CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 6 OCTOBER 1978

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003200210022-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: October 6, 1978
• Content Type: MFR

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6 0 CT 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with the Secretary of Defense,
6 October 1978
1. We went over th situation in the
t with
l
p ou
conference. I suggested the Secretary attempt to he
us the $7 million additional for
ve
t
o gi
persuading the conferees
He indicated he didn't know where he might best do that but he would
look into it and be glad to help if he could.
d that if money is put in for
h
agree
we bot
it is also important to insure that there is some wording
that keeps us from being tied down to the specific
proposal we have discussed.
2. The Secretary case. I,assured,him concerned
what may come to substantiate the press speculations.
We had a long discussion on 0 I took an adamant position
3
.
that Gerry Dinneen had agreed with me on the phone:
a. That the money for FY 78 would be transferred
to the NFIP budget;
b. That OSD would be obliged to transfer additional
monies in future years; and
c. That I would feel obliged in future years to
recheck whether in those budgets 0 would cross the 25X1
threshold of the NFIP. In such cases, we would have to
take the money out of the NFIP rather than accepting it
as a transfer.
E2 IMPDET
ri RY DCI
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Charles Duncan indicated that this morning Dinneen had given him a
diametrically opposite description of our conversation. The OSD
position is that if they add the money into the NFIP, it will increase
the size of the NFIP and lead to its being under pressure from 0MB and
Congress to cut it back down. They believe they should transfer the
4. NITC. Duncan averred that all things were going ver smoothly
with NITC except for the possible problem of the location of
personal office. I told him that was absolutely untrue. From my point
of view, I felt the location outside the 4J area was unsatisfactory.
The people needed access on a rapid basis to the CCF and to the NMIC.
They told me the proposed space was "contiguous" to the JCS. I said that
seemed difficult to understand since it was between the sixth and seventh
corridors and the JCS was over in the ninth and tenth corridors, but that
it might well be contiguous in boundary but the distance to the access
would be great.
a. I stated that an E-ring office for
was not my primary concern. My concern was to get adequate
space with direct access to the CCF and NMIC.
b. Secretary Duncan later made the contention that
it was an absolutely clear-cut case that the NITC elements
belonged in the Pentagon. I said that absolutely was not
my view. I stated that 2% of the time they were much
better off if they were in the Pentagon, i.e., during crises,
but that 98% of the time they would be better off in Langley
close to NFAC. It was difficult to weigh whether the 2%
was more important than the 98%, but I certainly didn't
think that was any open and shut case. In fact, it was
my preference that they be in Langley with provision for
moving a detail down to the Pentagon during crises, but
that in order to promote a team approach to the NITC and
to garner OSD acceptance, I was very pleased to bring them
into the Pentagon.
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5. I raised the DIA building.
a. The question came up of whether the S&I team looked
at Langley and the Langley options. I told him I didn't
know, but that they had not come to me and that I was really
the only person at Langley enthusiastically in support of
bringing the DIA building out there. Therefore, I thought
I had been had a l i ttl e bit.
b. Brown and Duncan agreed to review the merits of the
DIA building once more other than subjective judgments on
whether bringing it out here would lead to DIA being absorbed
by CIA. The principal objective factor that we want to take
into consideration is.the cost differentials. Secretary
Duncan implied that these were very minor and harkened back
to the original study on this issue. I reminded him we had
discredited that study and done another one. He, in turn,
said the figures in that study were discredited. I took
the position that whether that were the case or not, there
clearly were savings to be had on a one-time and on an annual
basis. Secretary Brown said we should try to come up with
what the real cost figures are, including those associated
with "time delay." Neither Duncan nor I could get a clear
understanding of what was meant by "time delay." I'd like
to have I Irescrub those figures and come back to me
with his view o what the best figures are, and where he
knows or thinks OSD will disagree with them. I'd like to
include recent statement to me that there
will be substantial savings in the transmission system for
SAFE between CIA and DIA if the buildings are located within
one mile of each other.
6. I&W. Secretary Duncan surprised me by a statement that we had
agreed to some committee in which DoD was represented that was going to
look at the management structure, the procedures, and the rewriting of
DCID 1/5. We fenced around with each other for a long time, with myself
making it clear that I was not looking for any recommendations to redo the
organizational decisions that I had already made. Neither Brown nor Duncan
averred that they were thinking of that. Instead they said they were very
happy with the arrangements as they were proceeding, particularly this
committee. I don't know what this committee is; Dick Lehman better tell
me, and I want to make it absolutely clear that no committee has any
jurisdiction to revisit a decision that I have made.
7. I reviewed my discussions with Dick Perle and Senator Jackson.
I alerted them to the fact that:
a. Perle clearly indicated he had illegal OSD documents.
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b. Jackson indicated there were very lax security
procedures through which material was officially delivered
to him and other people on the Hill from OSD.
9. I thanked him for Bill Perry's participation in the briefing of
the President on the Soviet space missile R&D complex.
10. I told him we'd have to take up the GAO at the next meeting as
we had run out of time at this one.
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director
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