ARTICLE ON NAVY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003200110004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 24, 1979
• Content Type: PAPER

Approved For Rise 2005/04/27: CIA-RDP80BO1554R~200SC6004-5
x r 24 August 1979
Article on Navy
Theme - The Navy has two combat missions--projecting power ashore and
sea control. The latter is the fundamental of the two. It has been
neglected in US naval strategy and force planning but will become the
Navy's primary focus if war with the Soviet Union breaks out.
I. Mahan
In 18 , A. T. Mahan wrote, "The influence of Sea Power on History."
This work was a historical analysis of British use of sea power
in the and centuries. It was instantly viewed as a
justification for navies; and that use has persisted.
II. The Mahanian Theses
Sea power is the necessary concomitant of trade and hence of economic
growth of trading nations. Sea power requires a network of bases and
a fleet of such strength as to dissuade an opponent from challenging
at sea; hence a capability to defeat an enemy battle fleet.
III. Validity of the Theses
As a historical analysis - valid.
As a proscription for the next century - increasingly invalid with
time:
A. Advent of the submarine - battle fleets no longer were the
sole determinant of use of the seas by merchant ships.
B. Advent of the military aircraft - battle fleets were even
less the determinant of sea control.
Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200110004-5
 Approved For R.se 2005/04/27: CIA-RDP80B01554RIP200110004-5
C. Advent of wider and more rapid communications and regard for
international law - the threat of blockade or interference
with merchant shipping became less credible.
IV. Why does the myth prevail?
A. Originally:
Kaiser
T. Roos
Both were looking for a rationale for expansionism-colonialism.
B. General - suited the economic and political philosophies of the
nations that were potential sea powers.
C. Fascination with combat vehicle.
The vehicle of war is designed to defeat the like vehicle of war.
Galley vs. galley
Cross bowman vs. cross bowman
Tank vs. tank
BB vs. BB
For the gladiator the chariot becomes an entity unto itself,
not just a means to an end.
Common failing of military mentality is to lose sight of
the end objective.
Common tendency of military is to continue to develop the
vehicle well beyond its usefulness.
D. Fascination with the "offense"
:.War is a masculine profession.
Battle fleets on offense, seeking out and destroying enemy,
are epitome.
2
Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003200110004-5
 Approved For Re&e 2005/04/27: CIA-RDP80B01554R200110004-5
Mahan's philosophy epitomized offense.
E. Budget justification.
Armies are relatively easy to justify - only their size and
shape at issue.
Navies are more remote and have limited political
usefulness.
Once Mahan provided a winning justification - why change?
Today the offense is considered part of justification
defense does not connote sufficient usefulness.
F. Dearth of naval strategists.
Military profession does not generate intellectuals easily;
but armies more than navies -
Who are the strategic writers?
Clausewitz
Mahan
Mackinder
Corbett
Perhaps it's the very remoteness of naval operations from
political objectives that discourages naval officers
from intellectualizing.
V. What should the new strategy by?
A. Naval contribution to defense of vital national interests must
be first concern.
1. Most likely and threatening is a war with Soviet Union..
a. Capability to project power with strategic nuclear
weapons is first priority -
Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003200110004-5
 Approved For Rose 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP80B01554R*200110004-5
b. Beyond that sea control of SLOC to area of conflict
is next because:
(1) War cannot be sustained beyond our shores w/o
sea control.
(2) Potential contribution of projection of power
forces is limited in a major war.
c. Sustaining war necessary?
(1) World Wars I and II hung in balance of sea control.
(a) Neither Kaiser nor Hitler prepared for
interdiction campaign.
1. Battle of Jutland preparation by both
sides--inconclusive.
2. Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bismarck prep
Hitler - 25(?) subs
Doenitz plea(?)
(b) On outbreak of each war Germans turned
immediately to sub warfare.
(2) Today not appear Sov have intent to interdict.
(a) Do have capability.
(Compare with Hitler's)
(3) Concept that SLOC not necessary to such a war.
(a) Short war view
May be short but one important factor in
that determination would be whether both
sides could sustain conflict.
(b) Airlift view
...(Statistics)
Approved For Release 2005/04/27 CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200110004-5
 Approved For Rose 2005/04/27: CIA-RDP80B01554R200110004-5
d. Limitations of projection.
