our view of the wart is much more reasoned and balanced./ Clearly, the United States must continue to pi ay a major role in the world. Yet the circumstances today are such~hat we must gauge much more carefully what that role can be and what it shoul d For instance, look at the difficulty that we have today in simply deciding who~i a are for and who+''1ve are against i n any i nternatipnaT issue. ~~~ Traditionally, we often were in favor of the country opposed by the Soviet Union. I But today it is not that simple./ In the last year or so, there have been at least two international conflicts pitting two communist nations against each othe with the Soviets backing one of them ~ In neither case was the other country an ideal candidate for our support. 2 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003000190001-2 Approved For Releas~01/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R 300001-2 Moreover, it is not nearly so clear today that the United States should take sides in every international issu~even if the Soviets are pr^e-ss ng for an advantage./The consequences of a natior~jsuccumbing to communist influence are not always as irreversible perhaps as we once thought. /Indonesia, Egypt, Somalia, the Sudan, all came under substan- tial communist influence, and have returned to independence. Now what all this adds up to is not that we are .impotent on the international scene but that our leverage of influence, while still considerable, must be exercised much more subtlely ~if it is to be effect i ve. / Ole must be more concerned with 1 ong term influences //Father than just putting a finger in the dike. And, if we w .~ w e m t `be?able to anticipate rather than simply react to events,, e recognize and interpret the underlying theme and forces which we can 5~9 influence over time. For the intelligence world this means vastly expanding the scope of our endeavors. Thirty years ago our primary concern was to keep track of Soviet militar activity ~ Today, we recognize that'the hrea to our national well-being/comes not alone from the Soviets/not alone from military _ _~ events. / We must be equally interested in politics and economics in ~ international food resources and population growth,/ and energy reserves, terrorism,/narcotics, and in technology transfer to name just a few. These new 'areas of concern simply represent the expanding areas of intercourse amon natio vith which we must be concerned in an ~ncre~, as- ?--- ingly interdependent world. Incidentally, the last one I mentioned, concern for ogy tra sfer isn't really new, it has been with us 3 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003000190001-2 Approved For Releas~01/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R0 00001-2 since colonial days. In 1622, in response to,~ai~Indian massacre of settlers near Jamestown, a ship was sent from London with the latest in weaponry. That happened to be armor" from the Tower of London and some crossbows. When the ship arri'v d it was decided to leave the armor--even though it was totally i appropriate for fighting Indians--but out of concern that if theecrossbows should fall into the hands of the Indians it would advan their technological level markedly--they put them all back on th ship and sailed away. So as you can see, our concern for_ technology transfer is nothing new,fthough the adverse affect it _.. i could have on us may be greater than in the day of crossbows., Similarly, ` =?----= there is hardly an academic discipline, hardly an area of the world / which we can afford not to be well informed in if we are to keep policy makers informed./ This is a more demanding time perhaps/than ever before for intelligence and it is a time in which there must be a vast expansion of the subject matter with which intelligence must deal,/ The second trend bringing change on ~s s the technological revolution in how we collect information./ A revolution which I hardly -----_~ need to detail for this audience/ Thankss t~~yo_u_ and to others in ~w.~-- - . r V~ related industries,/ our national capabilities in the technical area today, in overhead photography and signal intercept,/are simply bur- - - - J -- geoni g.l Interestingly though, rather than denigrating the role and. the importance of the human intelligence agents this has accented it. The more information our technical systems give us/ the more cLue_ stions it raises. A photograph or a signal intercept ~ which generally tell us 1 something that happened in the past prompt the policy maker to ask .R- why~ t happened and wh! at will happen next. Understanding the concerns, 4 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01.554R003000190001-2 Approved For Releas~01/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R0030~0001-2 the forces that bring about decisions, the intentions of other people and other nations, is the forte of the human intelligence agent. Thus today, the challenge is not only to absorb and utilize the vast new quan ities of technically collected information,/but also to pull together all of our efforts in these three fields--photo~d_~hic, signals, and hu~an~so that they can be grchest_ rated to com l ment each other to help us acquire what our policy makers need at minimum cost and minimum risk. This sounds 1Tgical and simple to the bystander./ But, as you well know, intelligence in our country is a large bureaucracy spread over many different government agerlsj es and departments each with its own ~-. --____.s concerns and~p_ riorities. 4!e can no longer `bsarb and process this flow --~-.... of technically derived intelligence efficiently/if we da here to our traditional ways of doing business./ It has taken some fundamental restructuring to accommodate these changes ~ For instance, a year and a quarter ago, President Carter signed a new Executive Order which gives to the Director of Central Intelligence authority over the budgets of all of the national intelligence organization and authority to direct The processes are sti,_,;.1 T,~ evolving, but are having a very substantial effect on the whole Intel- - ..