DCI REMARKS JOHNS HOPKINS SOCIETY OF ENGINEERS CHICAGO, ILL. NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003200210029-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: October 2, 1978
• Content Type: SPEECH

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DCI REMARKS
Johns Hopkins Society of Engineers
Chicago, Ill.
National Press Club
?,t~j dilt
I would like to talk to you about the role of intelligence in our
society today. What we intelligence professionals need in order to carry
out that role and what the society needs in order to ensure itself that
we are successfully fulfilling our role and nothing else.
I happen to believe that good intelligence is perhaps more important
to our country today than any time since the establishment of a centralized
intelligence community in 1947. At that time we were clearly the dominant
military power in the world, we were totally independent economically and
we were by far the strongest military power on the world scene.
Today our country remains the preeminent military, economic, and political
force in the world. Yet, like all other nations, we must recognize that
our national security is dependent in some measure on actions beyond our
control; most often the actions of other governments. This is especially so
as military might continues to proliferate; as economic interdependence
increases; and as political activism and independence become characteristic
of both long established and new nations. These forces can encourage nations
to act deliberately in ways inimical to the interests of others or to pursue
selfish national goals regardless of their international impact. In both
instances, such actions are likely to be taken secretly. Therefore, the
United States, like all other nations needs to keep aware of what others are
doing. Only if we are well informed can we guard against actions which
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impinge on our national interests. Only if we are well informed can we make
good policy decisions. Reliable information can provide leverage that is
often preferable to military force or other forms of power. Knowledge of
what others might concede is also essential to the successful negotiation of
agreements which contribute to continued world peace, such as arms control
agreements. Without independent verification of the provisions of these
agreements, there could not be adequate confidence to entrust the nation's
fate to such measures. If this were the best of all possible worlds and
other nations were at least as open as is ours, we might well be able to
garner the necessary fundamentals of information without having to pry and
spy. The facts-of the case are many if not most of the-world's nations are
closed societies in our terms.
The collection of foreign intelligence that is information about activities
in foreign countries, is the first role of our nation's intelligence community.
Our second role is one which is essential if the first is to be played.
This is the conduct of counterintelligence. Counterintelligence is the
obverse of our needing to collect intelligence for own use. It is the need
to prevent others from learning our national secrets. Ours is the most open
society in the history of the world. There is little that we think or do
which is not widely known. Yet, to remain strong we must be prepared for
what our potential enemies may do. Many of those preparations, to be effective,
must be kept secret. We cannot afford to develop expensive weapons systems or'
intelligence collecting devices an then not protect them. Once their character-
istics are known, they can be easily countered. Nor can we adequately
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protect our interests in negotiating treaties or agreements if our terms are
exposed in advance. Consequently, we must be able to uncover attempts to
penetrate our secrets and be able to neutralize or frustrate them.
The third role of intelligence for our country is covert political
action. In point of fact this is not truly an intelligence function if
we define intelligence of the collection and evaluation of information.
However; since 1947 under directives of the Presidents and of the Congress
have assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency the function of performing
such political action as the country is desired to perform on a covert
basis. Covert political action in essence is the effort to influence events
in foreign countries without the source of that influence being known.
One of the cardinal principles of United States foreign policy is to avoid
military conflict whenever national interests can be protected by other.
means. Generally, overt political means such as diplomacy, negotiation,
or economic pressure are available and can be used. However, there are
times-when knowledge-of the United States'-role-in attempting to influence
a foreign activity might dilute or undercut the effect of that influence.
For example, the thwarting of terrorist operations by penetrating the terrorist
organization even while pursuing open negotiations; the provision of financial
support to individuals or institutions struggling to maintain democratic
standards against external pressures toward totalitarianism; or the effort to
further our national interests by influencing foreign policies through
intermediaries when an appearance of selfish national interst might discredit
the approach. Accordingly, the instrument of covert political influence has
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its proper place in the specturm of foreign policy tools. This third role
for American intelligence completes the picture.
What do we intelligence professionals need in order to fulfill these
roles?
First, we need the support and the understanding
of the American body politic. For many years we had
that support simply on faith - on the faith that the
country needed to conduct some secretive spying activities
if it was to remain wise and strong. Events of recent
years have shaken that faith somewhat, although I am
persuaded that the American public remains fundamentally
in strong support of a strong intelligence capability
for our country. Nonetheless, the public deserves to
understand better what we do and why we do it so that
its faith and trust in us can have a stronger foundation.
