CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 2 AUGUST 1979 (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003200110016-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 3, 1979
• Content Type: MFR

and company. (C)
2. When I first arrived, Vaky and Bowdler were on hand. There
was a great deal of unhappiness over a piece of paper they had in their
hands which was the text of what we presented to the Congress on the
In effect they felt that they had been taken by
surprise and were not ready to agree with all of the specific actions
we were contemplating under the finding. They therefore felt that we
were putting on a poor show for the Congress to not have our-act
'together.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
3 August 1979
SUBJECT: Conversation with the Secretary of State,
2 August 1979 (U)
1. The Secretary at the beginning and again at the end of our
conversation thanked me very deeply and sincerely for the superb way
in which we handled the verification issue. He believes we have
defused that in a very effective manner and he felt that we la ed 25x1
our role here most professionally. Please pass this to
a. In additinn- ler in particular felt that he had 25x1
some ideas fo which were worthy
of our consideration and a ME Detil ,ed in this process.
b. Secretary Vance's concern was that we coordinate our
efforts more. The Secretary directed Bowdler and Vaky to come
up with a paper on how we should do this. (S)
3. I exp my opinion that the paper we took to the Congress
to explain the was in essence a paper which we 25x1
to the SCC and, ere sent ted out that they had seen that
paper well in advance of any presentations to the Congress. There
was a complaint, however, that in this particular instance the paper
presenting the proposed finding did not get circulated by the NSC to
the SCC members in advance of the meeting. I further indicated that we
were always anxious to gain their views on how we could do covert action
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better but that I didn't think it was necessarily a good idea to
develop the covert action proposal jointly. The SCC process provided
an opportunity for State and others to make an input. The Perspective 25x1
process gave State an opportunity afterwards to sign off on specific
actions that would flow from the covert action proposal.
6. We had considerable discussion-on the latest MX proposal and
I'm to hear it tomorrow. is going to be critically important that we
develop our position on whether or not the US proposal is verifiable. (C)
7. The Secretary recommended I get together with Phil Habib after
he comes back from his trip to the Caribbean. The Secretary is very
pleased with the initial papers Habib has developed on this. (C)
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8. The Secretary asked that we be very alert to anything coming
out of Lusaka during the Commonwealth Conference. He would like to
get as straight a read-out on that as he can since there will be many
different colorations to the official reports. (C)
9. The Secretary also asked for our appraisal of what the
Nigerians are up to. (C)
10. We ran out of time. I delivered.the blue bags. I didn't
get to any of the other items. (U)
11. Leave the Pakistan issue on the agenda, and put it on the
agenda for Brzezinski on 3 August. (C)
12. Drop the overflight issue. Drop the Backfire production
issue. (C)
13. Drop the Nicaragua Hopkins memo. (C)
15. Keep the 1962 US-Soviet Understanding issue. (C).
25x1
16. Take items J through Q and screen them down to see if any are
still applicable next time I get on the Secretary of State's calendar.
There were too many in this case; I couldn't possibly have covered them
all. I want two or three or four items for future meetings if we have
that many that seem important. (U)
17. I don't know that I want to raise the FBI report. Let me have
recommendations. (C)
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director
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