MEMO TO (Sanitized)FROM DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003300300012-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: MF

Approved Felease 2005/03/16: CIA-RDP80B0150033003
F--
Tape 53
Side A, 3 1/2 - 4
25X1 MEMO FOR:
25X1
25X1
will visit with me at 1500 on Thursday.
I told him to be at the Sheraton Carlton Hotel where he is staying and that
we would pick him up there at 2:30. I told him to look for a tan Buick.
I'd like to meet with him for 15 minutes and then have Bob Ames, Bob
Bowie if he would like,
and perhaps one other join us for another
half-hour. I'd then like to turn him loose with those people if they wan:t
to talk with him further and I'd like to give him whatever we can of a
cook's tour of the building without bothering Security.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/03/16 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003300300012-4
 Approved For Release 2005/03/16 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003300300012-4
R.i `C:!~ D
cll; PAGE
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
27 November 1978
The SAS. B
State Dept. "tiger teams" to make pro-SALT 2
Although the final version of the SALT 2 agreement
is being negotiated between the United States and the
Soviet Union with major points still unresolved, the
battle over its acceptance has flared with unprece-
dented intensity on the U. S. domestic scene.
Among the major points not settled between the
two countries are: -
sa Number of cruise missiles allowed in each
airborne vehicle and the means of verification.
in Role of the Backfire bomber. It is now technically
outside the SALT agreement, but the U. S. is
demanding conditional restraints on its use that the
USSR is unwilling to provide.
N Cruise missile ranges, particularly for land-based
versions.
as Number of IbIIRVs (multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles) allowed on new ICBMs.
With these major issues still in limbo, both the
Carter Administration and its growing opposition
have already begun major strategic campaigns to
convince the American public of the wisdom of their
divergent views. The Carter Administration leaped
into the recent congressional election campaign to aid
pro-SALT candidates with both threats and promises.
The defeat of six pro-SALT senators, including such
Democrat stalwarts as Tom McIntyre of New Hamp-
shire, chairman of the influential Armed Services
research and development subcommittee, and Dick
Clark of Iowa, a former spearhead of the Carter
SALT campaign, has had a chilling effect in legisla-
tive halls. One indication is the sudden aloofness of
the Senate SALT 2 floor leaders, Democrats Gary
Hart of Colorado and John Culver from Iowa, the
scene of Clark's defeat. Rather than involve them-
selves ostentatiously in the floor fight, they are now
taking a much lower public profile and leaving the job
to their staffs.
Meanwhile, the Carter Administration is sending
Agency employe. Tne K.H-1 a new reconnaissance where weakness apparent.
satellite of vastly improved capability on which the
United States was depending heavily for verification
of Soviet compliance with SALT terms. CIA Techni-
cal Director Leslie Dirks recently testified at the trial
where William Kampiles, a former CIA employe, was
convicted of selling the KH-I I manual to the Soviets
for S3,000 that Russian knowledge of the satellite's
capabilities would enable them to evade its surveil-
lance and successfully conceal SALT violations.
a Deployment of MiG-23 and MiG-27 nuclear-
capable attack aircraft to Cuba. Soviet denial caused
President Carter to send SR-71 Mach. 3 reconnais-
sance planes openly over Cuba for verification. This is
a scenario reminiscent of Andrei Gromyko's 1962
face-to-face denial to President Kennedy in the White
House that the Soviets were deploying IRBM missiles i
to Cuba at the very moment that U-2 reconnaissance
photos confirmed the installations of Shyster and
Sandal ballistic missiles- Gromyko is currently Soviet
SALT 2 negotiator.
tx Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin's a ogry perform-
ance before U. S. senators visiting Moscow reiterating
the traditional Soviet doctrine of "What's ours is ours
and what's yours is negotiable" and his reemphasis
that SALT agreements have nothing to do with
curbing aggressive Soviet actions in the rest of the
globe.
i! Russian moves to erase U. S. verification capabil-
ity further by returning to coded telemetry i;, weapons
testing and pushing development of a satellite
destroyer to operational status. The Soviets stopped I
coding their telemetry when the U. S. raised it as a
SALT I violation but recently resumed it. The strong
development program to perfect a satellite destroyer
provides the capability to blind U. S. verification
satellites. -
to Soviet development of a "look-down, shoot-down
capability" for attacking low-level U. S. bomber and
cruise missile penetrations and the first signs of
deployment . of, the new SA-10 defensive missile
pitches to civic leaders in major communities where system.
SALT support is dubious and has buttonholed newly n Leonid Brezhner's blunt warning to the U. S. to
elected legislators on arrival at Washington airports stay out of Iran, with the threat of Soviet armed
to offer deals for SALT 2 support. , intervention.
The opposition to SALT 2 has assumed unprece- All of these events have undermined. President
dented intensity both in Congress and in the grass. Jimmy Carter's portrayal of the Soviet leadership as a
roots, where anti-SALT citizens groups are proliferat- group-with which he can deal effectively in the tenor
ins and raising substantial war chests for their anti- of the Camp David Middle East negotiations. They
SALT 2 campaign. also raise grave doubts about the real Soviet inters-.
At the same time, there are a number of recent tions around this troubled globe that President Carter
Soviet actions that have shaken the foundations of has not been able to assuage. They tend to confirm
President Jimmy Carter's position and also raised the view of the SALT 2 critics that the Soviet Union
serious.doubts about Russian intentions within the believes it has gained. the upper hand through a
Administration's inner circle. They include combination' of its own increased military strength
a Sale of the K:4-71 reconnaissance satellite menu- and the vacillatin- weakness of U. S. leadership and is
al* to the Soi ppr" Fir Releatea G 11 a CIA 8Q@Q'~A54PgggVQ;QQgt1?t at every point