WHY WE NEED A MILITARY IN A POST-CONTAINMENT ERA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003500310001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 9, 1973
• Content Type: SPEECH

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a
WHY WE NEED A
MILITARY IN A POST-CONTAINMENT ERA
FOR USCG ACADEMY 9 Feb 1973
(2-5-73)
Why am I here?
Changes at NWC
At about same time local TV highlighted your course in
"MiXology"
* Naval War College tries to broaden horizons of its
students, but hasnt gone quite that far.
One of the programs NW DOES have is that of inviting
distinguished foreign military figures to speak.
Several months ago late VADM M. B. Maas
(Remarks on Personality)
? Stated that when Sukarno came to power in Indonesia,
Dutch Navy lost its primary mission.
* Was forced to reorient - Find new reason for existence.
* US Navy - Entire US military may be in similar position.
For past twenty-five years military policy premised on the
necessity for suppressing the expansion of monolithic communism.
No longer valid and no longer will sell at home or abroad.
Detente now everywhere
VN ceasefire
SALT
MBFR
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China & USSR visits - economic trade with both
Common Market
East/West German moves
Leads many people to ask why have need a strong U.S. military
in the 1970's-1980's?
Places you and me in difficult position. For all of my
career, it has been accepted that being in uniform in the
Service of your country was honorable, patriotic thing. For
all of this time it was assumed that strong military forces
were a necessary element of our way of life--there were
arguments over how much and what kind of Navy, Coast Guard,
Army, Air Force were needed but the underlying presumption
was that military strength was a foundation of our place in
the world. Today you and I must not only be able to perform
our assigned functions well, we must be able to articulate
why our services are needed by the U.S. of the 19701s. What
are you doing to get ready for that? Are you as Coast Guard
officers going to justify your role solely on the many and
increasingly important protective and humanitatian functions
that occupy most of your professional time. Or are you going
to face squarely the fact that you are inextricably part of
our uniformed military establishment. It used to be that you
came into the Navy only on declaration of war--but recently
we called on you for combat operations off the coast of
Vietnam and you responded beautifully. Are you prepared to
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defend this role that your seniors have just completed and
like roles that may engage you before too long?
Sure you would agree with me not really difficult to
know why we are going to continue to need a strong military.
? Obvious cannot abruptly abandon 25 years of
responsibilities we have shouldered around the world
in large countries and small.
? Military power and world status are synonymous. U.S.
is and wants to be a world power.
? Obvious despite enthusiasm and optimism, problems will
arise - Hobbes -
? Obvious no evidence ideology and objectives of Soviet
Union and China have changed; whether the contemporary
practice of detente will have any permanent impact
remains to be seen. (Von Ribbentrop? Rapallo?)
Convincing? Will this sell to your contemporaries in-civilian
life? Will they ask?
? Hasn't the world in which we could or should be the
world's policeman changed? The expense of "Patrolling
the beat" has become unbearable-especially with the
soaring costs of today's weapons.
? Hasn't increased awareness of extent domestic problems
lessened national interest in solving the problems of
others?
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Example
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? Hasn't armament building historically proven to be a
spiraling competition that ends on conflagration?
Someone must start to reverse the trend. The
opportunity is ripe.
* Hasn't Vietnam proved that our national interests do
not require sacrifices of that order.
? Isn't war intrinsically bad/immoral even if peace is
not "Normal" or "Usual"?
If these views have merit, how do we make an argument to
dissuade the older generation from their traditional opinions.
Or perhaps the problem is vice versa. Or where in between?
* It is much like the case of dealing with an evowed
pacifist. Each pacifist's denial of the use of violence
is somewhat different.
- Some object only to immoral wars.
- Some object only to wars overseas, but would take
up arms if the United States were invaded.
- Some would take up arms if the United States were
invaded only if assured we had not provoked the attack.
- Some would wait until his own home was sequestered.
(Quartering of soldiers)
- Some would take up violence only if the occupying
soldier had attempted to rape his sister.
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- Some would only strike a blow to save his own life.
