YOUR MEMORANDUM OF 4 DECEMBER ON TNF (S)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01554R003300190039-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 6, 2004
Sequence Number: 
39
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 7, 1979
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01554R003300190039-8.pdf60.77 KB
Body: 
Approved For Reisase 2005/. I RpP ~554ROU300190039-8 OPA FROM: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Your Memorandum of 4 December on TNF 1. I have read your memorandum of 4 December on "Possible Soviet Responses to an Affirmative NATO Decision on TNF Modernization" I was very much intrigued by the line of reasoning on the bottom half of page 4, page 5, and the top half of page 6. 1 have been seeking for some time to understand the different perspectives on who is ahead in TNF. It is difficult to get a U.S. presentation of this that doesn't show us hopelessly behind. You, I believe, have summarized it here in what is a more realistic manner--it could be viewed as though we are behind, about even, or well ahead depending upon the counting rules. 2. Could you reduce this to a matrix? The first row would show comparison of U.S. and Soviet systems with ranges in excess of 1000 kilometers. A column at the right-hand side would indicate that in this category the Soviets would have to see themselves as coming out on top. Next, there would be a row for systems with ranges less than 1000 kilometers. Graphically, this could be divided into systems that we would count and systems that the Soviets would likely count--taking into account your point on the capability of aircraft versus the avail- ability of pilots. A ain in the right-hand column we could show how this one could tilt. I A final row would add in the non-U.S. NATO systems and show now that again tips the balance. 0 3. In addition to this table, we would then go on with your discussion as to the acceptability of a freeze if the Soviets do look 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/13 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R00330019 o. 25X1 Tr" N Approved For Real ase 1/k3~ 4?), 180B01 at themselves as ahead, and hence the possibility that they would be willing to freeze. Hopefully, this might be reduced to short enough 25X1 length for a PDB annex. NSFIELD TURNER 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 20T/ : J > 11554ROO3300190039-8 ~