NIE 34-1-78: IRAN: PROSPECTS THROUGH 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003400050066-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 66
• Publication Date: August 7, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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7 August 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: NIE IRAN: PROSPECTS THROUGH 1985
Memo for DCI from NIO E&S
dated 3 August
1978,
,
Same Subject
1. I have had only a passing opportunity to review NIE 25X1
(1 August 1978 draft). I am concerned with both the number o-
specific points and the general philosophy behind the study.
2. Specifically:
a. I seriously question the estimate on the bottom of page
6 that the Iranians could fight a delaying action against the
Soviets until Western support could arrive. It seems to me it
would take a very long time for any significant Western support
to arrive. I also happen to think that if the Soviets chose to
make a drive for the Persian Gulf they would do a right hook
through Turkey, coming down on Iran from the northwest rather
than the north. Thus the time from the initial assault into Iran
until capture of the vital areas where the oil fields are could be
less than if they made a direct assault. Moreover, this and a
number of other judgments in the paper seem to come almost out of
thin air. I hope there is some backup analysis for this.
b. I believe the issue of personnel requirements for the
military is somewhat confused. We say they will have enough to
absorb the equipment but not enough to maintain it. There are no
statistics at all, however, as to what this means in numbers,
what the resource base of moderately educated Iranians is, or any
other data to support this conclusion. In addition, I'm not sure
that it is a really meaningful conclusion unless we believe that
all of the maintenance can be taken over by foreign contract
personnel. If "absorbing" an F-14 means you have a pilot and radar
operator trained for it but can't keep the plane flying, I question
how meaningful that "absorption" is. Moreover, in areas like naval
ships, contractor personnel aren't a very meaningful substitute
unless they are prepared to go to sea and engage in combat. Beyond
this I question, based only on gut reaction, whether they really
will have enough trained personnel just to man the new equipment. 25X1
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c. I am working on only a small sample but I question the
statement at, the bottom of page 94 that the Iranian military
personnel often have to be trained in English. I once visited
the technical training facilities of the Iranian navy and that
was not the case at all there. The U.S. lectures and manuals
were all translated into Farsi. (I don't question that that still
leaves a major problem since the manuals written by the USN were
generally unintelligible in English and must have suffered much
in translation to Farsi.)
d. My acquaintance with the Iranians indicated that there
is already a severe personnel problem in the economic sector.
This is not mentioned. The increase in the size of the armed.
forces' requirements for technically trained people is bound to
aggravate this.
2. My overall reaction from reading primarily the principal
judgments is to question whether this is what we want to produce as
an NIE--a series of rather categoric statements of outcome. I don't
get much flavor as to what factors will drive the conclusions that you
come to or prove them invalid. Hence I have no way of applying
independent judgment to your judgments, nor any way of measuring as time
goes by whether events are moving in the directions you have predicted
or not. What I would liked to have seen is a statement of the forces
which are likely to bring Crown Prince Reza into authority if his father
dies along side those that would push events in the opposite direction,
along with your estimate of the forces for Reza which prevail. There
is a very little bit of this on the top of page 19 but only that
explication which supports your thesis. There is no way to put this
into perspective and surely we have some hesitancy as to the accuracy of
this prognostication. This question I raise is a much broader one for
NIEs in general; it is far too late to attempt to rework this estimate.
Please look at the specifics I have listed above and let's talk about
the basic approach to estimates.
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