(1) Airpower
(a) Allied a/c inventory in Europe is
compares with attack and fighter
a/c on entire 6 CVs in Atlantic (and much
of VF and some VA must be retained for
defense of CV)
(2) Amphib - short of a Normandy not very important
due lack landing beaches.
(a) Considerable time to mount even division
scale assault--sea control essential to
move it.
(3) Risks - 4 CV needed to survive in heavily
contested environments where projection would
take place. CV is heart of sea control capability,
too. Could not risk 1/3 CV force in return for
limited # VA sorties or small scale amphib assault.
e. Sea control strategy
(1) No matter what US planning is; no matter how Sov
use their navy in beginning, US strategists are
bound to react in same way.
(a) Preserve our capability to fulfill the ultimate
need should it arise - protection of SLOG in
protracted conventional war.
(b) Could not afford to do otherwise short of a
true emergency requirement, e.g., devestating
blow to land based air power in Europe.
Approved For Release 2005/04/27: CIA RDP80B01554R003200110004-5
 Approved For R.se 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP80B01554F*200110004-5
B. Contribution to less critical national requirements.
1. Non-Soviet wars
a. Generally projection of power is requirement;
perhaps local area sea control (new weaponry)
(1) Premium on speed of response more than quantity
of air strike/amphib assault.
2. Peacetime show of force
a. Threat of projection of power; or blockade/sea denial.
b. Right place at right time premium.
c. Summary
USN strategy today requires mix of sea control
and power projection. Problem is to determine
proportionate emphasis and readiness and where,
with limited resources, one vehicle or weapons
system can fulfill both roles.
VI. What is the Soviet strategy?
. A.
Evolution of past 35 years
1. Gorskov the leader for years -- has lent singleness
of purpose
2. Original emphasis on subs - ideal sea denial weapon
a. Defense of homeland always high on Sov list
(1) CVs clearly a threat
3. Cruise missile on subs and surface ships extended
sea denial possibilities
a. Buildup of surface navy
6
Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200110004-5
 Approved For Re0e 2005/04/27: CIA-RDP80BO1554ROW 00110004-5
4. 1/2 Backfire production dedicated to Navy -
again sea denial role
5. Combination of forces has led to a gradually expanding
sea control zone as well as sea denial expansion.
6. Peacetime show of force exploited increasingly.
7. Gradual evolution of:
a. Unrep
b. Amphib
B. Direction for future?
1. Gorskov thesis: only if subs supported by air and surface
ships can be effective - coordinated operations necessary -
Hitler's failure
a. Presumably sea control concept
b. Moskva, then Kiev and possibly CV are indicative
of intent to operate in coordinated tactics outside
range of land-based air.
(1) Gorskov may well view sea denial in Atlantic
SLOC as unachievableby subs alone. In effect
must have sea control of surface, too, to be
effective.
(2) If so, may be building step by step toward an.
open ocean sea denial/sea control capability based
on subs, surface combatants and sea-based air.
7
Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200110004-5
 Approved For .se 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1554F200110004-5
(3) Edging sea control zone outward - knowing
that to move out from under land-based air
umbrella is a giant step - but the end objective.
VII.
Optimizing the US Navy to its strategy
A. Understanding sea control
1.
Four tactics against 3 threats:
air, sub, surface
a.
b.
c.
d.
Destroy at base
Blockade
Barrier interdiction
Point defense
2.
Nature of all four tactics has changed due:
a.
b.
c.
Increased range of weapons
Greater accuracy of weapons
Longer range detection
3.
Impact of changed nature of warfare on each tactic:
a. Destroy at base: More difficult to penetrate
and sea-based air always at a range disadvantage;
but greater destructiveness and accuracy if do
penetrate.
b. Blockade: Difficult to do with air; requires
such close in action against ships and subs that
only subs can attempt; technical trends are against
them as Soviet sea control areas expand.
Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : GE'fA-RDP80B01554R003200110004-5
 Approved For Rose 2005/04/27: CIA-RDP80130155490 200110004-5
c. Barriers: Requires sea-based air for air or ships;
probably even for subs.
d. Point defense: must extend 3 dimensional defensive
perimeter even further; requires air for rapid
attack and for elevating sensors.
a
B.