- Few would eschew violence totally.
Just as most pacifists actions be between the extremes of
total eschewal of violence and naked aggressiveness, so the
mission of today's military lies between two extremes. One
is exclusive reliance for security on military strength. The
other is reliance only on good will and detente. At one
extreme we support intervention at any dimly perceived threat
of a communist take over anywhere in the world. On the other
we accept total isolationism. As a pacifist, we are bound
to end up somewhere in between. Where?
- As a start, let's bound the problem on the side
of the most probable use of United States military forces for
which there would be national approval-consensus-This it seems
to me is an overt, precipitous, unprovoked, unambiguous Warsaw
Pact invasion of western Europe. Few would deny that the
absorption of Western Europe into the Soviet orbit would be
inimical to our national interests. There, of course, could
be dispute on how much peacetime military ,force we should
afford for the purpose of preventing the overrunning of
Europe. That's the same issue as how much fire insurance
you take out on your house. We know that we want some
insurance, but how much varies with our income, the condition
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of our house and our general outlook on the future.
But even if we agree on some level of assurance against
a major war for Western Europe, where else do we look past
this extreme?
What would our reaction be to a piecemeal, more subtle
Soviet approach to absorbing Western Europe? For instance,
a minor military' action to take possession of a portion of
the northern "flank" of Norway or easternmost flank of Turkey.
Would we view this as so inimical to the credibility and
adhesion of the NATO alliance that we would go to war because
the end result would be the same as an invasion of Europe.
Or would we view this as a Sudetenland issue where a
compromise or concession by us would bring "peace in our
time"?
A direct military grab may be too overt. What if Soviet's
made their naval power appear so menacing to Norway, or
Yugoslavia, or Iceland, or Turkey, that these nations believed
that they could be supported by allied sea power in an
emergency? If those states were about to enter the Soviet
.Bloc by default would we want to be able to counter the
impression of Soviet naval dominance in the area?
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Where would we draw the line in the Pacific? What if
Soviet Maritime encirclement of China (with or without
cooperation from Japan) left China so exposed that she was
forced into an accomodation with the Soviet Union? Think of
the impact this could have on the European scence--without
China menacingly at her back, the Soviets could free
sufficient resources to apply greater pressure on western
Europe than she can possibly afford today.
- Already our commercial trade in the Pacific basin
Is almost equal to that in the European. Would we be
willing to see minor Soviet or Chinese-inspired military
actions chip away at our access to these markets? Perhaps
a counter-coup in Indonesia, subversion in the Philippines.
In the Middle East would we stand by Israel if her
existence were threatened?
In the Mid-east also do we not need to consider that by
1980 perhaps 40 to 50 percent of our oil energy will be
imported from that area, if there are not major changes of
current policies. (and they must be changed very rapidly to
affect 1980) Would we tolerate to see military actions,
blockades, or embargoes that would jeopardize this flow?
How much pressure do we want to be vulnerable to if we
cannot prevent interference with this energy artery?
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Aren't there numerous other potential situations visible
even today in which it is imaginable that breakdowns in
world stability could possibly endanger U.S. interests?
(e.g., the Yugoslavia succession, Soviet-inspired Cuban
meddling in the Western hemisphere, or even severe economic
competition with Japan or the Common Market. After all, we
are talking about not only the tolerance level for employing
military forces in combat, but their use as instruments of
national influence. The military support and shield we
provide for Japan, for instance, is one of form of insurance
against too strong an economic position. Our military
guarentee in Europe is perhaps our greatest claim to any
influence in European affairs now those countries are
economically and politically strong.
Finally, we cannot overlook our potential for relying
on military forces to deter the outbreak of conflict simply
by their presence and implied capability. They provide the
President one, among numerous, methods of signalling his
intent. Yet, one should not (and cannot) use military power
to deter without a willingness and capability to employ it.