~ ligence community./ The third trend driving change/is the increased public attention to intelligence activities ever since the investigations of 1974 to 1976. Those investigations brought to American intelligence more public attention than has ever before been brought to bear on a major 5 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003000190001-2 Approved For Releas~01/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R0030~0001-2 intelligence organization. The impact of this has been substantial . ~~ and,~ithin the intelligence community, it has been traumatic. The right kind of visibility can be beneficial both to us and to the American public. By the right kind of visibility what ,I mean is visibility that gives the public access to information about the general way in which we go about our business~nd why we are doing %t~ and which confirms that the controls which are established over intelligence are being exercised as they were intended ~ To achieve this kind of right visibility the intelligence community is trying to be more open.) We are passing more of the information which we gain and producelto you through the unclassified publication of our studies. Taking the analyses thaw rn uce, we remove from it that which must be kept secret either to protect sources or to preserve for policy makers some unique advant~e, and if what remains continues to have adequate substance and we feel the American public would benefit from it, we publish it in unclassified form. In addition, we are nswering questions more. ~ We s.~eak in public more as I am with you We participate more in a.~ademic symposia and conferences. I know that the intelligence communitv_is doing an honorable and a ital job for our country and is doing it well. I personally want you to know as much about it as possible. Still, some of the visibility is unwanted. Unwanted because it ...-- ~ benefits neither Americans nor our friends and allies.] Here, of course, I am talking primarily about the unauthorized disclosure of properly classified information / At the least, these disclosures 6 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003000190001-2 Approved For Releas~01/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R0030~0001-2 have demoralized_an intelligence service that has traditionally, and of necessity, operated largely in secrec_v~ Far more important is the destructive effect that such disclosures can have on our abi~l`itsy~ .__. to do what we are mandated to do by the President and. the Congress. First, no foreign country or individual will entrust lives ar ..._.... sensitive information to us if they do not believe we can keep them secret. ~ Secondly, it is impossible to carry ou ~ the quest for informa- ...`_ tion in a society like that of the Soviet Union/if what we do and_how we do it becomes public information , In short, these impr~er revela- tions damage our country's long term abilit~r to know what is going on in the many closed societies around us. On balance this increased visibility is a net pTus.~ We do need the understanding and the support of the American publicnd we do need to avoid any possible abuses. Yet, at the same time,j we must recognize that with vis~ib~.'l~ity there are also mi~uses.~ There are inhibitions on the actions we can take~and limits on tllllllhe risks that we ~_ tiv~ill take.J The issue today before our country/is how much assurance +1 ~ does the nation need against invasions of its pry vacy~or against the possible taking of foreign policy actions that could be considered unet~ hical? ~ How do we balance these desires for privacy and propriety/ with the resulting capabilities?~ reduction in our intelligence/ and covert action Congress is expected to give expression to this questiQp of balanc by enacting legislation called cha_rte~s for the intelligence commu ity. (These charters would set forth our authorities to undertake 7 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003000190001-2 Approved For Releas~1/08/01 :CIA- DP80B01554R0030~0001-2 specific /intelligence activities, the bou~ ndaries within which we must operate,(a~,nd the oversight mechanisms for checking on those activities. + ..__ It is my sincere hope the Congress will pass these charters during this session of the Congress. Written with care and with sensitivity to the kinds of problems I have been discussing with you, charters could help to resolve some of these fundamental difficul ies. Over?red action, either by tying the intelligence community's hands~or by giving it unrestricted freedom,/ would be a mistake./ On one hand, emasculating our necessary intelligence capabilities Orr the other hand, inviting abuses.l After all these comments though, let me assure ou that in my view our intelligence arm is strong and capable ~ It is undergoing ----~ substantial change/and that is never an easy or a placid rp oces~s in a largee bureaucracy. But, out of this present metamorphosislis emerging an intelligence community in which the legal rights of our citizens and the controls and the restrictions on intelligence activities will ----_?. ~ be balanced with the necessity of gaining information~essenti'al to foreign p icy This is not an easy transition I We are not there yet but, we are moving swiftly and surely in the right direction.. When we reach our goal, we will have constructed a new model of -__.._ intelligence, a uniquely American model, tailored to the laws and the standards of our society.) As we proceed towards this goal in this period of transition which will probably last another two or three years, we will need your understanding and support./ For that reason I am gr teful that you have let me be with you t.aday.,~Thank you very 8 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003000190001-2