Understanding Projection of Power Ashore
1.
3 Tactics
a.
b.
c.
Air strike
Amphib assault
Gun/missile bombardment
2.
Nature of tactics has changed due to same characteristics
of weapons and sensors. Impact on projection tactics:
a. Air strike - air defense weapons require stand-off
attacks; more accurate weapons reduce tonnage
required per destruction.
b. Amphib - small, mobile, defensive weapons make large
assaults more difficult, including vulnerability of
only new tactic since WW II, helo assault.
c. Bombardment - missiles may open up new possibilities,
especially when consider in connection with required
stand-off for aircraft.
C. Understanding interplay of sea control and power projection
1. Clearly sea control is sine qua non for projection.
9
Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200110004-5
 Approved For .se 2005/04/27: CIA-RDP80BO1554F3200110004-5
2. Destroy at base tactic for sea control smacks of power
projection. Distinction is only in purpose--to destroy
elements contributing to enemy's sea denial capability
or to destroy elements related to air or land campaigns
or industrial or social strength. Importance of
distinction lies in more limited nature of requirements for
sea control, e.g., inland penetration not so deep, target
complexes more limited, types of weapons, e.g., mines, may
be different, etc. In short, the full panoply of power
projection is not a sine qua non of sea control; only a
limited application of power projection tactics to the
sea control. mission.
VIII. What kind of '.a Navy is'required to'fulfil1 this strategy?
IX. What is U.S. naval strategy today?
X. Why is strategy not coherent?
10
Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200110004-5
 Approv*or Release 2005/04/27: CIA-RDP8010 554R003200110004-5
Tape 7
Side A, 3 1/8 - 3 3/16
2 4 AUG X719
Note that I have two tickets to the Redskins-Bengals football game
on December 9th. Brunch at the Metropolitan Club at 11:00 and bus at 12:00
to the game. I'll have to invite someone else to go with me.
Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200110004-5
 Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003200110004-5
AR,1CLZ APPEARLD
01N PAGE - Il
THE LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 August 1979
NEB OVERT- CA BUYS.
=AD =j _
HELP WANTED'
WASHINGTON (UPI)-The Central Intelligence Agen-
,cy may try to keep its. activities secret. but it has. taken a
more open approach to recruiting.
The CIA Sunday took out a large display ad in the-
Washington Post in the "professional opportunities". sec-
tion of the classified ads% seeking applications for "special.
men and women who still have a spirit of adventure''
Reminding everyone the agency is an "equal opportuni-'
ty" employer, the ad uses the slogan- "It's time for us to
know more about each other.". ;
17.
The ad did not specify which jobs the agency was trying.
to fill, but its. wording appeared aimed at attracting appli-
cants. who mght be interested in some. of the CIA's more
Covert posts.:-_,-_
"There aren't many of you. One in a thousand, maybe..
You're a bright,' self-reliant, self-motivated, person we
need to help us gather information and put together a
meaningful picture of what's happening in the world." the
ad said. "You can rely on your wits, your initiative and
.your skills. And, in return enjoy recognition, positions of
responsibility, life in foreign places, plus knowing that you
belong to a very small, very special group of people doing
a vital, meaningful job in the face of challenges and possi-
ble hardship: -
= The ad specifies it is looking only for college graduate
who are American citizens and have foreign language ap
titude...
ApprovSor Release 2005/04/27: CIA-RDP8cI1554R003200110004-5
 Approved Fo lease 2005/04/27: CIA-RDP80BO15 003200110004-5
To the Special Events Committee:
XX I accept the two football package tickets
for the game scheduled on DEC LM_
I cannot accept.
I realize that cancellations will be accepted
only if the club can resell the footickets.
w
Approved For Release 2005/04/27 CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200110004-5
 Approved For lase 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP80B0155403200110004-5
24 August 1979
REMINDER MEMO
1. Start three pilot projects to demonstrate our ability to
provide better support to the military. Pick areas in which we
have real expertise and the military has a need.
a. Pick one for each of the three military services.
b. Pick one that has to do with an R&D decision.
c. Pick one that has to do with a procurement decision.
d. Pick one that has to do with a tactical situation.
2. Use these to demonstrate that we can do more, particularly
if we are allowed to share information on forces and weapons.
Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003200110004-5