There are those who would argue that any brandishing of
military force is bad. No issue worthy only of brandishing
is vital to U.S. interests and brandishing may be only the
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precursor to use. There are those who would say that most of
the situations I have hypothesized as potentials for
employment of military force are not concerned with U.S.
vital interests either. They are not concerned if Soviet
interference in Yugoslavia, for instance, should tip the
fine balances in Eastern Europe and impact on the Middle
East. They would never feel concerned at events in small
countries like Viet Nam or even our Latin American neighbors.
And well they may be right.
To return, though, to my analogy with the individual
pacifist, what I am suggesting is that somewhere between
fighting another Vietnam and defending Western Europe against
a major invasion, there may be a threshold point for U.S.
military involvement. How large and what kind of a military
establishment we require today is in large part a function
of where our intuition tells us that threshold will lie 5-10
years from now.
We have been talking about the tolerance level, the
threshold, for actually employing military force. In
practice, there likely would be more instances of relying
on the existence of our forces to deter the outbreak of
combat rather than actually employing them. However, one
should not (and cannot) use military power to deter without
a willingness and capability to employ it.
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Thus, the case for having military force in the 1970?s
and 1980's rests on the uncertainty of events that could
impact on U.S. national interests. The risk in not having
enough military force available lies in the possibility of
suddenly being confronted by some interference with our
interests which we cannot prevent because our forces are
inadequate, e.g.,
- Persian Gulf oil
- Fishing rights
- Mineral imports
But there are risks in having too much insurance also.
The obvious one is cost--the lost opportunities to spend on
other programs or to reduce taxes.
With military insurance, there some also see a risk
that our having military force will lead to its use, both
because of our past habit of reliance on it, and because
of pressures from within the military establishment. There
is a thin barrier between brandishing a sword and striking
with it.
The answer to the first objection on costs lies in a
judicicious balance in our allocation of resources. I for
one do not believe that this need be a major problem. We
are by far the wealthiest nation in the world. We can
afford what we need for military defense and for domestic
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well being. We need to sort out our sense of priorities
as a nation. We in uniform must help in doing this by
being explicit in stating what levels of military force
can do what for the country. If we overestimate or think
exclusively of goals that the country has rejected, we will
not help the process of resolving priorities. I am confident,
though, that the people of our country do recognize that our
responsibilities call for a strong military capability and
will support guns and butter too in reasonable proportion.
The answer to the second risk that comes with military
insurance--the unnecessary use of military force because
you have in firm civilian command of all national
assets--military and non-military. If, as some believe,
we have relied too heavily on military power in the past
several decades, the answer is to learn better how to employ
our economic, diplomatic, psychological and other national
assets. Premptorily eliminating the bass drums is not the
best way to prevent their dominating the orchestra. The
proper orchestration for the United States in the next
decade may call for a lesser military element, but let us
not tie the President's hands by denying him any option of
choice. Surely we can be rational enough as a nation not
to call out the military unnecessarily without eliminating
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our insurance policy entirely. There are simply too many
uncertainties ahead.
Within this broad framework, I see the roles for both
our Navy and our Coast Guard expanding over the next decade.
As this winter's fuel crisis brought painfully close to
home, our own nation is becoming increasily reliant on
overseas sources for oil. Other minerals essential to
industry must also be imported. As the Soviet Navy
increasingly makes its presence felt throughout the ocean's
of the world, we must be prepared to defend this trade.
Beyond this, the role of the sea in our daily life is
expanding exponentially. Man will tap the many economic
and recreational resources of the oceans to a dramatic new
degree in the years ahead. There are fewer laws and
precedents to govern this development than on land. This
is where we both come in, primarily you in the Coast Guard.
Much of the responsibility for regulating, policing and
ensuring the safety of our new reliance on the sea will be
yours, but always backed by the implicit fighting strength
of our total naval power, the United States Navy and when
needed the United States Coast Guard. Together we have
great challenges ahead and great opportunities for service
to our country.
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WITHIN THIS BROAD FRAMEWORK I SEE THE ROLES FOR OUR COAST
GUARD EXPANDING OVER THE NEXT DECADE.
