CONVERSATION WITH DAVID AARON, 3 OCTOBER 1978
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01554R003200210024-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 31, 2005
Sequence Number:
24
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 4, 1978
Content Type:
MFR
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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4 O CT 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with David Aaron,
3 October 1978
1. Aaron confirmed there will be an NSC meeting on Friday. He
wants particularly to know the strengths and weaknesses of the positions
.of Rhodesian Patriotic Front front-line states.
a. Has the Patriotic Front really committed itself to a
military solution or are they still willing to negotiate?
b. What game is Smith up to? Does he still put any hope
in the internal solution?
c. Is there any prospect that the Rhodesian military could
step in and oust Smith? Do they have the leadership potential?
Do they have the inclination? Is this just wishful thinking that
maybe Rhodesia will go back to being a British colony and we can
forget about it?
Aaron also wants to know about the prospects in Namibia and a
little on the prospects in South Africa.
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3. I complained that we weren't consulted on the proposed questions
and answers to the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance and the fact that
the action on this was given to OSD/PA. Aaron claimed he had a piece of
paper that had Agency comments on this draft of the questions and
answers. I'd like to know if we did clear it. Herb Hetu says he did not.
I also complained about Jody Powell's highlighting the
President's statement. The claim was that there was such demand
from the press that he had to amplify. I commented that we
hadn't had any demands from the press on this subject at all.
4. Aaron expressed his concern that the Senate Select Committee
is going to levy the charge that our ability to monitor SALT II was
compromised by Kampiles. We must be ready to respond to this, and that
is why there is the pressure for the damage assessment. (I made no
commitments on the damage assessment.)
6. 1 discussed the progress we are making on estimating what we can
release on the Kampiles case. I told him that I would try to see the
Attorney General on this next week, and that thereafter we should have an
SCC meeting.(Action--General Counsel).
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7. 1 delivered the letters on my standards for sensitive
collection.
8. I cleared the DDCI's tri 25X1
9. I explained the status of the Jackson/Perle negotiations.
10. I received a copy of the President's decision on Title I.
13. We discussed the Aspin/Boland meeting. I told him the status
was that I was trying to find a simplified way of processing the
clearances for covert actions under generic findings when they didn't
have to go directly to the President. I thought this was a reasonable
position that Aspin was taking and was trying to simplify the system.
14. I explained the status of our lobbying with the Congress on
. 16. Drop the SSCI Members' call on the President. It was implicit
in the discussion I had on the SSCI's interest in SALT verification.
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director
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