COMMENTS ON EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF NIE 11-3/8-79 (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003300180058-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: January 4, 1980
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Rekase,20.05/03/01 : CIA-RDP80B01554R@88300180058-8
i r" r C:
4 January 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Comments on Executive Summary of NIE 11-3/8-79
. 1. Having finally just completed my review of the Executive Summary
of NIE 11-3/8--79 I want to say I think this is really
a superior piece of work. I particularly like Section D, with emphasis
on paragraphs 35 and 36. (Incidentally, the title of Section D may be
a bit misleading since it's not only Soviet intercontinental capabilities
but US that are compared in this section.) It seems to me this section
puts. the overall strategic issue into much better balance. At least I
read it as saying that throughout this period we're both more than capable
of mortall wounding the other even after absorbing a surprise first
strike.
2. My first substantive recommended change would be to expand
paragraph 1 slightly to bring out the conclusions in paragraphs 35 and
36 in a summary way. In short, in paragraph 1 we talk about Soviet
strategic capabilities continuing to grow relative to those of the
United States and NATO. They improve most in certain areas, e.g., hard-
target potential. In addition, the net impact of this is still only that
we can both kill each other many times over. In some sense it's like
saying if the Washington Redskins had Joe Theismann and four other
equivalent quarterbacks. they would be improving relative to the Dallas
Cowboys. In sum, I'd like to make paragraph 1 about a page or a page
and one-half and make it a summary. F___j
3. I have two disappointments with the paper. One is that we
retreated from hard-target potential into missile RVs and bomber weapons.
Perhaps I agreed to this previously, but I certainly don't understand
it now. We're accepting all of the brickbats from Defense for having a
copy - o -
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"net assessment" in here, but we're doing our residual calculations all
with static indicators. It seems to me that while there isn't a big
difference between lethal area potential and megatonnage (except that
you can put a meaningful line on the chart for lethal area potential
to indicate its relative value, i.e., comparison of potential with
geographical area in both countries), the same is not true with hard
target potential. I would suspect that the curves for US hard-target.
potential would be more favorable to us especially in the near term
than are the curves of comparative missile RVs and bomber weapons. Yes,
the Soviets are closing the gap in accuracy but surely it is going to
take some time to replace all of those warheads even on the SS-lls, etc.
(Incidentally, I'm curious as to whether our estimate of how soon they
will have reequipped all of the -18s and -19s is holding firm this.
year. )
4. Secondly, the description of why the Defense people disagree
with us on displaying the residual calculations hasn't improved at all
since last year; in fact, I think it is worse. I think we should be
able to improve the statement of this thorny issue by now. Even if
we're not ready to use the SAGA work, isn't it far enough along to tell
us whether there is a major difference in conclusion from their approach
and ours. I doubt that there is and, if that is the case, it would expose
the fact that DoD's complaint is not a substantive issue but a matter of
turf.
0
5. Finally, I'm also disappointed in the several other expressions
of dissenting views. After almost three years, I just can't get the
idea across that putting the footnotes into the text is not intended to
be a matter of doing that literally. The point is to express a comparison
within the text of the differing views.. This we have avoided in all of
the footnotes.
6. When we print the NIE, and particularly the Executive Summary,
I would like to be sure that the charts fold out from the text so that
you can look at them while readin even two to three pages of text that
explain and interpret the charts.
.7. Good work. My other notes are annotated but are less than in
previous years (I think).
MANSFIELD
TURNER
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