? AS OIL IMPORTATION INCREASES THE COAST GUARD ROLE IN POLUTION
CONTROL BECOMES MORE CRUCIAL.
? CONSTRUCTION OF SUPER TANKERS AND OTHER SEAGOING BEHEMOTHS
REQUIRES EVEN MORE STRINGENT INSPECTIONS PRIOR TO SAFETY
CERTIFICATION.
IP AS OUR ECONOMY SHIFTS EVEN MORE FROM BULLETS TO BUTTER THE
AMERICAN WILL FIND MORE LEISURE TIME WHICH WILL RESULT IN
AN INCREASE IN PLEASURE BOATING AND THE COAST GUARD'S
HUMANITARIAN MISSION.
THUS AS THE UNITED STATES LICKSt ITS WOUNDS AFTER A
WAR EXPENSIVE BOTH IN LIVES AND MONEY, A SERVICE WHICH
ANNUALLY RESPONDS TO 40,000 CALLS FOR HELP,SAVES 3,000
LIVES AND RENDERS ASSISTANCE TO 2 BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF
SHIPPING, FINDS ITSELF A SECURE FUTURE.
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WHY WE NEED A
MILITARY IN A POST-CONTAINMENT
ERA
FOR USCG ACADEMY
9-Feb-1973
Why am I here?
Your Sup't Honored G
at our USMC Ball
40 Drowned by Marine
? Your and had las word with CG March
ybe this is.Admiral Thompson's Revenge
-4A19-4 /VW
At kbout same time local TV highlighted your Course
.in 'Mixology"
co Naval War College tries to broaden horizons
of its students, but hasn't gone quite that far.
One of the Programs NWC DOES have is that of inviting
Distinguished Foreign Mil figures to speak.
Several months ago late VADM John M.B. Maas
(Remarks on Personality)
? Stated that when Sukarno came to power in
Indonesia, Dutch Navy lost its primary mission.
? Was forced to reorient - Find new reason for
existence.
? US Navy - Entire US Military may be in similar
position.
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:
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r--
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For past twenty five years military policy premised on the
necessity for suppressing the expansion of monolithic
communism. No longer valid and no longer will sell at home
or abroad.
Detente now everywhere
VN Ceasefire
SALT
MBFR
-Lb 0/1
China visita/pd Economics moves
Common Market
East/West German moves
Leads many many people to ask why have a strong military in
the 7A7O's-l's?
()r
(
Don't wish to seem an'ORACLE" but it should be clear
\
hy we need military forces, despite the apparent
eclips,?
0 yip
\
monolithic communism.
? Cannot abruptly abandon 25 years of responsi-
(i,,i-o-4/17-,/ A4,W a'01;L-v,
A
? Military Power and world status are synonymous.
A ',:(T L.) G? L."),
Despite enthusiasm and optimism, problems will
arise. 24 -
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No evidence ideology and objectives of Soviet
Union have changed; whether the contemporary practice of
detente will have any permanent impact remains to be seen.
(Von Ribbentrop? Rapallo?)
Convincing? Will this sell to yourcontemporaries in civilan
lifeIill they ask?
? Hasn't the world in which we could or should be the
world's policeman changed?
has become unbearable.-
es Hasn't increased
lessened national interest
The expense of "patrolling the
beatI'
(g1-11131)14.4 e
awareness of domestic problems
in the problems of Others?
Hasn't armament building historically proven to be
a spiraling competition that ends in conflagration? Someone
must start to reverse the trend. The opportunity is ripe.
e Hasn't Vietnam proved that our natiOnal interests
do not require sacrifices of that Order. (Hindsight?-- s-e7EaTar-
to require atthe
e Isn't war intrinsically bad/immoral even if peace
is not "Normal" or "Usual"?
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If these views have merit, how do we make an argument to
dissuade the older generation from their traditional opinions.
Or perhaps the problem is vice versa.
(fr
sio It is much like the case of dealing with an avowed
pacifist. Each Vacifist6 denial of the use of violence is,
somewhat different.
- Some object only to "immoral" wars.