Plainly, as I am here with you today we are attempting
to be more open about those areas or activities where
it is possible to be so.
The second fundamental of our intelligence capability,
however, is being able to keep secrets. If there appears
to you to be a contradiction between our espousal of the
policy of greater openness and at the same time one
with emphasis on the necessity for secrecy, let me explain
that. Clearly, individuals, preparations, governments and
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within governments especially intelligence activities
all need some measure of secrecy. Clearly, also there
has been much too much secrecy within our government.
Too many documents are stamped with labels of high
classification unnecessarily. The policy of maximum
disclosure or openness is one way to whittle down the
huge corpus of classified data that is held within our
government. Such a process, I believe will enable us
to again achieve a higher degree of respect for the
classified document and thus to protect our secrets better.
There must however, be more than openness to preserve
our secrets. To begin with there must be a renewed
recognition of the legitimacy of secrecy. Secrets
are neither moral or immoral, good nor bad. They
are simply necessary correlaries of the world
in which we live. Our society needs to recognize
this more clearly, and not simply jump to the
conclusion that the holding of a secret is an
attempt to conceal wrongdoing and that so-called
whistle blowers are automatic heroes and defenders
of secrets are public servants who are self-serving
or malicious. Just as there are procedures for
preserving secrets there are procedures for questioning
improper or unnecessary secrecy. I have yet to
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see a so-called whistle blower who has taken recourse
to these methods prior to going into the public arena
where it would appear that fame and fortune might be
as motivating as any attempt to curtail improper secrecy.
Yet none of us who are sworn to preserve our secrets
or myself who am charged by law with protecting those
which relate to how we gather our intelligence information,
would ask the public simply to accept our word on what
needs to be kept classified as a secret. Surely, undue
secrecy or secrecy improperly employed is a considerable
risk to run our society. So too are the number of
procedures and techniques for the clandestine gathering
of foreign intelligence, the pursuit of counterintelligence,
or the covert execution of political influence. To begin
with there is the risk that even though our Bill of Rights
does not apply to non-American persons we believe in and
support the concept of world-wide human rights. If our
intelligence activities systematically violate those
rights of others, this would be inconsistent with one of
our fundamental tenants. It would belie the values which
our society proclaims. Beyond this there is always the'
danger that there will be accidental or intentional
involvement of American citizens in the clandestine
collection of intelligence. When such infringement
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pop
of the basic rights of Americans must be approached
with great caution. There are many ways other than
the collection of intelligence in which American
liberties are put in jeopardy by the activities of
our own government, but generally these are carefully
hedged in control. For instance, there is a necessity
for warrant for search or the approval of the Attorney
General for surveillance of telephone conversations.
So too, we need checks on the intelligence process
which will on the one hand protect the interests of our
citizens and yet on the other not so inhibit our
clandestine activities to prevent the fulfillment
of our role. Down to the balance it is a very
delicate one, it is one which I am
pleased to suggest to you that we have made great
progress. Out of the last 3 1/2 years of
considerable public criticism of the intelligence
.process in our country, we have forged a series
of controls or oversight procedures. These today
I believe give the American citizen greater
insurance against and yet assurance of the
achievement of effective intelligence than ever
before. What are these controls? They come in
four categories: general guidelines, specific
prohibitions, specific injunctions short of total
prohibition and oversight procedures.
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There are two general guidelines which are issued to intelligence
professionals, the first is that espionage is an extraordinary remedy.
Accordingly, we should never resort to clandestine means of gathering informati
when it might be available openly, and we always must assess the risks
versus the benefits in undertaking the clandestine activity. The second is
that actions which we do take in secret, we must be able to defend in principal
before the American public. Clearly, because of our need for secrecy we
cannot in fact go before the public with all the details of the specific
instances of espionage we are undertaking. But we can in public, defend the
general classes of actions which we take and we can before the appropriate
committees of the Congress justify our clandestine activities as being
consistent with the announced policies and objectives established by the open
processes-of our government.