- Some object only to wars overseas, but would
take up arms if the United States were invaded.
- Some would take up arms if the United States
were invaded only if assured we had not provoked the attack.
- Some would wait until his own home was sequestered.
(Quartering of soldiers)
- Some would take up violence only if the occupying
soldier had attempted to rape his sister.
- Some would only strike a blow to save his own life.
- Few would eschew violence totally.
The current trend to eschew vio e ce is not *Iiie. I
7-' ., 1
-7ieWk-4,
recommend to you Herman,Mouk's The Winds of
aptly protrays the Aod of the nation late 30's and
/
early 40's - be ter perhaps than any on-fiction. What
would have ppened if the Japane had not struck at Pearl
precipitous move do /to to home a;
4
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,igsauld-th-6-EaTITel7iThave
-war-E7775777-
,4,m_we
CAA .2-4
A
s,The mission of today's
mobilfie-a---b-6hina the
6Ij
.litary lies be ween two ext;-emes.
4).,t
i..6,4VAt
-
o d pot ?support intervention at
&* ,J,4, 4f-410,,,o
ILh1.-1-rtatiop will not an sh
I 0-, `4
1^i
any dimly perceive threat of a communist take over anywhere
01 14 9A
in the world._Oat do_Z-Jaalle-ve-t4-11--Et -accept, total
4-J /
isolationism.
/
()"
- As a start, let's bound the problem on the
side of most probable cg_acTrrence?,i-ri;ShKuse of United States
ax, tAL"" `-?41
military forces/07 an overt, precipitous, unprovoked, un-
ambiguous Warsaw Pact invasion of western Europe. Few would
deny that the absorption of western Europe into Soviet
-5"e-
la would be inimical
to our national interests. Thereo
of course, could be dispute on how much peacetime. military
force we should affor
777'?
overrunning of Europe.
for the purpose of preventing the
.44,4 ceiN.4.1
If we maintain a considerable military
".A.4
force solely t combat this iAprobable event,
who argue th t any other m4tion can ;be adequately m?hereby.
Before we a cept this "1 sSer included case" assumption, we
should exa ine some other potential thresholds for theuse
there are those
of military force,
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-6
PL,4 . U
What would our reaction be to a piecemeal, more subtle
approach to absorbing Western Europe?
t.
A20,4,
dirct military grab of a portion
For instance a
4A4-4-1-4'
of the "flank"
llortherniiorwayoreasterrunostmrke .
t.?
_
_Would this belviewA'A as as,Sudetenlan9,'issue wher a con-
( r\
by us would bring "peace in our -bite"? 4Would _It-4' ?
cession
?
jpe view
adhesion
aa- the fix-s'1 stin ;educing the credibility and
of the NATO alliance and thereby leaA inevitably
f ?OA" a.?) (PV. (9.4
e end result as an invasion of Europe?
A dir ct military grab may be too overt.
Soviet naval power appear yf so great to%orway,
tQwt.119.....aam
What if
or Yugoslavia,
or Iceland or any \of the C;.(3,Asta1 mid-east nations, that/!2
s9ne nation believed ,-ts cats were not support by
7
allied selyower. If at state's percep ion of isolation
LOyvA
became
LAA4 hia 0- CA-U/Y
Where would we
ko0
entertUV the SAoviet Bloc by defaut.
tfift$A4-- -&,n1,4..44,19/ kwpwcz (2/4a,
draw the line in the Pacific? What if
14v
Soviet Maritime encirclement of China (with or without
cooperation from Japan) left China so exposed that she was
forced into an ,ccomo4Ation with the Soviet Union? Woul& _
_ ,z7
nyct-tt av.e 4 Pe,,,tra,? orMat.
this-aot free_sufficj.ent S.weiet resources to apply greater
pressure on western Europe than she can afford today.
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/ C
917
C /411-
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?
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? - Already our commercial trade in the Pacific
'bOo
basin is almost equal that in the European. Would we
be willing to see minor Soviet or S-eviet-inspired
actions chip away at our access to these markets?
ct,StActi,