With respect to prohibitions there are activities such as assassination
which are so repugnant to our national standards as to warrant having been
unequivocably prohibited. Another appropriate prohibition is that of conduct
which is the equivalent of war. Clearly, intelligence agents should not
in a sense be allowd to conduct war when resort to that devise is closely
regulated by the Congress and Executive. Still another prohibition would
be that of experimentation on human beings other than controlled and approved
by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
I mentioned that a third category of control was injunctions, short
of total prohibition. There are in fact few clear cut cases that warrant
prohibition. This is largely because what is suitable and what is permissible
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? M
will vary with circumstances. Measures that should not be undertaken in
peacetime, or against a democratic state, may be permissible during hostilities
or against a totalitarian regime. Therefore, there must be adequate flexibility
to adjust to circumstances and to modify rules and procedures as conditions
change. These are analogous to the well-known democratic law enforcement
mechanism for balancing the individual's constitutional rights to privacy and
the acquisition of essential information; e.g., telephone taps can be authorized
only after a court has issued a warrant on the basis of probable cause
to believe an individual is engaged in criminal activity. The levels at
which these injunctions will be levied and exceptions to them granted will
vary with the severity of the risks involved so that there will be some
balancing between the adequacy of control and the cumbersomeness of the
control system. An injunction which we have instituted in the last several
years and which has received considerable attention in the public domain has
been that of the use of accredited members of the U.S. media for intelligence
purposes. We have made the basic decision that though there could be valuable
intelligence returns from such association the net benefits to the country
of casting a shadow of legitimacy on our media representatives does not warrant
such use. However, it appears unwise to make this prohibition especially when
it may be enacted into law. It would happen when a member of an American media
organization just happened to be the only go-between in a delicate international
terrorist situation should we deign to employ him at the risk of other human
lives. Should we not have an injunction rather than a prohibition with some
specific means for controlling the exceptions in this case. I alone, am
allowed to grant an exception to this convention.
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Let me assure you that these oversight procedures are, in my opinion,
working very well already. The Intelligence Oversight Board has been established
for almost three years. It is indeed an appropriate word for three distinguised
men composed of former Senator Gore, former Governor Scranton, and Mr.
Thomas Farmer. They do indeed actively keep abreast of their doing and
potentials in it for their use. They report their findings only to the
President but over and above that exquisite function they serve the role in a
place to which employees in the Intelligence Community may go if they ever
fear or suspect improper performance by their superiors.
Oversight procedures in Congress have been in place for two years
in the Senate, a little over one in the House of Representatives. In both
instances the relationship between the Select Committees on Intelligence and
those of us in the Intelligence Community has been one of cooperation but
also clearly one of oversight and supervision. Many in the Intelligence
Community have come to recognize in these past two years the very positive
values for us in the Congressional oversight process. The fact that ultimate
accountability is always sobering, in the business of intelligence where the
stakes are high patriotism and added enthusiasm where risks must be carefully
measured, it is good to have the element of accountability hanging over us.
We cannot let it drive us to intelligence by timidity but I see no evidence
that it is. Rather it is forcing us to be judicious to think out our risks
and benefits in ways that permit ready explanation.
Committees of the Congress are now in the process of legislating prohibitions
injunctions and oversight procedures in what will be known as the charters of.
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the Intelligence Community. I strongly support this undertaking. In the first
place it will provide the legal foundation for the activities we undertake.
In the second place, it will provide guidance for our roles in the
Intelligence Community. So that the man or woman on the street in a foreign
country and those of us in the headquarters elements we will have a better
idea of those things which we either must not do or those for which we must
make the case in convincing terms to our overseers.
Finally, the codification in the charters of the authorities for conducting
clandestine intelligence gathering, counterintelligence, covert political
action, and the controls under which those activities will be conducted. It
will ensure that there is the right balance and emphasis between the effectiveness
of our intelligence activities and the regulation on behalf of our citizens.
As I said before, I believe that our citizens appreciate the necessity of
what we are doing for our country in the name of intelligence. At the same
time, I am sure that they are not anxious that we violate their constitutional
rights. Good reasons although we perform in ways in which this country does
not want. Although I am optimistic that in the practice today we are achieving
the right balance between openness and secrecy in the effective operation of
oversight, the procedures are not yet fully established, I am confident it
will come out with the right measure of each. It will take in my opinion
several more years of practice to ensure that we have controls but not be
hamstrung. The charters will be legislated, hopefully by the next Congress.
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
per 1978
TO:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
Most of this speech is on the
tape, practically all. Portions are
excerpts from a Charters Legislation
paper Capt. T did in concert with DCI.
Capt. T has a copy for the Director,
Directed me to send one to H. Hetu.
This is first, rough draft. The tape
goes from 0 to about 10, and
the last portion--from about 8 on is
very bad--hope you hear it better than
we did. I had Capt T interpret the
last few paragraphs.
FROM:
ROOM NO. EXTENSION
FORM 505-24 1 REPLACES FORM 36-B FEB WHICH MAY BE USED.
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